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Abstract 
I adopt an interpretive methodology through which I investigate the becoming of Muslim identities in 
three national integration discourses.  I analyse the meanings of integration in abstract, in context 
and through texts across contexts, and working within a broadly critical constructivist approach, I 
seek to show how integration discourses have an underlying security complex which explains how 
they come to be framed with Muslims in mind.   
To analyse integration I outline a new generic concept of settlement which I refer to as habilitation 
and which means enabling or endowing with ability or fitness.   I then argue for an analytical 
separation of habilitative strategies, models and approaches, and thus remove integration from its 
generic descriptive status to one of strategy, model or approach.  This I argue is justified in the 
discursive distinctions made in every-day language and meaning.  I then investigate three broad 
habilitative models: multiculturalism, integration and assimilation.  
My primary data has been gathered in interviews with individuals acting as representatives of 
Muslim communities - Imams, organisation leaders, political activists and factory workers – 
corporate and societal actors such as Trade Unionists, Church representatives and state elites – 
policy advisers and integration officers.  Muslim interviewees emphasised widespread use of 
distortion and mis-identification.  I have defined such distortions as synecdoche.  This is a two way 
process in which the individual is held responsible for the whole and in reverse direction, the whole 
being held responsible for individual action.  The power of synecdoche to compress or expand 
Muslim identities is distortive and serves to reinforce the alterity of Muslims.  In addition I identify 
another layer of othering which I call ulteriorisation.  This involves placing identities under suspicion 
and is accomplished through a range of aspersive renderings – ambiguous loyalties, secularity, 
enclaving, underclass formation, and anti-integrationism.  Ulteriorisation is understood to feed into 
broader securitisation of communities, society and polity.  
In conclusion I look at possible research directions and finish by emphasising that the integrity of 
Integration will be judged by the willingness of parties to negotiate and the quality of voluntarism 
and solidarity these processes produce.  
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 
“The reappraisal of accepted wisdoms about Western Muslims and about integration into Western 
Society, is an important task for anyone writing in the field. ” (Saggar, 2009) 
Research Questions and some conceptual tools 
The global resurgence of religion and Muslim migrations into the urban hubs of western Europe 
frame the background to this research project, which explores some of the dynamic discourses  
impacting and shaping Muslim identities as they settle in Germany, The Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Adopting a constructivist analytic approach suggested by Guzzini (Guzzini) the core discursive 
meanings  of Integration, secularism and security are examined. This is followed by an exploration of 
the historical contexts of the three chosen case studies, to plot the trajectories of difference 
management and the framing historical events in which Muslim dentities have come to be 
understood. Finally speakers contribute some of their own understandings of these central 
discourses. A short analysis of power is then undertaken in which the power of Integration to order 
predications, presuppositions and subject positionings is interrogated. (Doty) As an interpretative 
account of how Muslim identities are being shaped within the matrices of power, the main focus  will 
remain on Integration (as well as the secular and security discourses which feed into it) since this is 
the dominant official through which Muslims identities and the conditions of their settlement are 
negotiated.  Assignation and analysis of power involves a politicisation of the issues addressed and 
implies taking a position and pointing out how things might be done differently. (Guzzini) 
Several questions have guided me in my research of Muslim identities1 and their settlement as 
shaped in and through Integration.  I explore first some of the conceptual meaning of Integration2.  It 
is initially understood to be a dynamic complex of adjustments involving structural, cultural, 
                                                          
1
 Identities are always understood as developing and never as completed or finished products.  I use Connolly’s phrase 
‘identities in becoming’ to illustrate identities with agency who to some extent actively shape their own identities. I use 
identities in construction to emphasise the structural components at work. 
2 Because integration has traditionally been used as a generic sociological term and more recently as a discursive 
descriptor, I use integration with lower case to describe the former and upper case to describe the latter.  
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interactive and identificational change. (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003) Though much previous 
research has emphasised structural alterations as central to integration, my emphasis switches to the 
‘identificational’ and seeks greater understanding as to how speakers ‘identify with’ new and 
changing social and political environments. I examine some features of integration through‘official’ 
speakers such as policy advisers, trade unionists and integration officers. By keeping the focus on the 
goals or ideal of Integration as ‘identification with’ I will seek to explore how this is something aided 
by positive structural change, greater cultural knowledge and denser webs of interaction but is not 
the result of them in any automatic senseIn addition I seek to uncover the kinds of underlying 
meanings which give Integration its particular urgencies. The question takes a deeper turn from 
‘what are the dominant meanings of Integration?’ to a performative analysis asking ‘what do these 
meanings accomplish or do?’. I explore therefore  national contexts and historical backgrounds to 
understand more fully how Muslims became part of the fabric of these societies, and how 
politicisation and securitisation of their presence occurred and how Integration developed within the 
historical particularities of these national narratives.  
Equipped with these background narratives I begin to explore ‘what Integration does’. how Muslim 
speakers are made conscious of their own security shadow- and the ways in which they come to be 
conscripted as security objects. I look at how this is mediated through Integration discourse generally 
and more specifically through official discourse speakers.  This leads then onto the next set of 
questions guiding this research: how is Integration mediated? What roles do the politicisations and 
securiticisations of spatial and temporal change and adjustment play, and lastly what kinds of 
meaning divergences exist between speakers who represent the state (as well as social and economic 
representatives) and the interests and Muslim representative speakers. How do they articulate their 
respective hopes and expectations and how are the workings of power uncovered through this. 
Conceptual Threads 
In the thesis the term habilitation is introduced and used to define a broadly encompassing term for 
adjustment and ‘fitting in’. It is introduced with the intention of achieving a clearer analytical focus 
on the different kinds of adjustment discourses which have been developed historically to adapt 
immigrants and their host societies. . Because Integration is developing in the early millennium as a 
distinctive adjustment-settlement discourse in its own right, it is thought in the interest of analytical 
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clarity to introduce habilitationto stand for the more general and wider-ranging sociological term. 
Integration as a particular habiliative discourse remains throughout a core focus of this research.3  
The lexical meaning of ‘habilitate’, as a transitive verb is ‘to clothe, to fit out, to equip, to make fit, to 
be capable, and to qualify for a post or office’.  As an intransitive verb it also means to qualify 
oneself, to make one-self fit or capable in the sense, for something, for some task.  Its core meanings 
therefore are clothing, capability, and fitting. Having both transitive and intransitive usages it 
distinguishes both active and passive senses.  Given these core meanings it may be conceptualised as 
a generic ‘fitting’ process which covers a range of adjustment processes with both active and passive 
senses.  Sohabilitative models or policies may be actively developed by official discourse and contain 
restrictive enforcing and thus assimilative dimensions. It may demand and require many kinds of 
non-negotiable ‘fitting in’ with the goal of obtaining a more uniform and mono-cultural population. 
In a similar vein, other habilitative modesl may prize the value of group diversity and lay a permium 
on self-development or self fitting in. This can then be distinguished as a pluralist laissez-faire model. 
Still others may be distinguished as hybrids, mixing both restrictive and laissez-faire elements, and 
pursuing negotiables while asserting sets of non-negotiables. This latter is how Integration as 
discourse, in this study is understood and characterised. It is therefore reserved to refer to particular 
contextualised discourses of ‘fitting in’ which have been developing in the cases studies since the 
1990s.. It contains meanings of ‘fitting in’ as self managed processes of becoming (cultural, 
interactive and identificational) and actively assisted processes of ‘being fitted in’ through more 
external  structurally determined processes. 
Integration and identities 
But what of the mechanics of Integration? Who is to integrate, into what is the Integration object 
supposed to integrate and how?  The research is concerned with these kinds of questions. These 
were alsofrequently put by Muslim interviewees (Gülbahar, Musluoglu, Tufan) and point out another 
important kind of question: why do Muslims seem to be brought into connection with Integration 
debate? Are they the primary objects of Integration and if so how do the come to be? This is not to 
say that only Muslims are Integration’s objects or to imply that the connection is clear and direct.  
Yet there is ample evidence to indicate that there is a strong and consistent connection between the 
                                                          
3 I seek to avoid the often confusing mixing of analytical and discursive terms as for example when Otto Schily a former 
German interior minister declared Assimilation would be the best kind of integration 
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two. This may be to do with how Integration is meant – a macro problem solving approach which 
defines certain communities as deficient. It may also have a lot to do with security dimensions 
feeding into and working within Integration. Here official speakers point to and reiterate their 
concerns at a growing Muslim ‘underclass’ which serves to lend urgency to the dominant problem-
solving approach of Integration. Secularism too is understood as a significant security feed which 
problematises identities with a religious predication at their most fundamental level. Once again 
Muslims and Islam cannot be overseen in these kinds of ‘value’ (religious, secular) debates.It is 
suggested therefore in this research that Islam is in itself a ‘securitiser’ which often deflects attention 
to the wrong kind of normative debates. People of religion is therefore a term which is used 
frequently to underline that Muslims are a group in a wider category of people and in a much more 
fundamental debate – the claims of secularism and those of diversity. People of religion then is a 
term which categorises only very loosely,  emphasising a much wider range of diversity but drawing 
in, only people whose religious identification is a significant identity marker:whether that be personal 
and/or shared, deeply religious or only casually so. So Muslim is used as a way of defining a particular 
subjectivity and people of religion for a much larger category of people – of which Muslims are part -  
which in some way problematise and are seen to be disruptive to core secular definitions.  
The Key message 
 The main thrust or energy at work in this thesis is uncovering how security dimensions work within 
Integration discourse and to seek to show how its powers of conscription underlie its dominant 
problem-solving approach. Yet though deconstruction and power identification are clearly the critical 
aims of this project, there is also a constructive dimension in that there is recognition that 
Integration may also become emancipatory. But for this to happen it will mean interrupting some of 
the security flowing into its central debates and seeing that the integrity of Integration meaning - 
meaningful engagement based on mutuality and negotiation – remain at its defining core. 
Integration must therefore do some things differently.  
Thesis Map 
This analysis begins with an examination of how ‘Islam’ has been constructed (chapter two) in the 
literature of Orientalism, in which essentialising narratives are woven around images of an enemy; 
these frame the background to this research which is located and developed within an anti-
essentialist genre. It aspires to add to a body of research which loosens the pincer-like binaries which 
hold Islam constructions in place, and seeks to underline the multiplicity and fluidity of identities 
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which mark out new Muslim identities of ‘becoming’. However through an examination of recent 
research, questions are raised about the dominance of materialist understandings. This research 
seeks to resist secular reductionism and to take ‘people of religion’ seriously.  Lastly, examining how 
habilitation remains in a sphere of national competence, the research places the emphases on the 
role of state and national Muslim organisations in negotiating the terms of becoming. Pathologising 
Islam is considered an important part of securitisation of Muslim identity construction and the  
Copenhagen school of securitisation theory is taken as a starting point in understanding how 
securing stable relationships through Integration involves nothing less than the sustainability of 
societies. 
Asking questions about what can be known and what kinds of knowledge may be gained becomes 
the focus of chapter three. Agent-Structure debates frame the discussion of ontology in which a 
constructionist position is adopted. Neither agency nor structure are prioritised but mutuality in their 
constitution. Likewise epistemology working with rationalist logics and based on empiricism and 
behaviourism is considered inadequate without the contextual and historical analysis which 
determines to begin with, what a particular logic, reason or interest might entail.  A qualitative 
methodology is adopted in which understanding and interpretation is closely linked to discursive 
histories, contexts and texts. Discourse analysis is undertaken on both secondary and  primary data; 
the latter texts were produced in approximately fifty interview situations. But discourse is not a 
single text production, since its meanings are intersubjectively produced, it does not depend solely 
on the quantity of voices. As a qualitative analysis it works therefore, with a smaller sampling set 
than quantitative methodologies and methods might normally require. 
Three central discursive identity frames have been chosen to examine Muslim identities in becoming 
in chapter four – Integration, secularism and security. It is suggested that integration should be 
moved from its generic status in which it is commonly used to describe all kinds of co-existence, 
adjustment and stabilities, to one in line with discursive practice which is commonly used to describe 
a common strategy or policy cluster. Habilitation is brought in instead to function as the generic 
replacement term. It is useful also to conceive of a continuum of habilitative strategies and policies 
which move between two poles of pluralism and monism. Although undoubtedly over-simplifying the 
complexities of policy design and underlying visions which justify them, it is necessary to have more 
clearly distinguished concepts of habilitation. Multiculturalism, assimilationism and integrationism 
are identified as distinct approaches, to allow more concentrated critical assessment.  Integration is 
used to define a set of negotiative processes which take place within demarcated non-negotiables.  
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Examination of the meaning evolution of Secularism introduces a second important framework 
shaping Muslim identities. More than the commonly accepted defining characteristics of sphere 
separation, state neutrality to religion and equidistance to religions, Secularism is understood as a 
dominant ideology especially as it fuses with liberalism, and is understood to define hostile meta-
narratives in which Muslims remain under permanent suspicion and are thus permanently othered 
and minoritised. 
Lastly, security is examined as it influences the ways in which Integration develops. Integration in 
sociological theory emphasises both the stability of relationships within the system and through this 
the sustainability of systems. Approaching Integration discourse from this angle helps us understand 
how it authors both an ostensible increase in dialogue and negotiation and yet simultaneously an 
emphasis on non-negotiability. To maintain stable relationships government elites need on the one 
hand to find legitimated representatives and build dialogic relationships but on the other not to 
inadvertently promote ‘unacceptable’ voices. 
Contextualisation highlights the significance of national narratives and ways of dealing with 
difference, in framing both the timing and the form of habilitative strategies adopted.  Chapter five 
looks therefore at each of the three contexts of settlement. 
An exploration of the problematisation of Germany’s ethnic and cultural monism in the post-war 
period through ideological othering within a common ethnic grouping, sets the historical context for 
national identity reconstruction in part one.  West Germany, refusing the two-nation fabrication of 
its communist other, needed an acceptable locale for positive identity construction.  The economic 
miracle together with the consumerism it created served as such a concentration point.  As Muslim 
workers from Turkey were brought as part of economic macro management, these became an 
integral part of German identity construction.  Their temporal status moved from transience to 
permanence when in the aftermath of the 1973 recession work importation was stopped.  By altering 
the logic of mobility inherent in the notion of guest labour, core assumptions of economic and 
political elites were upset.  Family reunification and settlement altered on the ground realities, 
making habilitation thinkable.  One habilitative move was the extension of citizenship beyond its 
narrow ethnic boundaries, but this was also resisted by a powerful conservative bloc. Constructing 
the post-nation ended in compromises and an optional citizenship model.  What promised therefore 
much in terms of accommodating diversity, became instead a politics of reluctance.  In the early 
millennium security concerns centring on a potential de-stabilising Muslim underclass have ensured 
that the conservatives have pushed Integration to the forefront of German politics.  This has been 
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marketed as a more negotiative and dialogic process and showcased in integration summitry but it is 
argued its underlying vision is one of security which produces its own set of demands.  
In the Dutch context the meanings of habilitation drew heavily on historical pluralism and 
segmentalism in the management of difference.  Dutch elites framed a regime of work importation 
against some core assumptions - the transience of guest workers4 and a laissez-faire approach to 
regulation.  In the pre-multicultural phase, guest-workers were an integral part of macro-economic 
management.  But it was ‘no love at first sight’, as one interviewee pointed out, it was strictly “show 
me your hands not your face!” (el Boujoufi, 2008)5 Only in the early 1980s when the temporal shift to 
permanence had been publicly accepted, did habilitative strategies come to be consciously 
developed.  Building upon historical experiences of difference management, elites provided the 
possibility for Muslims to partially pillarise and assumed a socialisation-integration dynamic would 
take its course.   It was an official strategy which mixed historically tried and proven segmentalism 
with modern state welfarism, seeking to protect identities within the strength of the pillar.  As social 
incubators, welfarised pillars were to control internally the conditions for development.  As such the 
multicultural policies which were developed were both protectionist and paternalist.  
Finally the de-centralised nature of the Swiss political system is examined, together with direct 
democracy opportunity structures which serve to localise political issues and render federal 
institutions and state elites vulnerable to initiatives from right wing populist parties.  One theme 
which illustrates more than any other internal tensions and vulnerabilities has been the politicisation 
and securitisation of immigration through a discourse of over-foreignisation.  Macroeconomic 
management is forced therefore to walk a fine line between the need for labour and the protection 
of national cultural identity.  As over-foreignisation has come to focus on Islam and Muslims it has 
become re-expressed in the danger of the creeping Islamicisation of Switzerland and the need to 
invisibilise Islam which has found egregious expression in the recent ban on minarets.  Established 
minorities have been represented proportionally and diversity has been pocketed in culturally 
uniform insulated territories.  Cultural diversity is therefore locally homogenised which renders 
                                                          
4 Developing habilitative strategies were thought unnecessary 
5 D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest officially recognised 
top-level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands.  He meets regularly with top government officials as part of 
CMO’s official advisory role, speaks publicly on a wide range of Muslim issues and coordinates Muslim leadership at the 
national level.  
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expressions of Switzerland as a multicultural state as grossly exaggerated.  Integrationism6 fuels well 
funded programmes and has become the dominant habilitative strategy but its underlying security 
dimensions and ulteriorisation of Muslims characterises an assimilative vision.  
The voices speaking from the three interlocking discourses framing Muslim habilitation in my chosen 
case studies are dealt with in chapter six. To offer a more systematised treatment of voices and texts, 
interview texts were organised through categories of space, temporality and expectation.  
An examination of integration, secularity and security through spatiality explores how interviewees 
understood the significance of mosque-building as an expression of belonging.  Here Muslim 
representatives emphasised the efforts made to underline access and transparency in the 
architecture of the buildings and how they (mosques) could be concrete evidence of integration.  
Moving to the transmogrification of neighbourhoods through Muslim immigration and concentrated 
settlement, security discourse works on changing visibilities to build an image of foreignised and 
appropriated space in which mosques themselves become symbols of ulteriority. Attention is drawn 
to processes of subordination in which visibilities are repressed. 
Voices define their temporal identities next, and although citizenship is the considered primary 
integrative legal mechanism affecting a move from temporariness to permanence, Muslim voices did 
not understand it as deepening identification with lands of settlement. Although Switzerland and the 
Netherlands both permit dual citizenship, Germany’s optional model suggested a deeper disruption 
of identification with the land of settlement. Looking at temporal dimensions of secularism some 
insights are offered into the non-negotiable and hence permanence of secular arrangements both in 
integration proper and in a key integrative site - the workplace.  
Lastly, interviewees expressed their expectations with respect to Integration, despite their 
frustration at its perceived protean character. Expectations of identity retention and mutuality were 
deeply embedded in the meaning of Integration and deviations from these principles were 
understood to endanger the defining processes. Undermining processes of identity compression 
through synecdoche, reveal how identity distortion was considered particularly unjust, as were 
ongoing othering processes of ulteriorisation.  
                                                          
6 I define integrationism as the belief that the efficacy of integration is directly proportional to the efficacy of its 
programmes. 
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To complete this chapter a short analysis of power is undertaken in which Integration is seen to 
identify and conscript its objects, through predication, drawing on presuppositions and assumptions 
and effecting subject-positioning.   
In the final chapter a short summary of the main contributions of the thesis are outlined. Lastly there 
are some suggestions for how research might be extended from the narrower localised emphasis of 
this research project, to include transnational and supranational dimensions.  
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CHAPTER TWO Essentialisation and the construction of Islam 
In this review, I seek to identify the key corpora of literature which investigate and interrogate the 
central discourses of this research project: integration, secularism and security.  In this chapter I shall 
seek to show where possible weaknesses exist and point out how this work sets about redressing 
them.   
Constructing Islam 
In this section I show how researchers and experts in the field wield Islam without sufficiently 
considering its constructed-ness nor what (assumptions) meanings have, in terms of indirect effects 
for Muslims.  Islam as cultural or civilisational construct is fluently employed for purposes of analysis 
but is politicised, vernacularised and utilised in particular image projections.  The question becomes: 
for what useful analytical purposes, does the term serve?  
I first turn to literature which deals with the construct ‘Islam’, this is the quintessential term into 
which Muslim identities are conscripted.  Two logics are employed - induction working from this 
instance to this generalisation and deductively from this entity to these instances - ant-like through 
society and polity to construct both Islam and Muslim.   It is a term that is at once problematical and 
indispensable.  Mandaville following Eickelman and Piscatori, comments about the problematic 
nature of employing ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’ in such terms as ‘political Islam’, and argues rather for the 
utility of terms such as Muslim politics.  “To focus on Muslims rather than Islam is to emphasize real 
people in real settings facing real issues.  The more we stress Islam as a unit of analysis, the more we 
face the dangers of abstraction and unwarranted generalisation.  Islam keeps us mired in debates 
about normativity, where an emphasis on Muslims allows us to appreciate the dynamic nature of 
Islam as a lived experience. ” (Mandaville, 2007:20)  
Yet the normative debates that swirl around Islam are of themselves crucial sites through which to 
interrogate powers – identificationary, aspersive - as well as sensitising processes embedded in 
collective imaginaries – so the term should not be so easily discarded either.  It may however be 
necessary since it is a key term of self reference for Muslims.  They identify – whether easily or 
uneasily I leave to one side - with Islam in all its immense abstraction and diversity.  Yet this 
sometimes automatic identification with the term is also not clearly explored.  Mandaville tells us for 
instance that “there is also a core corpus of Islam that somehow connects all Muslims. ” (Mandaville, 
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2007:17)7 Somehow Muslims are connected (in a passive sense) and connect themselves to (in an 
active sense) through their diversity and change along many rather nebulous pathways.  Islam as a 
term may be useful as a place-holder, but also a dangerously essentialist term to employ, working in 
effect to stereotype Muslim identities.  It may also be abused by being used as a convenient hold-all 
classification.  One of the most significant and most criticised approaches has been the rendering of 
Islam as a systemic component.  Rendered a civilisation, as the distillation of cultural essences, Islam 
has been powerfully employed in the metaphor of collision and clash, with other putative macro 
entities such as ‘the West’.   
Samuel Huntington’ s “Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” (Huntington, 2002) is 
emblematic of a culturalist approach.   Together with other old-guard orientalists, this literature is 
framed and effectively works with assumptions of enduring and reproductive difference and 
sameness.  This is not to say that the genre does not recognise diversity and evolutionary-like 
development, yet Islam remains a monolithic civilisational building block of the global system.  
Civilisations, according to Huntington, are not clearly boundaried; they lack historical beginning and 
end points.  They also lack precision but are nonetheless durable.  They are cultural collectors since ‘a 
civilisation is a culture writ large’ (Huntington, 1996:41) Religion performs a definitional function and 
permits macro grouping and classification.  Civilisations are considered evolutionary but yet 
sufficiently stable.  Huntington has employed a powerfully resonant metaphor of ‘clash’ and 
postulated a future of opposition and collision.  Abrahamian has pointed out how the dramaturgy of 
9/11 melded with this civilisational causality “the mainstream media in the USA automatically, 
implicitly and unanimously adopted Huntington's paradigm to explain September 11” (Abrahamian, 
2003:529) Although the significance of the construct among social and political elites has been 
greater in the US than in Europe the ripples have been felt also in the latter.  “If there is a Zeitgeist, 
Samuel P. Huntington has discovered it. ” (Hafez, 2000:3) It is not my purpose to explore the 
discursive dimensions of this cause célèbre.  Indeed it has generated an amazing volume of anti-clash 
literature which repudiates the way in which Huntington personally and kindred spirits, seek to load 
a volatile concept such as culture (aggregated and magnified into civilisation) with explanatory 
power.   Sewell reminds us how difficult a word ‘culture’ is and argues that possibly it needs to be 
discarded altogether, or at the very least used in the plural and then only firmly ensconced in 
quotation marks. (Sewell, 1999) Essentialising identities through culture and civilisation, and 
                                                          
7 My emphasis 
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representing a certain inevitability of collision and conflict, ‘evidenced’ by the bloody borders of 
Islam, comes in for the severest of condemnations namely, that it could be a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
Deconstruction of the Huntingtonian edifice has been undertaken by a number of academics and 
intellectuals such as Midlarsky, Ajami, and Gerges. (Jerichow, 1997) Some approaches attack the 
structure from an empiricist location; others take a postmodernist approach.  An N'aim argues that 
identity is multiple and being so, the multiple identities of Islam, require careful weighting, 
distinctions and treatment.  Internally more fluid, unfixed and contingent, the identities of Islam are 
open to negotiation and change.  (An-Na'im, 1999) Unsurprisingly it has been an approach which few 
have decided to follow (Volpi, 2010) but has become a standard fare upon which to cut critical teeth.   
Huntington and Lewis represent an Orientalist genre which has been attacked most famously by Said, 
who criticised it as essentialist and western-centrist.  (Said, 1995) This exposure, of course involved 
Said himself in generalisations and essentialisms which opened him up to some of the kinds of 
criticisms he himself had made.  Having exposed Orientalism, it only remained for someone to turn 
the tables and expose Occidentalism.  (Buruma and Margalit, 2004) Yet the important and unifying 
theme at the centre of anti-clash type literature is the idea that essentialism and reification fixes the 
image of the enemy.  The proper task of research is to dismantle that enemy image; indeed this is, 
for some, the condition for constructive analysis and critique.  (Hippler and Lueg, 1995:15) Orientalist 
accounts, whether or not the writers are full-blown orientalists of the old school, employ 
classifications of identity-types and isomorphic ‘meaning worlds’  –  religion, culture, civilisation - in 
which they inhere.  It suggests identity as something which is defined by given religious and cultural 
scripts, and thus primitivises notions of identity and agency.  This ascription of a fideist  core to Islam 
glosses over the rich diversities and transitions within, and constructs a particular kind of habitat of 
meaning (Baumann, 2000) and its inhabitant.  This involves imputing “a fundamental, basic, 
absolutely necessary constitutive quality to a person, a social category, ethnic group, religious 
community, or nation.  It is to posit falsely a timeless continuity, a discrete-ness or bounded-ness in 
space, and an organic unity.  It is to imply an internal sameness and external difference to 
otherness.”  (Werbner, 1997:228) This, as Werbner has shown, is the root of all kinds of evil: 
chauvinism, racism, ethnicism and Islamophobia.  The problem which essentialism raises however, is 
how to refer to terms such as Islam without becoming entrapped in essentialism.  After all, analysis 
involves some extrapolation, some classification, some simplification and some generalisation, so 
how then, can we avoid the trip wire? Werbner makes a useful, although not altogether satisfactory 
suggestion when she makes a distinction between ‘objectification’ - which she presents as acceptable 
procedures of generalisation - and ‘reification’ - which is unacceptable since it is used to distort and 
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silence.  (Werbner, 1997:229) In making this distinction Werbner places emphasis on the intentions 
of the user or speaker.  But we can establish the intentions of actors, in all but the crassest examples, 
only with great difficulty.   When Muslim speakers refer to their communities in essentialist terms 
how can we know if the intention is objectificationary or reificationary? Introducing intentions into 
the essentialisation problematic seems to open up more problems than it solves.   One alternative 
way to manage the problem is to assess the political-security power field in which the terms are 
used.  What is the effect of this kind of usage in this particular power context?  In this way there is a 
an opening up to the wider discourse so that the concentration of attention becomes less focused on 
individual usages but on the wider context in which these are employed.  The question then becomes 
how is it possible that this kind of usage can be employed in this way and in this context? 
Muslims and their identities 
Since analysis may be distanced from the term Islam8 - which is not to deny deep identifications with 
Islam by Muslims – the focus here will be literature dealing with more on-the-ground construction of 
identities, together with their transmissions and transitions.  I look at one stream of research which 
inspects the dynamics of how Muslims take possession of their own identity as opposed to being 
mere passive receptors.  The permanence that this kind of change implies is questionable and probes 
the extent to which the changes may be generational.  This opens up the possibility that changes may 
continue to develop along with new technologies, or may again revert to more traditional patterns of 
construction, transmission and reception.   
In this section the emphasis moves from an ‘Islam’ construct to the term ‘Muslim’ as adjective and 
predicative of human subjects.  This is not to say that using ‘Muslim’ as an adjective cannot be used 
to construct dubious macro terms such as ‘the Muslim World’, as a monolithic security referent, but 
in general it loses something of the brisance of Islam.  Defining people or organisations as Muslim 
and working with the adjectival or predicative term avoids much of the oppositional and collisional 
tension contained in the paired terms ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.  Space opens up to discover what these 
latter terms have concealed.  Mamdani has shown that Muslims are objectified (linguistically used as 
nouns as opposed to adjectives) and made subject to dubious moral distinctions.  Bush’s distinction 
between good Muslims and bad Muslims has become shorthand for those (good) who support the 
US and those (bad) who do not.  Changing the terms of usage therefore seem insufficient to prevent 
                                                          
8 for the purposes of analysis  
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conscripting and reducing political identities to religious-cultural ones.  (Mamdani, 2005:17) 
Emphasising Muslim as opposed to Islam requires in addition a conscious effort to retain focus on 
subjects in historical context.  It offers us political plasticity.    
As a guiding thread it might be helpful to hold onto the insights of Cornell West, “we construct our 
identities from the building blocks of our basic desires: desire for recognition, quest for visibility, the 
sense of being acknowledged, a deep desire for association.  We long to belong. ” (West in Sardar, 
2002) Roy investigates the transitions Muslim youth are undergoing in their quest for meaningful 
identities.  But rather than hitting the problems from the direction of inherency, he rather identifies 
the problem source as youth de-culturalisation.  Muslim youth living in urban European centres and 
on the edges of societies, struggle to define and re-define themselves.  (Roy, 2002) Between their 
inherited cultural frame-works, and secular national cultures, they search to re-connect to a larger 
more authentic Islamic identity - one purged of culturalism and ethnicity.  As a result of exposure to 
democracy and the possibility of self-autonomy, traditional conduits of authority are disrupted and 
weakened.   Globalisation as a macro compression chamber – compressing irresistibly concepts of 
time and space - generates new imaginings of a transnational religious community - a universal 
Ummah.  This is “as an imagined and constantly renewed community based on an understanding of a 
shared fate. ” (Cesari, 2003:157).  This new, reinvigorated Muslim imagination is driven through 
technologised awareness and interaction with other such Muslims.  They take control of symbols and 
construct new mental and emotional boundaries.  Cesari identifies two types of what she terms “new 
Muslims”, those that “pick and choose” what to believe and which practices to observe, and those 
whose attitudes are fundamentalist and who “demand respect for Islam in its totality. ” (Cesari, 
2003:159) These latter are identified by Roy as obsessed with trespass and blasphemy, and their 
specifically ‘religious’ identity is radicalised because it is a fragile construction.   
Two processes are stimulated by globalisation; first a diffusion of culture, second a de-
territorialisation of religion.  The portentous arrival of Muslims in Europe occurs at a time when 
globalisation has facilitated new imaginative powers, and when simultaneously, European integration 
has weakened the political dimensions of national identities.  (Roy, 2005) Selective practice and 
privatisation of religious belief are significant pointers to secularisation.  Neo-fundamentalism is 
therefore a condition of globalised modernity.  Culture is a haze and religion afloat a global sea.  But 
how significant are these insights? The insights are garnered from a relatively narrow slice of time.  
This rendering of religious identity change within the globalisation-localisation dynamic is essentially 
generational and phasal.  It places the focus of attention on a young generation in the process of 
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negotiation but it seems that that in itself is a limitation.  The young become replaced with another 
wave of youth and those at the centre of this research may move into more settled ways of life.  
Much in the same way as radical activism characterised the ’68 generation in the US and Europe and 
later found itself in more settled mind-sets, so the individualism of young Muslims may find more 
institutionalised resting places.  Some more time and at least one generational cycle will be needed 
before the full significance of these findings can be assessed.   
Islam deconstructed as  civilisational  and as a metaphor of collision, becomes a fecund world of 
diverse meaning.  Islam becomes less holistic and monolithic and more the reflection of its myriad 
diversity.   Post-modern senses of the multiplexity of identities have been plausibly extended to 
Muslims.  (An-Na'im, 1999).  Yet when we turn to integration research – understood as part of 
political discourse - it seems, once more, that we are forced to turn our back on this multiplicity and 
return to simplified, stabilised, secularised unitary identity concepts.   
Integration  
In this section literature which explores integration and its particular reference to Muslim identity 
will be examined.  How integration is bound up with national narratives will be explored and how this 
privileges the role of the state in integration.  I question secularism, materialism and behaviourism 
inherent in integration research with its (over) emphasis on structural dimensions and in which 
religious-cultural dynamics receive at best a nod of acknowledgment.  I draw upon and add to 
research by scholars who have emphasised a secular blind spot in social disciplines in which religious 
phenomena come to be subordinated to, or ignored by, secular reductionist logic.  (Thomas, 2005) 
The specifically religious, if referred to at all, is either subordinated to ethnicity or wrapped up in the 
vagueness of culture.  Privileging structural-material factors as the true engines of integration, and 
strongly entrenched in research and policy making, serve to obscure the vitality of religious belief in 
integration.  This may help us work out questions about how Muslims (especially later generations) 
fulfil all the conditions of integration but still are considered to be problematic and having equivocal 
identities.   I argue that by failing to properly account for ‘people of religion’ in integration discourse 
mis-recognitions are reproduced, and having jumped through all the integration hoops, Muslim 
identities will still be in question.  This research, by placing religion on a footing equal to other 
categories of analyses such as class, seeks to redress imbalance and counter misrecognition.  
Integration as a canopy concept covers an astounding diversity of understandings and meanings 
developed in many different disciplinary fields.  (van Berkel, Hornemann-Moller et al., 2002) Because 
16 
 
it is beyond the scope of this review to investigate much of its diversity or any of it in any great depth 
in social theory, the starting point will be a key distinction made by Lockwood between social and 
systemic integration and reference to some further refinements.  For Lockwood system integration is 
understood as a stable connection of units to a defined systemic whole.  (Lockwood 1964) What was 
meant by the ‘systemic whole’ was the functioning of institutions, organisations and mechanisms 
such as the state, the legal framework and financial markets.  In contrast to systemic integration he 
developed a contrasting notion of social system in which integration referred to the inclusion and 
interaction of individuals.  This core distinction has been built upon by prominent social theorists 
who in turn have re-defined the distinction and generated whole literatures on the subject.  
Integration has achieved prominence, so that it may be considered  the concept of sociology.  (van 
Berkel, Hornemann-Moller et al., 2002)  
The simple dualism of Lockwood’s distinction has received many further analytical refinements.  
Heckmann and Schnapper, have usefully identified four integration cores:  structural, cultural, 
interactive and identificational.  (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003) First, structural integration has to 
do with acquiring rights and memberships within the core institutions of the receiving society.  Here 
the indicators are the ease or difficulty, success or failure, which migrants and their children have in 
education and training (vocational apprenticeships) labour market (access and possibility for good 
jobs and positions as well as lower manual strata), in housing and citizenship.  Second, cultural 
integration occurs when immigrants learn a system’s cultural script.  Learning to read and imitate 
behaviours, interpret meaning, changing attitudes.  It is about acquiring the cognitive skills required 
to make participation possible at all.  Although it should be noted that the immigrant will have a lot 
more adjustment to make than the receiving society, (Wunderlich, 2005) the latter will also be 
required to change.  In this sense cultural integration is a mutually changing interactive dynamic.  The 
third indicator of integration the interactive core, concerns the density of webs of private and group 
memberships which migrants create through their social contacts - friendships, marriage or 
membership in organisations or associations.  Fourth and lastly, identificational integration is located 
at the level of choice and emotion.  It is a visceral subjective perception fed by the success or failure 
in the other three, and defines the strong (or weak) sense of ‘belonging to’ and ‘identification with’ 
the whole.  
The first three analytical cores are prioritised in the literature since they are thought to provide the 
benchmarks (measurable, quantifiable indices) of integration development.  This positivist approach 
inspects the quality of integration through hard data to assess processes, stadia or set endpoints.  
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This however is problematical from a number of aspects.   Firstly, there is the assumption that taking 
hard readings are accurate indicators of integration.  This short sells integration and oversimplifies 
complex decoupling – some may be socially mobile but estranged or alienated or simply distant from 
the majority culture.  Levels of employment, social mobility, anti-discrimination legislation etc; may 
(or may not) tell us where an integration process is, or the kind of integration we are constructing in 
terms of quality.  But the very definition of what integration is, will be just as significant, if not more 
so, than the actual readings of the dynamics involved.  For example we may have reliable data about 
host language proficiency but may discover that speaking the language of the host country is 
overshadowed by a political discourse of native language suppression (for example removing native 
language teaching facilities even although demand for them may be high).  Host language proficiency 
alone is an insufficient indicator.  If through a range of issues the same kind of result is established 
there remains only the retreat to the position that, individually no single integration area is sufficient 
(although of themselves each is necessary), to assess integration.   Yet this, in itself, is an inadequate 
argument since with limited resources not everything can be provided for sufficiently.   Integration 
then becomes a situation of resource allocation and prioritisation, and this, as we know, will be 
inevitably the outcome of political discourse.    
A second objection to the mechanics of integration approach is the very political question of the 
normative dimensions of integration.  Integration readings are non-neutral.  They may, and often do, 
privilege the expectations of receiving societies, and thereby obfuscate the shared responsibilities of 
mutual adaptation.  Immigrants are caught upfront in a deontological pincer grip ‘you the immigrant 
are indebted  you are morally responsible to make the requisite changes’.  In terms of unequal 
power, little is said about structural biases: how rules are formulated, how resources are distributed.  
(Giddens, 1986) Here the resources available to individuals, groups and the state are key as are the 
shifting groundwork of rules in which immigrants might find themselves.  The latter offer guidelines 
about how to fit in but may be too intrusive and interventionist in seeking to habilitate human 
subjects.  Since integration rules are framed to bring about enough similarity and internal coherence 
to the system, the question always remains open ‘into what am I expected to integrate?’  Bringing 
subjects to hold certain values is about laying out the main emotional and cognitive templates of 
social and political life.  We have moved quickly and inevitably to an ethical domain which 
subordinates the mere management of resources.   
Lastly although Heckmann and Schnapper point out that the fourth is the most important dimension, 
but only follows when the other three are properly calibrated, I suggest that this theoretical point is 
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getting the cart before the horse.  Identifications with or abnegation is registered first by the 
subjects/objects, in this case Muslims, and then through the broader restructurings of integration 
discourse in society and polity.  The sequence of approach is important, for by approaching from the 
subject/object to the policies, policy makers may become knowledgeable and experienced, and the 
objects become less so and more subject-like.   All too often this sequence is reversed and 
integration policies are presented together with the receipt – an obligation to comply.  By keeping 
the focus on the human subject as the starting point, integration processes become the foundation 
for a healthy critical commitment and holds out the possibility that balance may be maintained.   
If integration, analytically, rests on a depreciated understanding of people of religion, as well as 
unexplored moral, normative and security dimensions, then it behoves future integration research to 
rectify this.  The hope of structural integration theory is the notion of applicability across contexts.  
This is evidenced in EU sponsored comparative research on programmes of best practices.  (Entzinger 
and Renske, 2003)  Here, there is an emphasis on functional-structural integration working as an 
ahistorical approach; however this is problematic since it obscures the problems of application in 
very different national contexts.  It also under emphasises the necessary correctives that policies and 
pragmatic9 practices must undergo over context and time, as states balance their universalist 
commitments against their pragmatic practices.  (Kastoryano, 2002) Static and linear models, 
concentrating on top-down structural integration, ignore the possibility and potential of multi-
directional integration (Asad, 2002)  
From an analytical perspective, the distinction between social and system integration is significant 
for it points to ways in which different actors might conceive of and use the term.  Yet as political 
discourse, the distinction becomes blurred and appears to some extent conflated, since people and 
groups talk (producing text) through their experience of marginalisation and the issues of social 
integration, and into related systemic integration themes such as security and societal stability.  As 
political discourse, social and system integration reveal important cross-overs.  Speaking through 
personal narratives and their rendering of integration issues, individual and organisational actors 
seek to access systemic issues and thus to influence the course of systemic integration.  Likewise the 
framers of systemic integration and stability, through managing resources and framing rules, 
(Giddens, 1986) must keep a finger on the pulse of social integration since these micro-meso 
                                                          
9 I employ pragmaticism and related terms as an approach which seeks for practical solutions to pre-existing problems, but 
is also open to considering what the problems are, and how issues might be seen as problematical. 
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dynamics are where success or failure will be registered.  There are great expectations with regards 
to integration, (Demirdögan, 2009)10 and the stakes are therefore high.  
Institutional approaches 
One important area of state integration strategy has been to ‘organise’ Islam through supporting 
Muslim organisations and helping them pool their resources through aggregative regulation in 
umbrella organisations.  Research into Muslim organisations has however tended to narrow its focus 
to exploring aspects of growth, internal structure, the particulars of their goals and activities and 
what they express of larger Muslim aspirations.   This kind of research although valuable, tends to 
dislocate Muslim organisations from their developing social and political contexts.   Sunier points to 
two kinds of approach to the study of Muslim organisations - immigrationist and culturalist – but 
argues that each in its way is too confining.  To read Muslim organisations from the immigrationist 
perspective, for instance, is to lock them into a temporal transitory category, which will, with 
necessary generational transition, become obsolete.  This limits understandings about Muslim 
organisations themselves and more importantly the understanding of what they might be for.   As 
immigrant organisations, their primary purpose may be conceived to be to assist immigrant 
adaptation and integration.  (Rath, Penninx et al., 2002) The possibility that they might persist 
beyond a generation or so, could be read as evidence of dysfunction, that is, that they would be 
defective in their integrative functionality.  A culturalist approach by contrast, would see Muslim 
organisations as identity associations which would be tied to a solely religious raison d’être.   This 
approach’s concentration on religious-cultural rationales and continuities, obscure significant 
developments and organisational transitions into broader functionality beyond the religious-cultural.   
As Sunier has pointed out, in the Netherlands of the nineties, a newer generation of leadership was 
already looking beyond the narrowly defined ‘immigrant issues’ and was seeking to be part of a more 
ambitious project to redefine Dutch society.  This was they were arguing a necessary prerequisite to 
integration.  (Sunier, 2003) The changing self awareness of organisations and their intervention in 
Integration is significant and fails to be covered fully by either of the above mentioned approaches.  
Adequate research into Muslim organisations must therefore seek to understand both the functional 
                                                          
10 S. Demirdögan is a member of the Left party  and stood for election to the European Elections in 2009. She is a political 
scientist and Germanist and President of the Federal Association of (female) Migrants in Germany e.V. whose aims are to 
support the integration of female migrants into all areas of life, to offer a forum for female immigrants to speak and be 
heard, and to agitate for the rights to residency and work independent of husbands.  
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and religious dimensions of Muslim organisation within integration discourse.  As such the limitations 
and potential of Muslim organisations become more obviously different as they become integration 
contributors.  
Institutionalisation of Islam 
It has been a strategy of several European states with substantial Muslim populations, to encourage 
the establishment and development of Muslim (immigrant) organisations. This has been considered 
necessary to further  an effective  institutionalisation of Islam in European societies and polities. 
(Klausen, 2005) Structuring and institutionalising the corpus of Islam has been therefore been 
considered a valuable tool in Muslim socialisation and incorporation into European social and 
political spheres since internally, good behaviours (democracy, open debate, negotiation) will be 
produced and reproduced within the organisational structure and externally these acquired habits of 
doing things will significantly frame and institutionalise interactions with the state.  In this way 
organisations will come to be representative of Islam and to mirror or imitate the larger national 
liberal-democratic institutions in their organisational structure.  Kastoryano refers to this as 
‘institutional assimilation’, (Kastoryano, 2002) which implies that Muslim organisations will facilitate 
key transitions to becoming Swiss, German or Dutch institutions.  
The processes of socialisation inherent in these procedures are assumed to be integrative and 
considered a prerequisite to national incorporation of Islam. Yet finding and privileging acceptable 
(moderate)Muslim organisations, is problematic and reveals some important erroneous 
assumptions. 
The role of historical templates (secular religion-state arrangements, founding values of nations etc;) 
with which states work in their dealings with Islam has distorted both understandings of existing 
religious structures, and served to inflate expectations. Fetzer and Soper have pointed out how 
established state-church relationships may contribute to a kind of myopic institutionalism – by 
assuming similar ecclesiastical structures and hiearchies of authority in Islam. (Fetzer and Soper, 
2005) Diversity and multivocality mean that care has to be taken on the one hand to encourage 
organisation but not to over-privilege ‘organised Islam’ since as Sylvestri points out many ‘non-
religious’ Muslims will remain ‘unorganised’ and not identify with the religious agendas of these 
organisations. This may lead to in and out group competition and to monopolisation by more 
powerful groups. (Sylvestri, 2010) 
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Yet although the regulatory power of the state may seek to support and encourage moderate Islam 
there is the problem of ‘unacceptable’ images or identities.  Such ‘problematic’ organisations may 
fulfil, to all intents and purposes, the conditions of institutional acceptability, that is, to be properly 
reflective of larger democratic institutions, but yet be considered in some important senses 
unacceptable partners.   This hints at a larger agenda in which “states determine not only the 
immigrants’ social and cultural organisations but also an identity around which such an organization 
can be structured in order to be officially recognised. ”(Kastoryano, 2002:182) These approaches 
therefore under-emphasise the cultural significance of identity (the state’s self perceptions and 
perceptions of the organisations’ identity) in the state’s negotiation of Muslim incorporation.  Yet 
though Kastoryano highlights the significance of the perceived identity of Muslim organisations and 
adopts and blends structural-institutional and cultural-identity methodologies, she curiously omits 
the notion of security which is a key lens through which Muslim organisations are identified and 
categorised.  Although she emphasises the conflictual dimensions of identity negotiation and 
prioritises the role of the state, she leaves largely untouched the issues of threat and security.   Yet as 
Connolly has pertinently remarked “The mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the 
presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim 
of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of 
a threat. ” (Connolly, 1991:66) Because she understands conflicts and the negotiations as ‘moderate’ 
she is inclined to ignore whatcould  be critical - that the state is drawn into negotiation because of 
the fear that society, left to differentiate freely, may become unsustainable.  This adds another and 
surely more urgent dimension as to why states see the need to be involved in the negotiation of 
identities at all, indeed to recognise it as about identity framing in the first place.  Therefore this 
research draws attention throughout, to the security lens through which state political and societal 
elites see Muslim identity organisations and vice versa.   
The case of Milli Görüş (IGMG) is perhaps illustrative.  This is a growing Muslim organisation, and one 
of the largest representatives of Muslims in the three cases under study.  As a transnational 
organisation it has carefully crafted its own ethos of modern professionalism.   It possesses in 
addition a dynamic youth organisation and is making place for younger leaders to come forward.  It 
reveals all the characteristics therefore of a modern ‘institutionally assimilated’ organisation, yet it is 
only reluctantly engaged with by states such as Germany and The Netherlands.  It remains in both, an 
object of suspicion.  The self representation of its religious identity is considered with suspicion, its 
moderate statements of intent thought to be designed for an external audience’s consumption only.  
As such it is understood to possess an equivocal deceptive ulterior identity which lies submerged 
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under the surface of modernity and professionalism, a subterranean conduit for Islamist Turkish 
nationalism.  Although there has never been any charges brought of misconduct and although there 
is a ready admission from within the organisation that some past statements by spokespersons have 
been unfortunate, (Gülbahar, 2008)11 it is still understood as having other designs.  This 
ulteriorisation12 continues even although there has been high-level cognisance of competing voices 
within the organisation, it is still assessed as subversive and anti-integrationist.  (BMI, 2007).  
 Kastoryano rightly draws our attention to the centrality of the state in negotiating difference.  As 
such, she emphasises the state’s promotion of Muslim organisations but also the states’ involvement 
and negotiation of the identity of organisations.  This, as she fully realises, is a two edged sword, 
since not only Muslim and/or immigrant identities become scrutinised but national identities as well.  
Although she recognises the significance of transnational dynamics, the state remains central in her 
research,  and she argues that only the state has the range of legitimacy required to undertake the 
complex balancing (cultural difference and citizenship) and bonding (civil society and state) needed 
to negotiate.  But with the introduction of security, things receive a new focus which helps explain 
how organisations could have an acceptable institutional character on the one hand, but still remain 
deeply problematic to states.   Despite the widening of the field of Security there is still a tendency to 
view it in close connection with overt violence (terrorism) or the potential for violence (radicalisation 
alienation).  Yet perceptions of risk and danger are not objective, as Campbell has reminded us  
“Danger is not an objective condition” (Campbell, 1992:1) and the state in taking responsibility to 
minimise danger and maximise security, must needs also deal with the limits and quality of 
recognition.  
The State and Security  
In this section it will be argued that states are major actors in identity composition.  Existential 
questions of societal sustainability – demography, underclass – frame requirements for further 
immigration.  Yet past massive immigration has tested the tensile qualities of systemic and social 
                                                          
11 M. Gülbabhar is Chairman of The Federal Youth Council of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG).  He speaks 
on issues relating to Muslim youth at a national level. The IGMG  have an extensive network of organisations, control over 
300 mosques and are often considered suspiciously as ‘camouflage’ organizations and means of transmitting an anti-secular 
and radical Isalmist message.   
12 Ulteriorisation is a process I identify in which identities are treated aspersively.  
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capacities.  Further immigration will require effective robust integration structures (rules and 
resources).  Systemic and social integration-security therefore compels the state to be the chief 
architect of new habilitative frameworks.  While the existential question of the sustainability of 
society, as a focus of systemic and social security, requires the state to be involved both in 
immigration control and integration, it is with one major difference: whereas the former already 
involves, in the European sphere, member organisation and cooperation, the latter has remained to 
this point in time, solely a national responsibility.  Although needing to remain within the boundaries 
of international human rights norms, European states still see integration as primarily a national 
responsibility.  They remain, therefore involved with sets of national projects, since states’ unique 
resources and legitimacy can most efficiently calibrate and stabilise a system and its subsystems.  As 
the security provider, states engage with Muslim identities at a societal level but especially with 
relation to the pathologies of Islam at the systemic level.  Islam is understood and constructed as a 
systemic element - part of a religious subsystem.  It seems therefore that ‘the return of the state’ 
cannot be overlooked or downplayed.    
In transnational literature the centrality of the state becomes de-centred in its role as co-composer 
of Muslim identities.  Although not discarding a role for the state, it no longer actuates or determines 
that role.  Globalisation is thought rather to promote transnational possibilities.  The question 
becomes less the absolute power of the state but the degree of role-playing which is possible in the 
processes of integration.  It must be borne in mind that inactivity of states may also be unwillingness 
to intervene, or simple neglect.  Care must be taken therefore not to cut the story short by omitting 
transnational framings of Muslim identities and yet not to overemphasise them as may be the case in 
some transnational approaches.   
Soysal is frequently quoted as representative of this genre of literature.  In her work she has argued 
that Muslims increasingly look beyond the state to secure their rights and membership.  (Soysal, 
2000)  Yet these kinds of accounts fail to adequately explain the otherwise curious exertions of both 
Muslim organisations and the state in the struggles over rights and recognition.  Nor does it explain 
why so much effort would be expended and so many (limited) resources employed by Muslim actors 
at the national level to gain what are obviously nationally defined goals – recognition at a national 
level as well as a defined menus of rights obtained through national citizenship.  This has clearly been 
the case of Turkish organisations in Germany (Tiemann, 2004).  Kumar points out that Muslims may 
see their rights, in much larger and less nationally defined terms, but they remain concerned with the 
state as the primary locus of rights and membership.  (Kumar, 2003) Kastoryano has also drawn 
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attention to the fact that Muslim actors are prepared to use all the means at their disposal to secure 
their rights at transnational levels but do so in order to gain leverage so as to secure these rights at 
the national level (Kastoryano, 2002)  
Since the end of the cold war’s national-ideological confrontations, a significant shift in the 
understanding and theorising of security has taken place.  This has principally occurred through an 
expansive re-dimensioning of security research.  One obvious change has been a switch from an 
exclusive emphasis on the state-military nexus, to an inclusion of societal security.  (Buzan, Waever 
et al., 1998) To examine a discursive core, security, in Muslim identity construction, securitisation 
theory provides a useful starting point by theorising society as a proper focus of security.  Through 
theoretical widening of the concept of security, we are offered a useful starting point for exploring 
the way in which society can be a proper object of security and how it might hold a key to 
understanding the negotiation of Muslim identity in integration discourse.   
Securitisation theory places the constitutive effects of language, mediated through speech acts, 
centre stage in the understanding of how security is activated.  Islam as construct, and even Muslims 
as objects, become characterised as existentially threatening, so that Muslim identity construction is 
focused in the state’s cross-wires of system and societal security.  The efficacy of security, of what is 
said and by whom and in what circumstances has received new impetus through the introduction of 
identity (Weldes, 1999) language games. (Fierke, 2002)  Yet securitisation theory, building on the 
understanding of an utterance as an act in itself, puts security in that specialised category of speech-
as-action: “security is a speech act.  In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real; the utterance itself is the act. ” (Waever, 1995)13 Security texts as utterances 
follow rules: linguistic, grammatical and conventional rules.  In this way security enactments belong 
in a family of speech acts together with promising or placing a bet.   
The successful security (speech) act moves the location of referent objects from the normal sphere of 
politics to that of security where normal rules are overruled by security rules.  A successful 
translocation, of this order, alters and distorts the image of the referent object.  It/they become 
transformed into existential threats and thereby justify employment of extraordinary measures.  For 
example the securitisation of Muslims makes it then more justifiable to ‘send back’ immigrant young 
people who break the law.  Securitisation is therefore an act of abnormalising, it is no longer a 
                                                          
13 original emphasis 
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question of delinquency but a threat and danger to society.  The simplified solution found in populist 
discourse is ‘return to sender’.  
In suggesting that Muslim identities are securitised or abnormalised, is not to suggest that everyone 
or anyone can engage effectively in doing this.  Adopting this position would be to force the theory 
too much.  Speaking ‘security’ is not successful securitisation, rather the latter is ‘a social 
accomplishment’ (Williams, 2003:514) Securitisation defines some key delimiting factors.  For 
example it must be clear that the utterers are significantly different in terms of their socio-political 
position.  The assumption is that an influential social-political agent would be a more efficacious 
security speaker.  The chances are therefore higher for a Chancellor to speak security, than a factory 
worker.  As agents they may both be enacting kinds of securitisation, but their social and political 
positions suggest prima facie, differing securitizing potential.  Another crucial factor in securitisation 
theory is the audience or the hearers of the securitizing speech act.  They will be variably receptive or 
resistant to securitisation over time and in differing contexts.  How socially effective security speech 
acts are, depends on a set of delimiters: the linguistic/grammatical usage, the utterer or framer of 
the speech act and the audience or receptors.   
Not all situations/structures favour the utterance of security – it is not down to agent or structure 
alone, but rather is situated within a  strategic-relational complex, (Hay, 2002:126-134) which 
underlies the utterance.  As Hay, drawing on Jessop, emphasises on some occasions circumstances or 
the discursive structure ‘favours’ one option rather than another, in others, the skill of the speaker 
becomes more significant.  In this way not all security utterances, even by prominent speakers, 
become successful securitisation.  There is evidence for example in Germany, of the political middle 
joining ranks to prevent Muslims from becoming full-blown security referent objects.  Sometimes 
political elites may successfully isolate the issues in this way but events may serve to wrest them out 
of their hands, as was the case in the aftermath of the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh in the 
Netherlands.   
There is immense complexity in the way security utterances come to take effect – the skill of the 
utterer, the receptivity of the relevant audiences, the ways in which discursive agent-structure 
relationing take place.  Yet it can and does come together and what needs to be emphasised is that 
its effectiveness lies in the strength of its promoting discourse(s).  A key discursive resource, in this 
narrative is a dominating image of an Islam or a Muslim ‘other’ as ‘threat’ as ‘enemy’ as ‘suspect’.  
Security speech acts feed the image, and simultaneously feed on the image.  As later findings serve 
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to show this is conducted in a number of ways for example through a syncopative dynamic called 
synecdoche 14.   
Securitisation as a body of theory has been criticised along several fronts.  McSweeney has criticised 
the Copenhagen school for adopting an objectivist methodology in which security and its referents 
such as society, are things out there.  (McSweeney, 1999)  Securitisation then can be read as simply 
another kind of social expression or practice, which does not in itself entail an ethical or critical 
commitment.  Concentrating on speech acts as the securitizing vehicles in this ethically 
undifferentiated way, would mean theoretically being able to put populist or even fascist 
securitisation speech acts in the same order category as an utterer from the middle of the political 
spectrum – they are doing essentially the same kinds of things.  Yet, combined with an ethical 
(critical) stance, it is clear that their purposes and effects might be quite different.  (Wyn Jones, 1999)  
For this reason Williams proposes reading securitizing speech acts as communicative actions and as 
such placing them within a dialogic framework requiring justifications and arguments.  (Williams, 
2003)  
Theorists of securitisation are fully aware of this problem, and emphasise that any act of 
securitisation carries with it high risks and even dangers.  Since to securitise means moving issues 
into a field where different logics operate, where boundaries are sharpest, where we/other can 
transform quickly even uncontrollably into friend/enemy and where new types of action will be 
required.  It may of course not be the intention of a security speaker to linger in this danger zone.  It 
may be that the securitizing act has a more immediate political purpose, for example winning votes.  
Whatever the purposes, securitizing means taking large risks with unforeseen consequences.  As such 
the goal should be de-securitisation as counteracting and defusing security and herding the issues 
back to the safety of the political.  The ultimate, perhaps utopian, goal should be to get to a situation 
of asecurity, where securitisation is effectively unimaginable.   This is especially desirable where 
identities are involved.  We ought to, argues Waever, 
“...take seriously concerns about identity, but *…+ also to study the specific and often problematic 
effects of their being framed as security issues.  We have also to look at the possibilities of handling 
some of these problems in non-security terms, that is to take on the problems but leave them 
                                                          
14 Synechoche is a figure of speech in which a part is used for the whole ‘one for all’ and in the reverse direction the whole 
for a part ‘all for one’.  
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unsecuritised.  This latter approach recognizes that social processes are already under way whereby 
societies have begun to thematise themselves as security agents that are under threat.  This process 
of social construction can be studied, and the security quality of the phenomenon understood, 
without legitimising it. ” (Waever, 1995:66)15  
This critical research sensibility means being aware that talking in terms of security may reinforce 
what we properly wish to hinder - securitisation.  In this research exploring the ways in which Muslim 
identities have become objects of security concern might be thought to add to this dynamic.  That it 
may place the researcher on morally, even politically irresponsible ground.  (Erikson, 1999)The 
question is whether this sensibility, and political stance, although admirable, is not hyperbolic,  since 
it can scarcely be argued that Muslim identities are in danger of becoming objects of security – rather 
that they already are conscripted and well established common currency – so that any treatment of 
the subject might reinforce what was still open.  A deliberate analytical muffling seems the greater 
danger, since it opens up to the charge that the analysis is inauthentic.  Researching is both 
researching responsibly and taking responsibility.  
Because drawing security into this narrative of Muslim identity construction might have rather the 
opposite than the intended effects – serve to infuse as opposed to defuse - it is therefore important 
to establish and maintain a critical ethical stance.  The intention of this thesis is to show how security 
sits in integration projects and to suggest an alternative more negotiated and de-securitised 
habilitative model.  By drawing attention to security in Muslim identity construction, the approach is 
one of prioritising a de-securitising of Muslim identities through dismantling a dominant enemy 
image.  Yet for this to be done, it is necessary to show how security works its way into the narrative 
and to recognize that this is not always explicit.  It is important to keep in mind that it is not the mere 
utterance of security words but the maintenance of securitised discourse which needs to be tackled.  
If entrenched imaginaries of us/others work throughout to keep Muslims in place as security 
referents, then the driving purpose of this research must be to show how this happens, and to use 
core securitisation theory insights, to help aid the process of identity-security defusion.   De-
securitisation fetches identity construction back into a political sphere.  Integration, as a de-
securitised negotiated habilitative process, must remain the intention and goal.   
                                                          
15 Original emphasis. 
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Through a social constructivist approach, securitisation theory, provides not only a social theory of 
security but also an ethical stance, without which it might be prone to the criticism of methodological 
objectivism (Wyn Jones, 1999) Connecting identity and security, Waever emphasises, researchers 
must work with great caution.  But in addition they need to be careful with any strategic analytical 
re-categorisation.  
Research which concentrates security on the ‘pathologies of Islam’ – fundamentalism, Islamism, 
Salafism – tend to amplify aspects of religion which are considered ontologically deviant both in and 
of themselves, and equally politically deviant.  Kepel highlights two projections of Islam in Europe, 
one negative and one more positive.  In his negative projection he offers us a dual stream separatist 
Salafism.  The first stream is a more traditional version which preaches “mental and moral rejection’ 
(Kepel, 2004:255) of lands of settlement and whose guards “carefully mark the  borders of the 
territory where the re-Islamisation they control takes place. ” (Kepel, 2004:257) The second, a post-
modern stream, is identified in which the “masters of post-modern technologies surf the Web and 
pilot airplanes, while nurturing a totally closed, salafist vision of the world. ” (Kepel, 2004:290) In this 
essentially negative rendering, both streams are understood to construct their ‘habitats of meaning’ 
through dialectic of jihad and fitna in which continual calculations are made between the need and 
desirability for Jihad and the risk of fitna.  Although this has traditionally required the training of the 
Ulema, post-modern Salafists have freed themselves from the traditional religious authority 
structure so that “the Ulema have lost control over the declaration of jihad and no longer have the 
means of warning believers against fitna” (Kepel, 2004:290) Breakdown of religious authority means 
therefore, the summoning of free radicals since a vacuum of authority must be filled.  His more 
positive and idealistic projection of Islam is one populated by absorbable young Muslims, who snugly 
settle into a warm embrace of secular Europe.  These are the young ‘home-grown’ elites who will be 
able to transcend the dialectic of jihad-fitna and thereby discard religious dialectics for the secular 
separation of domains.  In this way they will, he argues, provide a force for liberation in the Muslim 
world. (Kepel, 2004) Kepel’s research of transitional trends in Islam reveals what Mamdani has 
highlighted in the US context, a moral partitioning of Islam into good and bad Muslims.  Whereas in 
the US this partitioning has come down to ‘for or against America’, in the European sphere it comes 
down to a question of integration.  Good Muslims are integrated Muslims, some are unintegrated 
but with a helping national hand they could become so.  Bad Muslims are clearly the anti-
integrationists, disintegrative elements mixed within the corpus Islamica.  This clearly parallels 
Mamdani’s ‘culture talk’ the pre-modern and anti-modern narratives in which the real enemy is the 
anti-modernist or here the anti-integrationist. (Mamdani, 2005) 
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Similar streams of research, touched upon earlier, mapped change and transition through 
generational progressions.  Time-lining Islam in this way brought to us a ‘modern’ secularised 
experimental Muslim youth (good Muslim) and offered theories accounting for and suggesting 
significant changing currents within a constructed mainstream.  For Cesari, Muslim youth privatise 
belief and practice and this is thought to point to effective and ongoing secularisation.  Islam cannot 
therefore be an exception.  (Cesari, 2007) Roy points out how globalised Muslim youth - de-
territorialised, de-culturalised – reconstruct their fragile religious identities (these may possibly be 
good but may need a helping hand as well). Because they are doubly deracinated - first from 
homeland and then from culture they - the neo-fundamentalists, intensely seek out a purer 
transnational Islam.16  Shedding ethnic and cultural specificities, which are no longer endemic to 
Islam, they have only the aspiration for purity of religion at the heart of their identities.  In this way 
they are sensitive to trespass and punishment, martyrdom and reward.17  (Roy, 2005)  
Yet pathological renderings of Islam may quickly feed into a process of pathologising Islam, and the 
cross-overs are not immediately obvious.  To make clearer the possibilities of crossover, some have 
shifted the explanatory ground to what might be termed, the various pathologies of the receiving 
societies and polities.  Casanova emphasises how socially and politically a range of powerful othering 
templates are aligned upon Islam.  By placing one upon the other a fusion of otherness is achieved.  
Muslim subjects qua Islamic objects, become compounded - especially in the European sphere 
although he adds not as much in the US - with immigrant, the religious, the racial and the socio-
economic underprivileged.  “Anti-immigrant xenophobic nativism, secularist anti-religious prejudices, 
liberal-feminist critiques of Muslim patriarchal fundamentalism and the fear of Islamist terrorist 
networks are being fused indiscriminately throughout Europe into a uniform anti-Muslim discourse, 
which practically precludes the kind of mutual accommodation between immigrant groups and host 
societies that is necessary for successful immigrant incorporation. ” (Casanova, 2009:147) This 
Islamic other, constructed from multiple perspectives, feeds powerfully and directly into the 
discursive currents of integration, but also security, since the enemy that was formerly without, is 
now the enemy within.  (Cesari, 2004)  
                                                          
16 probably bad 
17 clearly bad 
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Pathologies of Islam approaches tend to lead into a kind of assessment of potency and potentialism.  
This kind of security talk emphasises the possibility or probability of danger or threat.  Although it is 
not mediated solely through Islamist pathologies it can and does draw upon them to create strong 
subterranean currents of suspicion.  Springing as it does from existential fears of an Islamisation of 
significant segments of society, it has been politicised and securitised by conservative-rightist 
populism in all three cases.  Sarrazin18 talks for instance about Turks as a breeding underclass fit only 
to be fruit and veg provisioners.  (Zeit-Online, 2009) As such a growing class of un-integrated (anti-
integrationists) becomes more the root folder of insecurity– more so even than terrorism - into 
which many societal problems are placed.  Threat to society is made to be about the very 
sustainability of society.   (Laurischk MdB, 2008)19 In the rhetoric of politicians security traces are 
easily found.  Here a statement from Professor Böhmer the German integration minister: 
“Integration of people from migrant families is an enormous challenge.  Let’s turn it into a great 
opportunity for our country! For this decides the question on the sustainability of our society – on the 
national as well as European level.   (Böhmer in Press-and-Information-office-of-the-Federal-
Government, 2007)20 The question of society and its security, as implied by the quoted statement is 
known and acknowledged, and integration is transformed from challenge to solution.  Security 
dimensions within integration, points to creating societal (systemic-social) stability.  Since integration 
is about “the stability of relations among parts within a system-like whole…. “ (Heckmann and 
Bosswick, 2006:2) then integration has clearly security type goals - securing qua stablising the 
system.  Potential instability is the fuel of integration.  
Integrating difference 
Integration cannot be zoned singly in any one of the aforementioned categories.  Neither can it be 
divorced from its normative underpinnings.  One integration debate which has generated a whole 
literature has concerned itself with the distinction between individual rights and the individual’s right 
                                                          
18 A senior member of the governing board of The German Bank, who came in for public criticism over his overtly racist 
remarks that he wished Berlin’s immigrants had been east European Jews, since their IQ was about 15% higher than Turks. 
19 Frau Sybille Laurisck, is an liberal democratic (FDP) member of the German Parliament Bundesrat. She is at present 
chairperson of the Committee for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth. She is involved in the politics of integration, family, 
equality and youth.  
20 My emphasis.   
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to community.  The battle lines have been drawn roughly between those advocating multicultural 
approaches (also liberal) and a strong liberal approach.  Although this debate has in some measure 
subsided, with multiculturalism experiencing something of an eclipse, it still has a fundamental 
relevance for integration, in that it works to establish the degree of right to difference and sameness.  
Embedded within and indivisible from liberal values, is the centrality of the individual.  A rough menu 
of liberal individual rights would include: freedom of choice, moral autonomy, equality before the 
law and property.  Recognition of right is anchored to a free choosing and rational individual, all 
other kinds of predication invisibilised.  The problem is that for the purposes of liberal theory the 
free-standing free-choosing and thus essentialised individual is an analytical construct, a myth as it 
were, which does not correspond to any obvious reality, since there are only social individuals.  
People, may identify themselves (and their rights) individually but always in relation to others and 
within groups.  If individuals therefore need social interaction and community for meaning, then this 
also must be their right.  (Parekh, 2000).  Liberals, of the strong variety, have retorted by asking in 
what sense can communities have rights? They are not proper objects of rights and it makes 
therefore, little sense to talk as if they did.  As such it is a category error.  Given these reasons the 
proper and only object of rights is the individual.  (Barry, 2001) Barry argues in addition, that 
extending rights to communities involves us in the very practical consideration of individual rights 
being violated by a community.  Extensive research done on honour-based violence and 
traditionalism reveals the extent to which individual right is ridden over rough shod by 
communitarian values.  The alarms ring when the findings of such studies show that it is not a first 
generation immigration phenomenon but extends into, and is being reinforced by third and fourth 
generations.  (Brandon and Hafez, 2008)  
These kinds of argument draw attention not only to illiberal specificities rooted in traditional 
communities but are, as a rule, wrapped up in wide ranging discussion of Islam.   The latter is often 
referred to as possessing an inherent communitarianism and thus represents a fundamentally 
different understanding of rights to those of western liberal thinking.  Although Islamic right is 
conceived of as narrower, and especially with regards to the rights of women and the freedom of 
religion, crucially divergent attempts have been made to bridge the gaps.  Bielefeldt proposes looking 
at the constructed-ness of western liberal understandings of rights and proposes an adaptation of 
Rawls’ theory of overlapping consensus.  (Bielefeldt, 2000) Kymlicka adopts another approach in 
which he seeks to strike a limited balance by taking into account the need and right to culture and 
community.  He argues that to protect the individual and their rights properly you must protect the 
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context of that individual.  In this way only by protecting the cultural and communal context can you 
properly protect the individual.  (Kymlicka, 1995) This, however, only works where there is broad 
convergence on what kinds of context are defensible and how choices and rights are understood.  
The right of the individual to choose assumes that the individual is always able to choose, which 
assumes a kind of individual which Sandel refers to as „the unencumbered self“.  (Sandel, 1998) 
Individual choices and the processes of choosing, are in themselves however, complex interactions 
with significant connection to communitarian contexts and identities – religious, ethnic, cultural.  
Bracketing the latter, even for the purposes of theorising is problematical.  If identities and choosing 
are intimately connected, that is, if I accept who I am will play a role in what I choose and thus spring 
the self-interest monologue, then the two must have a mutually constitutive dynamic.  Choosing can 
never be in this reading a solely calculative choice, but must take into account the contexts of 
‘intersubjective meaning’ in which choices occur and which define simultaneously choices which 
cannot in practice be made.  It must show how individual choosing functions only within contexts, 
communities of imagination and feeling in which „living traditions“ still play a role.  (Salvatore, 2004)  
Amit  presents  us with a macro picture and emphasises how globalisation has altered notions of 
community from places of „actualised interaction“,  that is of spatially located webs of micro contact 
to a „quality of sociality“.  (Amit, 2002) Yet this recognition does not or cannot rule out the continued 
significance of on-the-ground communal contexts in which social imaginaries and emotional 
belongings are still firmly embedded.  Muslim communities are subject to global change but have 
nonetheless retained a strong sense of locality.  This recognition does not deny that there are ways in 
which qualities of sociality are now also being transnationally or globally framed, but Muslim 
communities are still capable of staking out ‘bright boundaries’ (Alba, 2005) and what must be borne 
in mind is, that where individuals choose against local community, it will mean crossing and will likely 
entail great personal cost.   
Multiculturalism continues to feature in the ongoing debate within the Liberal family.  In strong 
liberalism there is a commitment to universalisable individual rights - moral individual autonomy, 
equality and the supreme justice of difference blindness (Barry, 2001) and the neutrality of the state 
in matters of religious belief and culture.   Other strands of Liberalism, sensitive to the need to 
balance individual rights with cultural survival, are more ‘permissive’ (Taylor, 1992).  Some post 
modernist liberal-multiculturalists argue that the universalism inherent in strong Liberalism is 
inadequate to guarantee universal justice, and serves only, to bolster the power predominance of 
majority communities and their representative elites. (Young, 1990, 2000) 
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Modood has argued that the equality logic inherent in multiculturalism is centred on how difference 
recognition is established.  Multicultural difference recognition is about ‘difference affirming 
equality’ together with respect, recognition & identity (Modood, 2003:106) Muslim activism is a 
result of Multiculturalism rather than racism per se, but retains an ambivalent attitude to it because 
of its liberal secular bias and  its unwillingness to treat Muslims as a religious community in the same 
way as ethnic groups are considered communities.  However Muslim activists use the multicultural 
discourse as a means to highlight ongoing discrimination (Modood, 2003:109) which is particularly 
directed toward them by secular liberalism.  The latter uses for example the private-public debate, to 
argue that religion should be kept private even though sexuality, a formerly private domain, is 
legitimised, publicised and politicised.  Modood argues that if liberals were alarmed at the Rushdie 
affair, then 9/11 has been the event which has led to the liberal turn against Multiculturalism.  He 
argues states should pursue a moderate multiculturalism, incorporating Muslims, as opposed to a 
radical secularism which excludes them.  (Modood, 2003:113) The situation of multi-ethnicity 
emphasises that a detached transcendent sense of citizenship is insufficient to the needs of 
recognition and acceptance, but instead there is a need for recognition of a community of 
communities and individuals.  The imperative and ongoing task is to challenge all forms of racism and 
structural inequalities.   
Iris Young criticises strong liberalism’s understanding and insistence on ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ 
as the best strategy to meet difference and redress injustice.  She argues that it is a fallacy; for if 
justice means being blind to difference how can it tackle unjust practices aimed at those who are 
different.  Ignoring difference is to screen the injustice of treatment connected to difference.   Young 
makes a more radical statement by emphasising the fact that liberalism clings to the ‘fetish of 
procedural neutrality’ legitimates and cements in place, the predominance of central (liberal) 
collectivities over marginal others.  In this sense it is self-serving.  Transcendence of difference by 
ascendance to the abstract principle of impartiality will not effect emancipation from harm.  She 
suggests transcendence of difference (inequality) with difference (cultural) in the public sphere.  
Fairness means getting to the roots of disparity which must include jettisoning the supposedly 
uniform public space and occupy it with culturally different subjects, thus bringing those that are 
marginalised and subordinated to a place where they can be publicly respected and legitimated.  She 
emphasises the ontological significance of groups yet seeks to highlight the contingent nature of 
relationships and the fluidity of boundaries; in this she differs from any supposed multicultural 
tendencies to essentialise cultural community and difference.  The individual is for Young the locus of 
agency, but structures, institutions and relations precede and therefore are ontologically prior to the 
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individual.  They provide a number of social and moral goods essential to the well-being of the 
individual.  So there is an ongoing distinction in Young’s (later) work between group behaviours and 
the significance of the group.  Groups may engage in identity politics as one way of assertion, but 
there are others.  The heterogeneous public sphere should be the guiding framework for both the 
common good and social justice - a middle way between any separatism of subaltern groups and a 
liberal uniform dominance.   
Opening public space in the ways envisaged by Young are however risky and reactions have been 
critical.  Barry for instance has complained that it would permit all and sundry to ‘hype their 
difference’.  It would also defeat one of the most important purposes of liberal democratic space to 
recognise one’s own limitations and see the value of the wider community.  Yes but what is this 
wider community, if not a vast field composed of many different groups? An open and public 
dialogue with them is necessary, established in a process of interchange and debate about what is 
the common good or the defining principles of citizenship.  Young therefore rejects any sense of 
imposed unanimity; it is a dream that must be renounced.  If the argument is for an open public 
dialogue, how open should this be? Are the ends of the debate also open? Are there really no values 
which the polity must reflect, no commitments to be undertaken even the goal of peaceful co-
existence? This seems rather like a vehicle without a steering wheel or brake.  And it seems that she 
is vague on who the public will be and although she advocates some constitutional ground rules for 
discussion and admission – she does not suggest who then should set these? By arguing for public 
support and restitution for groups that have suffered harm by virtue of their being different, she 
leaves unanswered the following: which criteria should determine a group’s eligibility and how 
should groups be defined.  As to the latter, she argues that groups are in reality non-essentialisable, 
since it is impossible to hold still what is changing and fluid in nature, therefore difficult to impossible 
to place in set descriptions.  Neither are the borders of groups watertight, rather they are porous and 
permit all kinds of exits and entries and cross connection.  How, given this conceptualisation - and 
she emphasises it must be this conceptualisation, otherwise there could be no justification for 
differentiated politics -  can restitution be practically administered.  Surely there a need for some sort 
of cohesive group; otherwise groups break into sub-groups and sub-sub-groups until they are little 
more than groups of dominant individuals.  Then there is the problem that group elevation will lead 
to proliferation of groups claiming victimisation and counter groups claiming the same.  This appears 
to be a weakness in the practical translation of her theory into regenerative and restituitive policy.  It 
seems too, that she has distinct groups in mind when she is arguing such as the Afro-American.  
However cross membership is a complicating problem since members of Afro-American groups may 
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also be women, straights or gays and on welfare or middle class, each experiencing hurt in different 
degrees.  Restitution then as blanket restitution will not do and how should the unpicking process be 
realistically done? Her suggestion too, of group veto, is also problematic since this seems intuitively 
to take things in the wrong direction.  Wouldn’t this be more likely to deepen and reinforce 
difference and hand extensive powers of leverage into the hands of group leaders? Young’s whole 
conceptualisation of group seems to undermine the concrete suggestions she makes.  It has also 
been pointed out that she does actually use two conceptualisations of group – a fluid one, when 
dealing with groups proper and a more fixed reified one when engaging with institutions.   
Alibhai-Brown has argued that there is something inherently wrong with Multiculturalism.  (Alibhai-
Brown, 2000:109)  She criticises it as dis-connective as opposed to connective, in that  it encourages 
the formation of communities of exclusivity.  It has no international dimension, and creates and 
keeps people in a black box called ethnicity.  In so doing multiculturalism has become the domain of 
black ethnicity which leads to an exclusion of white people.  The latter, she argues, look at 
multiculturalism as ‘a black thing’ from which they are excluded by its very definition.  
Multiculturalism for Alibhai-Brown also has a class component, it is the favourite child of wealthy 
middle class and woolly liberalists.  As a class-based dynamic it reinforces the sense of alienation of 
the voiceless, for example of the poor and particularly of youth.  In her research she has found a 
deepening sense of alienation among youth; here she found strong evidence that young black or 
Muslims think multiculturalism has little to do with them.  She sees multiculturalism therefore as 
something which is speaking more to the past than the future and therefore needs to be scrapped in 
favour of a more dynamic integrative model of diversity.  Alibhai-Brown highlights a sense of 
alienation among those who most ‘suffer harm’ from ascriptive difference.  Multiculturalism has 
diverse meanings, which are defined in national historical and cultural narratives.  Although its 
meanings are diverse, it is broadly associated with anti-assimilationist struggles for identity 
recognition, equality and emancipation.  It is supported by the left, but in emphasising the primordial 
and particular against the universality of class, it also breaks with its traditional socialist thinking and 
argument.  Where it still strikes a chord with the left is where it reveals a struggle for emancipation 
from entrenched power.    
The impact of Islam in European societies and polities is reinforced by a perception of the global 
resurgence of Islam.  Thomas has written about the shortcomings of deeply rooted secularism in IR, 
(Thomas, 2005) which “exclude*s+ from the start the possibility that religion could be a fundamental 
organizing force in the international system. ” (Shakman Hurd, 2007)  
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Casanova highlights European civil society as “deeply secular societies, shaped by the hegemonic 
knowledge regime of secularism”  (Casanova, 2009:143) so that their very religiousness becomes the 
defining baseline of their otherness.  At a first take, secularism closes off sections of imaginative and 
creative thinking and its lens puts out of focus, the proper (full, complete) recognition of people of 
religion.  As such it problematises or simply downgrades religious people’s  understandings of self – 
intentions, motivations, emotions, interests, reasons for action etc;  Secularism by closing down 
instead of opening up avenues of understanding force analyses of people of religion and religious 
phenomena more generally, into essentialism and reductionism.   In this way the power of religion 
and the religious agency of people are downgraded,  made to be epiphenomena (Thomas, 2005) or 
simply trivialised. (Asad, 2006) A recognition of this kind must move Secularism from societal and 
political dispositions and habits, to an articulation of productive power in which its own contested-
ness and constructed-ness is obscured.  This is made to work, as Shakman Hurd points out, because 
of a strong presumption of stable categories – religious, political, sacred, secular – which fit neatly 
into public and private spheres.  (Shakman Hurd, 2007) 
 “Certainly, it is unlikely that western democracies would suddenly be so concerned with secularism 
and its protection were it not for the Muslim presence and perceived challenge posed by Islam.  Is 
Islam different from other religions vis-à-vis integration into western societies?” (Levey, 2009:15)21 
The construct Islam or the monolithised ‘Muslim presence’ securitises secular thinking, making it not 
only uncomfortable but a foreign return.   9/11 has thrown fault lines into stark relief “Secularism has 
been thrown out of focus, and the cultural complacency which had grown around it has been shaken. 
” (Mondal, 2004:5) To deal with the literature on Islam and Muslims is similar to playing the scales – 
there needs to be fluent movement between different levels of analysis.  It is necessary to grasp 
macro religious-cultural constructs through meso-framings in integration discourse and down to 
micro level reaction, springing from lived identities with all their plasticity and possibility.  (Sardar, 
2002)  
Tariq Ramadan argues, within a more religiously self-reflexive stream, that to be Muslim, is to live 
within a framework of immutable requirements contained in the Koran and Sunna.  He argues 
however, that the admonitions and commands of the Muslim canon must be applied to different and 
changing contexts and times.  There is therefore a need for continual Muslim intellectual exertion so 
that interpretation can maintain scriptural relevance in times of major, unforeseen, social change.  
                                                          
21 My emphasis.   
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This he argues requires the hard labour of human reason.  He argues that if the Koran had not 
foretold the phenomenon of Muslims migrating and living as minorities in non-Muslim lands, then it 
was up to Muslims to exert their intellects to understand themselves in the lands of their choice.  If, 
living as Muslims is the most important command, then living as good Muslims in their lands of 
settlement is the second.  Ramadan admonishes Muslims to effect a mental transition, to take 
possession of Europe and see these lands and societies as their own.  Possession is belonging 
(Ramadan, 2004)   
The immigration industry has generated extensive literature.  Yet a common criticism from those 
outside is the paucity of theoretical contribution.  The broadly positivist empiricist tradition, seeking 
to map the dynamic nature of human mobility provides an important part of the story, as research 
into the securitisation of immigration.  (Huysmans, 2006) This is however, often the primary focus 
and settlement and integration are not accorded adequate attention, so that settlement as the usual 
terminus of immigration remains under-theorised.  Whereas immigration and integration are clearly 
connected, there is need for more understanding of the way security comes to provide a shaping 
logic in both.   It is the aim of this research to contribute to filling this gap.  It is emphasised how 
security is the most plausible explanation for the ‘integration turn’, and further argued that, on the 
findings of the research, that there is less fear of ‘terrorism’ per se, than fear of a growing Muslim 
underclass, alienated and trespassing on the carefully manicured (theoretical) distinctions between 
private and public spheres.  This ‘unsettling’ of the secular in the three chosen case studies, has less 
to do with overt challenge or disruption to legal frameworks and institutions, but more with creating 
puzzling eddies in the stream of European secularisation.  Muslim identification with religion, and 
their desire to achieve par with native religious traditions are dissonant with a situation in which 
institutionalised Christianity is becoming socially less significant and in some circumstances content 
to be so.  Indeed, attempts to institutionalise Islam is often read as seeking to nativise Islam, what 
Saeed calls ‘indigenisation of Islam’. (Saeed, 2009) Unsurprisingly perhaps, there is considerable 
resistance among rank and file Muslims against any state meddling in internal religious affairs.  
(Şenay, 2008)22 
                                                          
22 Dr. B. Şenay is professor of history of Religion and is the Counsellor for Religious Affairs at the Turkish Embassy in The 
Hague. As Counsellor for Religious Affairs he has been appointed by the government in Ankara to head the department of 
the Embassy dealing with religious issues. He is responsible for the overall cooperation between Diyanet in Ankara, the 
organisation of official Turkish Islam in the Netherlands and the Dutch government. This interview took place at the 
department for religious affairs of the Turkish embassy in The Hague.  
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Muslims as people of religion, believe, practice and transmit their faith in a non-privileging social and 
political environment.  They seek to keep intact and transmit the ‘wholeness’ of the religious 
message to coming generations and are concerned about encroaching ‘evils’  in liberal society.  They 
sense, in many cases, that the cards are weighted against them and that national prejudices favour 
certain courses of action such as ‘taking off but not putting on’(Modood) and an ‘ an unevenness of 
moral concern’ (Asad, 2006:304).   Islam, as a powerful construct however, is being made, in ways 
that are exceptional and therefore it makes sense to talk of the exceptionalism of Islam though 
recognising simultaneously that exceptionalism is not defined any essentialised commitment to 
revelation, which in fact should be resisted.  (Cesari, 2007)  An enfant terrible however, is 
constructed through secularised and securitised western liberal democracies and has evolved in ways 
in which no other religion in (post, late or high) modern times has done.  Over Islam is placed a 
powerful lens of suspicion through which Muslim subjects are themselves scrutinised.  Essentialist 
suspicion of Islam (Asad, 2006) is, in the age of settlement, something which is firmly entrenched.  
Identities and the power of construction 
The introduction of identity based research and analysis has been of crucial importance in the 
development of critical approaches. Analyses of American foreign policy in Korea, Cuba and South 
Vietnam have shown how foreign policy, even military strategies, were framed around self 
understandings and the particular constructions of Enemy Others by American military chiefs and 
policy makers. (Weldes, Doty, Sylvan) Likewise understanding of organisational identities have been 
shown to influence the design of immigration policies and the allocation of resources to plan, 
manage and control the flows of immigration. (Geddes, 2003) But identity templates whether 
applied in the theatre of war or immigration, necessarily entail coming to a settled understanding 
(constructed and shared by in-groups) of Self and Other. The consequences of war and the 
understanding of mass mobilities are established through the identities which are constructed and 
positioned. As Geddes has pointed out asylum seekers have been especially subjected to suspicion as 
being disguised economic migrants. They are often perceived as abusers of liberal human rights and 
welfare regimes. Having identities ulteriorised in this way, the justifications for exclusion are more 
easily legitimated. They become seen as net subtractors – uneducated and unskilled – to the system. 
(Geddes, 2003:5) 
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This in many ways mirrors how Integration identifies its own object populations against national Self 
narratives of economic need and/or absorbable capacities. But though immigration and integration 
are intimately connected - there cannot be adequate immigration without adequate integration 
policies (Fratini) and integration mechanisms (integration tests) have been used to further determine 
who is wanted or unwanted through determining who is integratible or not (Penninx et al 2006) -  
there are significant differences. Whereas immigration is in part managed within a supranational 
framework, integration discourses take place in national arenas and privilege the active role of the 
state –  since Integration is seen primarily as a national responsibility. Where the politics of 
(in)security are introduced (Huysman) then states may well feel mandated to intensify integration or 
to exercise power to extend and include other significant populations. Integration therefore may on 
the one hand be the means through which more restrictive policies are developed but on the other 
the means to extend identity framing beyond incomers (even though it may be employed here as 
well to define the wanted or unwanted) to long term resident minorities as well. This is accomplished 
by identifying net subtractors, a set of underachievers or a significant underclass. Since Integration 
discourses are largely conceptualised, programmatised and run on integrationist logic, problem-
solving is understood to be what it does. This in its turnhighlights deficits and seeks workable 
solutions to root-problem causes. Searches for evidence for the success or failure of such ‘solutions’ 
in the main concentrate on hard (often overlooking or even ignoring soft) data. This as Cox has 
shown is inherently conservative, and effectively seeks only the preservation of the status quo. (Cox) 
If the introduction of identity into analysis is a key analytic move, then another significant critical 
contribution is to theorise  Self as being defined against Other. The strong reading of this is that Self 
and Other are mutually constituted in a complex of processes and this is at the heart of all 
individual/group identity making. (Wodak) So the view that Europe needs an Other to fill a vacuum 
that the disappearance of the communist Other has left is both plausible and important. (Kumar) This 
‘Other’ could be an Islamist (or perhaps simply a Muslim or a Turk), an asylum seeker or just a plain 
work immigrant.23 These identity templates too may be placed over each other to construct an even 
more radical version of Other. As Hansen points out, it is an over-simplication to posit a singular 
radical Other - there are always multiple ‘Others’ – overlapping and intersecting. (Hansen) So just as 
there are multiple Selves there are likely to be corresponding multiple Others varying in degree of 
                                                          
23 And of course there are still the internal Others: in Turkey the Kurds, in Spain the Basques, those with self-determination 
agendas threatening the internal cohesion and stability of nation-states. 
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radicality. This understanding fits with post-modern understandings of identity as fluid, porous, 
incomplete and in flux andnecessarily contrasts starkly and opposes essentialised and reified 
identities which are often used in the construction of the culturalist accounts of ‘the exceptionalism 
of Islam’. (Cesari) So on the one hand critical constructivist identity approaches reject  any over-
simplified plasticity of identity, yet simultaneously recognise that identities are at also implicated and 
at work in official stances, in the ways policies are devised and implemented. So these kinds of 
identity approaches (adopted and adapted in this work) on the one hand must necessarily  
problematise any simple separation of sheep from goats such as that of good and bad Muslims or 
what seems to be taking place in the European sphere integratible and non-integratible Muslims; this 
approach uncovers the powers which effect such categorisation and separations and points to those 
who aspire to decide who will be accepted (or who will be accceptible) and who not. Not surprisingly 
power and responsibility tend to be located in official discourse. 
 Integration then as a key identity framing discourse together with its discursive tributaries 
(secularism and security) can be explored through the meanings which define them, these in turn 
through their usage. This will involve exploring contexts in which these usages are shaped and lastly 
engaging in a performative power analysis of the discourses themselves i.e. asking, in this case, what 
does Integration do. (Guzzini) Doty has suggested a useful method through which power at work in 
identity framing might be interrogated. This involves looking at underlying presuppositions which 
shape how subjects are identified in the first place and how they become objectified through 
predication which results in their ultimate subject-positioning. The latter is the outcome of power at 
work. But another important factor is highlighted by Guzzini who emphasises we cannot get outside 
power to define it, therefore power analysis entails a greater degree of reflexivity in critical analysis 
than other methodologies. The very assignation of power in itself is a political act and will entail 
calling those who weild power to account. That is requiring of the power players, justifications and 
answers, reasons for these courses of action (or inaction) and not others. This will in its turn lead on 
to an opening up critical analysis to counterfactual analysis. This will entail presenting alternative 
scenarios by suggesting how things could be better, and supplying alternatives. (Guzzini) 
The contribution of this research  
This research contributes to ongoing research into how Islam is constructed by emphasising that 
much analysis (media, academic) draws upon a monolithic term which is insufficiently (critically) 
reflexive. So this research in de-centring analysis from the term itself to the subjects who are 
conscripted into its usage, looks at it from a different perspective even when the term becomes 
41 
 
inextricable from ‘institutionalisation of Islam’ debates. Employing predication is an important piece 
of power as is presupposition (Doty) and here the research contributes to anti-essentialist 
approaches, not only through reiterating the fluidity and multiplicity of Muslim identities and 
porousness of boundaries and contextual influences on self and other identifications,  but by 
problematising as well secular materialist reductionism employed in analyses of religion, ‘people of 
religion’ and Integration.24 In addition this work makes original empirical contributions by identifying 
habilitative processes and practices - including ulteriorisation processes and identity distortion 
practices such as synechdoch - which ‘rise from the data’.  Since Integration is the dominant 
discourse of adjustment in and through which Muslim identities are being constructed, this research 
investigates some of the issues but widens the scope of research from the more typical structural-
based approaches,  to take take into account the cognitive and emotional frameworks of Muslim 
people of religion. By understanding and theorising Integration as containing stable defining 
meanings of mutuality (respect, expectation, adjustment) and negotiation (concrete practices of 
dialogue and consultation) within non-negotiables it is possible to critically investigate how this 
develops in the three case studies chosen. Here one of the main contributory components of the 
research is to highlight how (in)security is implicated as significant power at work in Integration. 
Finally by identifying power in this way, and by returning to the core meanings of Integration 
discourse, the research suggests that the integrity of Integration must be preserved and and to this 
end suggests alternatives i.e. what it must do differently. 
 
                                                          
24  Integration is understood as one particular kind of habilitative process see pp 3-4 
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CHAPTER THREE Initial concepts, assumptions and commitments  
The objectives in this chapter will be to register the metatheoretical commitments, assumptions and 
convictions which underpin the research methodology or set of guiding principles of this research.  I 
argue throughout that, to research ‘people of religion’ requires taking religion, religious language and 
discourse seriously, and thereby seeking to provide significant contrast to positivist and materialist 
reductionist approaches to integration research.  Although registering positions is an important 
rationale for this chapter the intention is not to simply produce a catalogue of positions.  I will 
therefore draw upon some primary and secondary data - interview material and research journal 
materials – to answer how I come to make these commitments, and at the same time map 
something of my personal research journey.  
I adopt a straightforward sequence to this chapter.  Beginning with ontology I look at possible 
answers to ‘what is there to know?’, then I move on to Epistemology examining ‘what can be 
known?’ and lastly to Methodology: how to go about getting knowledge of socio-political reality.  
Although these three are irreducible categories (Hay, 2002:63) and although ‘inextricably 
interrelated’ (Smith, 1996:18) for the sake of clarity, I deal with each one separately and in turn.  The 
sequence ought not to imply priority or primacy.  The substantive methods I employed to answer the 
research questions will be described later.  
There attractiveness of methodological eclecticism, pluralism and pragmatism, needs to be tempered 
by the knowledge that picking and mixing methodologies and methods may create a problem of 
maintaining theoretical consistency.  Mainstream social constructivism – mixing a social ontology 
with a positivist epistemology has characterised mainstream social constructivism, leading to 
methodological inconsistency.  (Fierke, 2001)  Maintaining methodological discipline involves 
therefore making hard choices, based on earlier philosophical and metatheoretical convictions.  
Choices need to be made, so that keeping consistent is keeping credible.   Yet this is also delimiting 
since there may be methodological elements which can be grafted into an approach and interesting 
methods used, which don’t normally belong – pragmatic usage could then be the source of creativity 
even rapprochement between approaches.  (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:288-293) The credibility of 
the analysis will consist in part of ensuring that the claims made, run in consistent lines back to 
original ontological, epistemological and methodological choices.   
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Ontology, Epistemology and Methodology 
What kinds of socio-political reality are there?  How can one decide what belongs in this 
fundamental, irreducible analytical category called ontology? A good starting point and one of the 
well trodden roads is to look at the agent-structure debate.  It is a way to register ontological 
positions (Hay, 2002:91)  When confronted with the questions thrown up by agent-structure debate 
(Dessler, 1989), I felt that I needed  to find a way out, find a way to theorise out of a tight corner.  
Presented in abstract terms they exerted pincer-like pressure.  How could choices be made and 
justified when presented in an ‘either or’ format?  To theorise and locate the research at etiher 
macro or micro-level analysis, was unsatisfactory since both structure and agency were clearly 
significant.  It seemed that the only option was for some kind of pragmatic contextually located mix 
of agent-structure accounts of context.   
Bauman (in Hannerz, 1996:22) suggests that treatment of agency should not be combined with 
system but should be located within more flexible environments which he calls habitats.  Here agents 
could be properly agential, finding and using resources, defining strategies but also conscious of 
limitations.  One might ask: is this not this in some sense structure, but by another name?  Hannerz 
adopts the concept ‘habitats of meaning’ as a way of reducing “too much autonomy and 
boundedness.” inherent in structural approaches.  Yet this loosening up of structure takes on almost 
anatomical qualities - as entities which expand and contract.  Shared ‘habitats of meaning’ are 
identified in cultural processes in social relationships and their intersections and exposures to one 
another.  (Hannerz, 1996:22-3) 
Standard constructionist theory offers an attractive solution.  It suggests that actors and their 
structured contexts or environments should be theorised as mutually constitutive.  This dynamic 
approach avoids reifying structure or primitivising agents (Wendt, 1987) In an interview with El 
Boujoufi25 I was surprised when he stated that CMO26 supported restrictive immigration and 
explained that this would be better for Dutch society and Muslims as integral members of that 
society.  (el Boujoufi, 2008) Employing this strategy seems, to begin with, counterintuitive.  
Continued Muslim immigration into The Netherlands would increase demographic presence and 
                                                          
25 D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest officially 
recognised top-level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands.  For more information see Appendix two. 
26
One of the two Muslim top level umbrella organisations in the Netherlands  
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place pressure on government for further accommodation of Muslims in terms of government policy 
– it would broadly increase power.   Yet closer inspection of the shifts in meaning within and 
between the main parties, seem to suggest a different and more plausible account of what is 
happening in adopting a strategy of immigration capping.  El Boujoufi, by seeking to maintain and 
build upon what has already been achieved in terms of cooperation between his organisation and 
successive Dutch governments, reads the structure of his context in an unexpected way.  Rather than 
destabilise the socio-political environment through further immigration it would be more important 
to continue to build stable relationships.  Higher birth rates among Muslims will alter demography in 
any case.  In this one example it is possible to see how agents interpret the structural possibilities 
and make strategic choices accordingly.  So although this is only one interpretive way of reading the 
data, it shows that agents not only act, but fore-think and take continual readings of their structured 
environments.  They use structural opportunities, register changes in audience mood and seek to 
achieve their goals.  Yet there are constraints which agents face and which they may not fully 
understand.  To remain a player, ongoing assessment and calibrating strategies must be continuously 
undertaken.  Strategy design may be long-term and/or short-term and structural change may be 
immediate or more incremental.  In any case it will be the reading or mis-reading of possibilities 
which will relax or tighten the structured context of action.  Jessop theorises that although agents 
must be active, any socio-political environment may be understood to favour certain strategies and 
kinds of actors (Hay, 2002) 
Opposing ontologies and epistemologies are positions which cannot be merged or married.   Even 
when dressed in new conceptual language and novel approaches, theoretical divergences and 
divisions will be reproduced.  It is because they rest on different assumptions which exclude each 
other and which can neither be verified nor falsified empirically.  In this way “untestable assumptions 
about the nature of the social and political world affect, fundamentally, the manner in which political 
analysis is conducted and the status of the knowledge claims we feel we may legitimately make as 
political analysts. ” (Hay, 2002:34)  
One key assumption, on which the approach of this work is based, is that ‘rational interest’ type 
thinking requires its particular context.  “unless something is known about the context, broad 
assumptions about ‘self-interested behaviour’ are empty…We need a historically based analysis to 
tell us what they are trying to maximize and why they emphasize certain goals over others. ” (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992:9) So it is necessary to assess practices and behaviours to know how the logics at 
work in that context define what is a rational or irrational, a self-seeking or selfless, act.  
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Although logics are not iron-clad, neither are they always malleable.  Which logics are at work, how 
strong are they, how powerful are they? These questions are important and they bring us inevitably 
to a place where the spirits divide.  How are actors to be understood as agents? Both rationalist and 
behaviourist approaches nominalise agency.  Behaviourism reduces agents to ‘behaviours’ in which 
regularities and patterns are to be discovered.  This analytic approach therefore requires aggregating 
behaviours to find regularities.  In this way a degree of probabilistic prediction will be considered 
possible.  In a similar way rationalist approaches, by shifting emphasis from actors’ behaviours to 
structures, nominalise agency by rationalising choice through structure effects.  Assuming that 
agents are maximising calculators of self interest, given this structuralised context, then this is the 
choice they have to make.  Alternatives do not really exist, and so setting aside the possibility of 
‘irrational’ self-harming choices, there is only this choice.  
Constructionism problematises how causes are accounted for, or more accurately how the causal 
variables are constructed.  What kinds of understandings lie behind these causal accounts? In this 
research for example, there is no intention to seek to deny the integrative potential of good housing, 
education and vocational training for helping young Muslims to cope with alienating structures.  Yet 
it is questionable how causal claims might be built out this kind of structural, measurable data.  To 
make a claim, that good education and vocational training cause young Muslims to integrate more 
quickly, is based on a range of simplifying assumptions: that young Muslims may be understood as 
object-like units; that a notion of structure alteration is the meaning of integration; that there is the 
possibility of separation of integration discourse from other potentially de-railing discourses such as 
security.  To sum up simple causal claims would have to be built upon highly problematical 
relationing procedures.  
So if theories cannot be proven true, nor falsified, and yet they guide our choices as to what is 
relevant, the danger is that they also become our straightjackets, hampering and hindering as much 
as helping or guiding us.  Significant features may be overlooked because they ‘do not fit’ and 
research ends up as a process of confirmation or hindsight science.   “Theories do not simply explain 
or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not 
merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons. ”  (Smith, 1996:13) 
Rationalism and behaviourist approaches are implicitly or explicitly committed to a foundationalist 
epistemology.  They believe it is possible to make secure knowledge claims to ‘discover’ the 
underlying stable patterned realities.  Language is considered adequate to the task of rendering 
those realities accurately and therefore positive knowledge is possible.  Constructionist approaches 
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problematise this security of knowledge and, fostering more agnostic attitudes, search for alternative 
meanings.  As meaning becomes more precarious, knowledge claims become less foundational.  The 
possibility of richer knowledge accounts of social reality open up, when social realities are 
understood to be inter-subjectively constituted, when ontology and epistemology are understood to 
be mutually constitutive.  The status of social and political realities and knowledge become less solid, 
less foundational, less ‘out there’.  Knowledge becomes more interpretivist in tone, rendered only 
through analysis of meanings in discourse, but other renderings may also be possible and equally 
credible.   
Methodology is a set of principles guiding the choice of research methods and design.  Resting on 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, methodology underpins the methods chosen.  Studying 
the methods of investigation involve making, once more, some key choices.  Methodology unifies 
research design, metatheoretical commitments and enables the employment of appropriate 
methods.  Throughout, the goal is to seek to investigate intersubjective meanings in development 
and employ a qualitative methodology which treats ‘people of religion’ sensitively and argues that 
this is possible only when religion is understood as a fundamental category of analysis.  
Quantitative research rests on a positivist empiricist epistemology i. e. that realities are observable 
and quantifiable.  In integration research this means looking for regularities, trends and 
developments in areas such as social and political involvement.  For example, it may be valuable to 
know how many Muslims belong to political parties and to which parties; have they formed their 
own, how many and what kinds of social organisations have been set up and what kinds of 
membership do they have; what sort of services do they supply.  The same goes for education, 
housing, and the job market.  All provide valuable data for assessing social mobility, political 
participation and structural discriminations.  Yet all quantitative research requires investigation, 
interpretation and conjecture.  This research refers to but does not directly engage with quantitative 
research, since the assumption that upward social mobility and increased socio-political participation 
is sufficient to properly assess integration is questionable.  These and similar secular assumptions 
and attitudes have characterised the field of study.    
Even though important immigration-integration research has built and continues to build upon 
positivist-quantitative approaches, my initial interests exerted a gravitational pull toward qualitative, 
interpretivist approaches.  This is not because quantitative approaches do not tell us important 
things about integration, but rather statistical analyses of areas of integration significance - obtaining 
citizenship, levels of education, types of occupation and housing quality – tend not to concentrate on 
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less measurable variables such as feelings of alienation, which frequently came to the surface in 
interview situations.   These blind spots may weaken overall conclusions since statistical data may 
indicate improved social mobility across the board and may thus conclude that integration as process 
and endpoint is satisfactorily advanced.  It may give rise to consternation, dismay or resentment, to 
hear that material advancement is not integration.  Lastly quantitative approaches may also have 
deleterious effects in closing down additional and alternative understandings of integration.  To 
illustrate: in interviews with integration officers it became clear that well crafted and generously 
funded integration programmes were being made available and were still being developed and 
expanded.  (Morais, 2008)27 (Graber, 2008)28 Yet beyond the glossy brochures and public 
commitments to fairness,  tolerance and justice (Beck, 2005) other narratives emerged of 
bureaucratic processes in which increasing demands upon immigrants, rendered them increasingly 
vulnerable, objectified  and robbed of dignity;  (Musluoğlu, 2008)29 of increasing intrusion into the 
human subject, (Maizar, 2008)30   Senses of alienation, loyalties, memories, discrimination narratives 
were drawn upon by interviewees and became the primary data for interpretative analysis.  This 
                                                          
27
 J. Morais is head of the Cantonal integration department Integrationsfachstelle in Zürich.  Her responsibilities include 
developing an integration model for Zürich and diverse integration programmes.  Before coming to Zürich she was head of 
the Red Cross in Basle and her work concentrated on political asylum seekers.  She then built up the integration department 
Canton Basel.   
28 R. Graber is the head of the Integration department in the City of Heilbronn.  She designs local integration initiatives and 
implements integration programmes within the National Integration Framework and contributes to bridge-building 
between immigrant organisations.  
29 N. Musluoğlu is a qualified social counsellor for foreign workers and their families.  He has worked for many years for the 
municipal authorities but a number of years ago founded his own company Türkdaniş.  Offerring professional advice to 
Turkish immigrants and their families across a wide range of problems they may face in German society, he works also as a 
translator in negotiations.  He is active in a range of integration projects and is an trusted partner of the Integration 
department of the city of Heilbronn.   
30 Dr. I. Maizar is President of FIDS one of two top level Muslim Umbrella Organisation in Switzerland. As such he plays a 
clearly representative at the national level for Muslims in Switzerland. He is called upon to advise and liaise with national 
representatives and in the Cantons in Eastern Switzerland. In his public relations role he is called upon to appear in panel 
discussions and writes extensively on Muslim issues. His role as President of FIDS means contacts to every Muslim 
organisation in Switzerland.  
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means more than summarising what interviewees say and how they say it – it requires interpreting 
new primary materials within existent theory and knowledge.  (Antaki, Billig et al., 2002) 
A simple way of conceptualising the differences in scientific and hermeneutical methodologies is 
through positionality: outside/inside.  Science is concerned with explanation built up through 
‘discovery’ of causality.  Reality, natural or social, is working independently of observation.  This 
commitment determines the researcher’s position of detachment.  Hermeneutical approaches by 
contrast, see the importance of agency in the social world; the actor is a reflexive maker of meaning 
and lodged in a world of reflexive meaning makers.  All negotiate a dense jungle of shared 
convention and symbol.  A reflexive actor interprets meaning for her own action, and tries to assess 
what others will understand by her action, reads reaction, manipulates meanings.  Understanding 
approaches will therefore take account of private intentions and public meanings.  These are 
expressed in language.  If people as actors and agents are accorded greater significance their 
meanings, expressed in language, follow.  Understanding must therefore seek to appraise action in 
terms of what the actor meant by doing, and what the action meant in terms of shared rules.  
Throughout, the significance of the actions are weighted - did the actor know what she meant when 
she acted?  Meaning can therefore become elusive when subjective meaning is introduced.  Left here 
each action will have a uniqueness which defies any generalisation or understanding beyond the act 
in question.  However, acts are not only personal and subjective, people act and are guided, for 
example through ideologies i. e. ideas about what are worth acting for, and hunches about how the 
world ticks.  This, in its turn, frames normative approaches and expectations about how others 
should act.  
Understanding has a multiple rather than a blanket character.  Weber began by defining kinds of 
understanding: first a direct understanding in which the behaviours are known: the man aims a rifle.  
Then an explanatory understanding31 this may draw on several kinds of knowledge for example 
history: the man’s brother has been murdered; sociological: knowledge of customs for example 
vendetta.  Verstehen moves from observation to interpretation: is this man blinking or winking.  
Behaviourists would look to see what kinds of reactions the moving of his eyelids had and draw 
conclusions.  Hermeneutical approaches would seek to understand what winking might be and seek 
to understand different meanings of the wink: was it warning or complicity.  To fully understand one 
must know, first, the rules, conventions and context of the action and second, the agent’s intentions.  
                                                          
31 erklärendes Verstehen 
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If the chess player moves the bishop diagonally across the board, she is playing according to the rules 
but why this move? Why does she choose this move? Her choice may be rational; she sees an 
upcoming threat from another piece.  But she may have alternatives; maybe she is obeying less 
formal rules such as rules of good play.  Weber makes a distinction between Zweckrationalität and 
Wertrationalität.  The latter may override the former through acting on principles.  The former 
however, says here is my goal, this is my choice, it assumes ordered preferences, information and 
accurate information processing.  In its ideal typical expression it may be considered useful for 
mapping out in the ‘as if’ situations.  Yet it says nothing about the source of or rationality of the 
agent’s goals, here Wertrationalität can be disruptive.  Some may have martryrdom as goal.  For 
Weber adequate meaning is won through explanation and understanding, yet his individualist 
approach focuses on individual choosing.  He begins with subjectively meaningful action and moves 
toward ideal rational action.  
Winch argues, to understand reality is to understand the criteria which define it as reality.  (Winch, 
1958) Knowing which concepts are used is primary- it is irrelevant if it is a witch or a particle – it is 
about which criteria are used to identify the object.  Knowing or understanding anything to be real 
means knowing what conceptual belongings it possesses.  To understand the reality of a witch is to 
master the relevant concepts belonging to the organised practice or institution of witchcraft.  
Religion or science is about learning their institutional rules or their governing meanings.  This is a 
radical idea, since Winch seems to be saying that the key to ideas are the social relations which give 
it meaning.  Logic is intelligible only through knowing its institutional rules.  Right or rational conduct, 
is of the same order, knowing the governing institutional rules.  Natural science or religion is simply a 
way of ordering experience employing rules so as to know ‘how to go on’.  These are self warranting 
declarations regulated through internal and very different practices.  Causal explanations are, 
therefore proper to science but not elsewhere for example in religion.  For Winch they are different 
belief systems and the job to do, is to understand why they matter within what is given.  This comes 
uncomfortably close to relativism which is divergent from hermeneutics which understands how 
people internally order their experiences and then relate this to contextual reality.  Winch’s approach 
seems to suggest that they are different worlds.  
Muslim organisations are often invited to public forums and given opportunity to speak.  But often 
the value of communication is downgraded and devalued for the speaker’s meagre representative 
value.  The logic runs something like this: the organisation which this person represents is quantified, 
it has so and so many members; the constituent population is so and so many millions, the degree of 
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representation may be expressed as such a percentage.  The sums are easy.  Yet this presents a 
problem: what is the speaker doing, what does she think she is doing? Does she use representative 
language?  If so, can this one speaker be representative of a wider population? This kind of sampling 
however is bad discourse analysis, (Antaki, Billig et al., 2002) despite the representative character the 
speaker assumes.  Only extensive sampling could establish if these views were in the main the views 
of the constituency.   
Representative speakers as interviewees, move between different roles and actions.  They may be 
doing different things at different times in the course of the interview.  Expressing personal opinions, 
expressing opinions considered to be widely held in their wider community.  The job of Discourse 
Analysis is to show how the statements made, fit or do not fit in the wider discursive topic, through 
highlighting both the cognitive and social dimensions.  The speaker as actor or agent is always 
operating within larger social structures.  Social structures are populated by many, often competitive 
voices.  To take an example, in the aftermath of van Gogh’s murder in Amsterdam, Aboutaleb, a 
prominent Muslim politician, spoke in one of the main mosques in Amsterdam.  His speech occurred 
within a highly charged ‘crisis’ situation.  It was also occurring in a time of structural change – the 
eclipse of multiculturalism, evidenced daily by the constant stream of new abrasive realist speech 
making.  Aboutaleb spoke the hard talk of majority realism to his own supposed constituency.  But 
instead of appealing for calm and condemning the act by appeal  to commonly held religious norms, 
he used the opportunity to address the problem of the ‘unwilling’.  To all assembled he said that 
those unprepared to integrate should fit in or ‘pack your cases!’32 (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008) The 
significance of this speech was that it was aimed at several audiences.  One was the immediate 
audience in the mosque which expressed a mixture of confusion and anger at the speech, another 
was the native audience, and yet another was the Dutch press.  
Using language involves diverse speakers producing text for diverse audiences.  The significance of 
utterance may not be immediately clear, since there is always a question about who the speaker 
might be said to represent, and what kind of audience she is intending to reach.  Interrogating the 
text produced helps produce more precise complexes of meaning.  Yet Discourse Analysis requires 
many texts to establish significance, so that processes of predication, pre-suppositioning and subject 
positioning can be reliably identified.  
                                                          
32 ‘koffers pakken!’ 
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In this methodology section principles adopted to guide research methods can best be understood in 
terms of what is taken seriously and how seriously.  Agency and structure are understood to be 
mutually constitutive, but variable in context.   So neither agents nor the structures they must 
negotiate are abstract to begin with, they are embedded in their ideational and material contexts.  
Agents are subjects who are both cognitive and reflexive.  Their actions are intelligible – as opposed 
to being mere behaviours - because they are inescapably embedded in contexts of meaning 
consisting of intentions, beliefs and settings.  (MacIntyre, 1981:208)  
Language users create text, that is, they make purposive statements, yet underlying these 
productions are complexes of meanings or discourses.  Language analysis of lexis and grammar alone 
will not help understand the meaning or the discourses exposed in what is said.  (Widdowson, 2007) 
Knowledge of discourse is therefore required.  Language requires contextual knowledge, knowing 
how the game is played and which game is being played.  Wittgenstein expressed using language as 
making ‘moves in a game’ (Wittgenstein, 1953) knowing the rules, knowing the moves to make, ‘how 
to go on’.  But understanding language as rule governed games, although delivering an important 
insight, still does not say how these rules come to be the rules used in any particular game or how 
they change.  Language as text requires extensive contextual knowledge of discourses.  How for 
example, is language used to express particular moral purposes but not others? Here the language of 
moral talk must be contextualised and given a historical location.  This language is about knowing the 
rules of this game and requires a contextualising which reaches through, the game, to the perhaps 
religious purposes or telos of the speaker.  All moral talk and understanding has a historical location 
in political events.  (MacIntyre, 1981) Given that the language user may have a religious 
weltanschauung means employing sets of particular concepts with emotional attachments and 
memories.  Although there will be change, the subjects may display stability and continuity in ways 
which are not quite in keeping with fractured identity and modernist segmentation of the self.  
Insofar as subjects express religious purposes there may be continuities and stabilities.  The role of 
religious/communal belonging is significant as stabilizing subjectivities.   
The key methodological principles used in this work are prioritising subjectivity and framing that 
subjectivity in contexts of inter-subjective meaning production.  Dealing with Muslim subjectivities 
within integration discourse therefore requires taking religion seriously.  In the hermeneutical 
tradition, the emphasis in research is on understanding - how human subjects order their 
experiences and how they relate this to an external world of reality.  This ordering of experience 
takes place through personal and collective negotiation of social and political space.  Even the most 
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isolationist or quietist responses to integration requirements still involve negotiations, since there 
are no empty socio-political spaces.  They are always in this world.  Negotiations must take place 
since the religious or cultural meaning world of belonging must come to terms with – some might 
read integrate into - institutionalised practices.  To seek therefore to understand something of 
Muslim worlds of meaning – refracted through their religious, cultural and ethnic particularities – 
and to show how they are being negotiated through integration and security discourses, I employ 
rich descriptions,  seeking all the while, to stretch my own capacity to understand from the inside.  
(Hollis and Smith, 1990)  
Working with live data – a constructivist grounded theory approach 
In this section the methods employed to find and analyse data will be examined.  Methods are, in the 
first place, the procedures which were used to gather rich data and secondly the methods employed 
to analyse and enrich gathered data.  
 ‘All is data!’ Glaser famously asserted, (Glaser, 2002) and is a statement which seems, to begin with, 
overly indulgent.  It   gives, perhaps, the impression that the stuff of research is everywhere.  It might 
also give the impression that it is easy to find and gather since it must be just lying around.  This 
might, in turn, seem to trivialise what data is, and how much labour goes into the process of 
gathering and interpreting it.  However, Glazer is seeking to express the opposite view: that what 
might seem to be trivial, is in fact significant for research.  His statement also underlines the 
multivariate nature of data.  It may be comprised of many different things: interview transcripts, 
notes, conversations and memos.33  The researcher makes data, according to Richards, by focusing 
on texts (spoken and written), events and processes, recording them and considering their meaning 
for research.  (Richards, 2005) Text becomes data when it is regarded as relevant for the research 
project.  What is important then, is not the catch-all impression of Glazer’s declarative statement, 
but the important advice not to trivialise what you may have to work with.  Texts, as meaningful 
statements are made into data by deciding their relevance and recording it.  Text becoming data is 
about relevance and that is decided by research questions and their attendant puzzles.  “What’s 
required is a body of data from which you can derive an adequate answer to your research question, 
one sufficiently rich to provide a new understanding of the situation being studied. ” (Richards, 
2005:33) Data is not passive.  
                                                          
33 Appendix four data sources describes the range of data used in this research. 
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In contrast to quantitative research where research design is bolted to the ground before the process 
of data gathering and analysis begins, the aims of this work was to incorporate flexibility into the 
research design.  This was to facilitate both some creative ‘learning by doing’ and to allow for 
corrections that might be felt necessary as the project developed.  A Grounded Theory approach was 
chosen which offered the promise of “flexible guidelines rather than rigid prescriptions. ” (Charmaz, 
2006:15).  Although Grounded Theory is generally considered to rest on an objectivist research 
methodology, it has been adapted and used in constructivist research as well.  It offers a non-
determinist approach with its injunction to let the data lead, rather than making the data fit pre-
determined categories.  It encourages an attitude of openness.  Being prepared to let data re-shape 
original ideas, concepts and categories is a healthy research attitude at the heart of using Grounded 
Theory within critical constructivist Discourse Analysis approaches.   When Glaser says Grounded 
Theory is “a theory of resolving a main concern” the main concern or the discourse can also be 
understood as constructed within contexts.  By using Grounded Theory principles, and methods - 
comparing data, constructing categories and describing their relationships, reintroduction of these 
back into data - more abstract and general theory is allowed to develop and emerge.     
Grounded Theory works on a shuttle principle, in which the collected data is coded.  When interview 
transcripts were examined a dense coding approach was first employed.  Coding segments of data 
and comparison of data across cases, helped to develop categories and then it was sought to develop 
a process of reflecting upon the data, returning to data, reviewing coding and categories, revising 
relationships etc; In this way the aim, in accordance with Grounded Theory principles, was to achieve 
both closeness and abstraction from data.  These dual processes happened throughout the research 
process.  As new puzzles occurred, new investigations began with closer interrogations of data and 
re-examinations of original ideas.  In this way the intention was to not only read the data but to 
enrich it through analytical abstraction.   
By encouraging interviewees to express what they thought integration was, a bank of concepts or 
categories was built up; for example integration as participation, finding space, achieving public 
visibility.  The process of coding began in a simple way for example beginning with integration, 
various meanings people gave to it were coded: integration means participation, integration means 
acceptance, integration means fitting in, integration means fitting in but with the right to identity, 
etc;  these were then compared these with general or official discourse understandings and it was 
found that although the emphasis was on programmatic integration there were accompanying 
emphases on cultural identity retention.  What was the purpose of this? Was this simple 
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multicultural lip service? Returning to the data with initial puzzles and theories it was possible to 
surface other less obvious meanings.   Through this, shuttle process theory emerged.  Employing a  
shuttle procedure meant entering into the data with theory, but through moving back and forth 
between theory and data a process of refinement occurred and new insights and interpretations 
developed.   
From 2007 on I began coding broad discursive topics in academic literature and various public media 
– newspapers, government publications, party programmes – was carried out.  Aware of coding 
proliferation, a common pitfall, and the danger is losing proximity to data, I began densely coding 
transcripts and other relevant documents.  This was followed by questioning the codes, merging 
some, letting others drop.  The critical reading or enriching of data brought a lot of coding 
alterations. Copies of early coding were made and subsequently some comparisons were made to 
map development.  Reducing to manageable sets I then set about defining relations between the 
coded texts.  Coding, refining coding, reading and re-reading data, delineating relationship between 
codes defines relations and lead to categorisation and more theoretical abstraction.  From surface 
text analysis the process of coding and defining relations lead to a more abstract categorisation of 
material.   
Most interviews were conducted in English, standard German34 and Swiss German.35  Most Dutch 
interviews were conducted in English, or with English translation.   
Beginning with general research questions, core theories were used to guide the early phases of the 
research.  For example, the prominence of the term ‘integration’ seemed to point out a powerful 
underlying security discourse which particularly involved Muslims. In connection with integration 
fears of Muslim radicalisation, of demographic change and imbalance, of Muslim alienated 
underclass were brought up.  Another facet of this security discourse had to do with existential 
concerns about the public visibility of religion and its challenge to underlying assumptions of 
secularism.  Connections such as these framed initial thoughts and intuitions.  
Questions were framed around these intuitions and the aim, in a second phase of research, was to 
be open to the data and to hone and tauten the original questions.  For example, one way in which 
                                                          
34 hochdeutsch 
35 Schwizzerdütsch 
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data had spoken, was a greater concern with radicalisation than terrorism with regards to Muslim 
populations.  In Germany this deeper concern of a growing alienated underclass was understood to 
be strongly entrenched across the political spectrum. (Laurischk MdB, 2008)36 Conditions for 
radicalisation were understood to be present, but it was considered not yet at a crisis stage so that it 
was thought that many problems could be tackled effectively through structural tweaking. From this 
a strong narrative developed in which security perplexities were expressed with regard to Muslims 
and Muslim immigrants and its solution were seen to lie in their adjustment through integration. 
(Bauerbach, 2008)37  Additional data gathered in Berlin 2008 served to confirm my initial thoughts 
that integration as developing a range of projects and programmes was also preventive security 
practice.  
Of texts and connections – rendering discourse 
The term ‘discourse’ in this research covers two levels of conceptual meaning: a narrower one 
relating to the complex of meanings underlying specific texts and a more expanded understanding of 
‘discourse’, as that which refers to networks of texts operating to produce and reproduce 
institutionalized or alternative meanings.   
Language becomes text when it is recognised to have been produced “for a communicative purpose. 
” (Widdowson, 2007:4) Text can therefore mean what is written or spoken and can be combined with 
sensory props, for example, images or incense.  To understand the meaning of text requires knowing 
how semantic meanings are encoded in the language’s lexis and grammar.  Extensive knowledge of 
encoding possibilities is the basis for undertaking analysis and theory building.  For example, how can 
one recognise instances of conversational implicatures – irony and understatement?  This requires 
more than a grasp of semantic meaning it requires an understanding what texts are doing, how they 
are indicating an underlying complex of meanings and purposes.   
                                                          
36 Frau Sybille Laurisck, is an FDP member of the German Parliament. For more information see Appendix two. 
37 Bauerbach is a pseudenoym for an Islam expert working for the BMI.  He is an adviser on Muslim matters and 
contributed significantly to the organisation of the DIK through agenda-setting, formulating German responses and analysis 
of the processes of the Conference.  He asked that the material he provided could be used for academic purposes but for 
no other public purposes.   
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Text and discourse are different.  They are distinguishable because textual analysis can remain in the 
region of analysing linguistic construction, and increasing the focus on language itself will not help 
understand discourse.  Discourse analysis is therefore not a kind of conversation analysis, but relates 
talk and the texts it produces to cognitive and social contexts, in which the words work to produce 
meaning.  (van Dijk, 2001) The communicative event is therefore underpinned with shared structures 
or rules.    
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CHAPTER FOUR Securing co-existence - habilitation, secularism and security 
In this chapter some of the meaning frames, in and through which Muslim identities are being 
constructed, will be looked at more closely.   
Multiculturalism and backlash 
Multiculturalism, as a pluralist habilitative model or strategy, occurs most prominently among the 
case studies in the Netherlands.  Only there was it officially sanctioned and understood to be a 
normative guide to policy design.  In this section the meanings which have been developed within its 
ideological-normative register will be dealt with only briefly and concentration will be more on how 
its eclipse, as part of the ‘backlash against difference’ and ‘integration failure’ frames Integration as 
the most recent officially sanctioned habilitative strategy in all three case studies.   
Inglis distinguishes three registers or levels of analysis of multiculturalism:  demographic-descriptive, 
ideological-normative and programme-policy.  (Inglis, 1996) Multiculturalism can therefore be 
approached sociologically as an ‘on-the-ground’ reality, it may be understood and analysed from a 
political perspective as embodying sets of norms such as toleration, or from a critical perspective, as 
a programme for emancipation, and lastly it can be approached and examined as Government policy 
clusters or more generally as official discourse.  Analysis of multiculturalism is often a juxtaposition of 
all three approaches.  (Wieviorka, 1998) Likewise as defining discourse it combines and draws from 
all three levels.  It has been especially contested on the second level as an ideological-normative 
approach to co-existence and diversity.   
Equality, recognition and emancipation are at the core of multiculturalism’s ideological-normative 
register, so that multicultural difference recognition is about ‘difference affirming equality’ together 
with respect, recognition and identity.  (Modood, 2003:106) This ideal has been drawn upon to 
create greater equality and meet the core human rights demands of indigenous peoples, sub-state 
nation groups and immigrant groups.  Multiculturalists have argued for the need to treat Muslims as 
a ‘religious community’, in much the same way as ethnic groups are considered communities.  In the 
Dutch case, which is dealt with in chapter five, ethno-religious recognition meant creating structures 
and providing resources for the protection of communities of identity.  This was and is still 
considered a vital route to achieve the normative goals of equality, recognition and emancipation.  
Multicultural discourse has been therefore, a means both of highlighting and rectifying 
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discriminatory practices by not only recognising individuals but also seeking to protect their contexts 
of meaning. (Kymlicka, 1995) 
In addition multicultural communities should relate to one another in terms of openness, self-
criticism and interaction.  (Parekh, 2000)  Yet the opposite has been the main criticism levelled at 
multiculturalism by diverse voices across the political spectrum.   Multiculturalism, has become 
central to a new dogma of ethnic corporatist failure, (Uitermark, 2005) and unites a range of 
conservative sceptics and disappointed liberal-left identity voices.  (Alibhai-Brown, 2000) (Ateş, 2008) 
They broadly converge to agree with the thesis that multiculturalism has led to social isolationism 
and segmentation.  Yet whereas liberal-left voices argue against a now elitist programme which has 
become distant to the needs of those who suffer the worst effects of difference - the poor, the 
unemployed, and youth - the former employ it to argue against the very notions of diversity itself 
which it was once thought to promote and protect.  The confluence of critical voices centres 
therefore, on multiculturalism as a difference-reinforcing dynamic (Barry, 2001) promoting self-
segregation and social dis-integration.  “Multiculturalism has led not to integration but to 
segregation.  It has allowed groups to live separately, with no incentive to integrate and every 
incentive not to.  It was intended to promote tolerance.  Instead the result has been that, in 
countries where it has been tried, societies are more abrasive, fractured and intolerant than they 
once were.” (Sacks, 2007)  
In Germany multiculturalism was employed in a rather specific way.  It had been co-opted into the 
liberal-left project to deconstruct exclusionary ethnicised definitions of belonging.   An elite project 
from the start, it was employed to justify the political goal of breaking up a strong ethnic ‘us’ ‘other’ 
dichotomy and to further the project of inventing ‘the post nation-state’ in a federalised Europe.  
Throughout, it remained an elite project, being debated and contested without directly involving 
immigrants in general, Muslim communities in particular, or benefiting from their activism.  This 
vicarious activism is attributable in part to the absence of citizenship together with its attendant 
political rights for immigrants.  As a result  “foreigner interests *were+ vicariously articulated by 
domestic groups and organisations, from the Green Party to the churches. ” (Joppke, 1996:474) This 
served to keep multiculturalism clearly boundaried.  It was throughout an intellectual debate 
involving only autochthonous intellectuals and political elites.  It has never been officially adopted by 
any German government as a socio-political programme and thus remained something 
unacknowledged.  (Kraus and Schönwalder, 2006) In Switzerland multiculturalism was, in many 
senses a reality but not consciously a part of any policy design.  (d’Amato, 2010) In the Netherlands it 
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had been the moral conscience of liberalism, aimed at protecting minority religious-cultural 
identities, and promoting broader tolerance of difference.  In common with Germany it was an elite 
project but one in which the keynote was a more relaxed co-existence.   
In the ‘post-multicultural era’, policy-making has been markedly different in the three case studies.  
Banting and Kymlicka’s policy index of strong or weak multiculturalism based on national policies, 
(Banting and Kymlicka, 2004) placed the Netherlands in the ‘modest’ mid-range category, but 
Germany  and Switzerland in the ‘weak’ or bottom-range.  This suggests that even although the 
Netherlands may have moved beyond Multiculturalism as an officially sanctioned approach to 
diversity and habilitation, it continues to create policies which are in effect multicultural.   
In Germany and Switzerland multiculturalism as an emancipatory or protective strategy, does not 
strongly impact policy-making and thus finds only feint expression in policy design.  Although Banting 
and Kymlicka’s policy-comparative approach is valuable in taking readings of sensitivities to the role 
of difference, it overlooks the extent to which politicisation and securitisation has distorted its core 
meanings.   In all cases regardless of actual policy making, it has become a powerful discursive tool, 
used to highlight the dangers of segmentation and isolation, and used to point out the threat to the 
viability and sustainability of democratic society and polity.   
Multiculturalism is ‘a backlash against difference’, (Grillo, 2005) it has become ‘scorched earth’ in the 
German context (Holzberger, 2008)38 it has been binned in the Netherlands and replaced with a post-
multicultural discourse of diversity.  (Uitermark, 2005) As the bête noire of public discourse, policies 
which seem too accommodating are derisively referred to as Multi-culti.  Demonised across the 
conservative political spectrum it is seen as the embodiment of naive over-indulgence and 
exaggerated tolerance.  Anti-discrimination legislation becomes a suffocating intolerance: ‘Tolerance 
as state decreed political correctness this is the spirit of Multikulti. ’ (Schönbohm, 2006)  
Voices which speak for multiculturalism as a proper means to an end – an effective way to fight 
structural inequalities, discrimination and racism - have become powerfully marginalised.  Those who 
argue that by valuing diversity and encouraging culture sampling, multiculturalism can be the vehicle 
for creating a new imaginary, are unheard.   (Bowen, 2004) If multiculturalism may be re-made to 
carry new conceptual loads, (Vasta, 2007) it is limited.  Although multiculturalism may not be the 
                                                          
38 M. Holzberger is expert and adviser to the Green party Bündnis 90 Die Grünen, for Asylum and Migration. In his position 
as policy adviser he has contributed significantly to the SPD-Green project of extending citizenship to resident foreigners. 
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concept of the moment, questions of religious and cultural diversity and finding ways to 
accommodate difference, still remain.   
Kymlicka has argued that the new master narrative of ‘the rise and fall of multiculturalism’ is only a 
partial narrative and covers over the degree of unevenness in its ebb and flow.  On the one hand it 
has been instrumental in achieving recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples and sub-nation 
groups, but where it has been problematical and where it has ‘fallen’ has been when its policies have 
been extended to immigrant groups and particularly immigrant Muslim groups.  Securitisation of 
Muslim communities - illegal immigration, anti-liberal traditionalism, anti-democratic attitudes, the 
growing burden on the welfare state – has been the chief contributory to its eclipse.  However 
multiculturalism has been important in recognition of Friesian and Danish groups in the Netherlands 
and Germany.  Only where security has entered the equation has it been reversed.  Only where 
ethnic politics have been de-securitised and where the security of the individual is secured, can 
multicultural citizenship succeed.  (Kymlicka, 2010) 
Assimilation and terminal visions 
Assimilation in the context of the three case studies is strongly suggestive of power asymmetries and 
in general carries a lot of negative charge.  Even in France which is usually referred to as 
‘assimilative’, prefers in official discourse, to refer to integration and insertion as defining the 
struggle against exclusion.  (Kastoryano, 2002) Germany has practiced assimilation in the past and 
the case of the Ruhr and Berlin Poles in the early twentieth century is emblematic of this approach.  
(Praszalowicz, 2006)  The term and concept in mainstream habilitative discourse, defines an 
envisioned isomorphic endpoint and policies which are non-negotiable, enforced and expressive of 
power abuse.  
As a starting point it may be helpful to look briefly at cyclical models which have been used to explain 
and assess the process of social assimilation.  In the early twentieth century several models were 
developed within the Chicago school.  Gordon, for example developed his „phases model“ in which 
successful integration was understood to be achieved in seven assimilative phases (Gordon, 1964)  
First cultural, in which changes in cultural patterns and attitudes reveal how the units align with the 
receiving system.  This is the first one in the process and precedes all the others which follow; second 
structural, which is evidenced in a joining and being accepted in groups and organisations; third 
marital, which examines the possibilities of being accepted as marriage partner; fourth 
identificational, which reveals the alteration in feelings of belonging and typically moves from 
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primary (ethnic) identification to that of the predominant group in the system; fifth attitude, which 
examines receptional behaviours, for example exploring significant are discriminatory judgment-like 
attitudes are; sixth behaviour, which explores the forms receptional discriminations take, here it is 
key to see what evidence there is of diminishing or complete disappearance of discrimination;  
seventh and last civil, which assess the degree of disappearance of values and power conflicts 
between ethnic groups.  
This model did not, beyond highlighting the primacy of the first phase, make any hard and fast 
sequential claims.  The various processes could be happening in any order, or simultaneously, and 
could be taking place in varying degrees.  Gordon was convinced nonetheless, that the most 
important phase would be the general acceptance of migrants and their possibility of membership in 
the primary groups and organisations of the receiving society.  As a model, it has been useful to 
break the assimilative process down into manageable sub-processes, but the model, unsurprisingly 
assumes a strong uni-directional dynamic, based on the expectation that incoming units will 
acculturate - will ‘naturally’ adopt the language, culture and adapt completely to the existent social 
structure.   
This kind of theorising assumes a material basis to both identity formation and processes of 
adaptation or assimilative integration.  In this respect is also an epistemological stance.  (Van den 
Berghe, 2005) In the European context, assimilation has been understood as normatively unsuitable, 
too compelling and representative of processes which end in the surrender of cultural and/or 
religious identity.  When it appears, it is often linked with the American ‘melting pot’ metaphor 
which envisions a vast process of absorption, in which the immigrant is the ingredient, the receiving 
society the pot, and the social processes of adjustment, the heat applied to effect melting.  The end 
of the story is that social pressures of settlement thin and liquefy immigrant distinctions, permitting a 
social osmosis to occur.  The endpoint or goal to be achieved is disappearance of what is considered 
foreign and alien or anything that embodies the qualities of deep otherness.  Assimilation may be 
considered therefore as the antithesis of pluralism, with its endpoint, disappearance into sameness.   
It is not surprising then, that the word assimilation is met with such resistance among those who 
advocate identity retention and its protection as a human right.  Even in France, which is the country 
most closely associated with the term in Europe, it is also considered taboo, representing anti-
democratic sentiment.  In the French context, the word assimilation has been replaced by integration 
or insertion and is officially sanctioned as the struggle against exclusion.  (Kastoryano, 2002)  
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Yet the concept and the ways in which it is used, are illuminating.  It has been retained and 
employed, much like multiculturalism to point out negative tendencies within other habilitative 
concepts and drawing attention to what are considered assimilative tendencies within integration 
policies.  It is used more to make a critical point than to seriously theorise a habilitative strategy or 
model.  Harris for example, refers to integration as veiled assimilation, nothing but a gloss for state 
power.  In this way he seeks to open up new avenues of questioning such as ‘what might integration 
be?’, ‘into what should we integrate?’ and ‘is there any choice?’ (Harris, 2004) Assimilation is used 
therefore as a critical tool or device to penetrate through what is understood to be something quite 
different.  Thus it may have analytical, political or securitising value in presenting an alternative 
meaning to official meaning or representation, and may be utilisable as a mobilising or warning 
device.  
Because assimilationism points to an envisioned endpoint of cultural homogenisation, it is perhaps 
easier to understand the power of Tacip Erdogan’s message to the Turkish community in Cologne in 
2008.  His statements were ostensibly directed at a large gathering of Turkish and Turco-Germans 
but it was clear that he was addressing German state elites.  When he declared “assimilation is a 
crime against humanity” he was setting demarcation lines on behalf of Muslims in Germany.  It was a 
warning that they ought not to tread too closely to assimilation in integration discourse.  The setting 
of this line, with the aid of the concept of assimilation sent a message to his immediate audience that 
all energies needed to be mobilised to oppose and resist any attempts at cultural enforcement.  In 
addition he placed assimilation in a transnational space, by referring to ‘a crime against humanity’ it 
was as well, a more global message and certainly it would have been registered in both Switzerland 
and the Netherlands.   
When we set Erdogan’s speech in the discursive context of Germany with its emphasis on German 
language proficiency as corner stone of ‘integration’ policy, it is difficult to overlook the implicit 
warning Erdogan makes, ‘do not push ‘integration’ too far toward assimilation’.  By referring to a 
natural right to mother language, and therefore the legitimacy of parents to teach Turkish to their 
children, (Ataman, 2008) Erdogan places the right to Turkish language on par with German language 
learning.  He does not discourage the latter, only warns that the one should not be at the expense of 
the other.  There is a strong instrumental logic as well, since learning German is the means to social 
upward mobility.  At a later function, Erdogan, in a discussion forum with Chancellor Merkel with 
young Turkish students, called for German state funding of Turkish high schools and for bringing 
teachers from Turkey to deal with the language needs of Turkish schoolchildren.  (Spiegel, 2008)  
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The Cologne speech was greeted with outrage from the German conservative political establishment, 
for though it was referred to as a ‘private event’ it took place before an audience 20 000 people.  As 
such it was considered an illegitimate political intervention.  In addition it took place against the 
tragic backdrop of a fire in Ludwigshafen in which nine Turkish people, five of which were children, 
died.  Fears were widespread that it was an arson attack, a reprise of the Mölln and Solingen attacks 
in the 1990s.  Hürriyet described the tragedy as the work of right wing extremists, as evidence of an 
anti-Turkish current, reinforced by a German government cover-up.   This was translated as ‘Germans 
want to get rid of Turks whichever way possible’.  Merkel attacked Erdogan’s understanding of 
‘integration’ which she defined as converging with the way of life in a country of settlement.  
Possession of German citizenship was to be a citizen without curtailment.  “The loyalty belongs to the 
German state.  Therefore I believe that we need, also with the Turkish president, to discuss this 
further. ”(Spiegel, 2008)39  
As this example shows, the term assimilation would seem to be of little theoretical value in itself but 
is still of critical and discursive worth.  Theoretically it has, as multiculturalism, been eclipsed, yet the 
sensitivities it ignites, show that it has a lot of calorific value.  Assimilation is and remains a strong 
securitiser of identities implicated in the fate of Muslims, as in Erdogan’s speech, if they remain un-
empowered or ineffective.  It is a concept which demarcates limits and signals resistance.    
Alba and Nee have argued against caricaturing assimilation and have pleaded for more intellectual 
generosity with regards to the concept.  It has not only to do with the decline of distinctions and 
difference at some ‘ultimate endpoint’ they argue, but also about ‘shrinking differences and social 
distances’.  (Alba and Nee, 1997) This rather misses the point however, since the roots of contention 
lie in the kinds of understanding that frame the kinds of ‘shrinkage’ envisaged in the first place and 
which motivate policy makers to engineer mechanisms to affect this.  Because the primary concerns 
with assimilation are less theoretical than moral, I disagree with Bosswick and Heckmann who feel it 
better to leave assimilation aside altogether, because it is always in need of defusing.  They argue for 
‘integration’ as a more technically suitable term one more “adequate for scientific purposes” 
(Heckmann and Bosswick, 2006:6).  This swapping of terms is however unsatisfactory, since it 
assumes that the conceptual meanings are simply interchangeable.  If simple load transference is 
their goal, they shouldn’t be surprised then when integration also eventually needs defusing.  To 
seek to sidestep mere emotional reactions, by claiming it only confuses, assumes that the very 
                                                          
39 my translation 
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reactionism itself is confusing.  They seek to neutralise reaction as if it is not somehow, an important 
part of the meaning of the term itself.   In contrast to their position I understand the conceptual and 
discursive meaning of the term assimilation, as crucially important as pointing out critical responses 
and signalling resistance.   
Integration as midpoint? 
Analytically, integration (as in all habilitative models) has a qualitative relational core.  Integration 
from a sociological perspective envisions stable relationships which are located in clearly defined 
social and political systems.  Qualitatively (although often merely reduced to functionality) 
relationships are maintained through cooperation and reciprocity, and the degree of openness or 
closed-ness may be thought of as reflective of the stabilities, definitions and qualities of relationship 
between units, and between units and systems.  Integration can therefore be thought to be "…that of 
strengthening relationships within a social system, and of introducing new actors and groups into the 
system and its institutions.  The integration of immigrants is primarily a process: if this process 
succeeds, the society is said to be integrated. " (Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003:2)  
What constitutes success and qualitatively how should it be assessed? It is important to 
conceptualise integration not only as processual, but as working within discursively envisioned or 
defined endpoints as ‘desired end positions’.  (Bijl, Zorlu et al., 2008:200) According to this it may 
therefore, be intelligible to say: ‘a society is integrated’ or ‘I am fully integrated!’ if the processes 
have led to defined endpoints.  Yet working with ‘integration’ as an analytical term is not 
automatically to accept or reinforce any possible discursive or ideologically set endpoints.  Holding 
negotiation to be necessary to its conceptual architecture will require providing definitions and 
justifications about what immigrants and allochtones more generally, ought to integrate into.  Nor 
are there any a priori commitments to there being endpoints, since negotiations need never reach 
completely agreed upon endpoints.  Indeed, given the fluidities and open-endedness of which post-
modern identity theory makes us aware, it is likely that there will only the non-completable work of 
definition, re-definition and contestation.  Putting these assumptions into the conceptual toolbox will 
mean that it is not such a ‘treacherous metaphor’ as Banton has claimed it to be.  (Banton, 2001) 
Normative changes on what endpoints might be or the best ways to reach these will be ongoing 
sometimes proving vulnerable or resilient to politicisation or securitisation.  The understanding of 
integration as sets of visions and habilitative processes may point to underlying discursive power 
strategies which characterise phases of social change, (Engbersen, 2003) but they are at most 
pointers to changing practices or interim positions and transits on the way to proposed endpoints.  
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Heckmann has provided four habilitative core categories through which to organise the otherwise 
confusing array of different processes involved in integration:  structural  to do with  acquiring rights 
and memberships within the core institutions of the receiving society; cultural when immigrants 
learn the system’s cultural script;  interactive when immigrants weave thick webs of cross community 
social contacts; lastly identificational as choosing emotionally and imaginatively to possess society.  
(Heckmann and Schnapper, 2003) Integration is understood throughout as sets of inter-linked socio-
political projects located at multiple levels it functions therefore, as a covering term constructed 
through the ‘big issues’ and intimately connected with Muslim habilitiation.   
Although the purpose here is not to investigate citizenship in depth but rather to treat it as an 
important political project of one or more habilitative strategies, its prominence, as significantly 
altering the temporal boundaries of presence will be examined.  Citizenship is part of integration 
discourse in the three case studies under inspection, and emphasised by elites and immigrants alike, 
as a key moment or endpoint on the way to belonging.  The seemingly easy connection of citizenship 
and national belonging however seems to suggest a fairly stable kind of relationship – that is, that 
citizenship is closely linked with belonging to the nation - it can however be quite variable.  (Elay and 
Palmowski, 2008) Yet within the understandings of integration, developing from the 1980s to date, it 
is consistently connected to an integrated belonging.   
To begin with the acquisition of citizenship is generally mapped out along two pathways: an ethnic 
one, centring on the filiative principle of ius sanguinus and a civic-territorial one, based on the 
principle of ius soli/domicili.  Citizenship is therefore understood to contain both an inclusive and 
exclusive dynamic.  Citizenship may be theorised as being essentially a set of equal rights extended to 
citizens and therefore inclusive, and citizenship as belonging to the nation-state and therefore 
excluding foreigners.  The individualism of rights and the communitarianism of belonging underline 
citizenship as essentially dualistic.  (Joppke, 2005) As such it may be appropriated by actors for 
different purposes across the political spectrum.  (Faulke, 2000)  
Citizenship when it appears in habilitative discourse also reveals a normative dualism centring on 
rights and duties which sit in internal tension.  Interviewees were quick to point out the 
conditionality this expresses: “No duties without rights” and “No rights without duties”.  “There 
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cannot be duties without rights”.  (Cebo, Sengül et al., 2008)40 This duality of norms and logics has 
however always been mixed forms, with malleable core meanings.  They have been, and remain, 
“flexible legal mechanisms that allow multiple interpretations and combinations, and states … have 
generally not hesitated to modify these rules if they saw a concrete need for or interest in it. ” 
(Joppke, 2005:87) In Switzerland and the Netherlands dual citizenship has been understood and 
accepted as part of integration meaning, but in Germany this has been contested so that mono-
citizenship remains its central fixture.  In the latter case it has come to be characterised as a politics 
of reluctance (Keskin, 2005) and issues of indivisible loyalty.  (Angelow, 2008)41 
The danger with placing the defining issues at the forefront of integration is that its meaning may be 
subverted by on-the-ground practices.  I have argued for example that it is distinguished from other 
habilitative models by the degree of negotiation.  This has broad rhetorical resonance, since 
integration is commonly defined as a two way process.  Yet instances of unequal power serve to 
subvert meaning and to render it either as status quo theorising or mere idealism.  So in habilitative 
discourse integration may mean theoretically "… that the migrant has to adjust to Dutch society, and 
Dutch society has to adjust to the cultures of the minorities.  But in fact, this is more a romantic idea 
than a reality.  We know from our research that, in reality, integration is a one-way process. " (Radio 
Nederland Wereldomroep, 2008)  
To place integration as discourse, mid way between laissez-faire and assimilative approaches,  is 
obviously a very (too) simplified rendering but integration is quite obviously not assimilation, 
although there are frequent criticisms to the contrary, and it is not laissez-faire, as an excerpt of a 
speech by Horst Köhler President of  Germany might serve to illustrate: “Considering the experiences 
we have had with cultural and confessional conflicts in our history, we must be adamant about 
civilized standards being adhered to among us, standards as set forth, for instance, in our Basic Law. 
                                                          
40 C. Cebo leader of this interview group, is project coordinator at the Alevi national headquarters in Cologne. For more 
information see Appendix two. 
41 Dr. J. Angelow is responsible for political programme content and analysis in the CDU national party.  He is also an 
adviser to the government in the field of domestic politics and is co-responsible for policy development on the issues of 
immigration and integration.  He is chairman of one of three special commissions
4141
 within the CDU for ‘Domestic politics 
and integration’, and as such has been a key contributor to setting new emphases in the integration politics of the present 
German government.  
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42 Without a common basis, coexistence is not possible.  No group of people may be excluded from 
society, but also no group of people may exclude itself.  “ (Köhler, 2004: Section III)43  
In this short extract by the President of Germany we can see a number of interesting facets of elite 
understandings of integration.  First there is a clear delineation of non-negotiability and second an 
anti-segregationist position.  These provide the basic tones of this speech.  No group (Muslim group) 
may occupy its own exclusive spaces.  It is to be understood that there can only be shared space.  
With this statement it is clear that integration as inclusion means an end to the freedom to choose 
exclusion.  This significantly alters the notion of choice and voluntarism.  There can be no self-chosen 
or self-imposed isolation and thus ‘you are not free, not to integrate’.   Because this is constructed 
against a background of uneven power, and integration application, it must be understood as not 
being meant to apply equally to the whole population.  In other words the implication of compulsion 
in Köhler’s integration talk, is clearly not aimed at the majority population - who as the secure 
majority, will continue to be free to involve themselves or not - but at minorities and in particular 
Muslims.  If the logic of integration is one of inclusion then it too can be used to become a 
disciplinary instrument for minorities.  Yet insofar as this is the case, it will work with an internal 
contradiction, since integration, by definition, must be negotiated and must continue to work with 
notions such as solidarism, voluntarism and good will.   
Köhler’s equation speaks not only about non-optional inclusion but touches on wider issues such as 
accessibility.  If integration is a disciplining or security discourse then accessibility must be ensured to 
Muslim communities.  Immigrant women44 are one group in integration discourse, which have been 
identified as key agents of access.   As integration transmitters they need to translate societal values 
and norms to families and indirectly to communities.  The motto of a high level Dutch commission 
was “Educate a woman and you educate a family!” Relationality is the key, since wives, mothers, 
sisters and daughters will be transmitters of Dutch values within the family and indirectly to the 
larger Muslim communities.  (Commission for the Participation of Women from Ethnic Minorities 
(PaVEM), 2005) Likewise, in Germany immigrant women are understood to have a key role to play in 
the integration of their families into German society.  Because they are seen as bridges between 
                                                          
42 The German Constitution is referred to as the Basic Law 
43 my emphasis 
44 as well as Muslim Organisations 
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families and society, special courses are offered to women and girls, which are tailored to help them 
to plan and manage their lives better.  These special courses precede any other integration courses.  
(BMI, 2008)  
In this section I have argued for maintaining analytical distinctions in habilitative models and 
strategies.  Assimilation, pluralism (multiculturalism) and integration should all be analytically distinct 
with recognisable meaning cores.  Whereas integration has in the past been used as a cover-all term 
it has tended to lead to confusion. 45 Habilitative meanings are deeply contested, which has to do 
with formulating differing and conflicting imaginaries or envisionings of endpoints and the measures 
needed to get there.  All of this must be negotiated which requires an ongoing questioning of 
‘society’s operative values’ (Parekh, 2000:267) The integrity of ‘integration’ is therefore in 
maintaining the will to negotiate within delimiting non-negotiables, managing a variety of agendas 
such as participation, inclusion, equal rights and securing accessibility.  Integration, as it has been 
developing since the 1990s, and defined and re-defined by political elites, is one of negotiation 
within clearly circumscribed national standards, practices, norms and values.  But integration is not 
only about processes and endpoints but also effective transmission and implementation.  Here 
Muslim organisations and women are considered to perform important bridging functions.  
Secularism a hostile meta-narrative? 
In the preceding treatment of habilitative models, the aim was to establish some conceptual 
distinction between core terms and to indicate how there might be discursive and critical justification 
for such an analytical sharpening and location of terms.  A layer of complexity will now be added to 
the meaning of habilitation, and the ideology of Secularism46 will be introduced as this point.  Of 
particular interest will be the power of Secularism to minoritise Muslim identities.  It will be argued 
that Secularism, as a central operative values, is implicated in representation of Muslim identities as 
                                                          
45 see Roy Jenkins’ equation of integration with multiculturalism and Otto Schily’s with assimilation.  
46 My understanding and usage of terms:  secular refers to an ‘epistemic space’ (Shakman Hurd 2007:13) Secularism an 
ideology which is most simply described as a way of 'looking at this world in this world' (Tinney , 2005) This  has both 
individual and institutional expressions.  (Kosmin and Keysar,, 2007) Secularisation is a sociological theory which posits an 
inversely proportional dynamic at work in modernisation - the more modernised a society, the more secularised it will be i. 
e.  people become less religious across a range of cognitive and ideational categories - attitudes, beliefs, emotions, 
imagination which leads inevitably to diminished social importance for institutionalised religion.   
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a collectivity with the potential to subvert both institutionalised secular separations and secular 
social integrity.   
Asad shows some of the weaknesses in analysing religion as ‘an autonomous essence’, as a 
‘transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon’.  He argues that failing to establish this, the 
accompanying conceptual separation of ‘religion’ from ‘power’ becomes more properly a product of 
post-Reformation European history.  If religion cannot be universally defined in this way, then the 
very attempt at such definition is itself an historical product of discursive processes.  (Asad, 1993) In 
this way any religion or secularism are products of their specific context.  ‘Islam’ becomes a 
contextually linked definition, unique to its historical and social construction and as such underlines 
both contingency and mutability.  Changing conceptions of Islam were indicated by El Boujoufi47 
when, in his interview, he emphasised that when he came to the Netherlands as a young man, ‘Islam 
was something exotic; people wanted to explore its ideas and learn how I practised it’.  (el Boujoufi, 
2008) In a similar vein Mintjes48 emphasised how he registered a clear mood change in his 
autochthonous audiences.  In his Islam lectures, in the pre- 9/11-Fortuyn-van Gogh period, there was 
general curiosity and greater willingness to understand.  More recently he found that interest was 
still there, but it was mixed with a lot of suspicion and rejectionism too.  (Mintjes, 2008) As indicated 
in chapter two, it is necessary to understand Islam is a societal construct and one which is employed 
in ulteriorisation and identity compression practices such as synecdoche.  Accepting a non-
essentialised understanding of religion and secularism implies therefore a de-essentialised 
understanding of the people defined by such terms.  The term ‘people of religion’ is employed 
therefore as a loosely descriptive category which includes both those who are strongly religious 
(believing and practising) as well as those whose connection is more casual.  People of religion may 
also be secular in the sense of accepting secular institutional arrangements, or secularised as in those 
who have more individualised beliefs, but choose to identify themselves as Muslim. 
                                                          
47 D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest officially 
recognised top-level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands.  For more information see Appendix two. 
48 H. Mintjes is a member of The Protestant Churches in the Netherlands and is active in The Dutch Council of Churches 
which is an umbrella of various Protestant churches. He is chairman of an Interfaith sub-committee responsible for 
fostering good relations with Muslims, and is involved in framing inter-faith dialogue, writing policy documents, and giving 
lectures.  
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Secularism, as an ideology, creates a framework of principles, order sets of central and peripheral 
concepts through which claims and justifications are made.  (Steger, 2005) To "know what ideologies 
actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to 
look closely at their discursive manifestations. " (van Dyke, 1998:6) that is how, through text 
production they are articulated and transmitted.   Ideologies as generators of knowledge and belief 
(often action), create and draw upon networks of meaning, norms and values as well 
presuppositions, predications and subject positionings.  (Doty, 1993) In addition as Ricoeur has 
pointed out, ideology serves to distort, legitimate [the ruling  authority] and integrate, since 
“ideology provides society with stability as it creates, preserves, and protects the  societal identity of 
persons and groups … ideology supplies  the symbols, norms and images that go into the process of 
assembling and holding together individual and collective identity. ” (Ricoeur in Steger, 2005:7) In 
this sense Secularism, may be understood as  not only an historical arrangement of concepts but a 
subjectivity producer, (Barnett and Duvall, 2005) These two understandings are central to what 
comes.  
It is important to recognise that there is not one single Secularism but as many Secularisms as 
national legal frameworks.  (Ventura, 2007) Cesari, for example, provides a topography of secularism 
types which approximate to the kinds of historical arrangements European states have arrived at: 
cooperative – states and church cooperate; separative – the state establishes separation from 
religion; and a third more unitary variant49 of state and a state religion.  (Cesari, 2003) Muslims in 
their identity negotiation are unavoidably confronted by one of these secularisms.  Although none of 
the cases dealt with are ‘pure’ Laïc examples, they are generally considered examples of the more 
cooperative types, the two dynamics are often co-present so that separative and cooperative logics 
are at work in the same environments.  
Although religion and secularism are contextualised it does not mean that their abstracted terms are 
unintelligible.  However, it is necessary alongside the abstract meaning analysis, which will now be 
presented, to keep in mind that the terms are expressed and receive their particular inflections in 
discourse. 50   
                                                          
49 The third variety of secularism involving a state religion does not occur in this study.  
50 Understanding that discursive meanings derive from conceptualisations and abstractions helps avoid nominalism.  
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Secularism’s meaning cores have mutated several times (Taylor, 2009) within the specific historical 
and social contexts of its development.  Its normative meaning has migrated from a simple 
differentiation between profane and transcendent in a unified medieval meaning world, through 
‘freedom of religion’ in a religiously diversifying early modern period, to ‘freedom from religion’ in 
the late modern period.  In a postulated post-modern phase the global resurgence of religion, 
returning from secularly imposed exile (Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003) is thought by some to be 
ushering in a ‘post-secular’ era.  
In the early medieval period the term saeculum had been taken over from the Roman understanding 
of epochal measurement, and was made to function within new processes of identification.  It served 
as a differentiating segregating mechanism within the institution of the Church, and did this by 
drawing a key distinction between profane and transcendental times, spaces, and the subjects who 
served in those dimensions.  As such it can be thought of as a division or categorisation of time, 
space and labour.  As a discursive predication it served to distinguish a higher order from a lower 
order of priests.  Secular priests served in the mundane time-space continuum, but the saeculum 
priests served in a higher order.  Withdrawal from secular time and space was a key to fulfilling this 
function.  They withdrew from this world, (Casanova, 1994) (Taylor, 2009) from the occupations, 
occupants and immanent God-lessness of this sphere.  As subject-positioning, the lower order was a 
mundane priest the higher order a withdrawn and holy priest.  The presupposition underlying this 
was a worldliness and world that was God-less, set against a holiness of time and space in which 
closeness to God, the higher telos, was found in withdrawal.  
Secularism had its beginnings in early medieval, European, Christian contexts.  Its narrative set within 
institutionalised religion, within the ‘living tradition’ of the congregation.  It was concerned primarily 
with distinctions and divisions of labour within a hierarchical structure or subject positioning, and 
was based on powerful assumptions defining a unified weltanschauung.   This kind of distinguishing 
arrangement however was not unique to Christianity similar differentiations took place, were made 
and had practical application in other religions.  (Asad, 2003)  
A first seismic shift in the meaning of secularism took place in the European context, as a 
consequence of religion’s destructive involvement in the eponymous ‘wars of religion’.  When 
religious fragmentation became irreversible, sectarianism propelled the European world into its 
longest and most exhausting war.   Its scale of destruction remains difficult to fathom - liquidation of 
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populations,51 economic devastation and national bankruptcy were the results.  Medievalism’s 
conceptual foundations were displaced and the meaning of the concept of ‘secular’ was also set in 
motion.  (Keane, 2000:6) The term started to shed some of the normative potency of early 
medievalism, connected with its narrower and deeply religious hierarchical structure.  It became less 
a signifier for Godless-ness and through predicative extension to stand for property, possession and 
the transferral of rights.  ‘Secular’ became re-moulded, re-worked within a new world of religious 
diversity, Otherness, political change and accommodation.  As it had moved on the shifting political 
sands, it eventually settled within a multi-religious co-existential and habilitative set of 
arrangements.   
If the peace of Westphalia created the first nation-states then it came also to define a complex multi-
national accommodation or settlement, as a way of ensuring European peace and coexistence and 
defining a new international society.  Secularism altered normatively moving away from narrower 
negative understandings to more positive ones.  Secularism, the separation of religion out of political 
considerations, was considered necessary and sufficient to create socio-political space for co-
existence in religiously diversified Europe.  This supposed power practice of excluding religion from 
power and politics, created emotional distance which sustained a suspension of ‘the religious’ in the 
practice of politics.  The practices of making and keeping the peace, became equivalent to the notion 
of being obliged to keep religion privatised, or invisibilised.  All of this rested on what Thomas calls 
‘the Westphalian presumption’ (Thomas, 2005) that religion was privatisable and separable from 
political power, and necessary for (international) peace and society.  The meaning world of 
secularism (and religion) moved or re-located from a religious to a properly secular sphere, 
(Casanova, 1994) and became the habilitative model for a post-war Europe and international society.  
In a second mutation, taking place in the early modern period, the meaning of secularism started to 
re-pole this time toward the idea of thinking apart from the divine and transcendent worlds.  This 
became a process of encapsulation, narrowing of imagination and imaginaries to secular realist 
conceptions of what could be relevant. 52 Ways of constituting the secular through rational thinking 
                                                          
51 Some estimates place population depletion at 10-30% in certain regions of Germany, Württemberg it is estimated lost up 
to 75% of its total population.  
52 The secular as an epistemic space defined what could be relevant as in this world and the move to there is only this world 
was a next logical step.    
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came to be exclusionary, and in empiricism its epistemological refinement came to be exclusively: 
observing this world because only this world is observable.  In this time of philosophical and scientific 
ferment, secularism was understood to have emerged out of the ‘Enlightenment’.  In this narrative 
religion became displaced and replaced by science as ‘the more efficient technology’.  (Smith, 2008) 
This moved the conceptual rationale or logic, from co-existence through suspension and segregation, 
to co-existence through separation.  As Sayyid has pointed out, this mutation involved not only a 
territorial but also an ontological and epistemological separatism.  (Sayyid, 2009) Secularism as 
separatism became a hegemonic knowledge regime, in which new social theories of modernisation 
and secularisation became dominant and self-fulfilling prophecies.  (Casanova, 2009) “Rather than 
recognizing *…+ religious and secular pluralisms and the multiple European modernities, the 
dominant discourses in Europe prefer to hold on to the idea of a single secular modernity, emerging 
out of the Enlightenment. ” (Casanova, 2006:66)  
Secularism may be understood as a hegemonic knowledge regime, a habilitative model, a normative 
framework, and a social movement.  In all of these, the state no longer possesses a religious purpose:  
“the state upholds no religion, pursues no religious goals, and religiously-defined goods have no 
place in the catalogue of ends it promotes. ” (Taylor, 1998:35) This is not to say that the secular state 
or society is morally neutral, it retains its moral purposes, as Smith argues “Western society is an 
ethics society because it is fundamentally preoccupied with ethical questions. ” (Smith, 2008)  
Secularism and religion stand in relation to one another, “the secular, as a concept, only makes sense 
in relation to its counterpart, the religious”, (Casanova, 1994) so that the religious is what secularism 
is not.  (Connolly, 1999) The latter rendering of their relationality might be considered an 
exaggerated reading in which the relationship is always in a zero-sum situation.  It does however 
indicate that the relationship is not a neutral positionality but one of securitised relationality.  This 
produces (and is produced by) oppositional binaries, whose power is evidenced in iterative usage: to 
articulate sets values and identities in opposition, so that alternative positions and imaginaries are 
closed down; simplifying what is complex; providing mechanisms which can be manipulated for 
political purposes.  To deconstruct secularism and religion, sacred and profane  the sine qua non of 
opening up space for alternatives, (Shakman Hurd, 2007)  
In identifying its normative self and by default its religious other, secularism makes certain kinds of 
‘predication, presupposition and subject positioning’ possible and thus constituting a „mechanism 
that creates background knowledge and in so doing constructs a particular kind of world in which 
certain things are recognised as true. “ (Doty, 1993:306) Insofar as secularism can construct and 
74 
 
transmit oppositional meanings, religion becomes the "… domain of the violent, the irrational, the 
undemocratic, the 'other'. " (Hurd, 2004:237)  Drawing on its established relationality, the 
oppositional mechanism associates secularism with the best guarantor for peace, equality and 
tolerance.   One may be drawn to stronger conclusions: that religion does not reliably produce peace, 
equality and tolerance, and possibly even something more fundamental, that it cannot and never 
could.   In this way secularism frames political agendas by "…mark*ing+ out the domain of the 
'secular' and associat[ing] it with public authority, common sense, rational argument, justice, 
tolerance and the public interest" (Hurd, 2004:239) 
Iris Young has criticised liberalism’s understanding and insistence on ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ as 
the best strategy to meet difference and redress injustice.  She argued that it is a fallacy, for if justice 
means being blind to difference, how can it tackle unjust practices aimed at those who are different.  
Ignoring difference is merely to screen the injustice in the treatment of difference.   Commitment to 
a ‘fetish of procedural neutrality’ legitimates and cements in place, the predominance of central 
(liberal) collectivities over marginal others, and in this sense it is self-serving.  Fairness means getting 
to the roots of disparity which must include jettisoning the supposedly uniform public space and 
recognising its occupation with culturally different subjects, thus bringing those that are marginalised 
and subordinated to a place where they can be publicly respected and legitimated.  She emphasises 
the ontological significance of groups, yet seeks to emphasise the contingent nature of relationships 
and the fluidity of boundaries; in this she differs from tendencies to essentialise cultural community 
and difference.  The heterogeneous public sphere should be the guiding framework for both the 
common good and social justice - a middle way between any separatism of subaltern groups and a 
liberal uniform dominance.   
Connolly too has drawn attention to how secularism and liberalism are intimately connected.  
Although not reducible to one another, secularism needs to be understood as but one perspective 
among others in a pluralistic culture.  (Connolly, 1999) He argues therefore for a new openness, for a 
de-centred pluralism which re-considers the ‘sacralised’ founding myths and narratives which bound 
identities and underpin majority-centred liberal democracies.  (Connolly, 2005) In a similar vein Asad 
has pointed out that secularism in European discourse is oversimplified when presented as merely 
separation, neutrality and equidistance.  He argues that it is also exclusionary, defines religion in 
ways which conceals its own shortcomings and works through sets of contrasting practices – our 
secular ones versus Islamic.  (Asad, 2006) (Connolly, 2006) It is a common charge that Islam and 
therefore Muslims cannot adequately recognise public-private separations, cannot sufficiently 
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privatise belief and therefore cannot participate adequately as abstract citizen units.  They 
continually trespass on public space and this is considered some kind of essentialist defect on their 
part.   As such Muslims are conscripted and minoritised against a secular majority which 
acknowledges a key ‘marker of western identity. ” (Sayyid, 2009:189) They are consistently 
monolithised, and in this way made into an enemy image within hostile secularist ‘meta-narratives’ 
(Cesari, 2004).   
Asad argues that given this oppositional bifurcation ‘Secular majority’ versus ‘Muslim minority’, 
Europe cannot properly represent Muslims.  He elaborates by pointing to how Europe is defined as 
much by its exclusions as inclusions and these are symptomatic of anxieties and suppressed fears.  
He argues that it is not physical location which determines the authenticity of being European,53 but 
location within a civilisational construct.  Kumar points out how Europe is significantly defined 
through religion and through the ‘continued’ threats from Islam.  (Kumar, 2003) Because 
Enlightenment universalism is the European signature tune; Asad asserts that this draws from its own 
cultural lodes.  Political community is not therefore only a collection of abstract citizens.  Becoming 
European, properly belonging to Europe, will mean therefore shedding particularities - the 
surrendering and shedding of non-European histories, traditions and narratives.  Since Islam is the 
religious Other, the presumption is that they (the supposed non-Europeans) can in fact shed at will 
“narratives and practices they take to be necessary to their lives as Muslims. ” (Asad, 2002:223) 
Secularism casts Muslims as a minority unlike any other, insofar as it is unable and/or unwilling to be 
modern.  
Getting beyond thin procedural tolerance involves, for Asad, acquiring a deeper understanding of 
how ritual and discipline as practices are integral parts of lived religions and cultures.   His solution is 
for a minoritisation of thinking with regards to European identity and belonging.  This would be the 
pre-condition for a proper representation of Muslims.  What he means by this, is that Europe must 
get beyond mere head-counting, and to a place, where each collectivity might define itself “as a 
minority in a democratic state that consists only of minorities. ”(Asad, 2003) This would mean, 
according to Connolly, dropping the insistence that Enlightenment or Christian legacies must provide 
‘the authoritative centre around which other traditions must rotate. ’ (Connolly, 2006)  
                                                          
53 Bosnians or even Russians aren’t properly European according to this reading 
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Asad has opened up some important insights into the ‘hostile meta-narratives’ of secularism and 
civilisational belonging in Europe.  He has suggested a way out through minoritising Europe and 
allowing Muslims to be a minority in a system of interlinked minorities.  His anthropological account 
points out the insistences and powers which work within integration discourse.  However this 
approach has several limitations: first secularism’s insistences work primarily at a national level 
which limits in effect, any attempted re-tempering of consciousness at a European level.  That being 
so, how might this minoritisation occur practically in national democratic contexts? This question is 
relevant since it is in national contexts that secular insistences will be most keenly felt by Muslims.  
The case of the Netherlands is illustrative of what is meant here.  The native or autochthonous 
population no longer conceive of themselves as belonging to various minorities as they once did in 
the formerly pillarised period; liberalisation and secularisation has altered minoritised thinking 
constructing “a majority culture *…+ that can be described as liberal, secular, and white.  As these 
people no longer feel that they belong to a minority culture, they are less inclined to recognize the 
value of respect for minorities. ” (Kennedy in Cohen, 2006:543) At national level Muslim identities 
are conscripted into minority-majority arrangements and have as a result their identities collectivised 
and constructed for them.  (Sunier, 2005) Asad’s minoritised pluralism seems only plausible on the 
assumption that Europe can be effectively re-conceptualised; it does however, seem to offer little in 
terms of the interim period.  Connolly’s pluralism also seems less than likely, unless physical 
majorities are to voluntarily minoritise in a moment of deep reflexivity “to fold back into its own faith 
a moment of modesty and appreciation of its deep contestability in the bodies and brains of others 
that the formation of a new pluralism becomes most promising. ” (Connolly, 2006)54 Politicisation and 
securitisation of Muslims renders this improbable and the recent results of the plebiscite on the 
minaret ban in Switzerland suggest the remoteness of such recognition.   
In this section I have sought to trace some of the development of Secularism’s meaning, by sketching 
meaning mutations which redefined individual, social, and political relationships and their 
relationality in the European sphere.  This was further developed by drawing upon Asad’s insights of 
Europe as a civilisational construct, and his pluralist vision of Muslims as a minority among 
minorities.  The purpose throughout this section has been to emphasise that liberal secular ideology 
as power both orders and distorts to produce certain kinds of subjectivities and relationships and 
does so by working through discourses of exclusion and unease.   
                                                          
54 original emphasis 
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Security as stable social relationing 
In this section the aim is to focus on Integration through the lens of security and thus show how 
societal security has become a major motivational force in developing Integration strategy.  On the 
one hand governments are motivated to push the integration of immigrant Muslim populations 
through releasing extensive resources, making structural alterations, while on the other hand making 
more the conditions of belonging and fitting in, tighter and more explicit.   It is the product of re-
assessing processes and envisioning endpoints anew.  Although integration has been clearly defined 
in discourse as a ‘two-way process’, liberal-secularism and security each seem to skew ‘integration 
negotiations’ toward stances of non-negotiability.  This seems to be contradictory since the process is 
conceptualised as negotiative but the endpoints non-negotiable.  In terms of the preceding diagram 
integration may be higher up the negotiability axis but lie lower toward non-negotiability in what is 
envisaged as the endpoints.  It may be wise to keep in mind that “the nation-state is not a generous 
agent and its law does not deal in persuasion. ” (Asad, 2003:13) For the recalcitrant, those who will 
not be reasoned with, there will always be the option of legal enforcement.   
Integration, as a sociological concept, has to do with the stability and holding together of units within 
and to its defined systemic whole, so that a system’s integration has to do with how units cohere and 
function in its defined environment.  (Heckmann, Lederer et al., 2001) Inherent in definitions of 
integration are co-existential notions of position, function, stability, and cohesion which further 
suggest that integration has to do with relationship and relationality.  Integration as discourse 
however, will not only be about simple stabilities and cohesions within defined systems and sub-
systems but about the quality of those stabilities and cohesions.  Criteria which shape quality 
judgments will be drawn from envisioned endpoints and calculations about feasibility.  (Saggar, 2009) 
That differing and conflicting visions underlie all habilitative discourse, suggests present, if 
submerged, security dimensions.  We may be justified in suspecting that if they are inbuilt in the 
conceptual architecture, they will also find expression in discourse.  The understanding of security in 
this research assumes that the social individual is its proper and primary referent, and because the 
latter is necessarily related to other individuals and collectivities, security has to do with relationship 
and relationality.  These are the irreducibles of a reflexive approach to security.  (McSweeney, 
1999:88) 
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Integration has been defined in the Hague programme as a two way process between immigrants 
and residents.  (Council of the European Union, 2005) This implies an interactional type of 
relationship between people in society but also between authorities55 and communities.  Because 
integration cannot be imposed by definition56, it requires a normative underpinning structure in 
which commitment to negotiation remains central to all multi-level processes of mutual adjustment.  
Integration does not imply that all is negotiable, but rather that each is prepared, at least initially, to 
‘negotiate within sets of non-negotiables’.  An asymmetry of power, will also be significant, since the 
parties in the process are “… fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources. ”(Penninx, 
2009) Amin57 particularly emphasised the asymmetry of power in Switzerland and characterised 
Muslims as very weak and facing serious difficulties organising within the federal system.  This was 
primarily due to lack of resources and very limited state help.  (Amin, 2008) But it is not only about 
resources - although their availability or lack may be significant in the possibility of success in the 
process - but also about who may shape the background imaginary and the envisioned endpoints.  It 
is proposed therefore, to examine security by looking at how it works within the negotiative process 
of integration itself, and how it defines what its envisioned endpoints are58.   
State elites and Muslim organisations involved in integration must seek and find stable legitimate 
representatives.   It is both the necessary and sufficient condition for integration to succeed, to find 
interlocutors who are able, willing and mandated to negotiate within an adequate and agreed upon 
framework.  Integration, to be a continuity process, requires first secure, stable and sustainable 
relationships through the negotiative levels within the system.  States will clearly be concerned about 
who will speak on behalf of Muslims, as will Muslim communities and individuals, and elites will 
search, assess and filter, to find acceptable Muslim faces.  Secularity may be important in this respect 
providing important identity information about who Muslim representatives may be.  It may also be 
                                                          
55 Federal, regional, municipal and communal 
56 for then it would be assimilation 
57 Dr. Ismail Amin former professor of Arab philology from Zurich University, is President of VIOZ an umbrella organisation 
in Canton Zürich. The umbrella organisation represents mainline Sunni organisations but because of theological differences 
not Ahmadiyya or Alevis which are not recognised as genuine Muslims. Speaking with a united voice and being heard at the 
Cantonal and national level on all issues affecting Muslims is the aim of the VIOZ. 
58 this implies also understanding of what it is not 
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significant in determining the degree of acceptance of their subjectivity and their message, by state 
interlocutors.  Who decides who may take part, is a significant indicator of power.  In the second 
Islam conference59 there was public controversy about whether a veiled Muslima could take part.  
The issue was neatly side-stepped by the then interior minister Schäuble by his insistence on keeping 
the original participants.  (Leise, 2007) Who gets to speak is another power-marker; some 
participants in German integration summitry complained, that individual Muslim voices – secularist 
and feminists – having no representative legitimacy60, had been given disproportionate influence 
over the process.  (Kiliçarslan, 2008)61 
Although Muslim representatives may be actors in asymmetric power structures, within which they 
must seek to negotiate the terms of integration, they may understand that they can achieve greater 
leverage over the process through adopting different strategies – confrontation or cooperation or 
mixes of the two.  How these strategic choices are framed point not only to material interests but 
also to deeply felt identity issues.  These affect relations within and across boundaries since “Identity 
claims announce a boundary, a set of relations within the boundary, a set of relations across the 
boundary *…+ contentious interaction frequently triggers attempts to change those boundaries. ” 
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:85)  
Four Turkish organisations boycotted the second national integration summit in Berlin 2007.  This 
was to protest at a new immigration law passed by the German Parliament shortly before the second 
integration summit.  The legislation was designed to prevent forced marriages and the practice of 
importing brides, frequently unable to speak the German language.  This law is clearly discriminatory 
since the conditions placed upon a Turkish bride wishing to come to Germany are not the same as 
those placed upon others for example those coming from Japan or New Zealand.  (Oezbek, 2007)62 
                                                          
59 Berlin 2007 
60 nor claiming to have 
61 A. Kılıçarslan is vice General Secretary of DITIB and is the first woman to sit on its central committee. She holds German 
citizenship and has a degree in teaching and is an economics teacher. She works at The Meeting and Training centre for 
Muslim Women Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum muslimischer Frauen (BFMF) in Cologne and leads its training 
section. 
62 N. Oezbek is a member of the central committee of The Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IGM) Industriegewerkschaft 
Metall and is leader of the Union’s Migration Department.  He is an influential voice, shaping immigration and integration 
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The strategy of boycott adopted by TGD,63 DITIB64 and FÖDET65 was designed to pressurise the 
German government to alter immigration law.  The approach adopted however, was clearly too 
direct and confrontational and was met with blank refusal.  Merkel’s response was that the German 
government would tolerate no interference with law-making and that they would continue with or 
without the Turkish representatives.  They would however leave the door open for those wishing to 
return.  (Aykol, 2007) All of this was in keeping with the policy of the BMI to keep strict control over 
the summit process.  (Bauerbach, 2008)66The Turkish organisations were generally thought to 
exaggerate their own self-importance, to engage in a disruptive campaign of dis-information and in 
severer readings to be seeking to subvert democratic process.   As Saggar has pointed out when 
political negotiation slips into political demands of a unilateral kind then a pariah reputation is 
created.  (Saggar, 2009) This confrontational approach proved a clumsy strategy, and the boycotting 
parties later returned to the summit.  This example illustrates both the asymmetry of power involved 
in integration summitry and how contexts seem to favour agency or structure differentially, as 
Jessop’s strategic-relational approach suggests.   (Jessop, 1996) (Hay, 2002) Kolat67 however 
continued to emphasise throughout his interview that the issues were still on the table.  (Kolat, 2008) 
Other interviewees emphasised the discriminatory character of this law as a continued bone of 
contention.  (Hibaoui, 2008)68 (Oezbek, 2007) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
policy within Europe’s largest Trade Union, which has been an influential negotiatior on behalf of immigrant workers since 
the beginning of work importation schemes and into the Integration Summitry of 2007-9.   
63 Turkish Community in Germany  
64 The Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
65 The Federation of Turkish Parent Associations 
66 Bauerbach is a pseudenoym for an Islam expert working for the BMI.  For more information see Appendix two. 
67 K. Kolet, Turkish Community Germany (TGD) the largest secular Turkish-Muslim organisation. For more information see 
Appendix two. 
68 Dr. A. Hibaoui is a former Imam of a Moroccan Mosque in Stuttgart working in the department of Integration Politics at 
the municipality of Stuttgart. He is involved in the project: ‘Intercultural Opening and Qualification of the Islamic 
Communities in Stuttgart’ in which he liases between the municipal authorities and the Arabic speaking communities in 
designing integration initiatives. 
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Although neither Switzerland nor the Netherlands have adopted the high-profile high-risk summit 
approach to integration, as Germany has, interviewees here emphasised ongoing dialogue and 
relations between their organisations and high state officials.  Both Maizar69 and El Boujoufi 
emphasised that they met frequently with top level officials to discuss integration matters, 
understood as important for their communities.  This level of activity is, on the face of it, less 
negotiative and has more to do with building bridges of understanding.  However, the qualitative 
character of these types of relationship was emphasised to be stable because they were frank, 
friendly, and earnest.  In addition, defining the status of relations was considered significant.  Maizar 
emphasised that his activities frequently took place at both cantonal and federal level.  He attended 
meetings with the Swiss President, which underlined both the significance of organisation and leader 
but also the position of Muslim communities in general.  He also emphasised that it was understood 
that these meetings would take place at eye level, in other words, power asymmetries were set 
aside.  (Maizar, 2008) El Boujoufi emphasised his advisory role and the position of his organisation 
within the institutionalised regularities of consultation.  He was called upon to give authoritative 
advice over a wide range of issues, considered relevant to Muslims and their integration.  One of his 
roles was to make policy makers (and their advisers) aware of wider implications and to help law-
makers to be more aware of the situation on the ground.  Through consultative dialogue el Boujoufi 
felt positive input was being provided into maintaining and shaping future relations between Muslim 
communities and the state.  (el Boujoufi, 2008)  
Organisations in all three cases seek to be net contributors to societal stability and the quality of 
relationality was emphasised throughout interviews with integration activists and state partners.  El 
Boujoufi emphasised that his organisation had taken a public position against further Muslim 
immigration into the Netherlands.  This he understood to be necessary to maintain stability and thus 
a responsible position to take, given the state of things in the Netherlands.  In this way El Boujoufi 
understood his role not only as bridge-building but contributing to stability and security.  Likewise, in 
Switzerland VIOZ has distanced itself from any protests  or demonstrations against the Minaret ban, 
since this would lead only to an escalation of emotions and misunderstanding.  “With good will, 
earnest and competent dialogue and transparency we will maintain peaceful coexistence in our 
country. ” (VIOZ, 2009) In this way they seek to intervene in a potentially volatile situation.  The 
                                                          
69 Dr. I. Maizar is President of FIDS one of two top level Muslim Umbrella Organisation in Switzerland. For further 
information see Appendix two. 
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emphasis remains on dialogue and transparency – both de-securitising stances.  Prins and Saharso 
have emphasised a discrepancy between official rhetoric and elite practice with respect to 
organisations.  Regarding domestic violence, official discourse was confrontational, demanding legal 
prosecution, yet financial support enabled Muslim organisations to intervene, to become more 
deeply involved.  What resulted was greater action on the part of organisations, a softer approach to 
dealing with the problem and closer collaboration between the organisations and the state elites.   
(Prins and Saharso, 2010) 
Stability and cohesion practices have obtained a much more public and visible character through 
integration summitry in Germany.  Yet this elevation of process has upped the stakes and increased 
the risks as well.  Although confrontations and ultimatums were made and rejected, participants 
returned to later summits; this served to further underline subordinate power positions.  Although 
high profile integration summitry has to do with the securing of relationships on a nationally visible 
level, stabilising relationships is the goal set for less visible and ongoing interactions between state 
elites and Muslim organisational representatives, institutionalised in consultation and advice.   
Security underlies integration not only in terms of securing processes, but spans also envisioned 
endpoints.  In the Dutch case the latest emphasis on integration is as civic integration.  A 
Government memorandum ‘See that you fit in!’ emphasises active responsible citizenship and 
cultural immersion, the ‘safety’ of ‘native’ autochthonous society is emphasised.  Integration is 
conceived as a strategy to overcome blanket alienation of both allochtones and autochthones.  The 
growing visibility of Islam has led to feelings of alienation among autochthones and therefore 
integration must create safety for all.  (Integratiennota 2007-11, 2007) Integration as endpoint is 
envisioned in terms of security and safety for all.  System and subsystems are to be balanced, and 
units are to learn to find their place in society through self-effort and knowledge of Dutch culture and 
history.  In this way savant units will interact safely among themselves and within the system itself.  
Integration as secure habilitation draws on ideas of stability, cohesion and participation, and 
emphasises integration practices such as moral reflexion, obligation, voluntarism, solidarity, and 
loyalty.   
Diffuse fear and deep-seated mistrust of Muslims as ‘collectivised’ human subjects, disrupts such 
idealised endpoints.  Integration issues introduced into politicisation and securitisation discourse 
enable alien or enemy portraiture, and ways of thinking become habitualised, routinised and 
embedded.  Although significant security events may be triggered by specific action and events and 
media saturation, the measures adopted may be presented as dealing specifically with this 
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emergency or that crisis.  They may or may not70 be fed into macro-stabilising measures.  One longer 
term disruptive to visions of long-term integration, has been possibility or likelihood of Muslim 
alienation and radicalisation.  In the three cases there seemed to be less alarm over possible terrorist 
attacks but a continued anxiety over a growing and immobile Muslim underclass.  Whereas the 
actual possibility of terrorism was entered into shorter term calculus (Laurischk MdB, 2008),71 a 
permanent underclass would render the system unviable.  As the German integration minister put it 
“… integration will remain one of our key tasks – as a challenge to be faced not only by government 
and politics, but by the whole of society.  What is involved, is nothing less than the sustainability of 
our country, because for demographic reasons alone, we cannot afford not to utilize the potential of 
those who have come to our country and their children. ” (Böhmer, 2008)72 This illustrates one of the 
core anxieties which underlie Integration, fears of a fiscal drag on welfare resources and the loss of 
competitive economic edge.  (Wagishauser, 2008)73 
The long tail of Muslim underachievement (Saggar, 2009) however, comes together with another 
dimension of insecurity namely the unwillingness of Muslim populations to integrate.  Illustrative of 
this way of thinking has been Sarrazin’s74 racist comments: "A large number of Arabs and Turks in this 
city, who have increased in number as a result of wrong policies, have no productive function other 
than the fruit and vegetable trade *…+ The Turks are conquering Germany in the same way the 
Kosovars conquered Kosovo: through a higher birth rate *…+ I don't have to acknowledge anyone who 
lives off the state, rejects this state, doesn't properly take care of the education of his children and 
constantly produces little girls in headscarves. " (Spiegel Online, 2009) A subsequent poll conducted 
for the daily newspaper Bild found 51% of Germans felt that many Arab and Turkish immigrants were 
                                                          
70 For example the security problem surrounding anarchists find little place in these discussions. 
71 Frau Sybille Laurisck, is an FDP member of the German Parliament. For more information see Appendix two. 
72 my emphasis 
73 U.A.Wagishauser is Amir(leader) and President of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Germany. The organisation 
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat e.V. represents moderate views on religious practice and accepts the secular constitution of 
state and society. They are considered heterodox and their core religious identity is denied by other mainline Sunni 
organisations. A convert to Islam, Wagishauser is one of the more prominent ‘Muslim’ voices of moderation in Germany. 
74 A senior member of the governing board of The German Bank, he wished Berlin’s immigrants had been east European 
Jews since their IQ was about 15% higher.  
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unwilling or unable to integrate, whereas 61% felt he was right to bring this debate out into the 
open.  (Bild, 2009) 
Political elites not only see danger in underachieving populations but in physically segregated worlds, 
still more dangerously, ideational worlds which Muslims, with exceptions of course, are thought to 
uniformly inhabit.  Here liberal secularism plays a role in producing ‘properly integrated’ portraiture 
and recognition of deviation.  Religious Muslim organisations such as Milli Görüş,75 have long been 
suspected of operating with double standards - playing on the one hand the role of serious 
negotiators but concealing their true (anti-democratic) agendas.  Whereas they appear socialised, 
they are rendered conspiratorial enemies of democracy and spreaders of subversion.  Building on 
essentialised and oppositional thinking, they come to represent part of a ‘lurking danger’.  The 
blanket aspersion which is referred to, is well captured by Schiffauer when he says “what is seen by 
Milli Görüş  as a struggle for a space for Muslims is interpreted as an attempt to establish Muslim 
spaces. ” (Schiffauer, 2006:100).  To this end they are considered to prey on vulnerable alienated 
Muslim youth, who are the victims of ‘failed integration’.  Heitmeyer describes the situation of a class 
of young Turks who project superficial positive self images, but behind which work larger more 
powerful forces of fear76 and exclusion. 77 They have uncertain futures as well as identities deeply 
wounded by emotional and social rejection.   Milli Görüş is thought to target both Muslim youth and 
a general public; they fashion their message for the audiences they seek to reach – moderation for 
an external audience, superiority and the right to violence to the core membership.  (Heitmeyer, 
1997) The genre of commentary Heitmeyer represents reinforces the sinister and duplicitous ‘other’ 
for which Milli Görüş provides a visible reference.  Yet this organisation, as one representative 
emphasised, has remained under constant surveillance by German intelligence but has to date, been 
unprosecutable.  (Gülbahar, 2008)78 
                                                          
75 The name Milli Görüş literally means ‘community of opinion, perception or view’ and understands itself as an 
Abrahamitic community of faith.  See http://www. igmg. de/verband/islamic-community-milli-goerues/what-does-milli-
goerues-mean. html 
76 angst 
77
 ausgrenzung 
78 M. Gülbabhar is Chairman of The Federal Youth Council of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG). For further 
information see Appendix two.  
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Within a discourse of failed integration there sits not only stereotypical alienated Muslim youth open 
to ‘escapist ideologies and charismatic leaders’ (Vertigens, 2008:63) but communities of religious 
others.  Although Muslim youth may be easily identified and categorised, there remains as well a 
substantial number of ‘religious Muslims’ who span many different categories.  A substantial group 
for instance, may be categorised as socially mobile, who have acquired citizenship, assert democratic 
rights and are participating both in society and politics.  But neither social position, nor an acquired 
citizenship, in themselves, signal belonging or acceptance.  The ostensible stability religious people 
and organisations represent does not deflect from their problematical character, rather it provides 
disruption to more traditional images of secular belonging (in citizenship, through social mobility) 
and serves to underline suspicious unease.  Others become not only ‘delinquent’ or vulnerable 
Muslim youth but those who continue to be ‘spatially close but spiritually distant’, and such 
paradoxes of presence contribute to the aspersive spaces in which ‘moral panics’ may be produced.   
There is much greater complexity involved in constructing the politics of security and insecurity than 
merely pointing to or highlighting security issues.   To begin with “putting an event or development 
on the political agenda as a threat or not, can be a major stake in politics. ” (Huysmans, 2006:7) 
Another related aspect of this kind of risk-taking is to generate hope for, and expectation of security.  
This has been the case with integration, which according to Demirdögan79 has awakened a lot of 
hope and expectation among Muslims.  (Demirdögan, 2009) Raising integration to serve a macro-
security project involves necessarily investing extensive resources.  Facilitating adjustments and 
prioritising working together, as major goals of government policy means that its failure or 
perception of failure would have possibly large and long-term consequences.   
Both in tabling an issue as a threat, or developing strategies and policies as its solution, language 
plays a central constitutive role.  It is used to identify and account for threat-events or conditions of 
threat, and these usages produce and reproduce, as well as adjust and re-adjust, domains of 
insecurity within discourses, such as immigration and habilitation.  Language therefore, has the 
capacity to mobilise and integrate meanings by moving occurrences or events into a broader 
condition of insecurity (Huysmans, 2006:7) but also of strategies and solutions.  Both insecurity and 
the hope of security can be powerful techniques for governing danger, since they can legitimise 
                                                          
79 S. Demirdögan is a member of the Left party and stood for election to the European Elections in 2009. For more 
information see Appendix two. 
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judgments of what is good or bad, right or wrong and what can be done.  (Huysmans, 2006:12)80 If 
‘what can be done’ is to frame not only problems but also solutions to insecurity then these too may 
legitimise what may be considered good, bad, right or wrong.  Insecurity and security therefore, 
become utilisable techniques in the governance of danger but also of envisioning solutions.  If 
complete societal security is unrealisable (Laurischk MdB, 2008) then solutions, regardless of how 
comprehensive, can be understood only ever as partial.   
Cesari has pointed out that one of the consequences of 9/11 has been an intensification of branding 
or stigmatisation of Muslims through linking Islam, terrorism and socio-economic position.  (Cesari, 
2005) This has led to the articulation and implementation of more restrictive immigration policies 
and the development of new habilitative strategies and policies, in which EU member states 
cooperate and produce new migrant categories, each clearly defined in terms of wanted and 
unwanted.  (Geddes, 2003) Multiculturalism as an official laissez-faire and protective discourse has 
been powerfully blamed for reinforcing Muslim immigrants’ exceptionalism by failing to provide 
them with the means for real social advancement.  (Scheffer, 2000) Muslims have come to be seen in 
the Netherlands and Germany as dangerously segregated and dangerously stuck at the bottom of the 
social scale.  Integration is considered the macro-solution to this problem, yet the presence of 
security in this understanding, is problematic.  In liberal democracies, security speeches will be aimed 
at an audience which is also an electorate.  Not only will the speakers be practising security, through 
articulating and mobilising security knowledge, (Huysmans, 2002) they may see it as an effective way 
of winning votes.  To leave security themes such as immigration from electioneering may be to 
disadvantage one’s own chances of electoral success and give advantage to political opponents.  (van 
Strein, 2008)81 Introducing and talking security may serve as well to create a more enduring entity, a  
political community (Huysmans, 2006)  
                                                          
80 My emphasis 
81 Van Strein is a policy adviser in the areas of immigration integration and international affairs to The People's Party for 
Freedom and Democracy Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. In his advisory capacity he works closely with members of 
Parliament, Henk Kamp (former Defence minister) and Hans van Baalen (now VVD faction leader at the European 
Parliament). He describes his work as analysing new Government policy documents, advising on responses and drafting 
response and position documents. He also liaises between the Parliamentary party and the municipal level getting on-the-
ground responses to integration issues. 
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In this chapter the aim has been to show that secularism is not solely only about procedural 
separations, neutrality and equidistance but about historically locatable meanings and their 
ideological expression; neither is it only about material conditions but also about qualitative 
relationing; neither is integration solely about material resource allocation but about the envisioning 
of endpoints, their divergences and contestability.  Each is intimately connected to the becoming of 
identities in all their fluidity, multiplicity and mutability.   Security cannot be divorced from profound 
human imaginations and emotions with their qualitatively perceived relationships of self with other.  
If, as Kasoryano asserts minorities, “…differentiate themselves from the larger society by their 
language, their culture, their religion, or their history *…+ in opposition to other immigrant groups, 
but above all in opposition to the national community. ” (Kastoryano, 2002:4) then integration must 
help not only in adjustment but in the creation of a secure network of oppositional relationships.   
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CHAPTER FIVE Foreigner, worker, immigrant. 
Positioning this research 
The significance of identity has been emphasised in many different areas of social and political 
research, as for example in the analysis of foreign policy (Weldes, Sylvan), and immigration (Geddes). 
These draw on theoretical insights into identity as inherently more dynamic - fluid, porous, 
incomplete and in flux – than was or is generally accepted in positivist approaches. This research fits 
within critical constructivist and post-positivist approaches which stand in contradistinction (and 
opposition) to approaches which assume (and reinforce) reified and essentialised identities. For 
Muslims in the post 9/11 period, this has become a significant political stance andtask; the 
deconstruction of a powerfully constructed enemy image. (Hippler) Islam has been  characterised as 
a civilisation (understood as an aggregation of cultures) in conflict with a posited western civilisation. 
(Huntington, Lewis) These assertions and theorisations have had immense political fall-out, as they 
have been key in shaping the understandings of US policy makers and their framing the ‘war on 
terror’. This has led to imposing a simple but invidious binary of good and bad and the possibility to 
define unilaterally who is  a good or a bad Muslim. (Mamdani) 
 In addition this work is conceived as being set in contrast to materialist and reductionist approaches 
which approach Integration through structural problem-solving approaches and through using 
positivist methodologies. (Heckmann) Since ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, 
problem-solving theories serve not only to maintain the existent status quo (Cox) but assume not 
only that there are problems but that subjects objectified are the problems themselves. This 
research, rather than asking after causes, asks how problems come to be constituted as such 
andwhich constructions are required as well as which power dynamics are employed, to achieve 
these constructions. 
This research understands Islam as one such ‘powerful construct’ into which Muslim as subjects are 
irresistably conscripted. It therefore, in common with Mandaville, suggests shifting predication to 
Muslim (although it is also recognised that this too can be abused) in so doing however it places 
subjects, people in their ‘real world situations’ in centre field. In addition, by contributing to, and 
seeking clearer understandings of religion, with its necessary extension to ‘people of religion’, it 
expands that literature which problematises the neat divisions, separations and privatisations of 
secularism. This work therefore also draws on some of the insights of liberal multiculturalist thinkers, 
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who understand not only the significance of the individual but also the importance of the context of 
individual’s subjectivity and development (Kymlicka, Modood, Taylor, Young) So there is a resistance 
to the complete abandonment of multiculturalism as some have argued as being necessary or an 
incontrovertible fact, (Uitermark, Alibahai-Brown) though there is a concurrent recognition that it 
has been in the cases studied, something of an elite project and therefore often remote from 
subjects in their everyday realities. Yet greater understanding and tolerance for group identity is 
required to deal with increasing diversity and mixity. (Grillo) Multiculturalism may be eclipsed by a 
powerful backlash against diversity (Vertovec, Wessendorf, 2010) but that diversity must be 
negotiated nonetheless within some habilitative frame.This conundrum sits at the heart of diversity 
and its managment or governance. 
Examining cognitive frameworks and sets of practices - the ‘soft data’ produced in text such as 
motives, emotions, understandings of self and other identities - is the stuff of this coming chapter. 
Yet what is to come not only concentrates on Muslim speakers and their texts - seeking to theorise 
new ways of becoming and construction in Integration, secularism and security -  but on the meaning 
productions of their interlocutors, that is to say it is core to this reserach that a range of speakers 
from government, economy and society be addressed which are involved in shaping Integration. As a 
constructivist approach, the speakers are understood to produce meaning not in isolation but 
intersubjectively from within discursively derived meaning habitats. (Fierke, ) These are constructed 
within their own communities, with their interlocutors and interactively with the interviewer in the 
interview situation. (Charmaz) Meaning production is therefore understood throughout as co-
production. But though this places meaning on a less stable foundation than positivist approaches 
might seek or require, it works with some stable meaning cores which speakers draw upon.  
As a critical approach to identity framing on central dynamic is that of self-other boundary setting. 
This in common with many critical approaches points out a central tension in identity development 
and framing. (Wodak) Being constructed through powerful sets of oppositions – selves/others, 
believer/non-believer, private-public, integrative-disintegrative, even the most basic of moral 
binaries good-evil/bad. But although a crucial part of the critical approaches is to deconstruct, it 
cannot be done from a position outside discourse, there can be no position of neutrality. Critical 
researchers need therefore to engage in ongoing self-reflexive examination of the dynamics of 
power- not only in discourse but in the very job of research.  Research and analysis are therefore also 
analysed for possible performative aspects as well as the core discourses. That is to say this research 
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examines both power in the interview as event and in discourse – so that both are understood as 
political interventions. (Guzzini) 
Because this research also has important empirical dimensions and data is interrogated through 
existent theory its goal is to produce new theories. So examining how identities are constructed as 
othered, self-conscious and reflexive speakers bear witness to the processes in that othering, and 
new theories ‘rise from the data’. So for example in what is to come we will see how alterity is also 
built up through ulteriorisation. Though much valuable research has been done on how Muslim 
youth (Roy, Cesari, Kepel) construct their own identities (as well as having them constructed by 
outside forces)  this research has a broader scope – it spans generations, gender and ethnicity – since 
all are in their own way conscripted and objectified in Integration. Therefore as a critical discourse 
analysis, this work it is neither conceived nor executed in such a finely grained analysis as other 
research designs allow for. That is, the analytic approach is not involved with the minutae of 
particular text productions such as content analytic approaches would require or concentration on 
particular identity sub-groups.  The range of speakers insofar as they are restricted, are to Integration 
players – those broadly representative speakers in this discourse. .  
The role of Muslim organisations is considered therefore of importance, less because this research 
seeks to locate within, and thus to contribute to, institutionalist approaches, than to emphasise that 
these developing organisations are vitally important in the present, and will necessarily be involved 
in any future negotiations within Integration discourse. Yet though there is an institutional dimension 
in which organisation speakers are privileged there is also scepticism as to how far incorporation and 
institutionalisation of Islam can ‘succeed’ through ‘institutionalisation or incorporation of Islam’ 
approaches of the governments in the three cases under consideration. As almost all literature which 
approaches from this angle will emphasise, Islam contains huge diversity and will therefore always be 
multivariate and multivocal. Any attempts therefore by governments to find an acceptably moderate 
and modern (Euro) Islam may be problematic as some of the better organised groupings have 
strongly religious conservative agendas. Indeed as will be discussed in this chapter new 
organisational forms may be deeply resented by substantial ‘out-groups’ who reject any attempts by 
organisations to define what Islam is and therefore who is or can be a genuine Muslim. There is 
adequate evidence that the German government for instance is beginning to see the danger of over-
concentration of representative power and seeks rather to work with, even promote, diversity and 
multivocality. 
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Introducing the case studies 
To decide which case studies to choose, I looked at several locales where significant Muslim 
immigration and settlement had taken place, and then identified significant markers within 
developing discourses concerning Muslims, e. g.  the tension between free expression and offence as 
in the Danish Cartoons affair, the struggle for visibility as in the case of the Veil in France, the struggle 
for recognition and incorporation in the German Federal Republic etc; Then I developed the following 
criteria for choosing: first the cases should be European states with a history of accommodating 
religious diversity.  I initially wanted to investigate how secular states with a mature history of 
religious diversity experienced and ‘coped’ with Islam; then I looked for cases with a similar 
immigration trajectory; lastly I looked for cases where significant Muslim settlement had occurred 
and where significant securitisation had developed around this.   When I felt, that these conditions 
existed, I then applied additional filters.  I began examining cases more closely and comparatively, 
looking to find enough discursive similarity to provide the grounds for analytical comparison yet 
enough difference to bring out contrasting tensions as well.  In other words I sought to avoid on the 
one hand cases with too much national uniqueness in the dominating master discourses and on the 
other too much similarity to each other.  The case studies needed therefore to have both internal 
balance in themselves, and both sufficient contrast and yet enough ‘family resemblance’.   
I decided on the German Federal Republic as a suitable first case study for the following reasons: first 
it has historically accommodative frameworks for religious and regional diversity.  It has pragmatic 
sets of social arrangements have been developed, in which the two main incorporated religious 
groups exert influence through a network of social partnerships.  Second, the German Federal 
Republic’s trajectory of economically driven Muslim immigration was sufficiently similar to some 
other cases under initial consideration.   
I decided for the Netherlands as a contrasting second, for the following reasons: first it had until the 
late sixties the most comprehensive system of difference accommodation.  Lauded as a paradigm for 
pluralist religious arrangement, (Lijphart, 1975) it worked with in-built segmented grouping.  Yet the 
Netherlands displayed some interesting contrasts too, for instance the merging of segments of the 
root population through a process of strong liberal secularisation.  It developed a mixed laissez-faire 
and protective habilitative strategy to accommodate Muslim populations.  Packaged as multicultural 
modernity in step with secularisation, this became the official and celebratory ideology of diversity 
and difference.  Yet societal unease with continued immigration and the unsettling and irruptive 
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events surrounding the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, forced, at least rhetorically a retreat from 
this position.   
My third case study choice, was possibly the most difficult and perhaps analytically the most risky of 
my choices.  As a second ‘small’ state, Switzerland fulfilled all my initial criteria: it too had a long 
history of accommodating religious diversity.  Difference however was not only religious, but regional 
and linguistic as well.  There had also been significant Muslim economic migration and settlement.  In 
common with Germany, a federal system, but in contrast to the more centralised Dutch system, 
important habilitative competences devolve to Cantonal and communal levels.  One key contrast is 
that Switzerland remains, and is likely to remain outside the EU.  Yet although it still makes much of 
its neutrality and difference, it has also made efforts to calibrate much of its legislation to harmonise 
with EU legislation.  A second major difference I considered was the role of Switzerland’s direct 
democracy.  This has provided a structural opportunity for the populist right to instrumentalise and 
mobilise around the ‘danger’ of the Muslim presence.  Such structural opportunities do not exist in 
either the German Federal Republic or the Netherlands.  In fact the German Federal Republic has 
inbuilt institutional barriers to exclude extremists from gaining representation in the Bundestag.  
Historical legacy has led to a universal rejection direct plebescites.  Yet despite Switzerland’s 
singularity, it offers interesting comparison as well, traditional xenophobia and its more recent 
crossing to Islamophobia, and thus merging within a long established over-foreignisation discourse.  
Muslims have been made the ‘new foreigners’ – taking over from the Italian guest workers of the 
sixties and seventies.   
Although national discourses rooted as they were within their own  conceptual lineages and 
structures, were important in my initial explorations, the significance of Muslims as ‘perceived 
group’, was also factored into the criteria of choice.  I was looking here, to balance external criteria 
such as population size, absolute and relative growth, group image and social mobility, as well as 
internal compositions such as ethnicity and sectarian difference.  In my initial research design, I had 
rather favoured concentrating on Muslims of a single ethnic and religious background, for example 
Sunni Muslims of Turkish origin, but as a result of discussion with my supervisor, Dr. Frédéric Volpi, I 
decided not to exclude existent diversity – ethnic and sectarian - which must be an important factor 
in this research of Muslims and their places of settlement.  This move from a position of wanting to 
research a more unified Muslim identity bloc, threw up questions about how much diversity I could 
handle in this research project.   
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As in methodology, the process of making case choices has been sometimes exacting, requiring some 
difficult trade-offs.  In the end, I decided to keep Germany as the large major ‘indispensable’ 
European state (Ireland, 2004), which had no distortive ideology or colonial heritage, I then added 
the Netherlands and Switzerland as smaller but religiously diverse nations.  All three offered, I felt, 
sufficient contrast and yet enough ‘family resemblance’ as well. 
Part I Germany - The Coldly divided Self 
The starting point in this narrative of German national identity construction and boundary creation 
was the divided political reality of the post 1949 period, when a deep ideological line was drawn 
between two Germanys.  For West Germany (FRG), the significant radical other was Communism 
mediated through the German Democratic Republic (GDR) regime.  It was an external other, but 
shared common ethnicity, language, memories and a sense of shared fate.  In the reverse direction 
the GDR’s self-defining other was Capitalism and its personification, the Federal Republic, which 
came to increasingly threaten the socialist vision with its subversive materialism and luring 
consumerism.  Each selectively appropriated German history to construct a more authentic German 
identity, drawing continually upon an ideological frame-up of each other and the disturbing 
otherness of a past self82.  
Constructing their new nation83 identities meant drawing heavily on recent histories.  Each had to 
prove a demonstrable break with the Nazi past, both to local populations and political overseers, so 
that the greater the antipathy to the past self, the more legitimate the new German identity.  
(Fulbrook, 1998) The GDR was re-constructed as the ‘anti-fascist’ state and its elites sought to 
establish and emphasise the permanence of the two German states for two German nations.  
However this fiction was effectively undermined by defections to the West by East Germans, and a 
West Germany which held out the attraction of greater consumerism.  Lastly the FRG had a 
constitutionally anchored commitment to one nation with the clear implication being, that it was the 
legitimate embodiment of that one nation.  To emphasise this, those who moved to FRG were 
automatically granted citizenship on the basis their sharing a common ethnic nation identity.   
                                                          
82 National socialism 
83 Because of the overload on the adjective national, I employ nation. 
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East Germans were tantalised with the goods their western relatives’ could buy, and the knowledge 
of which was transmitted through West German Television, through visits to East Germany by 
relatives from the west and a constant flow of goods packages sent to eastern relatives.  At the state 
level there were also factors which undermined the myth of two nations such as special 
arrangements made by the FRG for GDR, such as easier credit conditions and trade advantages.  
Although all of this gave East Germans a material edge over neighbouring socialist countries, it was 
also a constant reminder of how good it was in the West.   In the two states, economic, institutional 
and identity reconstructions were necessary but were to be accomplished through supplied 
ideological blueprints.  Although both states sought to define their nation identity through a double 
antipathy - to the quintessential evil of Nazism - and to each other, the East German myth of two 
states for two nations was in the long-term unsustainable.   
Economic reconstruction and the consumerism it produced have been key markers in German 
identity construction in the post-war period.  (Schutts, 2003) Because many avenues of identification 
were closed off, there were few places where the reconstruction of a positive self image was 
possible.  But one such place was in the economy.  From the 1950s on, rapid economic growth and 
the consumerism it generated became the primary loci of positive self-identifications.  But to 
maintain the growth dynamic meant a need for recruitment and importation of manual labour.  This 
had been supplied initially by a stream of expellees from the east, workers from the GDR as well as 
returning prisoners of war.  It was an immediate but only temporary solution to labour demand.  
When the Berlin wall was constructed and one important conduit stopped, the FRG was forced to 
look elsewhere for labour.  Since a broad consensus existed among the economic management elites 
that the German corporatist state needed to maintain both full economic growth and at the same 
time control inflationary pressure, the solution suggested and accepted was the importation of 
foreign labour.  (Hollifield, 1992) This introduced a difficult new dimension of self-understanding that 
it was and would continue to be a land of immigration.  
Immigrants and immigration denial 
The conservative transition from denial to recognition of permanent immigrant-driven diversity has 
been a rutted process beginning with Helmut Kohl’s massive anti-historical denial “Germany is not an 
immigration land!” It was a statement which not only contradicted a very obvious reality but was 
symptomatic of a much wider European approach: “ad-hoc, reactive and control oriented [in] 
character” and reveal*ed+ a bottom line of ‘basic non-acceptance of immigration’ (Penninx, 2004:4) 
Although pressure was brought to bear from major corporate players, “…we just couldn’t make Kohl 
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understand, not in sixteen years, that Germany was a land of immigration.  For IGMetall, Germany 
was always a land of immigration, in all its history even under Hitler’s fascism *. . .  + but in the 
meantime the German political scene from A to Z recognises that Germany is a land of immigration 
and that is good news. ” (Oezbek, 2007)84  
To meet labour demands, the FRG in the 1950s turned first to the labour reservoirs of southern 
Europe – Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia – and then in the early 1960s to Turkey.  National agreements 
were signed at state level, which permitted the regulated importation of labour.  Through the 
mediation of the Federal agency for labour85, work and residence permits were granted to foreign 
workers.  In common with Switzerland residence permits were legally dependent on having work and 
in this way macro-economic allocation of labour was to be effectively managed.  Imported foreign 
workers, were designated guest workers86, and ‘guest’ underlined their temporal and subordinate 
status.  Their raison d’être was work, they were the navvies and the factory workers and their only 
required qualification was to be young and healthy; their settlement was neither imagined nor 
imaginable.  “There were no social structures for them, they lived in barracks - they slept, they 
worked, but that was all.  The Turkish government could have demanded more for them when they 
signed the state contracts.  They could have won more provision for their religious, cultural, social 
needs, but they were silent because they thought they’ll be coming back again. ”(Gülbahar, 2008)87  
“There were few facilities for us.  We just learned enough German to get through at work.  I was 
younger and could learn German more quickly so I just got asked to translate and mediate in 
disputes.  But for most, all we wanted was to save some money and make a better life for ourselves 
back in Turkey. ” (Musluoğlu, 2008)88   
                                                          
84 Nafiz Oezbek is a member of the central committee of The Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IGM). For more information 
see Appendix two. 
85 Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 
86 Gastarbeiter 
87 M. Gülbabhar is Chairman of The Federal Youth Council of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG). For further 
information see Appendix two. 
88 N. Musluoğlu is active in a range of integration projects and is an trusted partner of the Integration department of the 
city of Heilbronn. For further information see Appendix two.   
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Neglect is perhaps too sweeping a claim, although it certainly was how it appeared to the first 
generation workers and their descendents.  At the national level however the FRG set up a 
corporatist welfare regime - a consensus model in which the macro-economy was organised and 
managed with emphasis on agreement and moderation.  Trade Unions played a key role in this 
arrangement, they were influential but also expected to be moderate in their demands and generally 
to be cooperative as opposed to confrontational.  The Unions had two main stipulations: foreign 
labour was not to undermine the conditions of the native workforce through cheaper wages; and 
access to welfare was to be guaranteed to all workers.  So at the earliest stage corporative 
agreements about welfare came to play an important role in the social integration of foreign 
workers.  (Bommes and Kolb, 2006) The stipulations of the trade unions were key, since immigrants – 
Turkish Muslims, Italians, Spanish, and Greeks – were able to contribute to the reconstruction of 
German identity by making possible upward mobility.  “We all took the elevator up one floor!” 
(Oezbek, 2006) Co-creators of the new economic reality in the FRG, they not only lubricated the 
macro economy, but also contributed to the German insurance-based corporatist welfare regime.   
Yet there were always significant differences between native and guest workers: they were primarily 
defined in terms of a powerful and universally held assumption of transience.  They were manual and 
uneducated; they were passive units to be directed to where the economy needed them most, or 
when no longer needed to be re-directed back to their country of origin.  The logic of mobility 
required therefore a reservoir of moveable, pliable workers willing to accept direction within the 
economy and eventually, if need be, to be relocated or returned.  Migrant guest workers differed 
from native workers in that they were marginal consumers.  In general their existence was frugal and 
the bulk of their earnings became remittances sent to their families in Turkey.  This pattern of 
minimal consumerism suited macro-economic management planning; since domestic native 
consumerism became a key economic dynamic, the challenge for managers was not to let that fuel 
inflation through over-consumption.  Had guest workers been consumers in the way native workers 
were, they would have contributed not only to economic re-building but also to economic and social 
slow-down.  Lastly not being socially mobile, they were not directly competitive to their fellow native 
workers; they served only to take up slack in the lower sectors.   
Since Turkish guest-workers facilitated both the consumerism and upward mobility of German 
workers, they were not only key players in the reconstruction of the German economy, but in the 
reconstruction of German identity as well.   On the factory floor, there were perhaps few legal 
differences, since the Trade Unions ensured that they were covered by the same welfare 
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frameworks; but even in their work-defined environments, they were different.  They sat together in 
the canteens and talked among themselves; (Özdemir, 1999) their dominant reality was work; they 
were ‘workers’ but were unskilled, foreign and temporary; they functioned in a common workspace 
and contributed to the modern German corporatist welfare state, but in many senses they were 
working objects and not human subjects, so it was easier to extend to them formal protections than 
to embrace them.  (Ireland, 2004:28) 
The 1973 stop to labour importation was a significant moment in the narrative of settlement since it 
authored a new logic to govern a different set of dynamics.  The immediate consequences of the stop 
was that no new labour would be recruited but further stipulations were to have unforeseen but 
important consequences.  A stop to new recruitment in times of economic recession made perfect 
economic sense and fitted with the conception of pliable mobile objects to be moved around.  The 
problem was how to deal with those surplus units.  Another important stipulation of the 1973 
stoppage was that those returning to Turkey would be barred from returning to Germany to seek 
work at any point in the future.  For those workers considering a return, it would have meant that 
many of the insurances they had paid would also have been stopped.  The effect of this stipulation 
was to put pressure on Turkish guest workers not to return but rather to stay and demand instead to 
have their families join them in FRG.  (Sen and Aydin, 2002) Stoppage counter intuitively led to 
increased inflows of people from Turkey.  
The next phase of family reunification with extensive inflows of women and children made it more 
recognisable as immigration.  As Cinar89 points out, when family reunification took place it was de 
facto immigration.  (Cleaver, 2004) Muslim presence would no longer be the gendered barracks-
bound existence but would come to be identified and defined through a broad front of social 
interaction.  There would be more solid visibilities and denser interactions and this would model 
more complex sets of relationships.  From then on, fundamental cognitive alterations took place “. . . 
from here on they [guest workers] began to see Germany as the centre point of their lives. Even 
although we were not a classical immigration land like Canada or the US, immigration denial no 
longer accorded with the underlying reality. ” (Norbisrath, 2008)90 But even as families arrived, 
contentious debates ignited about foreign workers’ right to remain.  It was argued by churches, 
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trade-unions and welfare organisations that the right to work without the more permanent right to 
remain was too precarious an existence for guest-workers and their families.  Still neither the 
German elites, nor the Turkish government nor indeed the Turkish workers themselves, considered 
their presence as permanent.  The universal dream of Turkish workers and the internal calculation in 
all their plans, even into the eighties, was a return to Turkey (Sen and Aydin, 2002:13)  
The temporal move to greater permanence, secured only upon the alteration of citizenship laws in 
2000, began to feed a discourse of anxiety.  There were concerns about ethnic and cultural 
foreignisation so that although the temporal transformation of Turkish workers was becoming 
quietly understood as fact, this did not diminish the desire by many of the state elites to see the 
“guests” return.  By the late 1970s unemployment among guest workers rose to about 300 000, 
which entailed claiming benefits to which they had contributed in insurance payments.  In 1983 the 
SPD-FDP coalition passed a law to promote the voluntary return of guest workers and their families 
through financial incentives.  The workers were to get 10, 500 DM plus 1,500 for each child plus the 
return of the health insurance they had paid into the system.  This was not as generous as it first 
sounded, since the other half, paid for them by their employers was also rightfully theirs.  As it 
turned out, only about 10,000 agreed to return.  Although praised as a success it was clearly not 
what had been expected, and served to reinforce the generally held prejudice that foreigners were 
treated too well and were staying for the social benefits.  (Özdemir, 1999:100-103)   
The conservative denial of immigration has had several important consequences: firstly it was used 
to refuse any governmental responsibility for the development of integration policies, which led to 
increasing Muslim disadvantage and segregation; (Norbisrath, 2008) secondly it characterised a 
politics of reluctance, and it gave a clear message of rejection to Muslims.  (Kaplan, 2008)91 Therefore 
for Muslims to integrate fully, it was becoming clear to non-conservative streams, that the German 
state and society must recognise that it was no longer a land of temporary migration92 but a land of 
permanent immigration. 93 (Tibi, 2001).   This would entail a seismic shift in self understanding, and 
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an acceptance of consequences.  Only this would give a positive and very necessary signal to Muslims 
already living in Germany, and to all potential and future immigrants.    
SPD-Greens’ contradiction and consequences 
The conservatives’ fundamental denial of immigration was conclusively contradicted in 1989 by the 
new SPD-Green coalition government.  “We said, ‘we are an immigration land!’ and for the first time 
it was officially recognised that immigration would be a permanent uninterrupted feature of German 
reality.  We knew this would have consequences; getting a new immigration law through would be a 
hard struggle because of the conservative dominated regional governments. ” (Norbisrath, 2008)  
Yet in the wings of the conservative parties too, there were new dissenting voices beginning to be 
heard.  For a new generation of young conservatives the reality on the ground was too strong to 
sustain denial and these ‘the young savages’ as they were called, began to weigh up the 
consequences of further denial.  They were increasingly sensitive to the growing numbers of 
permanent foreign residents and problems connected with increasing segregationism and they 
began to call for a re-think within the CDU.  “Altmeier, Röttgen, Kleeden and Gröher as the younger 
political elite, recognised there had to be a different quality of "living together" between Germans 
and immigrants and their offspring; they recognised that the situation as it stood, contained 
explosive material.  Growing numbers of immigrants or people from migrant backgrounds, and an 
increase of problems in this connection, would mean that in the future things would all come to a 
head. ” (Angelow, 2008)94   
As security concerns worked their way into centrist conservativism, the SPD and the Greens95  sought 
to bring citizenship and immigration law into line with new realities.  Multiculturalism was 
conscripted to designate a new approach and alternative way of dealing with diversity and 
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difference.  (Holzberger, 2008)96 Although multiculturalism had been used to define many different 
kinds of diversity projects – anti-racism in the UK - in Germany it was made to serve the project of 
uncoupling the nation from its mono -ethnicity and -culture, and establishing the post-nation.  
(Joppke, 1996) It was employed to justify the revision of citizenship law, embedded in archaic 
imperial law of 1913, which “still exhaled the spirit of that age, which roughly put was ‘German is, 
who is of German blood’”97 reminding us of what we wanted long ago to leave behind. ” (Norbisrath, 
2008) The strategy was to extend the principle of  ius sanguinus to incorporate a territorial principle 
ius soli.  This move was little more than bringing German law into line with other European states, 
but it was nonetheless fundamentally changing the conditions of belonging.  It became an important 
site of struggle so that it was not primarily about immigrants at all, but about Germans.  (Joppke, 
1996:466)  
Joppke’s comment becomes clearer when it is understood that West Germany - a provisional state – 
had been represented as the homeland for all Germans, it was based on a legal fiction placed in the 
preamble of the Basic Law, and was at once both sharply exclusive and generously inclusive.  The old 
citizenship law was left in place, “since meddling with citizenship law meant meddling with the legal 
bridge to national unity. ” (Joppke, 2000:152) In a similar vein the rigorous denial that the FRG was 
not a land of immigration was part of the strategy which was concerned to keep alive the political 
project of recovering national unity.  (Hailbronner 1983 in Joppke 2000:153) With re-unification, new 
political elites saw an opportunity to use the extension of citizenship as an integration tool.  It’s 
revision was “one of the most ambitious pieces of socio-political engineering in post-war Germany. ” 
(Holzberger, 2008)  
Changes in thinking by state elites began to focus on the obvious dissonances in the praxis of 
citizenship.  A descendant for instance of former German emigrants to the east, who perhaps could 
speak little or no German was granted immediate citizenship on the basis of German descent; but a 
third generation descendent of immigrants from Anatolia, born and raised in Germany, could only be 
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legally recognised as a ‘tolerated foreigner’. 98 The anachronistic nature of German citizenship 
required a civic republican revision, but here there were two diametrically opposed understandings: 
on the one hand a liberal egalitarian position which understood the duty and responsibility of the 
state to ease and facilitate the integration of immigrants through easier naturalisation conditions; 
and an opposing statist communitarian position in which citizenship was be a reward for evidence of 
adequate integration.  (Triadafilopoulos and Faist, 2006)  
These entrenched positions marked out the political oppositions around citizenship reform.  It was a 
sharply divisive question which distilled into a question of ‘whose responsibility?’.  Was it the state’s 
responsibility for the welfare of all to facilitate integration; or was it the responsibility of the 
individual? The conservative position was that those seeking German citizenship had to provide 
evidence of integration; exemplified in a willingness to forego former citizenship and thereby prove a 
single loyalty to the German state.  Both positions entailed an understanding of integration 
sequence; the one in which citizenship would precede integration, the other in reverse, integration 
before citizenship.  Whereas the former embodied a strong understanding of individual welfare and a 
procedural understanding of democracy and legitimacy, the latter emphasised the states’ 
responsibility to protect the political community by assessing the degree of suitability or fitness of 
individuals.   
Although there had been tensions between the Greens and the SPD internally about details of the 
immigration law - whether there should be quota immigration or an easing of conditions for granting 
asylum - the chief bone of contention was the proposed dual citizenship provision of the new 
citizenship law.  In the Hessian State Elections Roland Koch99 adopted a populist strategy:  a signature 
campaign under the motto   "Yes to integration – no to double citizenship”100 (Scherer, 1999) This 
strategy took the political establishment by surprise and led to his election victory in the Hessian 
state elections.  This, in turn, upset the fine balance of power by giving a majority to the 
conservatives in the upper house. 101 With the loss of a majority in the upper house the SPD-Green 
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government were forced to compromise and agree to an optional citizenship model. 102  Although 
Holzberger described the new citizenship laws as forever changing the way in which Germans could 
define belonging, (Holzberger, 2008) it in fact ‘limped into law’ and came to be definitive of the 
politics of reluctance which underlay the political process of immigration and citizenship reform.  
(Keskin, 2005) 
Although multiculturalism was drafted into the SPD-Green citizenship project, and became 
implicated in a powerful conservative backlash, other elites too were involved in shaping meanings.  
It would therefore be an exaggeration to see it only as a narrowly defined project.  Churches, trade 
Unions, welfare organisations, as well as individual politicians from the CDU and SPD contributed 
significantly to the development of a broader meaning of multiculturalism as co-existent diversity.  
Heiner Geißler103 of the CDU, drew upon internationalisation and Europeanisation, for instance, to 
argue that multiculturalism was an unavoidable fact.  (Geißler, 2007) In addition he presciently 
argued that the likely unwillingness of future immigrants to give up their cultural identities and thus 
refuse to assimilate or integrate would mean that some form of multiculturalism would be the future 
working model for coexistence in ‘a new colourful republic’.  (Geißler, 1991) There were also 
multicultural projects set up in urban areas or regions with high ethnic diversity.  Frankfurt am Main 
for example, explicitly adopted multiculturalism as an institutional building block.  In 1989 it set up 
the department for multicultural affairs which listed its tasks as promoting peaceful co-existence 
across ethno-cultural diversity.  It functions as an anti-discrimination office but without any legal 
bite, only heightening awareness and offering advice.  It has been designed to function across the 
bureaucratic superstructure of Frankfurt to further integration.  (Frankfurt-am-Main, 2009) It has 
been generally recognised as one of the more innovative institutions which have overtaken the 
unpopular Foreigners’ Advisory Councils. 104  
Because multiculturalism had been more closely involved in reframing a new identity of the nation 
than in a strategy for habilitating diversity, and because conducted largely as an elite debate, it has 
unsurprisingly remained remote to Muslims.  Insofar as multiculturalism had developed to extend 
                                                          
102
 Optionsmodel in which children of immigrants born in Germany could be granted citizenship upon reaching adulthood if 
they chose to forego their former citizenship.  This qualified ius soli is unique in the EU.  
103 German minister for youth, family and health from 1982 to 1985 and general secretary of the CDU from 1977 to 1989 
104 Ausländerbeirat 
103 
 
the conditions of inclusion and to protect difference, then it had been done vicariously, since ethno-
religious voices remained absent throughout.  For the SPD-Green coalition, it defined what was to 
become a catalyst for irreversible social and political change; for conservatives, that which expressed 
social and political naïveté.  “Multi-kulti has become a swear word but we are multicultural and we 
are happy about that, it is reality there are many cultures, a mélange from which we profit [. . ] but it 
is a term one had better not use, since it only invites attack from conservatives. ” (Norbisrath, 2008)  
“. . .  today it is just so much scorched earth and no longer worth beginning a discussion about’.  
(Holzberger, 2008)  
Although this is a pessimistic end-appraisal from those whose parties employed its meanings and 
language to effect social and political change, integration is the universally preferred term.  It has 
been minted to be the new currency of diversity management.   Geisler105 speaking for the Lutheran 
Church (EKD) saw integration as not assimilative, but as a dynamic which in its continual 
development of participation requires open exchange in dialogue.  As a significant player in 
integration, the EKD seeks to reinforce the ‘integrative function of religion’, in a ‘multi –religious,        
--cultural Germany, unbolted and open to the world.  The EKD welcomes the reformed German 
immigration law as regulating the permanent opening of Germany to immigrants as well as informing 
the majority population of the permanence of immigration.  (Geisler, 2008) But it becomes clear that 
these expansive and somewhat standardised descriptions of tolerance and acceptance are not 
without a few locks and bolts as well – for example: Immigration law restricts immigration to skilled 
labour only.  And it is emphasised that ‘open exchange’ of integration dialogue can only take place 
within sacralised ‘fundamental values’.   This ‘integration’ with some multicultural spin defines in part 
the newly developing habilitation discourse as negotiation within non-negotiables.  
The integration turn - security and summitry  
Immigration acceptance has at best only been implicitly accepted by the CDU.  As Norbisrath pointed 
out, there is still a kind of opaque denial in the conservative switch from “Germany is not an 
immigration land” to its new motto “Germany is an integration land”.  If this is true, then policies 
which seem to be the consequences of such recognition may have other motivational sources as 
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well.  Economic self-interest and security dimensions also lie at the root of the integration turn, as 
this statement from Chancellor Merkel indicates: “We have recognised, that our land must be an 
‘Integration-land’ to remain economically strong.  It is not some kind of major charitable deed106 if 
we involve ourselves and integrate those who come to us *…+ rather the future of our land depends 
upon the question of whether we can learn to live with each other. ” (Merkel, 2008) 107  
This statement illustrates several important discursive connections: firstly integration is about self-
interest as protecting future economic position which impinges, as I have shown, intimately on the 
German nation identity; secondly this is reinforced by a hard-nosed denial of charity, which implies 
that it is not a welfare project although the state is understood as the integrator.  Lastly there is a 
strong security statement which emphasises that the future itself depends on the quality of 
coexistence, implying the success of this habilitative project.  
Securitised internal party re-thinking as well as external social and political pressures meant that 
Merkel within the grand coalition108 struck a distinctively new ‘integration’ chord.  Oezbek has 
emphasised the pressure IGMetall placed on the coalition government, since “. . . it isn’t enough to 
say that ‘Germany is a land of immigration’ we must see that all that was formulated in the past be 
put into action.  The Government has accepted our formulation of the situation and on the initiative 
of the Chancellor and on our recommendation, has hosted an integration summit, which began last 
year.  The goal was to discover what was developing here in Germany and what needs to be done in 
migration, immigration and integration politics.  Migrant organisations were invited, and the 
government began to speak to them and not about them, which to begin with was a good approach.  
The economy was interested, the political scene as well, individual institutions and not least, we too 
were interested.  We were, if you like, the motor of the whole movement. ” (Oezbek, 2007) 
Whether or not the trades unions alone could exert such pressure is moot but integration has been 
given a national profile and marketed as a central policy platform of two conservative-led coalition 
governments.  Muslim and immigrant voices were now to be heard in a series of planned summits.  
At the government’s invitation a diverse group of organisations and private persons with a stake in 
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‘integration’ were to be invited to take part in a new “process of dialogue”.  In truly corporate 
fashion the net was widely cast -  trade union representatives, religious leaders, immigrant 
organisation leaders and alternative voices; all representing the broadest cross section of society 
were to meet in working groups with experts and state elites.  The summits were to be the chosen 
framework to publicise and symbolise the government’s intent to seek the successful integration of 
immigrants into German society.  The motto was “Talk with, and not about, migrants”.   Significantly 
there was to be a separate Islam conference109 under the direction of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior (BMI).  
The German Islam conference (DIK) was the initiative of Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Interior 
minister and the conferences were held within the same time-frame as the Integration summits 
between 2007-9.  Overlapping themes were dealt with at the two series of meetings, but at the 
DIK110 the specific focus was on Islam and Muslim perspectives on integration.  The two series 
however can be understood as part of the same process with the DIK as nesting within the larger 
Integration summits.  (Bauerbach, 2008)111 Security has been an underlying theme in both summit 
series but it is at the DIK that it becomes most closely focused on the subjects of my research.  
The security dimensions of DIK were first highlighted by an external critique from the Turkish 
Government which made it clear it would follow the procedures closely.  They protested that since 
the BMI was the responsible ministry for internal security and the very fact that they organised the 
DIK, revealed the real security agenda behind the conference.  This was a powerful argument but 
BMI sought to counter this with reference to the organisational structure of the interior ministry 
which had a much wider remit than was common in other European national interior ministries; 
being responsible for integration and internal security institutional remits, they argued, required that 
it fall to this ministry to organise the conference.  But this seemed less than convincing since the 
organisation might easily have been taken over by the ministry of Immigration and Asylum which in 
any case has a permanent presence in BMI.   
                                                          
109 Referred to in the singular it was in fact a series of conferences and work groups meeting over a three year period.  
110 German Islam Conference Deutsche Islamkonferenz 
111 Bauerbach is a pseudenoym for an Islam expert working for the BMI.  For more information see Appendix two. 
106 
 
This attempted deflection could not completely exorcise the deeper security implications and served 
to highlight the difficulty of bringing internal security and Islam into such uneasy proximity.  Gülbahar 
illustrates the sensitivities involved: ‘I resent my name or person or my organisation being mentioned 
in the same breath as Al Qaeda or 9/11. ’ (Gülbahar, 2008) Some participants therefore responded 
emotively when they felt pressure to discuss internal security through themes such as Islamism and 
terrorism.  Another point of conflict was when the BMI sought clear statements from participants on 
constitutional recognition and acceptance.  Because constitutional loyalty is the basis of all 
integration, (Bader, 2008) 112   or as another interviewee put it, “Integration is the software but the 
Constitution is the BIOS”, (Norbisrath, 2008)113 clear positions according to BMI, needed to be drawn.  
Given the widespread acceptance of the constitution as the foundation stone for all negotiation, it 
gave rise to ill-feeling when Muslims were asked to specify their positions.  “They said114 we won’t 
admit that we recognise the German constitutional order, because it is self evident, and that must 
not be put in doubt.  But our position115 was ‘de facto it is put in doubt!’ and for integration it is 
important that you say ‘we too respect the German constitutional order’.  But here it was evident 
there was underlying sensitivity, fearing to be branded as terrorists or criminals, which of course is 
not without foundation, since in the media the two are often linked.  Integration is a much more 
positive constructive process, but the one doesn’t work without the other; also for to win 
understanding in the majority society.  In the committees it was eventually accepted with gritted 
teeth, but not in the most willing or cooperative manner. ”  (Bauerbach, 2008)116  
All of this indicates that for the state elites, security was integral to Islam summitry and more widely 
to the integration processes.  Bauerbach portrayed it as the more negative side of the integration 
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coin but nonetheless indispensable connection.  So although state elites recognised that bringing 
Muslim issues into close proximity with security was problematic it was necessary to legitimise the 
procedures.  They were clear that in discussing these themes many participants felt it would further 
stigmatise Muslims.  Others participants more astutely argued that it assumed there were security 
issues to begin with, and that seeking statement positions was working from under the shadow of 
suspicion.  However the BMI’s position remained throughout that to omit security dimensions would 
have rendered the conference dubitable for the majority society.  Bauerbach indicated that the BMI 
intended from the start to retain a tight control of the event, for neither the discussion themes, nor 
the list of invited participants was up for discussion.  It was a strictly take it or leave it option.  
Keeping control of who may sit at a table has long been recognised as a significant power and the 
BMI exerted its power ostensibly in determining who might be heard.  In insisting upon hearing a 
variety of voices – a mix of quasi-representative and private voices were placed on the same level as 
more representative voices.  This also served not only to allow a platform for alternative voices to 
the more conservative organisations but to signal that the state was not prepared to recognise or 
commit to any future Muslim representative partner.  Inviting secular and conservative voices to 
speak also meant that heated discussions and irresolvable issues drew the dividing lines not between 
Muslims and state but among the Muslims themselves.  (Bauerbach, 2008) 
Formal representation and the limits of recognition 
The German government’s integration and Islam summitry has been publicly promoted as speaking 
and listening to each other (The Federal Chancellory, 2010) and as offering the possibility for a 
diversity of voices to speak at the national level.  Yet the move to hear this diversity must also be set 
within a larger context of the state’s encouragement of Muslims to organise and aggregate so as to 
speak with a unified voice and be reliable partners in processes of consultation.  Here the primary 
emphasis of the state had been to find stability and coherence in terms of Muslim leadership.  The 
challenge for Muslim organisations had been to create an institutional framework which transcended 
ethnic, sectarian and political oppositions.   
Forming loose umbrella organisations has been the favoured institutional approach.  One of the most 
recent developments has been the formation (during the DIK)  of the Coordination Council of 
Muslims; (KRM)117 this loose confederative structure consists of four main Muslim organisations: the 
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Turkish-Islamic Association (DITIB), the Islam Council for the Federal Republic (IRD), the Federation of 
Islamic Cultural Centres in Germany (VIKZ), and the Central Council for Muslims in Germany (ZMD). 
118 In its founding principles it commits clearly to the constitutional order in Germany and states as its 
goals: providing a long-term structure for unity which is open to all streams within Islam and 
achieving official legal recognition for Islam from the German state.  (KRM, 2007)  
Yet although this aggregative process has drawn public praise from the German government it has 
also been subject to extensive criticism.  Serious questions exist about its claim to representativeness 
and putative right to speak on behalf of all (or the majority of) Muslims.  (Bauerbach, 2008) Critics for 
example have pointed out that the KRM is as exclusive as it is inclusive; they refuse membership to 
Alevi and Ahmadi organisations, and followers of Fethulla Gülen, as well as to some Sufi orders.  
Excluding significant ‘Muslim’ populations, and simultaneously claiming representational legitimacy, 
open it up to the charge that it seeks to appropriate the right to say who is Muslim and who is not.  In 
the battle for representativeness, the KRM itself claims to speak for around 80 -85% of all Muslims in 
Germany, but this is considered by many experts and government elites to be a vastly inflated claim.  
This runs to the heart of different understandings of representation.  On the one hand the 
government bases its estimates on membership, whereas the KRM on the number of mosque 
associations it represents.  Köhler argued that ‘the Muslim mentality’ resists registration and 
therefore only representation of the associations accurately reflects the true representation of 
Muslims.  (Welt Online, 2007) This has however remained unconvincing and in a government funded 
research study,119 it was discovered that only 20% of respondents were involved in a religious 
organisation or community;120 only 10% had ever heard of KRM; 50% felt Muslim organisations 
unrepresentative with only a small percentage feeling represented by any Muslim organisation.  
(BAMR, 2009)  Given government accounting a generally accepted figure based on membership 
figures, sets KRM representation of Muslims at 10-15%.   
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In addition to the explicitly excluded groups mentioned, many secular Muslims felt such a 
conservative organisation could not represent them121 since its weltanschauung would be 
fundamentally religious.  This seems to have been borne out by events, since one of its first demands 
was for separate swimming classes.  (TAZ, 2007) This impression was further bolstered by the KRM’s 
call for a boycott of the Centre for Religious Studies at Münster which had been training teachers for 
Islamic religious education for the state of North Rhine Westphalia.   Kizilkaya, the KRM spokesman, 
criticised the director of the centre, Professor Muhammad Sven Kalisch, for publicly doubting and 
questioning the historicity of Muhammed and argued that this rendered him unsuitable to train 
teachers.  (Spiegel, 2008)  The KRM advised all Muslim students not to enrol in the courses offered by 
the centre.   
Security aspects also cast doubt on the ability of KRM to negotiate integration or speak for a unified 
Islam.  Ulteriorisation on the one hand has been mediated through the indirect presence of ‘ant-
democratic’ organisations such as Milli Görüş122 which continue to be under surveillance by German 
intelligence123; on the other hand by a lack of transparency within some organisations such as the 
IRD.  ‘No one knows who its members are and who has elected Kizilkaya as its President’.  (Dantschke 
in Spiegel Online, 2008) The dominance of DITIB has also served to ulteriorise KRM since this is 
interpreted as providing Turkey with influence in the formation and workings of the organisation.  
DITIB’s inbuilt veto right (as well as its three representatives - as opposed to the others’ two) has 
been highlighted as inbuilt Turkish say-so and the rather sudden closer ties between IGMG and DITIB 
are interpreted to be a reflection of Erdogan’s policies in Turkey.  The KRM has been understood 
then to be part of larger Turkish designs to gain more leverage in German domestic (and by 
extension European) politics.  (Spuler-Stegemann, 2007)  
Although security and ulteriority are disruptive to recognition, there are also more mundane factors 
working against KRM.  It has been criticised for its under-developed organisational structure with 
insufficient staff, no central office and no website; and its failure to put together a coherent strategy 
and programme.  (Breuer, 2008) The organisation is ineffectual in influencing the development of 
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religious education in the schools, since this is the responsibility of the regions124 and KRM would 
need to be more adequately represented at this level which it is not.  (Schröter in Islamische Zeitung, 
2008) 
All of these criticisms serve to cast doubt on the KRM’s ability to adequately represent Muslims in 
Germany, and to achieve one of the goals it has set - to be the contact partner for the German 
authorities.  The other main goal to achieve the long running demand for the legal incorporation of 
Islam under German law is also in doubt. 125  Although this has long been considered, by state elites, 
as a necessary way of integrating Turkish immigrants into German society, (Bauböck, 2002) 
(Kastoryano, 2004) it has been consistently rejected since 1979. 126 The incompatibility of Islam’s 
institutional structure – lacking any ecclesiastical hierarchy - has been and continues to be, one of 
the main arguments against official recognition of Islam as a religious community127 in the public 
space.  Yet the failure to recognise Islam as a public incorporated legal entity, damages the reality of 
freedom of religion.  (Beck, 2007) 
In this short overview of the most recent attempts at finding a unified voice there have been 
important questions raised about representativeness and the right of KRM to define, even if 
indirectly, who is Muslim and who is not.   The charge that it is also exclusive in the sense of its 
conservative platform, in which there can be no place for liberal Muslims, (Akgün in Welt Online, 
2007) has also weakened its claims to be representative.  Although government elites have 
welcomed the efforts, they see it as only a first step to adequate Muslim representation.  Laschet128 
sees the Achilles heel in the membership issue which is a prerequisite for official recognition of Islam 
as a legally incorporated identity under German law.  Without this recognition the KRM cannot hope 
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to have responsibility for religious instruction in public schools or to receive taxes from tithed Muslim 
workers. 129(Laschet in Spiegel Online, 2007) 
Whether organisational restructuring will take place and successfully convince sceptical state elites 
and other critical voices, remains to be seen.  Kilicarslan130 informed me that she had been actively 
arguing in the central committee for a re-structuring of DITIB along membership lines so as to meet 
the criteria of representativeness and that there would be significant changes in the near future as a 
result.  (Kiliçarslan, 2008) Mohammed131 however remained sceptical since the organisations were 
hopelessly divided.  He placed very little faith in Muslim organisations and thought Muslims could 
only be properly represented, and their goals reached, by being active in political parties and 
participating in the political process.   (Mohammed, 2008) 
Whereas, formerly, finding a single unified voice was considered the prerequisite for stable and 
coherent negotiation, summitry points to an alternative understanding of safety in diversity.  If being 
united entails exclusion of significant populations and making excessive claims to speak for Muslims 
and seeking thereby to define who can be considered Muslims, then the longed for recognition will 
continue to be postponed.  The BMI was careful in the Islam conferences not to imply that the 
invitation to the conference indirectly recognised future negotiating or advisory partners. 
(Bauerbach, 2008) State elites concerned therefore, that an officially recognised single institutional 
voice would promote a conservative religiosity (and invite more Turkish influence and leverage), has 
placed a new and greater emphasis on recognising the diversity within Islam.  “We have to do with a 
very diverse religion … that has come out very clearly in the Islam conference.  The demand for a 
single negotiating partner has been strongly relativised. ” (Böhmer in Welt Online, 2007)132 
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130 A. Kılıçarslan is vice General Secretary of DITIB and is the first woman to sit on its central committee. For more 
information see Appendix two. 
131 B. Mohammed is by profession a Health and Hygiene inspector. He is director of the European Integration Centre 
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organisational executive member Präsidiumsmitglied in the DIK.  
132 Professor Dr. Maria Böhmer is Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery and Federal Government 
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Alternative voices  
Arguing that Muslim organisations and their top-level umbrella organisations are inadequately 
representative, the German government has placed special emphasis on diversity.  Within that 
diversity, women have been singled out as ‘carriers of integration’.  This has created on the one hand 
space for critical and alternative voices to enter the integration debate but on the other to give it a 
problematic gendered aspect.  Kelek133 has been highly critical of what she sees as a lax approach to 
entrenched immigrant traditionalism.  She has argued that government must look more closely at 
how ‘religious culture’ is manipulating a multicultural ethos in Germany to the disadvantage of 
women and girls.  On the one hand she identifies the positive in Islam, as that which bestows 
identity134 and provides orientation, but also emphasises strengthening traditional Islamic thinking is 
a reaction to the individualism of German society.  She has been acutely critical of the cultural mores, 
she sees wrapped up in religious garb, being used to exclude and to reduce women to their lowest 
common denominator, their sex.  She has argued that Germans probably make more efforts to 
understand Turks than ever before, but this, to many Turks has a superficial quality: „Aha so that’s 
how you are!“ but then turning away again, satisfied that they have found an answer to something 
that has puzzled them.  She asserts that Turks generally remain uninterested in German culture.  She 
is emphatic that “Religion belongs to Culture, but it mustn’t be allowed to cut me off from the 
society in which I live.  And the constitution and the basic rights of freedom must not be 
subordinated to any religious culture. “ (Kelek, 2005)  
Necla Kelek’s voice in the Islam and Integration conferences was controversial for a number of 
reasons - first as a voice without representational legitimacy which was set on a par with the 
umbrella organisations which represented "the vast majority of the Mosque community in Germany"  
(EFMS, 2006) Second as author of the book ‘The Foreign Bride’135 (Kelek, 2005) which has been 
influential in framing restrictive new immigration laws for outsourcing spouses.  She tells the story of 
a young Turkish woman, Zeynep whose arranged marriage has locked her into life of slavery.  Unable 
to speak German, her life is about control and restriction; she is only being permitted to leave her 
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home to attend Koran school.  Kelek argues that she is only one of the many ‘modern day slaves’ 
whom the liberal establishment chooses to ignore out of fear of being accused of being hostile to 
foreigners. 136 Muslimas have therefore formed organisations to actively draw attention to and fight 
for a prohibition of marriage migration.   Feminist Muslimas within the summits have been 
committed to breaking the silences and exposing naive multiculturalism.  (Ateş, 2008) (Kelek, 2005)  
Although feminist emancipatory voices have been given space to speak conferences and summits, 
there is also a stereotypical locking of Muslims and Muslimas into preconceived gendered roles - 
male oppressor and female victim – but this is also disputed and contested among feminist 
Muslimas.  Demirdögan,137 a left wing candidate for the European Parliament, emphasised in her 
interview how ’arranged marriage migration’, is instrumentalised to sharpen the image of the 
enemy.  “I find it frightening, as a woman, the way the whole debate on honour killing and forced 
marriage is conducted.  It is expressed in very sharp tones but no solution is sought or wanted.  This 
is my observation through my work in helping women.  They138 travel on this track to construct a new 
enemy image, erecting an Islam discourse in which the Muslim woman is tyrannised, repressed, and 
subdued, and the girls who are born and grow up here are forced into marriage and there is no other 
position possible. ” (Demirdögan, 2009) 
In a similar manner Zaimoğlu139 criticises over-sensitivity to demands for religious Islamic 
exceptionalism.  Although he argues for a sensitive understanding of Muslim immigrants, he 
recognises that many are still working with archaic and paternalistic ‘farmer values’, and living in 
their own ‘ethno-bubbles’.  Permitting religious parents to have their children excused from class 
trips or swimming lessons is being too tolerant.  Yet when young people begin to express a religious 
identity through wearing a hijab, they are simply identifying with something powerful.  Islam has 
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138 political and social elites 
139 Ferridun Zaimoğlu is author and publicist and has been a participant in DIK 
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overtaken from the alternative scene of the Kanakster140 as the scene to express difference.  When 
experts tell them of the dangers of Islamism, it becomes a flirt with danger and the forbidden.  They 
feel it is chic.  A few may cross the line to become Jihadis, but for the majority it is a normal part of 
growing up.  However, some politicians and media employ the ‘clichéd Muslim’, ‘multiculturalism’ 
and ‘parallel societies’ as ‘terminologies of war’.  Zaimoğlu expresses astonishment since they don’t 
know what kind of reality they are talking of.  They have never visited a Turkish men’s club or even 
visited ‘the front lines of immigrant society’.  If they would, they might discover many positive things 
as well.  (Kahle, 2005)  
Cultural dominance 
Integration as habilitation is discursively conjugated in security-insecurity, in assertive powers and 
resistances.   One such has been the periodic assertion of cultural supremacy.  This debate tends to 
ignite periodically and seeks to assert the existence of a German leading or guiding culture141.  It is a 
culturalist approach intended to clarify the identity of ‘the nation’, by defining who the national we 
could possibly be.  In the face of de facto immigration and settlement the terms of belonging have 
necessarily required some alteration, so that the principle of cultural belonging or as Pautz calls it ius 
cultus has been needed to replace ethnicity ius sanguinus as the exclusionary identifier and was to 
draw new boundary lines between nationals and immigrants.  (Pautz, 2005) As a conservative 
attempt to re-inscribe German identity, this time with a cultural monism, it necessarily militates 
against a limited multiculturalism within integration.  It also serves to securitise cultural-religious 
Muslim identities.  
Schönbohm142 has argued, that immigrants and those of immigrant background may ‘align’143 as 
opposed to subordinate144, themselves to a basic German culture.   “It has to do with the alignment 
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of immigrants to our German culture.  It is that this land becomes ‘homeland’ to immigrants. ” 
(Schönbohm, 2006) Obviously this kind of argument presupposes that there is some single definable 
cultural national Self composed of recognisable German  values and norms rooted in a common 
history and registered in the constitution.  All of this underpins his concept of a German Cultural 
nation145 in which social and political rights are intimately related to German-ness.  (Pautz, 2005)  
Merz146 although anchoring the term within wider commitments to Europe and the values of peace 
and coexistence, has demanded that immigrants adopt Germany’s dominant culture as expressed in 
the values of the Basic Law.  (Green, 2004) Although the term ‘dominant culture’ surfaces and 
submerges periodically, there is a tenacious culturalist dimension to integration defining right-wing 
conservative positions.  In a more recent CDU policy paper the term reappears in which a 
commitment to German leading culture means “willingness to make effort and accept responsibility, 
recognition of the binding cultural fundamentals, the values, which descending from our history 
influence our constitution and which frame our political culture.  This is characterised in particular by 
German history, and its federal and confessional traditions.  These together form the groundwork of 
a leading culture in Germany.  The confession of a leading culture and identification with it, are the 
prerequisites for successful integration. ”(CDU-Grundsatzprogramm-Kommisision, 2007:2) 
A strong culturalism, such as the above illustrates, drowns out the more moderate expressions which 
also appear in centre-conservative statements.  In the same document we read ‘integration means 
the acceptance of cultural difference on the basis of generally shared and lived values. ” (CDU-
Grundsatzprogramm-Kommisision, 2007:12) Yet the continued insistence of cultural dominance with 
its implication of cultural submission or abnegation147 is a giving up of that, which underpins and 
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gives established identities meaning.  It is therefore not hyperbolic to read ‘integration’ as equivalent 
to being required to give up your own identity in German political discourse.  (Oezcan, 2009)148  
In reference to the idea of an ‘integration contract’ at the G6 meeting in Heiligendamm, which future 
immigrants would be required to sign,  Schäuble149 insisted that this would be an important signal 
that “we are offering to integrate them”150 Stoiber151 to the Bild152 newspaper put it this way “It has 
to be clear that in our country the monopoly of power belongs to the state and not the Turkish man. 
” (EurActiv, 2006) Contractualising integration, it would seem, offers further legal leverage over 
immigrants, a way of ‘checking up’ that “new immigrants live up to the values of our society”153 and 
it should be understood, with the option of expulsion for those found wanting.  (Williamson, 2006) In 
a similar vein Schönböhm suggested that integration could be seen as an ‘offer’ which ought also to 
be extended to those immigrants already settled here.  In what he calls ‘catch up integration’ living 
“with us instead of among us . . .  who doesn’t accept this offer, should rather leave our land.”  
(Schönbohm, 2006)  
In addition to explicit and implicit securitisation of Muslim presence as the bottom-heavy underclass 
as well as social and political constructions of Islam and Islamicisation, there exist as well, a range of 
culturalist nation assertions.  On the one hand this is asserted as a national mono culture of 
dominance to which immigrants must adapt; on the other it is likely to contain, in the German case 
especially, a supra-European contractualist culture.  Each point points, in significant ways, to the 
discursive contexts in which Integration becomes inextricably lodged.   
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Part II The Netherlands - poldering 
The global metaphor employed to describe the Dutch socio-political system until the 1960s is the 
pillar.  It emphasises the verticality of social and political organisation and loyalties which 
characterised systemic functioning and arrangement.  All class strata were contained in sub-cultural 
blocs through which elites negotiated, forged alliances and mediated compromises ‘over the walls of 
the ghetto’.  The churches formed the nuclei of the religious blocs, and from here radiated outwards 
through three pathways – school, political party and newspaper – into a plethora of 
compartmentalised organisations.  (Petersen, 1997:197)  The Dutch socio-political system was thus 
calibrated to maintain inter-religious154 and religious-secular balance155 and was maintained through 
established religious and secular solidarities.   
At grass root level, the pillars were introverted, isolated and hostile to each other, set up to defend 
the cultural and social interests of threatened minorities, (Lechner, 1989) through which they 
conducted their emotional charge into the political sphere.  Although considerable animosity existed 
between the blocs and was reproduced at the political level, yet the system was stable.  This was 
accomplished through a universal commitment to the principle of proportionality which regulated 
resource distribution, and the principle of just sharing.  Limited resources were divided rigorously in 
proportion to the representative156 strength of each pillar or bloc.  The social insulation of the pillars 
meant safe reproduction of social relationships and weltanschauung in the political sphere, since 
political parties were ambassadors of their sub-cultures.  (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:26) Issues were 
transmitted vertically within pillars to their political entrepreneurs.  To get the business done 
required long-established traditions of pragmatic flexible trading.  This was characterised by the 
practice of elite compromise and consensus, but insulated from their social bases.   The business of 
compromise was conducted behind closed doors, and overarching elite consensus became the ‘sine 
qua non’ of the Dutch consensus game.  (Lijphart, 1975)  
Because any direct accessing from the social base would have meant disruption and exposed 
systemic vulnerability, issues were dealt with according to formalised, routinised and phlegmatic 
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practices; the business of politics had a viscous certainty since it was reduced to the predictabilities of 
elite management of well regulated difference balance, and to blank disinterest amongst the 
electorates.  The system nurtured therefore a passive detached democracy.   
In addition to this stable way of doing business, the system also exerted other stabilising influences.  
Although the central axis of Dutch politics was, a Christian-secular one, and Christian coalitions were 
ideologically religious conservatives, the latter needed to be socially progressive as well.  
Conservative coalitions introduced extensive social reform in order to stave off the possibility of 
socialist threat.  (Petersen, 1997) In addition the social democrats, in the aftermath of universal 
suffrage and proportional representation, had little choice but to resist voices from the left and to 
reconcile themselves to a minority position and to get involved in consensus style politics.  (Blom, 
2006) 
This is the standard narrative and has often been criticised for its simplifications.  For example there 
were powerful horizontal identifications as well - loyalties to state and monarchy, common language 
and cultural identity and ways of doing things.   Pillarisation was not uniform either in its cohesion or 
power, so that it is more accurate to refer to degrees of pillarisation.  Lijphart addressed this issue 
and provided measurement criteria to assess the degree of pillarisation.  These were the role of 
religion and ideology, size, density and cohesiveness of organisational networks, the extent of 
separateness or ‘social apartheid’ secured within the pillar, and the degree of loyalty 
demanded/encouraged by elites  - (Lijphart in Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:23) Catholics clearly 
constructed the most massive pillar with a large organisational network and interlocking directories, 
but the Protestant pillar was noticeably weaker due to its internal religious heterogeneity and less 
hierarchical leadership structure.  A league table of pillarisation would place Catholics at the top, 
followed by the re-Reformed157, Social Democrats, Dutch Reformed and last and least and more by 
default, liberals.  (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:25) The liberals were in many respects quite different 
from the others, for whereas the Social democrats centred on the party and the trade union and had 
a socialist ideology, the liberals seemed to lack a strong uniting ideology or weltanschauung.  They 
existed by appealing to non-sectarianism and nationalism and criticising narrow partitionist thinking 
which guaranteed social insulation and non-unity and they sought to ally with kindred spirits and 
break through the pillars but were unable to sufficiently exploit discontent within the system.  They 
lacked the dense networks of organisations of the religious pillars and seemed to be a pillar more by 
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default loosely held together by a common mind set.  The liberal ethos however remained powerful 
in many spheres of life: cultural, corporate, academic and bureaucratic.  (Blom, 2006)   
The Catholic Church was a key player in the pillarised system, and vertical transmission was the 
favoured strategy for promoting Catholic issues and norms,158 as well as Catholic identity themes. 159 
Yet in the post-war period signs of change were beginning to be nervously registered within the 
Catholic bloc.  Hard-line ‘mandatory letters’ sought to maintain discipline by forbidding Catholics to 
become members of the non-Catholic Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV), from reading 
socialist works, and listening to ‘subversive’ radio stations.  The Catholic newspapers still largely re-
produced the Catholic Church’s line but it was becoming out of step with popular Catholic thinking.  
As one perceptive observer wrote “…there is definitely something dangerous in the huge gap 
between public opinion as it is expressed in the newspapers and the vox populi.  Eventually it [the 
pillar] will become rather like a tree trunk decaying from the inside out. ” (J. Leyden in Schuyt and 
Taverne, 2004:330) 
A social loosening up process, often referred to as de-Pillarisation, powered by liberal-secularisation 
was well underway by the late 1960s.  (Slomp, 2000)  The emancipatory dynamic proved too 
powerful for the disciplining of the pillars, and the traditional columnar containments came to be 
understood more as communal restrictions and elite dominance than places of protection and 
stability.  In a fifteen year period 1960 to 1975 secularisation and liberalisation began to radically 
alter the internal constitution of religious, social and political sub-systems.  As the religious pulses 
from the pillars weakened a culture of freedom and enjoyment developed.  A rejection of a Calvinist 
ethos meant liberation from an ‘enjoyment is sin’ mentality.  Large scale defections from organised 
religion meant that carefully constructed religious, social, and political networks started to unravel.  
Most obvious was the defection of voters from the religious parties, across the board, from the 
minor Calvinist parties through to the powerful Catholic party.  The main Protestant church160 had 
been, for some time, questioning the utility of the pillarised system.  Sizeable parts of the population 
were no longer willing to be restricted in their membership choices, and thus the insulative function 
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became less effective.  The Catholic pillar, which had been the most powerful and cohesive of the 
disciplining regimes, and the one putting up most resistance, could not withstand the winds of 
change.   
As pressure to belong decreased, in a new developing ethos of consumerism and individualism, the 
broadness of the social change encompassed not only those who left the churches, but even those 
who remained.  They too began reasoning differently.  Religious people too, felt freer to form 
friendships and join associations outside their subculture which made new social and political 
constellations possible – as in new social memberships, party mergers and political coalitions.  Many 
of the pillared institutions such as schools, hospitals and social work remained, but there was much 
more individual choice and free movement.  As the pillars hollowed out, social and political activism 
increased - environmental protection groups, anti-nuclear, animal rights – and dozens of single issue 
parties were set up to fight elections.   
Pillarisation and its subsequent dismantling sets the narrative scene, for immigration and Muslim 
presence.  But several things need to be kept in mind throughout, since ways of doing business 
would be re-employed in attempts to habilitate new differences: first that the Dutch were habitual 
and practiced segmentalists, skilfully ‘living apart together’; second the mechanisms of insulation and 
shock absorption produced a legitimated style of detached governance; third de-pillarisation took 
place on the back of an emancipatory liberalisation-secularisation dynamic.  The price for stability 
had been the practice of detaching political decision-making from the social bases which the elites 
represented.  The significance of this however was that it exacerbated new pressures which were 
building especially in Dutch urban spaces.  Silences and detachments had worked well in a 
Netherlands of rival minorities, but as Cohen has pointed out, with depillarisation these former 
minorities began to feel like a majority and one which began to define itself against an immigrant 
minority.  (Cohen, 2006) As the political elites practiced detachment and silence, they created a 
powerful political vacuum.   
Multiculturalism and policy evolution 
A concerted effort to accommodate new immigrant diversity was attempted by the Dutch 
government when it introduced in 1983 the Minorities Policy. 161 This had a strong and explicitly 
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ethical goal: the empowerment of ethnic communities.  The motto: “Integration with the 
preservation of the migrants’ own identity,162 expressed policy priorities and the standard position of 
the Christian Democratic party.  (BZK Ministry of Interior Affairs, 1983) In the tradition of 
pillarisation, the state had funded radio and television as well as religious schools; this was now re-
introduced for minorities.  (Michalowski, 2005)  Since the overriding imperative and goal was to 
ensure that immigrants gained an equal footing in Dutch society, the state set about creating the 
requisite institutional apparatus.  Advisory bodies163 were set up for each ethnic community which 
received state funding and all state bodies were required to be advised and to take this into account 
in framing policies likely to impact the communities involved.  This policy has animated Muslims to 
organise their religious life with the result that mosques and Islamic schools have been set up.  
Islamic schools place religion in a central role.  “We recite the Qur’an and sing religious songs as part 
of our school routine at As-Soeffah. ” (Rahman, 2008)164 However they are regulated by the Dutch 
educational curriculum. Altuntas165 from Milli Görüş emphasised Dutch Muslim life form in which 
‘our future is the Netherlands and we organise our lives around this fact.  We are Muslims but 
Muslims in the Netherlands and in Europe. ” (Altuntas, 2010)  
The moral content of the Ethnic Minorities Policy was unmistakable.  It strongly supported selective 
identity retention, since this was not yet thought incongruous or contradictory with successful 
habilitation.  Pillarisation would be emancipatory as the former pillarised society had been.  Ethnic 
minorities would organise and fashion their own organisations, and the state would guarantee 
equality before the law and would pursue equality of opportunity across the social smorgasbord.   All 
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of this was an unmistakeable throw-back to Pillarisation166 and ‘subsidised autonomy’ (Lijphart, 1975) 
which was the pervasive socio-political template of the Netherlands up to the late 1960s.  The core 
assumptions were fuelled by feelings of social and political responsibility and obligation, and 
confidence in a tried social template.  It was easy to believe it could be re-applied for the habilitation 
of immigrant communities and would achieve their emancipation through self-preservation.   
The pillarisation embodied in Ethnic Minorities policies was however a “truncated mini-pillarisation”.  
(Pieterse, 2004:94) In contrast to the old fully developed denominationally defined model - working 
through a plethora of institutions and spanning the gamut of social and political spheres - a strict 
internal discipline was missing from the new truncated version.  In this pillarised structure there 
would be no centralised Islam but rather an often confusing polyphony.  Importantly, the other 
pillars had been largely dissolved so that this truncated multicultural pillarisation was distinctly out of 
step with times.  Some pillarised mechanisms such as the principle of proportionality were 
introduced, by which resources would be reliably allocated according to the relative size of the 
communities involved.  Yet this worked better in the housing sector than in employment and 
education where widespread discrimination continued to be practiced.  Anti discriminatory 
legislation in the employment sector met with stiff resistance from employers who argued, that 
disproportionate employment wasn’t evidence of discrimination but of ethnic minority under-
qualification.  This argument is still the ‘fall-back’ response today, where discrimination is not 
admitted to.  (Oezcan, 2009) 
In 1989 a new report by the Scientific Council167 criticised the lack of progress in education and the 
labour market as well as the funding and subsidising of policies with respect to ethnic groups.  The 
report recommended a greater concentration in the areas of under-performance and urged that 
more pressure be brought to bear on immigrants by emphasising their obligation to ‘integrate’.  The 
report also emphasised the need to move away from protectionism (in the area of cultural rights) 
and provisionism (in the area of facilities).  (Penninx, 2005) When the Framework memorandum168 
was presented in 1994, it was evident that many recommendations of the Scientific Council had been 
adopted: there was a new emphasis on individuals and personal responsibility; a disengagement 
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from sensitive cultural affairs, since culture was to be a private matter; (de Jong, 2002) and over-
dependence on ethnic organisations - the government started concentrating attention on 
neighbourhood programmes which had the advantage of removing direct attention from ethnic 
groups and reliance on their organisations but still reaching underprivileged ethnic clienteles.  By 
dealing with the larger segments of disadvantage they could at once move away from ethnic group 
dependence but still target them; and lastly a concentration on incorporation through education and 
work.   
Clearly the Purple coalition169 represented a major break with the familiar flow of Dutch politics.  
“There was a great deal of triumphalism and many members of Parliament stressed the secular 
principle.  Bolkestein in the 1990s was one of first who raised issues about Islam and I agree with 
some things he said; he insisted that religion must stay behind the front door, it is a private affair and 
has no place in the public sphere.  For the VVD that was a principle.  In the Purple cabinet, you felt 
something of their triumphalism ‘we have finally got this lot out’, but also had to do with 
secularism.” (Mintjes, 2008)170 Unsurprisingly, perhaps that the motto of the new Purple coalition 
emphasised the universal culture of work as its motto made clear: “work, work, and once again 
work!” (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcès-Mascarenas et al., 2006) The new policy’s overriding goal was 
equal participation in all social and economic spheres.  On the one hand improving educational 
achievement and greater participation in the labour market were emphasised but on the other there 
were recessionary welfare cutbacks.  The introduction of civic integration courses171 underscored the 
guiding assumption that ethnic ‘integration’ failure had to do with insufficient individual 
competences, and hence the need to increase individual functionality through greater proficiency in 
the Dutch language and knowledge of Dutch society and its institutions.  In 1998 The Newcomers 
Integration Act172 (WIN) emphasised obligation to self-sufficiency.  Compulsory assessment and 
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integration courses (with exceptions) were introduced not only for new comers173 but for longer 
term residents174.  Throughout, successful completion of the integration courses was understood as a 
first step toward integration.  With ‘getting opportunities, seizing opportunities’175 the government 
was charged with creating opportunities but allochtones were expected to seize them.  (BZK Ministry 
of Interior Affairs, 1998) 
Breaking silence and new realists 
Laissez-faire, as a relaxed regulation of immigration in which initial recruitment and later family 
reunion took place, gave rise in the early 1990s to criticism that things ‘were out of control’ 
(Doomernik, 2004) It was a time too, when discussions about the ‘nation’ became obsessive; it was a 
battle for whose version would prevail, and therefore for which selections of history could be used to 
socialise citizens.  (Lechner, 2008) In terms of policies, the dominance of temporal perceptions 
precluded any systematic development of policies to regulate either incoming flows of people or to 
facilitate their habilitation.  The early phase of immigration was therefore characterised by a mix of 
ad hoc-ism and laissez-faire.  Under pressure from the municipalities, media, academia176, and 
security focus-events177 this tension between divergent reality and rhetoric, was brought strongly to 
the fore of official thinking.  (Penninx, 2005) In 1979 a Scientific Council for Government Policy178 
(WRR) produced the influential report ‘Ethnic minorities’ in which lawmakers were urged to 
recognise ethnic diversity as a permanent feature of the Netherlands; and to intensify policies to 
redress structural imbalance which tended ‘to perpetuate the social backwardness and cultural 
isolation of the ethnic minorities’.  (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1979) State elites 
became more receptive to the notion of an already developed weaker ethno-cultural underclass, 
                                                          
173 nieuwkomers 
174 oudkomers 
175 Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken, integratiebeleid 1999-2002 appeared December 1998 the policy paper 
176 Hans Entzinger already warned in 1975 in ‚Nederland immigratieland?‘ of the danger inherent in de facto immigration 
and permanence, and risks of elite denial of this.  
177 such as the train hijackings and kidnappings by the South Moluccans 
178 Wetenschappelijke Raad vor het Regeringsbeleid 
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which was running the danger of permanent marginalisation.  Underprivileged ethnic under-classes 
were now to be systematically targeted for help.   
Constructions of silence require substantial resources, labour and disciplining mechanisms in a liberal 
democracy.  The situation in the 1990s suggests strongly that such a scenario had been created.  
Habits of elite management of potentially divisive issues continued to be the norm, and alternative 
space, which would have permitted direct debate and treatment of social tensions, was still 
considered the dangerously short road to divisiveness and instability, so that political silencing was 
an entrenched security practice.  Addressing problems and tensions surrounding immigrant 
settlement or questioning the sense of continued immigration drew standardised reactions – 
accusations of intolerance and racism.  So as the hatches were kept battened down, the issue space 
remained closed.  (Bale, 2008) But the maintenance of silence and the effectiveness of keeping social 
themes out of the political-security realm created a dangerous vacuum.  Elites were all too easily 
portrayed as wilfully deaf to everyman’s concerns about continued immigration and social division.  
Contra voices began to challenge the status quo, speaking what few dared to speak; and began to 
make elites responsible for defective policy-making rooted in defective thinking.   
El Boujoufi179 has highlighted how the politicisation of Muslim identities has been obtained through 
conflating Islam with individual Muslim behaviours.  By so doing politicians were not opening up 
space, rather they were closing down space, since they engaged in compounding native Dutch fears 
and thus erected barriers to the acceptance of Muslims as full citizens.  (el Boujoufi, 2008) 
Bolkestein, leader of the conservative liberal People’s Party for freedom and democracy (VVP),180 was 
one of the first prominent voices to meet the issues confrontationally, and in so doing he broke rank 
with the political elite to which he belonged.  In a revealing speech to the Liberal movement in 
Lucerne in 1991, he drew attention to the ‘inexorable pressure’ exerted by migrants from Morocco 
and Turkey who wanted to settle in the Netherlands.   He talked about already ‘harbouring’ 400 000 
Muslims; how in terms of sheer volume and the demands on absorbable capacity this was defining a 
new, never before experienced situation; and to compound the problems, these immigrants were of 
a different culture and lacked Dutch language proficiency.  
                                                          
179 D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest officially 
recognised top-level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands.  For more information see Appendix two. 
180 Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
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“If everyone's cultural identity is allowed to persist unimpaired, integration will suffer.  And 
integration there must be, because the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are here to stay.  That is 
now recognised by all.  If integration is officially declared government policy, which cultural values 
must prevail: those of the non-Muslim majority or those of the Muslim minority? Here we must go 
back to our roots.  Liberalism has produced some fundamental political principles, such as: the 
separation of church and state, the freedom of expression, tolerance and non-discrimination.  We 
maintain that these principles hold good not only in Europe and North America but all over the 
world.  Liberalism claims universal value and worth for these principles.  That is its political vision.  
Here there can be no compromise and no truck. ” (Bolkestein, 1991) 
This passage illuminates a number of points: cultural identity and cultural values cannot remain in 
pristine wholeness – they must be damaged or diminished in the interests of  integration; his 
expressions reveal a clear majority-minority oppositionalism - autochthonous majority versus 
allochtonous minority; he recognises the transition to permanence of immigrants which he 
understands as something universally accepted; he appeals to liberal universal principles firmly 
rooted in Dutch culture, so that, although he argues for flexibility and pragmatism, this can only be 
achieved within a game of non-negotiable liberal rules.   
Muslim immigration into a normatively soft social and political environment was, in his view, the 
core problem of Dutch multiculturalism.   There needed to be a change of mind and minority 
integration should be  “handled with guts. ” (Bolkestein in Prins, 2002:4) Bolkestein felt the 
underlying tension: “below the surface a widespread informal national debate, which was not held in 
public, was already going on” (Bolkestein et al. , 1992) after all it was ubiquitous “incessantly 
discussed in the pub and in the church” (Bolkestein, 1991b).   Lacking the stricter social disciplining 
and insulation of the pillars, it became increasingly impossible to contain social tensions arising out of 
immigration and habilitation.  They were beginning to directly impact the political sphere as a 
growing critical chorus insistently pointing to an impending home-made crisis resulting out of 
uncontrolled immigration.  They abused elites with the damming charge of a ‘failed integration’.  
Mintjes is somewhat sceptical about the way in which the overthrow of multiculturalism is 
characterised.   “yes”, he admitted, “it is a dirty word and one which is no longer used”, but he 
disagrees that the elites were wilfully silent, they were fully aware of the problems; their reticence 
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was due to disagreement among themselves “They just didn’t agree on the solutions”(Mintjes, 
2008)181   
Whichever perspective one accepts, the effects seem to be quite clear: as the elites sought to 
minimise politicisation of the issue, it effectively opened the elites and the multiculturalism which 
they officially espoused to devastating broadside attacks.  Scheffer’s exposure of what he called the 
Multicultural disaster182 was illustrative of a trans-ideological concern with multiculturalism.  
Scheffer, an intellectual of the left pointed to an ethno-religious underclass, and criticised a detached 
majority which preferred to look away from the uncomfortable realities of inequality and 
segregation.  Ethnic minorities were lagging behind because they were locked into poverty, 
unemployment, and criminality.  He lambasted both the government for gambling away the future of 
immigrant youth and Islam as intolerant.  Seeking to hit the mercantile nerve, he declared that there 
was little return for the investment being made in the name of multiculturalism.  It had been unable 
to offer adequate solutions but rather compounded social problems and tensions. (Scheffer, 2000)  
In later work he reiterated much of the criticism of the Dutch society’s casual and undemanding 
approach which was rooted in harmful national self effacement.  He argued that to make no 
demands meant to require no obligations, both of immigrants and state-society and implied 
acceptance of permanent exclusion.  “You are not doing migrants, wishing to obtain the nationality 
of the land of arrival, any favour by demanding nothing of them.  The veiled message is: you will 
never be part of this society anyway.  We don't expect you to have any influence on anything that 
happens in our parts.  That way, no obligations are entered into, as we know full well that, when you 
make demands of newcomers, the receiving society also undertakes an obligation.  We are so 
tolerant that, more than anything, we don't want to make things difficult for ourselves.  We have to 
break with the years of avoidance.  Perhaps integration was successful in past years and the 
newcomers have simply adjusted to the nonchalance of the natives. ” (Scheffer, 2007)  “Once you 
accept that multicultural argument against teaching them our history, you are excluding them from 
collective memory, from an enormous chance for renewal *…+ 9/11 gave many of them their 
                                                          
181
 H. Mintjes is author and lecturer and member of The Protestant Churches in the Netherlands, which is a member of The 
Council of Churches in which he is chairman of a sub-committee responsible for interfaith relations with Muslims.  He is 
involved in framing dialogue, writing position papers and giving lectures.  He has been a keen observer of changing 
attitudes in the Netherlands with respect to Islam.  He lectures also at both Islamic Universities in Rotterdam.  
182 het multikulturele drama 
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narrative. ” (Scheffer in Kooijman, 2008:122-3) As Kooijman points out the usage of ‘our’ and ‘them’ 
are problematic, and make assumptions that there is one broadly accepted narrative of the nation or 
its history.  As in all nation-identity narratives ‘our’ stories hide the fact that they are many 
contending versions and the one Scheffer defines, is but one.   
“Fortuyn was one of the first to accuse politicians that they were refusing to see reality.  He had of 
course his own agenda and a rather odd history moving in as he did from the left.  He wrote a book 
on Islamisation of the Netherlands in 1990s and I remember I had to talk about that book,183 he 
made some good statements but then his views became too massive, he ignored the nuances in 
Islam.  He was, to begin with, pushed aside *by the elites+ maybe because of an attitude that ‘it isn’t 
done to talk like this’, but then came 9/11 and then he really got the wind in his sails.  When he died 
it was remarkable, there was a whole new manifestation of popular religion; hundreds of thousands 
pilgrimaged to Rotterdam to his house. ”(Mintjes, 2008) Perhaps this statement as well as any, 
expresses something of the ‘Fortuyn effect’ and construction of his legend: his maverick flamboyancy 
which symbolised Dutch liberation; his successful challenge of long-established political culture of 
distance; and at his death the mass outpouring of neo-religious emotion.  
The effects of his death were registered as an unprecedented crisis; in the election which followed 
the LPF184 party won 26 seats making the recently formed party the second largest in the lower 
house.185 It remains an exceptional episode, since latter day populists have sought to energise on the 
same issues and emulate the 2002 election result without equal success.  As van Strein186 put it 
“Wilders is not Fortuyn!” Our interview took place in the Tweede Kamer and we were looking out 
onto the adjoining square.  “You know there is an underground passage which leads from the 
Parliament diagonally across under that square to that building.  When Fortuyn was murdered a huge 
                                                          
183 Fortuyn (1997) ‘Against the Islamicisation of our culture: Dutch Identity as Foundation’ Tegen de islamisering van onze 
cultuur: Nederlandse identiteit als fundament  
184 Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
185 Tweede Kamer 
186 Van Strein is a policy adviser in the areas of immigration integration and international affairs to The People's Party for 
Freedom and Democracy. For more information see Appendix two. 
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crowd filled that square, we had to smuggle members of Parliament out through that passage.  We 
all thought there was going to be a revolution!” (van Strein, 2008) 
Fortuyn’s agenda transcended the right-left spectrum - taking a left-liberal position on some themes 
a rightist position on others – so that he is not easily categorised.  As one commentator said “Fortuyn 
should have been placed on the far-left, but with an asterisk attached. ”  (Quoted in Bralo and 
Morrison, 2005:120) Broad and strident criticism of multiculturalism and a personalised ‘massive’ 
criticism of Islam were the trademarks of his contribution to the breaking of elite silence.  
Islamisation he warned would be a direct consequence of liberal multicultural naïvity.  The root of 
the problem he argued was located in how Muslims possessed a sense of collective responsibility 
subordinated to the Koran, to culture, and to family.  All of this, he argued, was diametrically 
opposite to liberal understandings of individual responsibility.  (Fortuyn, 1997) 
Whereas Bolkestein had to take account of internal party considerations, which as leader prevented 
him going further on the issues he had addressed, Fortuyn was less hindered, since he spoke from an 
outside position.  His success may be said to have been his setting issues on an independent footing, 
framing a political party around them, and succeeding in disrupting what was in effect, a staid 
remote political system.  As Dutch political culture changed rapidly from traditional class-based 
themes to culturalist ones, he discovered a less stable electorate – one more willing to defect on the 
emotive issues such as ‘immigrants’ and ‘Muslims’.  From this time on, centre parties would be 
forced to walk a fine line between issues and conflicting traditional positions and ideologies.  (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008)  
Van Gogh by contrast presented himself as ‘the village idiot’ whom no one would harm.  He 
understood himself as one who not only lifted the lids off issues but kicked them off.  He employed 
an exaggeratedly abrasive rhetoric, for it emphasised not only a free and liberal Netherlands but a 
place where ‘words were without consequences’ and where “offensiveness  projected *…+ a sign of 
sincerity, the venting of rage *…+ a mark of moral honesty. ” (Buruma, 2007:228) The worst crime for 
van Gogh was to look away, to dodge the issue by keeping silent.  (Buruma, 2004:3) In hindsight all of 
this seems to indicate extravagant over self-confidence both in the person of van Gogh and his 
audience.  But as with Fortuyn his murder marked a point of no return: ‘We were very naïve until van 
Gogh was murdered” and his murder “was our wakeup call” (van Strein, 2008) The ritualised and 
brutal quality of the attack as well as the Boujeri’s clear identification with Islam precipitated another 
national crisis.  “Van Gogh’s murder was a shock; people were amazed that it could happen here.  
Forty-two leading voices in the Netherlands signed a document entitled “Where to go from here?” 
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They felt it to be a national crisis.  One article wrote that his murder proved that it was a straight line 
from Mohammed A.  to Mohammed B187. ” (Mintjes, 2008) 
Prins has usefully theorised abrasive confrontationalism as ‘new realism’.  The new realist 
understands herself to be a facer of facts, shows moral and civic courage by speaking out; she speaks 
for ordinary people in a way they understand, and this very naming and breaking of silences, creates 
legitimacy to speak and the connective to speak for them.  Lastly frankness and straightforwardness 
are considered part of an earthy Dutch realism which is considered to define the national identity.  
Lastly this new realism is defined in terms of resistance to the Left.  (Prins, 2002) “Fortuyn made 
realism possible through forcing politicians to dump clichés and dogmatism.  After Fortuyn politicians 
were not afraid to say that it is Moroccans which are causing these particular problems.  We have 
come a long way and now have a realistic view on things.  We aren’t always sure of the solutions, but 
the realistic view has helped us to go a step further. ” (van Strein, 2008) 
Organisations as integration agents 
Integration as defining a move from the ethnic group emphasis continues to see an active role for 
Muslim and more generally immigrant organisations.  The emphasis and direction however has 
moved significantly.   In a study of the municipality of Amsterdam, Uitermark has described the sense 
of failure the authorities felt with their ‘Ethnic Incorporation’ model, in the post-van Gogh period.  
There was an accepted opinion that the ethnic groups they were dealing with were not 
representative of, nor sufficiently rooted in their religious and ethnic communities, and therefore 
lacked any real political influence.  In other words, they were ineffective consultative bodies which 
could bring about only minimal change in the most urgent areas of need.  In the 1990s the 
municipality of Amsterdam developed a new ‘Diversity Policy’ model, in which funding policies were 
to reflect and support the philosophy of multiplicity and the positive strength of social diversity.  In 
this way organisations containing diverse ethnicities or having greater generational span were to be 
preferred when it came to funding social projects, than the more traditional mono-ethnic 
organisation.    
This pluralist model it was hoped would promote diversity throughout the immigrant organisational 
structure.  It led however to a number of unforeseen problems: first it tended to alienate traditional 
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representative groups which resented being by-passed in funding allocation and who now sought to 
challenge the contention that they were not representative.  Second many multi-ethnic organisations 
were formed which lacked professionalism and stability.  Groups suddenly appeared and 
disappeared just as quickly.  In a similar way leadership turnover of these groups was rapid.  As a 
result the municipality found itself being pushed back towards the older, better established and 
more professionalised ethnic groups, who did not fail to point out that when it came to the crunch 
they were the groups that really counted.  (Uitermark, 2005) 
As this example shows, organisational stability is vitally important to integration processes.  At a 
national level the Dutch government has encouraged the formation of aggregative umbrella 
organisations and since 2004 accords them official recognition.  (Godard, 2007) The most important 
is the Contact Organ for Muslims and Government188 whose members include Milli Görüş and the 
Diyanet affiliated Islamic Foundation,189 and with around 370 mosque organisations a membership 
estimated at 500 000. 190  Such organisations are publicly funded and play a pivotal role in the 
integration process developing in the Netherlands.  They have become important conduits, 
transmitting Government positions and with emphases on integration issues to Muslim communities 
and they are seen as the first line of contact on any issue involving Muslims.  They are the 
governments’ preferred partners.  (el Boujoufi, 2008)  
One issue which has been a testing ground for co-operation and partnership between organisations 
and Government has been the issue of Imam-training in the Netherlands.  This has been a securitised 
issue since the van Gogh murder which the Government has sought to address through funding and 
organising the training of Imams at Dutch universities and higher institutions.  This, it has been 
argued by state elites, will help keep control both over the content of the courses and prevent the 
introduction of conservative traditional or radical anti-democratic Islamists into Dutch mosques.  But 
the issue reveals some of the difficulties involved in poldering191 close to Muslim religious practice 
and organisation.   
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189 Islamitische Stichting Nederland 
190 For more background information see Appendix on Muslim organisations 
191 An indispensible new Dutch verb meaning to consult and cooperate.   
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Ousalah192 welcomed the development generally, but he had visited several institutions offering 
Imam courses and had doubts about the standards of education.  “Muslims come to Imams for 
guidance.  Living in the Netherlands is very complex and thus requires extensive knowledge of the 
Qur’an, Hadith and many different Fatawa.  The courses are not deeply grounded and we don’t want 
situations where they have to google for answers!” (Ousalah, 2010) 193  Altuntas of Millis Görüş 
Noord Holland, emphasised also his support for local Imam training by emphasising its positive 
integrative potential.  “Being a Muslim in the Netherlands or Turkey are two different things.  Our 
ambitions focus on the Netherlands and Europe, so we have to look forward and not behind us.  
Training Imams locally will be good for integration. ” (Altuntas, 2010) Şenay194 commented that they 
were not against training Imams in the Netherlands in principle, however he felt there were some 
aspects that the Dutch government should be aware of.  First there was a resistance from the 
grassroots who saw the possible interruption of Imam supply as unwanted interference in internal 
Muslim affairs.  Charges of radicalism were unfounded since Diyanet ensured the supply of moderate 
Imams to Dutch mosques.  Second there was the important issue of training and authenticity.  It was 
not a matter, argued Şenay, of simply attending an Imam course and gaining a certificate, it had 
more fundamental aspects.  Imams were trained from when they were boys and the emphasis was as 
much on moral training as knowledge acquisition.  This would have implications for authenticity and 
thus for recognition and acceptance by local members.  (Şenay, 2008)195 
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the Dutch government.  This interview took place at the department for religious affairs of the Turkish embassy in The 
Hague.   
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In the long-term the training of Imams locally will have implications for the organisation of Islam in 
the Netherlands, since it will necessarily interrupt long established lines of organisation and 
communication.  Muslim organisations have extensive contacts with national governments and also 
receive considerable financial support, for which in return, the Moroccan and Turkish governments 
maintain a degree of control over the management of Islam.  This is problematic since the Dutch 
government is, in principle, unwilling to permit external national influence on its education system.   
(Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, 2005) Yet as Şenay has pointed out Dutch governments have been 
content that the Diyanet through its control of Imam supply, has provided a buffer against radical 
Islamism.  Imam training has revealed on the one hand the need for cooperation and partnership 
with religious organisations but has revealed an ambiguous attitude between the avowed principles 
of secularity and security-integration practices, since pushing for local Imam training is not the 
proper province of a secular state.  Nor is it consistent either, for as Mintjes pointed out, the Islamic 
University of Rotterdam was refused funding on the grounds that the state must remain neutral.  
“which was extremely short-sighted, since it deprived an institution of funding based on a narrow 
secularism, which teaches a moderate Islam. ” (Mintjes, 2008)  
Although consultation and consensus continue to be central mechanisms in the Dutch polder model 
of governance,196 the governing elites have increased pressure on Muslim organisations to raise 
awareness of responsibility and obligation for the pluralism in Dutch society.  As Doomernik 
emphasises, new integration regimes demand undivided loyalty and responsibility.  (Doomernik, 
2004) In this respect Muslim organisations are understood by state elites as collaborative agents in 
the battle against radicalisation, and are valued accordingly.  Yet this instrumentalisation has also 
damaged the organisations’ reputations and effectiveness in Muslim communities.  (Canatan in Rath, 
Demant et al., 2007)  
Cohen has pointed out that “for a long time the government in this country has not paid attention to 
the role of religion: the separation of church and state is deservedly well thought of with us.  But the 
question is whether the government, although in compliance with the doctrine of that separation, 
should not be a better judge of the role of this religion, just because it does play such an important 
role as the binding agent.  If we want to keep the dialogue between each other going, then we also 
need to take into account the religious infrastructure.  Without mosques, temples, churches and 
synagogues we will not succeed. ” (Cohen, J. in  ter Avest, Bakker et al., 2007:205) 
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In the same speech Cohen described religion as a stabilising adhesive holding society together 
through mutual respect and tolerance.  “The easiest way to integrate these new immigrants might be 
through their faith.  For that is just about the only anchor they have when they enter Dutch society in 
the twenty-first century. ” Cohen’s observations and suggestions were seen as ‘rank appeasement’, 
so provocative as to goad van Gogh into comparing him to a Nazi collaborator. ” (Buruma, 2007) 
Introducing Islam directly into the politicised atmosphere of the debate in the early millennium and 
suggesting such an expansive tolerance and a pragmatic cutting through of secular principles came 
across as exaggerated and dangerous.  “Cohen argued that Religion had a role to play and others 
crucified him for this statement.  Some said this is still the old naïveté of the 1990s.  Maybe the worst 
wave of anti-Islam was in the wake of van Gogh, then people wanted no more hushing up but 
confrontation; and in the Church there was the same mentality.  People started saying ‘We have no 
churches in Mecca but they have all those freedoms here’.   After 9/11 and van Gogh’s murder, 
Muslims were also accused of not speaking out enough and when they did they were condemned for 
not doing it strongly enough!”(Mintjes, 2008) 
Visibilities: the litmus of failed habilitation 
In common with Germany there is a general and deepening anxiety connected to the notion of 
ghettoised parallel societies.  In the Netherlands this has been equated with failed habilitative 
strategies which are considered one root cause of social unrest, radicalisation and terrorism.  
Suburbs such as Schilderswijk in The Hague or Amsterdam-West have become visibly foreignised in 
the minds of many.  They are spaces where the native Dutch are now the unwanted minority.  
“Imagine … the effect that outside forces, over a relatively short period of time, can have on the 
transformation of the whole of the relations that make up urban space, including its sacred 
geography and unquestioned givens of the way things are in cities.  Imagine, not only one building 
being constructed on an alien model, but an entire system of urban life in its economic, political, and 
symbolic-cultural forms being imposed upon already existing towns and cities that have been 
organised on quite different bases. ” (Gilsenan 1982:195 in Pieterse, 2004:88) Foreignness need not 
be understood in such a gargantuan scale as Gilsenan suggests.  Yet as one interviewee put it: “You 
go into a neighbourhood and you see all the litter and broken glass and you don’t feel safe anymore.  
But that is not to say you wouldn’t find the same in autochthonous neighbourhoods” (Mintjes, 2008) 
Behind the visibilisation of foreignness lies a more sinister opacity.  Because ghettos197 gain 
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reputations as ‘no-go areas’, they project a sense of impenetrability.  Natives are nervous to go there 
and the state seems to have lost effective control.  Ghettos have become the danger-spaces where 
terrorism198, crime and patriarchalism flourish side-by-side.  Although ‘Parallel societies’ may have a 
very visible dimension they exist too in the sense of spaces where opaque economies operate.  
However illegal and semi-legal employment may be caused partly by postal-code discrimination, that 
is banks and insurance companies will turn down mortgages only by virtue of the area lived in.  
Alternative economies grow up around such discriminatory practices offering ‘underground banking’ 
services.  In some areas there is rumour that Shar’ia has been reintroduced.  (de-Wijk, 2006)  
Lifting the emphasis from ethnic groups as direct integration objects and re-placing it on the 
responsible participatory individual, is one characteristic of Integration as the new habilitative 
concept and policy direction in the Netherlands.  Ethnic groups have since the late 1980s been 
considered, ontologically too exclusive and brightly boundaried.  (Alba, 2005) Yet as the WRR report 
“Identification with the Netherlands” points out over-emphasis on ethnicity in defining the national 
identity is just as exclusionary.  The new emphases on teaching Dutch history, demanding Dutch 
language proficiency and acceptance of Dutch norms and values deeply problematise the integration 
of immigrants as do politicised framings of the issue of loyalty or multiple loyalties.  (Scientific 
Council for Government Policy, 2007)  
Official integration endpoints aim for a society in which everyone “actively and fully participates” and 
in which the principle of equal treatment is its guiding norm.  (Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning 
and the Environment, 2009) The simple, if catchy, phrase ‘Integration as participation’ obscures as 
much as it reveals.  It says nothing, for instance, of the increased compulsion involved in some of the 
most recent Dutch Civic citizenship199 legislation.  As van Strein emphasised, the Dutch experience 
gravitates against any automatic integration based on assumed voluntarism or bolstered by welfare 
indulgence.  These, he insists, are insufficient to fit the pieces of the Dutch jigsaw puzzle together, 
there needs to be a mix of both compulsion and voluntarism.  He describes integration as ‘a vital 
state interest [and] Dutch politicians would be pretty daft to deny that integration is not security 
driven. ” By concurring with security in integration, he points to a broader trend in policy thinking; 
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one of stricter controls and severer consequences: “…frustrate integration and you will be declared a 
persona non grata and put on a plane out. “Obstructing integration will be prosecuted under the 
penal law.” Integration penalties and punishments are a means to an end simply because it is about 
ensuring security: “We have the right to curb elements which are threatening our security.  You can 
call it many things but yes I think integration is about security, that’s a fair assessment. ” (van Strein, 
2008) 
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Part III Switzerland – importing labour and protecting culture 
Post-war immigration discourse in Switzerland may be usefully periodised (Schmitter Heisler, 2001) 
to illustrate the main phasal changes in how immigration, foreigners and Islam have come to be 
understood and reacted to in the Swiss context.   
From 1948-63 the emphasis had been on flexibility and mobility as key to efficient macro-economic 
management and functionality, so that both employers and immigrants were subjected to the 
stringencies of a rotation system.  This regulatory regime was developed to ensure a strict 
subordination to labour market needs and to prevent settlement.  For employers the residence 
permits were issued to foreign workers only if a stable Swiss-foreign workers ratio was maintained.  
In this way it was hoped that natural replacement would occur where new migrant workers would be 
replace returning ones.  Migrant workers, were required to obtain work permits which needed to be 
renewed annually; to obtain permanent residence one had to remain in the same employment for 
ten years, and could not be joined by family five years.   But these restrictive policies were inimical to 
economic growth which employers quickly recognised.  But despite these strictures, the imperative 
of economic growth guaranteed increased migration and continued guest worker residence.  The 
latter eventually qualified them for family reunion which set in motion another migration dynamic.   
In a second period, 1964-80, following a similar trajectory to the other cases, the logic of mobility 
inherent in the rotation principle was reversed.  With the coming of families the public character of 
imported labour began to alter and become immigrant in character, that is with the coming of 
families there was evidence of a decision and a permission to settle.  Once more this placed foreign 
workers in a new social dynamic, one of a broadening range of social contacts.  It meant also a 
solidifying of foreign – principally Italian Catholic -  presence, which could now be strongly politicised 
and cast in existentially threatening terms, as upsetting internal linguistic and religious balances and 
stability equations.  When the Italian government intervened to ease the conditions of Italian 
workers, and although the Italian Agreement200 of 1964 largely achieved what it has set out to do, it 
triggered a mediatised battle.  (Piguet, 2006) Against this background Schwarzenbach launched the 
famous “Schwarzenbach initiative” in 1969.  This demanded that in each Canton201 the percentage of 
                                                          
200 Italienabkommen 
201 an exception was made for Geneva at 25% to protect its international character 
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foreigners should not overstep 10% of the total population; no Swiss national may be fired if a 
foreigner occupies the same kind of job in the company; lastly a moratorium must be made on family 
reunions.  The Federal Council protested that it would violate international human rights 
agreements.  It was narrowly defeated but it had a strong mobilising effect202 and created several 
knock-on effects.  The first was stricter control by the federal government which now set a global 
ceiling for foreign labour import, and the second was more over-foreignisation initiatives. 203   
In a third period the federal government began to intervene in the over-foreignisation debates.  
Successive administrations emphasised the positive aspects of immigration, the fact that foreigners 
were an integral part of Switzerland and that, irrespective of shallow recessionary cycles.  This 
opened up space for integration to enter the debate.  Government elites now argued that conditions 
must be created for the integration of long term residents and set about the revision of the Law on 
Foreign Nationals' Residence and Settlement (ANAG),204 the legal instrument which regulated 
permits and residence rights.   In 1982 the proposed reform of ANAG was narrowly defeated in 
referendum.   
Lastly a fourth and more recent phase may be characterised by the Federal government’s concern to 
calibrate Swiss legislation so as to align it with EU and international treaties.  Here the chief concerns 
have been to balance the continued need for foreign labour205against the cultural need for 
protection and thus the need for restriction.  This has translated into attempts to keep the 
temperature down, with variable success, on the sensitised concerns with national and cultural 
identity and to improve integration for long term residents.   
Switzerland has had early experience of importing labour and the development of immigration as a 
site of contentious politics has a long tradition.  (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007) Already in the late 19th 
century, net migration inflows were being securitised in terms of over-foreignisation. 206 Security 
                                                          
202 a record 74% turned out to vote 
203 which were all defeated with 60-70% majorities 
204 Aufenthalt und Niederlassung der Ausländer Gesetz 
205  preferably from within EU  
206 In 1900 the Federal Council was already worried about foreigner-native ratios. 
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discourse is identifiable therefore as a persistent underlying tension between the need for labour 
importation and identity defence.  It can be plausibly argued that it follows an economic-political 
cycle: the imperative for economic growth requires labour, migration gates are opened which 
activates xenophobic politics.  (Hollifield, 1992)  
From the 1960s, xenophobic themes have been at the heart of the right’s successful and sustained 
mobilisation.  For this reason, immigration regardless of whether labour or asylum-seeking, has 
remained close to the populist right’s strategy for success.  Although it would be wrong to classify the 
right-wing parties as mere ‘single issue parties’, a brief look at the themes they address publicly –in 
party manifestos and speeches – reveal the continued reworking of the threads of exclusionism, 
nationalism, and xenophobia.  The more recent Islamisation discourse may be understood as a 
derivation of over-foreignisation fears and belongs properly in this larger security discourse.   
 In the Swiss context the term over-foreignisation carries within its conceptual imaginary: images of 
invasion, of imbalance, and subversion of national identity.  Yet the term implies that a degree of 
foreignisation is acceptable, but that there is always a danger of over-saturation leading to imbalance 
and thus necessarily a loss of national equipoise.  Yet Islamisation discourse differs, in that it is not 
over-Islamisation which is the issue, but rather Islam and Islamisation per se.  This indicates a more 
totalising discourse.   
One class of migrants which have contributed significantly to the Swiss over-foreignisation debates 
have been asylum seekers.  From 1983-1994, 42 000 Tamils arrived in Switzerland, having escaped 
the civil war in Sri Lanka.  Using networks of agents, they were provided with travel documents and 
even paperwork to support their asylum claim.  In this way a professionalised network facilitated the 
migration.  (McDowell, 2005) In 1992 according the “World Refugee Survey” Switzerland had given 
shelter to 70 000 Bosnians (Germany 220 000 and The Netherlands 7000) (US Committee for 
Refugees in Gibney and Hansen, 2005:52).  Since it is the responsibility of Canton and Commune207, 
to accommodate asylum seekers and immigrants more generally, there is direct involvement at the 
local level.  In the absence of large urban centres this has meant that asylum seekers have been 
placed throughout the Cantons, so that smaller Communes are also actively involved in framing the 
conditions of settlement.  In addition sheltering asylum seekers is financed by Cantonal and 
communal tax, so that there is a very direct connection between the issue of asylum and localities.  
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Although Asylum has also been an issue in the other two cases, it has a more localised character in 
the Swiss de-centralised system.  This has allowed a politicisation and securitisation of asylum 
seeking at the level of grass-roots politics.   
Muslim immigration to Switzerland, although following a similar trajectory to those of Germany and 
the Netherlands, occurred later, at the beginning of the 1970s.  (Nielsen, 2004) Yet the securitisation 
of immigration had occurred at a much earlier date than the other cases, so that Muslim migrants, 
although part of a much later inflow, were entering an already circumscribed security discourse.  
They were initially seen to be part of a larger and older problem.  In common with the other cases, 
Muslims initially were connected with notions of temporariness and mobility.  On the one hand 
mobile labour was there to meet economic shortfalls but was rooted in a rotation assumption:  that 
immigrant would re-migrate and in turn be replaced by others.  Following the other cases this 
changed with the reunification of families.  This was facilitated by compliance with Article 16(3) of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights, “the family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by the society and the state. ”  Keeping families separated 
was a clear violation of this human right.   
With the coming of families, Muslims were no longer invisibilised in the factories and their often 
barracks-like living quarters.  Social interaction began to occur along a broader front: they began to 
spend in the local economy, they sent their children to school, their babies were born in local 
hospitals, they began to organise themselves for religious purposes – in short they were becoming 
socially visible.   
Direct Democracy, populism and the problem of plain speaking  
In an interview with Alfred Heer,208 the reformed character of Zürich was quickly brought up as a key 
defining Swiss identity trope.  When asked why he thought this significant, given the degree of 
secularisation in Switzerland, his reply was straightforward: “Swiss culture has a strongly defined 
culture and national identity and these are deeply rooted in reformed thinking: saving, trading, hard 
work, grass-roots democracy, and individual-national independence. ” (Heer, 2008) He described in 
                                                          
208 A. Heer has been a member of the Cantonal Parliament Zürich Kantonsrat and factional leader of SVP from 2004-07.  In 
2007 he has was elected to the Swiss Parliament Nationalrat.  He describes his goals as peaceful coexistence, but insists 
that violent foreign criminals must be set clear boundaries and be expelled.  He is for low taxation and a strong middle 
class.  His motto Security and Prosperity for us!  
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considerable detail, how the SVP209 had originally been a Reformed party with its first strongholds in 
the Reformed Cantons of Zürich and Bern.  It had in the meantime successfully broadened its appeal 
by emphasising ‘conservative middle class’ themes, and so had become as strong in Catholic Cantons 
as in Reformed ones.  (Heer, 2008) In the SVP manifesto brochure “Our Switzerland” the SVP play 
upon the fear of a growing Muslim population which supposedly threatens to minoritise the Swiss 
and to force Islamic values and laws on Swiss society.  The populism and security at the heart of their 
agenda is apparent in the following excerpt: “The SVP was the only party which warned that through 
slack immigration Switzerland would reach the limit of its integration ability and integration 
willingness.  This has nothing to do with Xenophobia or isolationism but rather with the stability of 
society. ” (Swiss People's Party, 2007:44) Beside this text is a picture of two Muslim women in hijabs 
with the caption: “Are we soon to be foreigners in our own land?” The emphasis is on over saturation 
and over-stretched resources as threatening Swiss political and social stability, and is part of the 
larger over-foreignisation discourse.  Yet the placing of the text beside two veiled Muslimas, gives 
security a visibilised and gendered emphasis.   
Understanding right wing populist parties only as anti-immigration parties is to underestimate the 
ways in which they have been able to adjust to new political and social situations.  For example as 
the conditions of immigration have been tightened, they have been able to focus on integration and 
especially on liberal multiculturalism as undermining Swiss values.  Turning from immigration to 
integration they argue that further immigration will hinder integration since parallel societies will 
become established, and the result will be that receiving societies and the new immigrants 
themselves will have even less incentive to integrate than the first immigrants.  “…for the radical 
populist right, successful integration depends on both the willingness and the ability of foreigners to 
adopt their host country’s culture, values and way of life.  For those who share the prevailing values, 
integration poses no problem at all; for those whose cultural disposition is incompatible with the 
prevailing values, integration is impossible.  In such cases, they should be returned to their country of 
origin.   (Betz, 2007:39)  
Swiss citizen culture210 is a mix of plain speaking, grass-roots democracy and, in keeping with 
historical decentralisation, contains a strong anti-establishment sentiment.  This is the dominant 
                                                          
209 Schweizerische Volkspartei 
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ethos of what Frisch famously referred to as ‘the little master race’. 211 (Frisch, 2005)  This strongly 
embedded citizen culture, with direct democratic opportunity structures, as well as the possibility of 
access to political decision-making, keeps the federal Government vulnerable to the initiatives of the 
right (Skenderovic, 2007) So in one respect Switzerland differs significantly from the other two case 
studies, in its constitutionally anchored right of people, organisations, and political parties to initiate 
legislative change.  This is accomplished first through ‘initiatives’ which require a minimum of 100 
000 signatures to be accepted and then a majority in direct plebiscite, this being the case then there 
must follow the appropriate alteration to the constitution; and second through referenda in which 
Federal laws may be challenged with 50 000 signatures and also put to a popular vote.    
This unique opportunity structure has been extensively used by the populist right, to mobilise on 
over-foreignisation issues and to increase its own power base.  The ‘winning formula’ according to 
Betz has been their ability to successfully promote themselves as anti-elitist, the ones who talk 
‘common sense’ and therefore the truth, who dare to speak what ordinary people think, and in this 
way portray themselves as the only genuine democrats.  They exploit deficiencies in representative 
democracy, which have been accentuated by globalisation pressures, an ideological void left by the 
left and the crisis in the social welfare state.  More specifically “the populist Swiss radical right 
promotes itself as defender of national and cultural identity, particularly against the country’s 
growing Muslim immigrant population. ” (Betz, 2007:45) 
In the 2007 Parliamentary elections the extent of the SVP was startling:  “Victors of the national 
Parliamentary elections of 2007 were the SVP.  They gained 2. 2% over their last election result and 
so strengthened their position as the strongest party with 28.9% of the vote.  No party has been so 
strong since proportional representation was introduced in 1919.  Their lead over the second 
strongest party SPS, was 9. 4%.  …” (Federal Office for Statistics, 2007) Although the SVP successfully 
tap into diffuse fears and resentments, they have also been able to exploit a central tension within 
immigration policy.  The latter may be characterised as one of double protectionism: on the one 
hand immigration is needed to meet the need for low cost labour and thus protect economic growth, 
stability and prosperity, but it must be balanced by the need to protect cultural identity.  This double 
protectionism is anchored in ANAG,212 and in case there should be any doubt where threat to cultural 
                                                          
211 das kleine Volk 
212 The Federal Statute on the Residence and Settlement of Foreigners from 1931 
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identity should come from, ‘over-foreignisation’ is explicitly mentioned.  Article 16.1 states that the 
granting authorities must take into account in their decisions, the cultural  and economic interests  as 
well as the degree of over-foreignisation of the land. (ANAG, 1931) The economic good requiring 
immigration should be managed against the evil effects of over-foreignisation.  Between these 
protective plates the SVP have proven themselves skilful strategists.  
In 1968 a signature collection began for an Over-foreignisation initiative,213 and in June 1970 the 
referendum was held and was the first major rightist populist measure aimed at the immigrant 
population was defeated  by 54% to 46%.214  Zürich  56. 4% to 43. 6% However eight German Cantons 
including Berne voted for the initiative. (Swiss Federal Chancellory, 1970)  The wording: ”The 
Federation shall take measures against population and economic over-foreignisation in Switzerland.  
The Parliament will ensure that the number of Foreigners in each Canton, with the exception of 
Geneva, should not exceed 10% of Swiss citizens, according to the last census.  For the Canton of 
Geneva the percentage shall be 25%. ” (The Federal authorities of the Swiss confederation, 2006)215  
What was remarkable about the Schwarzenbach initiative was that it marked out Switzerland as one 
of the earliest European countries in which the political right focused sustained negative attention on 
immigration and immigrants.  In the 1960s the ‘too numerous foreigners’ were mostly south 
Europeans,216 who came as a result of an extended and sustained economic upturn.  But instead of 
according migrants with some of the credit for economic growth, they were held responsible for its 
negative effects: expansive urban growth (often represented as reckless concreting of the 
countryside), as well as general changes in moral perceptions. 217  Schwarzenbach held foreigners as 
the main beneficiaries and culpable for these processes and set about defending Swiss identity – the 
core of which was “eternal and armed neutrality”.  He also argued for the defence of the middle and 
small business classes against international Capital.  (Buomberger, 2004) The Schwarzenbach 
                                                          
213 This was popularly known as the Schwarzenbach initiative after James Schwarzenbach leader of the Swiss Republican 
Party 
214 With a 74. 72% turnout 
215 My translation 
216 Principally Italians 
217 This refers to the liberalisation secularisation wave of the late 1960s 
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initiative was not significant so much in terms of its failure, but in the size of the yes vote.  Had the 
Schwarzenbach initiative succeeded, it would have meant that some 300 000 people would have 
been expelled.   As it turned out however, in the economic crisis of 1973 many thousands of Italians 
lost their jobs anyway and returned voluntarily to Italy.  They had been a temporary mobile 
economic presence – coming with economic upturn and leaving with economic downturn.  The next 
waves of immigration brought people whose immigration was connected with economic cycles but 
whose settlement pattern were not.  Schwarzenbach and his party had successfully mobilised the 
Swiss population, had driven opponents onto the defensive, and lodged the issue of immigration 
together with ‘the immigrant’ at the centre of Swiss politics.  
Independence, armed neutrality, popular sovereignty218 and direct democracy, energise the SVP’s 
battle against EU entry, employment issues, securing society against criminality, anti establishment 
themes, more citizen less state, as well as evergreen themes such as demanding the cutting back of 
immigration and a rejection of mass naturalisation.  (Heer, 2008) Christian Blocher taking up the 
mantle of Schwarzenbach has dominated debates on foreigners and has come to represent an 
eponymous polarising energy in Swiss society and politics.  ‘The Blocher effect’ has been defined as 
being “when one listens although one wishes to ignore …so that conflict rules where consensus is 
sought.” (Lorenz, 1998)219 But it reflects, as well, a failure on the part of the main parties to be 
coherent with regards to the issues, and to keep their voters’ attention off personalities and on the 
issues.  In this respect ‘the Blocher effect’ is a distraction through the personalising of issues.  In the 
2007 elections the Social Democratic Party (SP) 220 sought to create their own anti-Blocher effect, to 
mobilise their middle class urban voters.  In adopting this strategy they engaged in their own kind of 
populism:  ‘Blocher the enemy’, ‘Blocher the cause of confusion’ – but with limited success.   
Invisibilisation and the Minaret initiative 
One traditional strategy of dealing with alterity has involved a process of invisibilisation or limiting 
visibility221 of others.  This is a coping strategy in which a fictional threat is constructed to justify 
                                                          
218 Volkssouveränität 
219 My translation.  
220 Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz 
221 I use invisibilisation loosely to define processes which are employed to subordinate through limiting visibility.  
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limiting visibility and being heard.  Through this the hegemony of self is visibilised and asserted, and 
the ostensible power to conceal, to neutralise and subordinate reinforced.  Dätwyler222 pointed out 
in his interview, that invisibilisation has been a traditional way of dealing with alterity in the Canton 
Zürich.  (Dätwyler, 2008) Catholicism had been historically the radical other and in distinct phases 
invisibilisation had been employed to deal with it.  There were clear stages to this stratagem: in the 
earliest phase there had been a sense of existential threat from Catholicism and invisibilisation was 
imposed absolutely.  In this phase Catholic churches were not permitted.  In a subsequent period of 
relaxation, when the Canton Zürich felt less threatened, there was a period of subordinate 
visibilisation.  Then Catholic churches were permitted, but subject to laws circumscribing spatiality 
and visibility – Catholic churches were not allowed to be built near Reformed churches, and Catholic 
spires had to be lower than those of reformed churches.  In the last phase the threat from 
Catholicism had largely dissipated and restrictions abolished.  This brief outline suggests that the 
present alteriorisation and ulteriorisation of Islam points back to an earlier historical pattern of 
subordinating power.   
The campaign against minarets draws on Article 72 of the constitution which permits the state to 
take action in the interests of preserving peace between religious communities.  Yet there has been 
strong elite opposition at the federal level to this initiative – cabinet ministers Guisep Nay argued 
that even if this initiative were passed and it were to be accepted and the constitution changed, that 
would put Switzerland in conflict with the European Human Rights Convention of which Switzerland 
is a signatory.  Unsurprisingly there has been strong Muslim Opposition - Adel Méjri, the president of 
the League of Swiss Muslims, has said "As an organisation that is helping Muslims to integrate and 
become model citizens, we are shocked by this initiative".  And "the launching of this initiative 
prevents the possibility of dialogue".  (Beaumont, 2007) Both the Protestant and Catholic churches 
have rallied to the defence of the beleaguered Muslim community, claiming the constitutional right 
to religious freedom must allow the erection of minarets.   
                                                          
222 P. Dätwyler is a trained theologian and  journalist.  He has worked in a wide range of media - newspaper, radio TV.  For 
15 years he worked in the department of religious affairs in Swiss Television and switched to take charge of public relations 
for the Reformed Church Zürich Reformiertkirche Zürich.  Since 2000 he has been cultural representative of this church 
kulturbeauftragte and works closely in an advisery role with the President of the Church council Rudi Reich .  His cultural 
work is a mix of contributing to feuillton, organisation of cultural projects, concerts, exhibitions, special events, and 
representation in panel discussions.  His cultural work  involves ethnological inter-religious dialogue.   
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The minaret ban initiative has received extensive international media coverage.  Yet the national 
media has often been brought up in interviews with Muslim representatives, and represented as 
being a negative image-maker; of fanning the flames of insecurity; of picking up only the dramatic 
and ignoring the realities Muslims face on the ground.  It was generally represented as contributory 
to creating the master image of Muslims as enemies.  (Sadaqat, 2008)223 In a general survey of 
European media, Hafez states that “Verbal stereotyping has decreased strongly.  Generalisations 
such as ‘Islam is essentially anti-progressive’ are much more infrequent. ” But as he goes on to say in 
his report there is a process of narrowing the range of themes dealing with Islam.  This is 
accompanied and reinforced with repeated images such as veiled women.   “It is as if one would 
report the Europeans with the bull running in Pamplona. ” (Hafez, 2007) Narrowing themes and the 
production repetition of visual images are central in the securitising process of native and non-native 
populations (Williams, 2003) “Images and information about the politics and society of "the other" 
have remained highly selective and fragmented. ” (Hafez, 2000) 
But not only minarets and veiled women are the visibilities which need to be suppressed; ethnic 
foreign youth is seen as destabilising and intrusive.  Lenzin224 drew attention to this when she 
remarked how ‘Young Bosnians, love fast cars and love showing off, it is a part of their youth culture.’ 
Of course it had to do with stealing cars, breaking speed limits and playing loud music; these she 
asserted were becoming the distinguishing marks of a Balkan anti-establishment youth culture.  
Lenzin continued however to draw attention to the possibility of another connection.  “My worry is 
that they225 will move beyond the ethnic and make the connection with Muslim. ” (Lenzin, 2008) This 
has not yet happened partly because there is no overt Islam involved.  It is still largely a narrative of 
ethnic delinquent youth, yet the danger is always there that it may become yet another evidence of 
Muslim non-integration.  In any case to be young, foreign and involved in crime is to open them up to 
the possibility of expulsion and erasure.  “Those guilty of serious226 crime have abused their right to 
                                                          
223 A. Sadaqat is Imam of the Mahmud Mosque in Zürich the first purpose-built Mosque in Switzerland.  Built in 1962 it is 
one of only four Swiss mosques with a Minaret.  He is a spokesman for the Swiss Ahmadiyya community and has gained 
prominence through his public participation in debates about Islam, Islamicisation and more recently the confrontational 
debates about Minaret ban initiative.    
224 R. Lenzin is an Islam expert of  Swiss-Pakistani origin. For more information see Appendix two. 
225 She was referring to the populist right and their voters 
226 serious here remained undefined 
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be here, they are a drain on our resources, they are a danger to our society, and they should be 
expelled. ” (Heer, 2008)  
Swiss integration   
In contrast to the other cases naturalisation and citizenship as integration mechanisms suffers from 
not being exclusively competences of national governance in Switzerland.  In the decentralised 
federal political system, immigrants have traditionally been the responsibility of the Cantons and 
local authorities. 227 Only recently has the federal government been given a mandate to develop 
legislation which deals comprehensively with the legal status of immigrants.  Although Federal laws 
are binding, Cantons retain nonetheless a wide interpretive berth in implementation.  This means 
varied rather than consistent applications of Federal law.  However the Federal government 
continues to develop new integration directions and plays an important conscience role by 
emphasizing equality of opportunity, respect and openness.  (Fenton, 2006:314).  
 “An application for naturalization according to the standard procedures can only be made if the 
applicant resides in Switzerland.  Basic conditions: 12 years’ residence in Switzerland in total, with 
the period between the ages of 10 and 20 counting as double; integration into Swiss society. ” 
(Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008)228  Because there is co-responsibility for naturalisation 
between Canton and local government, each must be taken into consideration.  Local residence 
stipulation for Zürich and Geneva is two years, but fifteen for the Canton Uri.  Any movement 
between Cantons can also cause additional waiting time.  Further stipulations are that candidates 
prove: respect for the legal order; do not compromise the interior or exterior safety of the country; 
are integrated and are familiar with Swiss habits and customs.  The conditions of residence, respect 
for legal order and security status are checked out and verified by the federal administration.  But 
the integration and familiarity conditions are vague, and are judged by local actors.  (Helbling, 2008)  
The ‘integration into Swiss society’ stipulation provides not only for a cultural protectionism, but 
reveals that integration is a ‘cultural assimilationalist’ model, since cultural assimilation is the 
condition for granting citizenship rights (Koopmans, Stratham et al., 2005:108-9)  
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However uneven the residence conditions may be, the transition from transience to permanence for 
Muslim immigrants has also been officially acknowledged in the Swiss case.  “In ten to twenty years’ 
time, Muslims living in Switzerland will be Swiss citizens – if they are not already.  They will constitute 
a permanent component of Swiss society.  This is a natural demographic development.  As the 
consequence of migration, it has taken place again and again throughout history.  The Muslim 
population makes an important contribution to this country’s economic and social development.  It is 
therefore essential to work with them to find forms and expressions of their religious beliefs that 
Swiss society considers appropriate.  Switzerland’s third-largest religious community must not be 
forced to worship in garages and back rooms.  That would be unworthy of our state and of our 
concept of religion. ” (Point 9 in Federal Commission against Racism, 2008:4)229  
This is point nine of a document, produced by the Federal government, which speaks vicariously for 
Muslims to the Swiss ‘natives’, and emphasises the following: that the move to permanence will 
occur ‘naturally’ in the near future; Muslims will continue to make a  valuable developmental 
contribution to the Swiss economy and society; repressed visibilisation or being kept in back-yard 
mosques is unjust and is dissonant with Swiss understandings of self identity;  finding the right form 
of worship is to be negotiated but the criteria of judgment is that, which Swiss society considers 
‘appropriate’.   Cooperation to find forms and expressions of religious belief are delimited by what 
“Swiss society considers appropriate.” Integration is conceived of as mutually cooperative praxis but 
one strongly subordinated to an assimilative dynamic.   Integration in Switzerland has a strong 
assimilative undercurrent, so that to be integrated in Switzerland properly according to Maizar230 
means “if in Switzerland do as the Swiss do!” (Maizar, 2008)  
As in the other cases the concept of integration was considered by many interviewees to be difficult 
to pin down.  It was also in the Swiss context conceptually indeterminate although there was clearly 
a coercive dimension to it.  (Sadaqat, 2008) (Lenzin, 2008) (Maizar, 2008) Although some 
commentators have argued that this conceptual fuzz is an advantage, creating its own interpretative 
space, (Bauböck, 2001) it becomes frustrating when it becomes a vehicle of demands.  Morais231 has 
                                                          
229 My emphasis 
230 Dr. I. Maizar is President of FIDS one of two top level Muslim Umbrella Organisation in Switzerland. For further 
information see Appendix two. 
231 J. Morais is head of the Cantonal integration department in Zürich. For more information see Appendix two. 
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defined it as ‘producing opportunity-justice’232 for this to be realised, a plethora of integration 
programmes have been developed which are bundled under two guiding, mutually supporting 
obligations: ‘Support and Demand’233 On the one hand, Canton and Commune are obligated to 
support and encourage immigrants in language learning and to provide them with adequate 
information about what is required and demanded of them in Swiss society; and on the other hand 
the immigrant is under obligation to fulfil the integration requirements.  To this end the Canton 
Zürich has developed together with three other Cantons, an integration contract which formalises 
these mutual obligations.  It is partly the work of integration departments to follow up and ensure 
that immigrants fulfil their obligations.  Failure to do so will result in withdrawal of residence rights.  
(Morais, 2008) 
In examining the extent of integration programmes in development it is clear that they have become 
something of a boom industry; they are treated as a panacea for all social ills and form not only a 
shallow policy trend but more paradigm shift.  (Prodolliet, 2006)   The Federal government 
understands Integration as embodying a strong social component and built ‘locally’ on developed 
projects and programmes of the Cantonal and local governments.  Through federal funding, with its 
provision of matched Cantonal and communal funding,234 it seeks to ensure that integration is 
‘mainstreamed’.  “Although the federal government in Switzerland has been a key player in the 
recent initiation of debates and policies regarding integration, it sees the policy as one to be taken up 
by the cantons and communes, by voluntary organisations and active citizens, in such a way that the 
pursuit of integration finds its way into daily routines and community living.  (Fenton, 2006:286) This 
however brushes over the immense complexities of who is to be responsible for what.  
Implementation of integration mirrors the Swiss political system.  It is ‘a resinous process’ in which a 
multiplicity of voices have to be taken into account and is, from a bureaucratic perspective, 
‘strenuous’.  Morais described in detail the process of getting an Integration law at Cantonal level.  
The committee alone, of which she is an advisory member, will take between two and three years of 
deliberation before anything concrete can be presented to the Cantonal Parliament.  In addition, 
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there is always the risk of a political torpedo through the SVP’s and Ueli Mauerer’s conservative anti-
immigrant politics of reaction.  (Morais, 2008) 
It is hardly surprising then that integration policy-making has been anything but smooth.  When in 
the 1980s it started to become clear that immigrants were staying, it also became clear to policy 
makers that not only the mechanisms of immigration needed to be managed but the mechanisms of 
reception and absorption.  Yet when proposed revisions to ANAG235 which would have eased the 
conditions of naturalisation for second generation migrants, refugees and stateless persons, it was 
virulently opposed by the right and defeated in 1982-3 (Niederberger, 2004) and again in 2004.  Even 
into the 1990s integration remained the neglected pillar of Swiss politics since access to the labour 
market, vocational training and social welfare were the sum of integration policies. 236 This apparent 
neglect however pointed out what was understood by the concept, namely having a job, and being 
able to look after a family by having adequate living quarters.  Unemployment or welfare 
dependence could be reasons for withdrawing residence permission.  (Prodolliet, 2006) At the end of 
the 1990s the Federal government was accorded the right to aid immigrant integration through the 
funding of integration projects.  Significant financial fuel injections from the federal government 
were to be matched by equivalent funding from Canton and community.  This meant that new 
professional structures were created to conceptualise and craft new integration programmes at 
Cantonal Municipal and communal levels.  (Morais, 2008)237 Integrationism may be termed the 
habilitative norm, which assumes the efficacy of extensive programme development and intensive 
implementation.  
However, although extensive resources are now being injected into ‘integration’, education  and 
vocational training which are widely accepted as important integrative tools for immigrant youth, 
(Mahnig and Wimmer, 2003) (Fenton, 2006) have had only limited effectiveness.  There are several 
reasons: first in the federal structure since education is a Cantonal responsibility, it is impossible to 
devise a uniform national integration policy.  Although work environment and vocational training 
                                                          
235 The Federal Statute on the Residence and Settlement of Foreigners of 1931 
236 According to Prodolliet there were three pillars: first the regulation of immigrant admittance to maintain demographic 
balance; second the regulation of the labour market also through control of admission; the third integration politics.  
237 Frau Morais is head of the Cantonal integration department in Zürich.  Her responsibilities include developing an 
integration model for Zürich and diverse integration programmes.  She was formerly integration officer at the Canton Basle.  
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remain major integration sites, Switzerland also lacks adequate equal opportunities and anti-
discrimination legislation.  Again this is due to its institutionally limited central legislature which 
could more effectively tackle discriminatory practice.  Second discriminatory practices continue to be 
a key factor in determining the degree of identificationary integration.  In point 7 of a position 
statement of the Federal commission against racism, attention is drawn to the way in which 
proliferation of stereotypes encourages day-to-day forms of discrimination: Trainee-ship applicants 
with names suggesting that they may be Muslims are rejected because of fears that they could cause 
problems; Muslims are publicly abused; Anxieties and uncertainties lead to social exclusion.  
Repeated experiences of discrimination make Muslims – particularly young Muslims– less ready to 
integrate.  (Federal Commission against Racism, 2008) Zürich has approached the problems of 
discrimination experienced by Muslims - and immigrants generally - by grafting it into a broader 
discourse of fighting exclusion.  In so doing the Cantonal government seeks to deal with 
discrimination as a xenophobic problem rather than narrowing it down to Islamophobia.  Thus 
broadening to a common ‘immigrant’ denominator, casts the net over a much wider segment of the 
population, and discrimination directly aimed at Muslims is only indirectly tackled by the Cantons 
and communes.  
The prominent Swiss sociologist, Hoffman-Novotny explored how social life spaces were both 
segregated and territorialised in the Swiss context.  Because cultural diversities were territorially 
bounded, migrants (even native migrants) moving from one Canton to another were required to 
assimilate to that Canton.  His conclusions were that the Swiss democracy could function precisely 
because cultural dominances were secured and relatively well insulated from one another.  Notions 
of multiculturalism as cultural mix did not characterise this view of Switzerland, where several 
segregated cultures must dominate.  In this sense multiculturalism only existed in this segregated 
sense and only for the established minorities.  (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 2001) Muslims and more 
generally labour migrants are not part of this arrangement so although diversity is often mentioned 
in connection with Switzerland, it hides a greater homogeneity than the image suggests.  (d’Amato, 
2010) This is not to say that there have not been influential attempts to recognise diversity through a 
multicultural prism but as in Germany it has tended to remain the project of the liberal elite.  (Kälin, 
2000) 
Heer appeared in effect to favour a multiculturalist habilitative approach. He began by arguing that 
the crux of the problem was that many young Muslims were trouble-makers and criminals. If, he 
continued, Muslims and other groups were quiet and lived in their own quarters then that was fine 
152 
 
with him.  He said, after all that there were other groups who had their own cultures.  He pointed to 
a small rich British expat community who lived in their villas by the lake, drove their Jaguars and 
were a in some senses an unintegrated group.  They too had their own little parallel worlds and no 
one cared about that.  The same would be the case with Muslims he asserted, if they caused no 
trouble then nobody would care if they lived for themselves. (Heer, 2008)  If Muslim immigrants and 
their culture have never been identified as such, nor policies framed for them as a minority, they 
have come to be recognised as a culturally distant underclass.  The Muslim ‘problem’ is part of the 
immigrant ‘problem’ which has long been considered a “new social stratum located below the 
stratification structure of the immigration country. ” (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1973) As such it is not the 
privileged foreigners who are the objects of integration, but the underprivileged, since it is they who 
will cost the state money.  (Prodolliet, 2006)  
Muslim Organisations 
As in the other cases there has been a concerted effort on the part of Muslim organisations to form 
umbrella organisations and to represent Muslim interests at local, regional and national levels.  In 
Zürich ‘The Federation of Islamic Organisations in Zürich’ (VIOZ)238 represents the mainline Sunni 
Muslims in city and Canton.  In the founding principles of this organisation there are clear avowals of 
support for the UDHR including free choice of religion and gender equality.  In addition article 6 
makes a clear statement of support for the ‘integration’ of Muslims in Swiss society but understands 
that the great diversity of Muslims means it will necessarily be a longer, slower process than some 
might wish.  Although Islamic identity must be protected the duty of Muslims is to be active for the 
general good of society is also emphasised.  The latter is understood to be increased through greater 
integration of Muslims.  To this end and where possible, in conflicts between religious requirements 
and secular laws, VIOZ seeks to find compromise by consultation with Muslim scholars.  In this way 
solutions have been found with respect to burial and ritual slaughter.  (VIOZ, 2005)239 
In common with Germany, Muslims seek the official recognition of Islam as a religious community 
with a legal incorporated status in Switzerland.  This would permit, in common with other religious 
communities, Judaism and Christianity, the establishment of a chair of Muslim sciences at a faculty of 
                                                          
238 Vereinigung Islamische Organizationen in Zürich 
239 Fatawa permit Muslims to be buried in shallow coffins, and animals may be drugged before slaughter, which are both 
requirements of the Canton Zürich.  
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theology at universities in German and French Cantons as well as a central Muslim cemetery.   
According to Article 72 of the Constitution there is no ‘national’ or federal recognition of religion, and 
so it falls once more to the Cantons to regulate the relationship between religion and secular 
authority.  However factionalism and under-funding make very plain the limits of Muslim 
organisational capacity in Switzerland, (Amin, 2008)240 Muslims have not been able to gain this kind 
of recognition, so they have had to organise themselves according to the Swiss civil code, in which 
they may be recognised as foundations regulated by private law, which is a right available to all 
religious groups.  (Piccand, 2003)  
Achieving an overarching Muslim organisation at the national level has been and continues to be 
highly problematic but remains the chief goal of regional umbrella organisations.  The need to create 
a stable representative voice for Muslims and to be recognised as such by the federal government is 
the most pressing need especially in the light of Muslim consternation at the result of the 
referendum on the Minaret ban.  Mainline Christian churches supported a rejection of the initiative 
and The Swiss Council of Religions (SCR)241 has roundly condemned the result.   This has been an 
important signal to the Muslim population and to their representative organisations on the SCR: The 
Federation of Islamic Umbrella organisations in Switzerland (FIDS)242 and Coordination of Islamic 
organisations in Switzerland (KIOS)243 
Integration as negotiated coexistence is not only weakened because of weak organisation, but also 
by the structure of the political system which is a mix of vulnerable and weak federal government; 
strong cantonal and municipal autonomy; and direct democracy opportunity structures.  As Ireland 
has highlighted, this institutional framework has shaped the kinds of immigrant mobilisation 
strategies.  He contrasts the differential effects of Muslims operating in the centralised French 
system with those in the decentralised Swiss system, and has found that the latter has generally 
worked against Muslim interests; for whereas conditions in the former Muslim organisations have 
                                                          
240 Dr.Ismail Amin is President of VIOZ, a Muslim umbrella organisation operating in Canton Zürich.  For more information 
see Appendix Two. 
241 Schweizerischer Rat der Religionen 
242 Föderation Islamischer Dachorganisationen in der Schweiz 
243 Koordination Islamischer Organisationen Schweiz 
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been motivated to target and win concessions at the national level, in Switzerland, Muslims have 
been relatively ineffective in influencing national policies, yet they have been more successful at the 
local level.  (Ireland, 1994)   
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CHAPTER SIX Texts through space, time and expectation 
Sampling 
Sampling was designed to get a mix of voices, and the starting point was interviews with trade union 
officials, and workers in IGMetall244 in Frankfurt and the Audi car plant in Neckarsulm.   The idea here 
was to explore different types of social environment which a broad spectrum of Muslims must 
negotiate. 245 The reasoning here was that this would provide some historical continuity and facilitate 
initial cross-case comparisons.  Beginning with the workplace I explored the secularity of this space 
since it must be negotiated from first to last across the three chosen cases, and across generations 
from guest workers to the present second, third and fourth generation workers and from youth to 
retirement.  I was therefore interested to hear from Trade unionists, workers and managers to assess 
the integrative significance of this secular space.  From the initial round of interviews, I felt in this 
area to be significant, so I decided to remain in the mid-field but vary the kinds of representational 
actors.   
The next set of people I decided to interview was the representatives of Muslim organisations.  
Although there has been, and remains, some scepticism about the significance of these organisations 
in the integration process, they are considered, at least publicly, significant voices in Integration. This 
problem is important since the degree of representation – the degree they reflect wider Muslim 
opinions, and the right they have to speak for them -  is tied to the degree of significance that can be 
attached to them as ‘actors’ ‘speakers’ ‘opinion makers’.  Interviewing various committee members 
and Presidents of Muslim organisations led to the larger and more loosely organised umbrella 
associations.  In all three case studies, there was an extensive network of Muslim organisations and 
associations each with very different clienteles, functions and aspirations.  This extended from those 
who claimed high representative status246 to many others organising around narrower interest areas 
                                                          
244 IGM Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IGM) Industriegewerkschaft Metall 
245 workplace, schools and so-called ghettos 
246 For example  Turkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD), ‘Millis Görüş (IGMG)  and ‘DITIB’ The Turkish-Islamic Union for 
Religious Affairs 
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for example, organisations set up to meet the very practical needs of their members and clients: 
extra language tuition for migrant children, Muslim burial or Hajj.  
Independents became the next research focus.  These were people who performed a swivel function.  
They articulate and direct criticism at both government and at Muslim organisations: these were 
usually independent consultants, or business people.  This group has also been considered significant 
by government as is illustrated in their representation in various fora which the German government 
has created for Integration dialogue.  Concurrently I sought interviews with ’on-the-ground’ voices 
Muslims and non-Muslims: Imams religious representatives and those involved in inter-faith 
dialogue.  These I reasoned, insofar as they were socially active and articulate, and even speaking as 
non-representational individuals might also register something of the pulse of the discourses under 
inspection.  In the Canton and city of Zürich the circle of individuals active in ‘Integration’ was quite 
restricted, and they had over time become networked and provided valuable insights into their 
interactive integrative practices.    
Lastly I interviewed officials at municipal, regional and Federal/National levels.  Since as policy 
advisers, they were involved in designing programmatic integration, and who in significant ways 
‘managed’ the processes.  These implementers were also significant decision makers – although in 
the case of Switzerland these processes remained vulnerable to direct democratic opportunity 
structures. 
Given the limits of this research, the texts produced in interview situations were, relatively small – 48 
in number.247  The qualitative methodology employed, placed emphasis both on the meanings 
intersubjectively produced i. e. on the quality of texts and their interpreted significance.  As subjects, 
interviewees were understood to be contributory to meaning change and that they themselves could 
be changed in their turn.  So texts were not simply serving discourse identification and confirmation.  
Deviant voices too were understood to point to transition and development, so that textual deviance 
was understood to require even closer examination than confirmationary texts.  In conducting this 
discourse analysis I sought to keep contextualising texts, locating them within larger discourses since, 
                                                          
247 22 interviewees were Muslim organisational representatives 12 of which were either President or vice-President of their 
respective organisations and 10 central committee members. 10 speakers were directly involved in Integration at the 
political level. These included 2 members of Parliament and 8 political advisers; 4 Integration officers, 3 Trade Union 
officials as well as 8-10 workers who were also members of trade Unions (these individual voices only appear in group 
interviews). The remaining interviewees were significant speakers into Integration from Industry, Church and Society. 
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as Hannerz has pointed out: “we cannot occupy ourselves only with the small-scale handling of 
meanings and symbols by individuals, or small groups, and assume that wider cultural entities come 
about through an aggregation of their activities. ” (Hannerz, 1996:22) 
Choosing these interviewees from such differing strata of society and politics, added to the balance 
of this research as well as reducing the danger of bias in the analysis of the data. To have 
concentrated wholly on Muslim organisations and how they produce Integration meaning would 
clearly only have  been too thin a slice of the discourse, likewise only analysing official voices, policies 
and programmes, would have missed key reactions, criticisms and resistances from those most likely 
to be affected by it. Integration is therefore understood to be intersubjectively constructed over a 
wide range of  cognitive frameworks and contexts.  
Throughout, speakers were understood to be (and understood themselves as being) representative 
of wider constituencies. As they created texts of meaning,  they took on a ‘representative role’ as 
leaders of Muslim and corporate organisations, policy makers within political parties, bureaucrats or 
government spokespersons. Their position within their respective organisations and departments, as 
well as those organisations were clarified through cross checking. I would ask an official speaker how 
important organisation X would be in these debates, or whether Speaker Y was an important 
contributory. Also Muslim organisational representatives were asked how they viewed particular 
official actors for example those participating in the Islam conference. Though there was not uniform 
knowledge available (some Muslim speakers would not know the names of those devising 
government policies or organising summit events) some idea of who the key players were, was 
gained through cross referncing. Muslim umbrella organisations were considered especially 
important since, as aggregative organisation they represented groups of smaller organisations and 
groupings on Integration issues at the national level. So office holders of these organisations 
(Presidents and central committee members) emphasised their organisations’ contacts with national 
representatives and their developing negotiative-consultative roles within Integration discourse. 
(Kolat, 2008), (El Boujoufi, 2007), (Maizar, 2008) (Amin, 2008) 
Yet one recurring disagreement between speakers, had to do with the assessment of the 
representative character or value these Muslim speakers ‘in fact’ possessed. Though some official 
speakers depreciated the value of such organisations and speakers, representing ‘at the most 10-15% 
of the Muslim population’ but ‘all we have to work with at the moment’, (Bauerbach, 2008) in 
practice there was a more flexibility. There was an implicit understanding that membership lists do 
not always equate accurately with how representation of Muslim communities functions, yet there 
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was still a lot of work to be done from Muslim organisations to gain greater representative 
legitimacy. There was also evidence that this was ‘getting through’ as Muslim organisations were also 
taking steps to formalise representation more in keeping with legal requirements. (Kilicarslan, 2008) 
However officials could not ignore informal representation either. (Tufan, 2008). Similarly official 
speakers clearly only could represent pieces of established and emerging meanings rising from 
governmental, economic and social spheres.  
Because speakers can only ever contribute ‘a part’ (since discourse is never reducible to one voice) 
dealing with the diversity of positions within different levels of government, economy and society 
was accepted as part of the research design.  
Significant also was that interviewees sought to transcend their own positions, seeking to represent 
their own clients – members of organisations, political parties, religious communities -  and internal 
and external audiences. On occasions it was important to check if a particular statement was a 
personal point of view or one held within that organisation or the wider community. Throughout the 
interviews I also kept in mind that speakers could be addressing several audiences. The academic 
community to which I belonged was also significant. Some interviewees wished to know more about 
the university and the kinds of research undertaken there and how Integration was developing in the  
UK. (Kolat, Oezbek, Kilicarslan) 
Interviews as sites of power  
Positioning 
As interviewer/interviewee interact and take up their respective roles.  It is not always clear to begin 
with, how the kinds of subjectivity each brought into the situation would will shape the interview 
event.  Adopting a constructivist grounded theory methodology, the interview itself is understood as 
a politically significant event, and not merely a location for recording data. Rather it was understood 
to be a complex exchange between multiple subjectivities which indicated significant dimensions of 
power at work. (Charmaz)  
If the interview site is not a neutral recording place then neither is the interviewer a mere recorder of 
text.  Both interviewer and interviewee are in themselves ‘multiplex subjectivites’ and ‘multivocal’ ie 
speaking from different perspectives (official, personal). Given the non-neutral environment and the 
multiplex character of speaking, the power of position between interviewer and interviewee was also 
understood to be complex. (Sanghera et al) In many of the interview situations the academic persona 
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was foregrounded by the interviewee, this subject positioning worked through assumptions and 
presuppositions on the part of the interviewee that the researcher possessed already extensive 
expert knowledge and was employing ‘scientific’ methods. (von Leoprechting, Löffler, Böckle, Senay) 
In such situations interviewee answers were often well considered, often prepared and structured 
beforehand. Even though this worked against the kind of semi-structured informal  interviewing 
methododology I sought to pursue, in some interviews it was thought important to maintain this, 
since the danger was that the interviewee might think she/he was not being taken seriously. (von 
Leoprechting) However on other occasions I sought to change the underlying presuppositons by 
emphasising the incompleteness of my knowledge of significant pieces of discourse and that these 
were were now being acquired in the interview. Shifts within the assumption index of the 
interviewee altered the positioning of interviewer-interviewee since the latter became aware that 
she/he was also involved in clarification and filling in knowledge gaps.  The downside of this was that 
it could lead to exerting pressure on the interviewer to accept key positions of the interviewee, to 
require and demonstrate sympathy now that more complete knowledge or clarification had been 
provided. Where this occurred I adopted no standard response, sometimes it was better to agree so 
that the interview flow could continue, on other occasions it was better to question what was being 
said.  
It is also important to understand that I was not only the questioner. Several interviewees were able 
to turn the tables as it were and question my own implication in the discourses. El Boujoufi went 
straight to heart of problem I had not fully consiered in the initial stages, for example my very choice 
of discourse implied something. Why are you directing integration to me? (El Boujoufi, 2008) This 
was a powerful questioning of involvement which I hadn’t considered before, pointing out that I too 
was implicated in Dutch Integration discourse – possibly reinforcing an illegitimate and subordinating 
discourse. However though this question was a warning not to reduce Integration to problem solving 
nor the problem to Muslims, it also reinforced the impossibility of standing outside discourse. As a 
critical approach my reasearch refocused on the power dynamics – conscription, intrustion, identity 
distortion, (in)security – which underpin this habilitative approach. 
 
Interview preparation 
I found therefore that I needed to be flexible and prepare for each intervew as an individual and 
different kind of interaction. Setting up the interview usually involved one or more telephone calls, in 
160 
 
which information about expectations were gauged on both sides. This was followed up by my 
sending a preparatory email containing some ‘guiding questions’ and some short comments 
indicating that the interview should be relaxed and conversational in tone. Even though this gave me 
some initial leverage (power) over the kind of interview to be conducted, this was often overturned. 
In the Senay interview, though punctual, I was asked to wait. Dr. Hamurcu (an attaché at the 
embassy) used this opportunity to  emphasise the high position of the interviewee. The interview 
unsurprisingly began with polite formalities and turn-taking with uninterrupted question and answer. 
Later however the attitude relaxed, and I was able to loosen up the structure of questioning, 
sometimes interjecting comments which to begin with, would have been unacceptable to his role as 
religious counsellor.  
To get beyond the strictures of role playing, I sought in the aforementioned example, to shift 
assumptions by emphasising different kinds of subjectivity and subject positioning. The range of 
subjectivities I drew upon included the following: academic researcher, outsider, foreigner and Irish.  
I employed these by adding some biographical detail or anecdotes. Here my own personal 
experiences were utilised – also having been/being an object of discrimination, growing up in a 
conflictual environment and being someone who was technically ‘a foreigner’ though having been a 
long term resident in Germany. This served sometimes to bridge distances by blurring lines between 
interviewer-interviewee and also to concretise the problems of foreigners in German society.  Where 
the trajectory seemed to develop unsatisfactorily for example, where it involved too much story 
swapping, then greater neutrality of tone was introduced, seeking to refocus and rebuild interviewer-
interviewee relationship.   
Positioning subjectivities in the interview helped displace what was presupposed – a German, a 
Christian – and enabled me to provoke certain kinds of reaction. For example in an interview with 
Aydin after hearing how he and his family had become naturalised German citizens, I asked how he 
as a German felt about how the government were handling Integration. He immediately became 
uneasy and then admitted he couldn’t easily recognise himself in that description (predication) I had 
just included him in. He went on to explain that even after years of residence and the acquisiton of 
citizenship, he still felt his identity was that of an immigrant and foreigner. He was still nervous about 
the future and that of his children. It was important that he understood that I was both outside the 
situation (ie not a German) but in some respects inside (long-term foreign resident in Germany). In 
this way I was able to test the extent to which his new citizenship identity, involved a deeper 
identification with his new homeland.  
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But that did not mean I, as interviewer, was always the effective power exerter (ie the one who 
exerted power over the interviewee). On other occasions altering presuppositions and subject 
positioning didn’t seem to achieve the effects hoped for and interviewees would revert to a default 
positions such as ‘but you look German’ (Musluoglu) or ‘but you are not a Muslim’ (Gülbahar). Yet 
even in situations when attempts to alter subject-positionings seemed to have limited effects - 
neither becoming an insider nor being completely an outsider either – there was evidence of some 
changes in attitude, some reappraisal of who the interviewer was and what he was trying to do. As 
such within the interviewer-interviewee exchange, changing presuppositions about interviewer 
subjectivities, resulted in altering (though sometimes in a limited sense) subject positionings. This 
flexible approach reinforced the conviction that power structures underlay the interview interaction.  
Choosing the venue 
The venue for the interview was chosen by the interviewee and included mosques, cafés, offices and 
homes. The guiding thought here was that the interviewee should have that environment which they 
thought most appropriate to the interview (convenience was also a relevant issue in choosing). 
Though most interviews were conducted in offices and conference rooms which provided initial 
pointers as to how the interview as event was understood, Mintjes and Tufan asked me to conduct 
the interview their home. Though this signalled hospitality, I was also aware that this might place me 
in a more subordinate position. On the one hand the home is the place of the interviewee and 
powerful scripts accompany this setting – politeness, friendship, relaxedness. I was aware this could 
have a distorting effect – by putting me in a position of not wanting to ask uncomfortable questions, 
or not being comfortable about questioning an account being given.  I sought therefore to signal not 
only my sense of privilege and gratitude to be asked into such a personal place but also to keep the 
interview as the purpose in the foreground. However the home interviews tended to be relaxed and 
informal.  One interviewee requested that I drive an additional 120 kms so that the interview could 
take place in his home (Tufan, 2008)248 In this way the interview as event was not stipulated by the 
interviewer, but had a negotiated character.  Some chose their mosque or a café in a religious centre.   
                                                          
248 J.Tufan is vice-President of The Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe Avrupa Türk Islam Kültür 
Dernekeri Birgliği. He is a member of the central committee of the Central Council of Muslims Zentralrat der Muslime in 
Deutschland (ZMD) and Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland. He is a 
Christian Democrat (CDU) and is a councillor in the city of Dinslaken.  
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It became clear that choosing the situational context was important for modelling the kind of 
interview.  A range of places therefore were chosen by interviewees which each exerted subtle 
power - home, mosque, place of work (surgery, a penthouse office in a company complex, in 
Parliament buildings in the Hague and Berlin) – all gave important signals as to how the interviewees 
understood themselves and their role. 
Throughout contexts were understood as more than situational ones which these scene-settings 
have described.  It had to do with expectations and assumptions about shared understandings and 
places were intimately involved.  In addition there were significant  schemata to be negotiated such 
as what the ‘interview as event’ was about - its purposes and procedures.  The assumptions of 
common knowledge i. e. that we both have some grasp of core concepts being talked about.  
Multiple contexts are established and maintained but also altered throughout the interview by using 
language to produce text and paralanguage - tones of voice, facial gestures etc;  so that the interview 
situation was also experienced and as the  ‘felt flow of interpersonal communication and 
engagements. ’ (Kleinman and Fitz-Henry, 2007:53)  
Interview type 
I chose to begin with an in-depth semi-structured Interview type, (Bryman, 2001:113) with one-to-
one and face-to-face  interviewing.  A few telephone interviews were necessary since some 
expressed interest but were unavailable during my research trips. Some group interviewing also took 
place as happened unexpectedly at the Alevi centre in Cologne, (Cebo, Sengül et al., 2008)249 
occasionally these were pre-arranged such as the group interviews as with IGMetall in Neckarsulm.  
The questions loosely around three core discursive topics: integration, secularism, security.   It was 
made clear through introductory mails or at the beginning of the interview itself, that the 
participants would have freedom to approach the core topics as they chose. They were encouraged 
them to see the topics as orientation points and to use them as loose guidelines so that they would 
always have the freedom to move to other themes that were connected in some way, but perhaps 
                                                          
249 This was a group interview with C. Cebo, D. Sengül and A. Zülfikar.  Cebo who functioned as leader of the interview 
group, is project coordinator at the Alevi national headquarters in Cologne. He is a veteran activist and led an important 
campaign in Germany in the early 1980s against xenophobia and discrimination against foreigners. He has served as 
chairman of an umbrella organisation and has been speaker of a special anti-discrimination commission set up by the 
regional government of Northern Rhine Westphalia.  
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not directly captured by these questions.   This approach was used by one interviewee to give a 
gendered interpretation to Integration as she discussed female Muslim identity and visibility within 
integration discourse in Zürich.  (Lenzin, 2008)250  Another highlighted the role of large multi-
nationals such as Metro in contributing to Integration at the level of business, and through its 
transnational reach extensive financing of Integration projects which supported the education of girls 
in Turkey. (von Leoprechting, 2008) 
In objectivist positivist approaches bias requires careful planning and must be part of the design so as 
to become a controlled variable.  In constructivist approaches the subjectivity of the interviewer is 
taken onboard and becomes integrated into the analysis.  (Charmaz, 2006) My own position was a 
cross between the two positions: whereas I was careful to foster an objective attitude, I sometimes 
inserted subjective elements – agreements, nods of the head, body language to reassure the 
interviewee that I knew exactly what she was talking about.  Although I sought to weigh fairly, 
looking at different angles, using different lenses of analysis, my objectivity was something akin to 
seeking to exert control over my own ‘visceral registers’.  (Connolly, 1999) Reflexive negotiations 
were employed in analysis to probe for possible blind spots - for facts which fitted too easily, or 
didn’t fit at all with what I understood – this was employed each time I inspected the data.  
Objectivism then in this research was a conscious discipline: of not being too easily satisfied, of being 
willing to question and open up data in unexpected ways.  This was an objectivism which 
acknowledged its own subjectivity.   
If meaningful texts are produced in a complex of discursive meaning, then the quality of the 
interaction of the interview situation is also important.  For example, in the interview with Kolat,251 I 
was struck by the rehearsed nature of his responses to my ‘integration’ questions.  The interview 
                                                          
250 R. Lenzin is an Islam expert of  Swiss-Pakistani origin. She teaches at the European Project for Interreligious Learning in 
Zurich, is a lecturer in intercultural communications at the University of Lucerne, and is Vice-President Interreligious 
Association of Switzerland. She has gained public prominence in Zürich through her interreligious dialogue championing 
Muslima affairs and opposition to the Minaret ban. 
251 K. Kolet, Turkish Community Germany (TGD) the largest secular Turkish-Muslim organisation. He was a participant in 
both the Integration Summit and German Islam conference, and boycotted temporarily the Integration Summit in protest 
against new discriminatory immigration laws which restricted the immigration of Turkish spouses to Germany. 
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took place after lunch and I could read tiredness in his mannerisms.  Through this I understood that 
he was giving me a prepared text with a well-practiced quality.  Only when I expressed surprise and 
interest in a distinction he made between Ottoman and Turk, did he become properly engaged.   On 
some occasions I introduced personal details such as my own experience of communal violence in N.  
Ireland.  This often awakened interest.  I occasionally mentioned that I too was a foreigner who had 
lived in Germany for over twenty years.  Through careful introduction of short personal narratives, I 
sought to recognise not only the nature of my own involvement, but to (though in a limited sense) 
initiate intersubjective meaning construction.  
Attributing power in the interview situation – place, roles, rules, persona or subjectivities – means 
that (as in all power attributions) a heightened reflexivity and that in the analysis of the interview as 
an interactive event (apart from the textual analysis) things could have been different. Because 
research is a ‘political intervention’ (Guzzini, 2005) the following chapters are also ideological sites.  
(Charmaz, 2006:163) Examing power transforms the sense and purpose of research from discovering 
what is assumed to be ‘out there’, to purposeful reflexive  understanding of what, the researcher is 
doing.   
Organising texts 
Spatial, temporal and shared expectation categories are employed in this chapter to group data 
systematically and to create clearer understandings about how integration, secularism and security, 
work through themes such as presence and visibility, transience and permanence, and what kind of 
shared expectations exist and how discursive realities are understood to deviate from them. 
Categorising in this way prevents texts produced, melting discourses into one another, and allows us 
to understand and assess the strength of discursive linkages. Grouping themes however, means 
breaking apart a ‘natural’ flow which occurred in the interview situation, where speakers were free 
to connect and disconnect the three core discourses. Categorisation has therefore both 
systematising and didactic purposes. 
This research project has drawn upon a broad range of representative speakers. These consisted of 
people who were involved in shaping the processes of Integration. Official speakers  included 
parliamentary members, political advisers and experts, as well as party spokespersons and 
bureaucrats involved in the design and execution of integration projects.  This was supplemented by 
corporate elites such as managers of large multi-national companies, Trade-union officials as well as 
some independent entrepreneurs. Top and second -level umbrella organisational representatives 
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were the main Muslim speakers, but these were supplemented by religious leaders such as imams 
and those engaged in inter-faith dialogue and mediation. Last but not least, on a few occasions single 
voices such as those of factory workers were included since they often brought the freshness and 
urgency of being in the front line.  
Throughout this chapter, spatial and temporal aspects of Muslim presence (fitting in and living 
together)are talked about, since the social dimensions of transition are significant for all the 
speakers. But although Muslim voices especially, deal with the immediacy of their social realities - 
change, identity distortion and non-acceptance - it is the political construction of those realities 
which remains our ongoing concern. In other words, it is the politicisation and securitisation of these 
themes which will receive the greater emphasis in this chapter. 
Part I Parallel space 
Exploring issues of space and integration, interviewees drew attention to one of its most solidly 
visible aspects - mosque building.  The journey from the backyard mosque to the ‘showcase’ mosque 
is undoubtedly an important symbolic journey pointing out important transitions - transience to 
permanence together with upward economic and social mobility.  Acquiring citizenship may be a 
relatively private matter but mosque-building is unmistakeably up-front visibility making unequivocal 
claim to social space.  Mosques too have been made massive security signifiers, which draw together 
the significance of changing Islamic presence and security in social and political space.  In this section 
I look at what interviewees had to say about their understanding of Muslim spatial inscription.  
Securitised objects in securitised space 
Bekim Alimi’s 252 mosque is a typical backyard, low profile functional mosque.  It is in a small older 
industrial area of the town near the railway tracks where the frequent trains seem to underscore the 
marginalised character of location.  He talked about the growth of his community, about the fact that 
the mosque cannot really hold the believers, especially on holidays, and that they will shortly have to 
pray in the yard in front of the mosque.  The obvious solution to this problem of accommodation 
would therefore be to build a new mosque for this still largely immigrant Balkan group.  He 
emphasised that the town is cooperative and generally positive to Muslims, and he underlined that 
                                                          
252 Bekim Alimi is active in the top-level Muslim umbrella organisation FIDS, and is vice-President of The Association of 
Islamic Communities in Eastern Switzerland DIGO. For more information see Appendix Two. 
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his work had been a contributory factor to this atmosphere.  “School classes come to see the mosque 
and to ask questions so that it is also a place where cultures meet.”   Not only is the mosque a 
cultural hub but a sacralised place of worship, of prayer and a social space for Muslims as well. As a 
multifunctional space it also has an unmistakeably diasporic and ethnicised character, the majority 
coming from the Baltic region; a place to come and talk of home.  It is also a protected and protective 
space: “We try to protect *traditions+ in our mosques and to provide a feeling of homeland.  The slow 
loss of tradition and assimilation causes us some pain. ” (Alimi, 2006)  
Alimi is convinced that acculturation is inevitable and that as a new generation grows up, Switzerland 
will naturally be their focal point and German will be their chosen language of communication.  
Preaching in German is only a matter of time.(Alimi, 2008) He asserts that the building of a mosque 
could and should be understood as an important integration step in itself.  (Alimi, 2008) In creating 
sacred spaces for Muslims, Islam takes its place among other religions.  “When people walk into 
town they can tell their children this is a Catholic church, there is a Synagogue and that is a mosque. 
” Pointing to a minaret would be equivalent to pointing to a church tower, and would become also a 
recognisable feature of the town’s face.  “The minaret would be evidence of integration. ” (Alimi, 
2008) When I asked Alimi to talk about the political implications of this comment he replied that it 
would not be fitting for an Imam to get involved in politics.  Yet the reference to the minaret was a 
significant political statement, since he would have been fully aware of the discursive dominance of 
the Minaret ban initiative.  In using the minaret as a symbol of successful integration, Alimi was 
taking it out of its securitised context, and placing it in a novel context of visible integration.    
Kilicarslan253 drew attention to the struggle for presence and visibility in Cologne.  She recounted the 
countless obstacles to getting building permission.  There were disputes and negotiations about all 
manner of physical details – the dimensions of the cupola or how many minarets there could be.  
Although this would not be unusual in complex building projects in urban areas, she indicated that 
this was a lot more complex than conforming to building regulations.  She pointed to the pro-
Cologne initiative254 and mentioned that there would be a programme on Television about the 
                                                          
253 A. Kılıçarslan is vice General Secretary central committee member of DITIB the largest Muslim organisation in Germany. 
For further information see Appendix two.   
254 Pro-Köln is a self proclaimed ‘people’s movement’ which mobilises in opposition to the Ehrenfeld mosque. 
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mosque.  Its purpose however was to highlight its controversial name, ‘Fatih’. 255 When I asked if she 
could understand why people might be upset with such a name, she brushed this aside.  She 
explained that it was in honour of a tolerant and an enlightened Sultan, and that this reaction was 
down to exaggerated sensitivity and reading too much into the name.  Although he was a conqueror 
he also guaranteed religious minorities freedom to live and practice their religion.  What could be so 
bad about that? (Kiliçarslan, 2008) Kiliçarslan’s mosque narrative is clearly not only about reaching an 
accommodation between city and religious community demands, it has been and remains a battle 
for space.  
Within a territorialisation-visibilisation stem, one theme which occurs across the cases, concerned an 
ulteriorised understanding of the hidden purposes of the building of mosques. Especially show-case 
mosques underscored presence through visibility and marked out sites of contention so that “the 
symbolic significance of places of worship cannot be overestimated. ” (Sunier, 2006:22) Mosque 
building is not understood to be merely meeting ‘religious needs’ but has become transformed to be 
emblematic of foreignised spaces, and evidence of encroaching Islamisation.   
Referring to the Ehrenfeld mosque project in Cologne, Ralph Giordano,256 understands Cologne’s 
showpiece mosque  as “an expression of the creeping Islamisation of our land. ” (Boyes, 2008) The 
expression ‘creeping Islamisation’ suggests something more sinister than mere Islamisation.  This is 
an ulterior Islamisation, one characterised by a surreptitious incremental increase of power and 
influence.  He is emphatic that this mosque is not a symbol of integration but of parallelism “There 
are people who say this mosque could be a step toward integration *…+ I say, ‘No, no, and three 
times no. ’ (Landler, 2007) He continues that it is “a bid for power and influence, a land grab” (Boyes, 
2008) Mosques are being interpreted not only as concretised symbols of parallel worlds but of a 
cloaked staking out and taking of land.  
Alimi emphasised throughout his interview the protective function of the mosque, which is not a 
closed space but one characterised by openness.  Neither is it static but dynamic, he emphasises the 
growth of his community and the need, in absence of a proper mosque, to annex public space - 
praying in the yard.  However, throughout the interview, although he avoids ostensible political 
                                                          
255 The name means conquerer and is an epithet given to Sultan Mehmet II, the Muslim conquerer of Constantinople.  
256  Is a prominent German Jewish intellectual, holocaust survivor and self appointed speaker for a German population 
supposedly handicapped by its own history.  
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commentary, there is an awareness of the political and security field within which mosques are 
placed, and from within which he must speak.  He points to minarets as visibilised and successful 
integration which is clearly set in opposition to the populist usage in which they are symbols of 
surreptitious Islamicisation of Switzerland and must therefore be forbidden and invisibilised.   
Kilicarslan spent considerable time explaining the conceptualisation and describing the architecture 
of the mosque.  By providing an extensive tour of the thought that has gone into its design, she 
sought to de-securitise the project of mosque-building generally and this one in particular.  She 
described how it would be located on the site of the old DITIB headquarters which had in the 
meantime been pulled down to make way for it.  The new building would, she said, be in the heart of 
the Ehrenfeld district of Cologne, and the architecture would reflect modernity and integration.  
There would be lots of glass thus underlining transparency.  In addition there would be several 
entrances which would emphasise accessibility.  To reinforce the latter there would be a reception 
centre for visitors, with a view on the central prayer hall.  This was to ensure they could enter at any 
time, look around and yet not distract or disturb worshippers.  She emphasised, that the location of 
the viewing areas would be placed to avoid the usual views of the backsides of the faithful at prayer.  
(Kiliçarslan, 2008) 
Parallel societies – segregation and segmentalisation 
Another aspect of securitised space centres on ‘enclaved’ Muslim communities, which concretise and 
evidence ‘failed integration’. Rapid urban change and the transmogrification of urban streetscapes 
and skylines has had a powerful impact on native imaginaries: “Imagine, not only one building being 
constructed on an alien model, but an entire system of urban life in its economic, political, and 
symbolic-cultural forms being imposed upon already existing towns and cities that have been 
organised on quite different bases. ” (Gilsenan 1982:195 in Pieterse, 2004:88) This is a rather 
dramatic representation of urban change through immigrant settlement, but  one point ought to be 
held in mind, that urban re-shaping is rarely the work of one ethnic or religious group, rather it is the 
result of multiple group re-modelling.  This is not solely the impact of Islam although security talk 
clearly magnifies the significance of concentrated Muslim visibility.  This resonates also among 
anxious natives who worry that some neighbourhoods are no longer accessible to them; that they 
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resemble a foreign occupation; that whole neighbourhoods have simply been taken over.  (Mintjes, 
2008)257  
In addition to this direct securitisation through visual ‘evidence’ other securitisations are layered 
upon this, such as highlighting diminishing societal and political safety and opaque impenetrability.  
Here securitised thinking centres on the connection between immigrant inflow and autochthonous 
outflow and emphasises that the resulting segregation leads to increased crime.   Allochtonous 
neighbourhoods can often feel strangely impenetrable ‘off-bounds’ to autochthonous and it is a 
common suspicion that the police are unable or unwilling to do anything and even avoid these areas. 
(Mintjes, 2008) They come to be understood then, not only as places of immigrant Muslim 
appropriation and occupation, but also sites of territorialised resistance and secessionism.  Urban 
spaces become and remain localities of security.  
The idea of existent parallel societies bundles several streams of securitised thinking focused on 
Muslims.  A dominant image in this is the development of an underclass, enclaved in run-down 
neighbourhoods.  A second related theme258 is the alienation and radicalisation of disadvantaged 
Muslim youth.  Laurischk259 emphasised these two aspects of official German security concern.  She 
began by emphasising that blanket security was utopian, that it was really a question of seeing where 
the potential for threat lay and nipping it in the bud.  She described how there had been and was, 
still widespread unease across the political spectrum stemming from the time of the Banlieu riots in 
Paris.  She explained how her own constituency was just across the Rhine from Strasbourg and how 
she felt uneasy thinking that there was unrest in suburbs she could see from her home.  ‘We 
determined this was not going to be repeated in Germany!’ She emphasised that unease in the 
political and security community did not come from the fear of terrorist attacks but of a developing 
underclass of Muslims who would become alienated and vulnerable to messages of violence.  ‘We 
have Kreuzberg260  and there is a lot of potential there. ’  (Laurischk MdB, 2008)  
                                                          
257 H. Mintjes is active in inter-faith dialogue within The Dutch Council of Churches. For more information see Appendix 
two. 
258 often understood as a direct causal relationship 
259 Frau Sybille Laurisck, is an FDP member of the German Parliament. For more information see Appendix two. 
260 an area of high Muslim concentration in Berlin 
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Parallel societies are understood in securitised discourse as the result of collective self-chosen sealing 
off strategies;261a voluntary quarantining and insulation which is desired and required to maintain 
the homogeneity of the community.  Here the primary social glue is understood to be ethnicity, 
social class, a philosophical world view262 or a mix of all three.  The inhabitants of these so-called 
parallel societies are often considered in danger of being left permanently behind, of becoming in 
themselves a major structural barrier to integration.  Insofar as parallel societies and ghettos are self-
chosen the inhabitants may be considered anti-integrationist and thus deviant, and the spaces and 
meaning habitats they possess as non-integratable.  Ostensible traditionalism fused with religious 
ideas and values visibilised in veils and burqas, is understood to run counter to the spirit of liberal 
democracy so that by constructing autonomous semi-autarkical systems of dovetailing organisations 
and social services, Islamist ideas may be more easily focused and transmitted. Simultaneously liberal 
democratic integrationist ideas are more effectively blocked in dense Islamic spaces.  
Essentialised identities are clearly located within this securitising process : “with regards to Muslim 
migrants the challenge is central because Muslims have different moral concepts263  which thrive in 
parallel societies and create enclaves of conflict264. ” (Tibi, 2002) This is an essentialist alterity type of 
argument in which birds of a feather naturally flock together, build their own nests in which their 
foreign values can incubate and multiply.  As Bader265 argues however, to have a classic parallel 
society several things must coincide “a mono cultural identity, a voluntary and conscious social 
retreat also in settlement and everyday life, a far-reaching economic demarcation, a doubling of 
State Institutions. ” (Bader, 2004) If parallel societies are in large part products of securitised 
imaginaries they are vivid and effective.  The ‘immigrant’ suburbs such as Kreuzberg or Schilderswijk 
have become icons of Muslim exclusivism presenting a transmogrification of traditional 
neighbourhoods from which even interviewees with more liberal views seemed to recoil.  (Mintjes, 
2008) 
                                                          
261 abschotten 
262 weltanschauung 
263 Wertevorstellung 
264 Enklaven Konfliktherden 
265 F. Bader is a regional secretary of IGMetall, Europe’s largest Trade Union.  For more information see Appendix Two. 
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Muslim parallel societies are understood as security risks because they are segregated places. Yet 
sequestered spaces exist and are sought by autochthonous populations.  Native practices of remote 
living express themselves in segmentalism, although these life choices do not carry such strongly 
negative connotations as ghettoisation or segregationism.  But this too must be considered in the 
exploration of failed integration.  There may be nothing new or startling in the fact that natives 
prefer and practice segmentalism as lifestyle choice; however when it was thrown up in the context 
of integration it pointed out embedded discriminatory practices. 
 Böckle266 highlighted how Germans possessed a ‘compound mentality’ through which a selective 
multiculturalism was practiced.  Germans, he asserted, valorised identifications based on a mix of 
ethno-religious and class categories and on the basis of which made limited interactive choices.  The 
workplace was such a compound, in which work interactions took place according to production 
scripts but which were not likely to be carried beyond the factory gate.  He mentioned that most 
Germans only had minimal contacts to Turks and that, mostly in the workplace; here they 
cooperated well.  But when they went home they had their own, very different sets of contacts.  I 
asked him about the kinds of people he would choose to meet and socialise with.  There were a few 
Italians and they were interesting people because they shared the same kinds of interests.  They 
were fun to be around.   He had even done a course or two in Italian, so as to be able to 
communicate better on holiday.  I asked if he had learned Turkish.  He replied no, he had been on 
holiday in Turkey and that was nice but they (the Germans) stayed in their hotels and had only very 
minimal contacts to Turks there.   I asked if he had Turkish friends, he replied that he had no Turks in 
his circle of friends.  In answer to my question why? He replied: ‘Turks aren’t chic’.  (Böckle, 2008) 
Kilicarslan underlined that all separation was not bad or anti-integrative in itself, and offered a 
religious perspective on the need for segregated spaces.  She made a significant statement about life 
worlds when she emphasised that it is natural that life should be made up of shared and unshared 
spaces.  From a religious perspective, she accepted that there would be religious spaces which could 
only be shared with fellow believers. (Kiliçarslan, 2008) The Boekle interview suggested how native 
life-style choices constructed a selective multiculturalism based on narrow interactional 
communicative bases.  This ensured that types of engagement and the rules governing interaction 
                                                          
266 W. Böckle has been for many years the Personnel manager of the Kolbenschmidt-Pierburg Aluminium plant in 
Neckarsulm which employs over 2000 workers. For more information see Appendix two. 
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were known to all sides and relationships remained stable.  The contrasts to the religious view lay in 
the religious prescriptions which clearly demarcated the sequestered spaces . 
Segmental thinking was evident across the cases and suggested a strong undercurrent of how, 
beyond the rhetoric, things are done and thought.   Van Strein,267 suggested that the political 
establishment would be content, if only they268 would keep quiet and not cause trouble.  If only they 
would get on with their lives like the Chinese, do their business and keep their heads down, no one 
would have a problem.  (van Strein, 2008) Heer269 stated that Muslims who wanted to live their own 
lives posed no problem for the Swiss. “The British live out by the lake, they do their own thing, we 
have no problem with that.” (Heer, 2008) Multiculturalism has often been demonised as reinforcing 
even causing fragmented living since it is understood to work only on the principle of a minimum of 
cohesion, namely the ‘lowest common denominator of territorial sharing’.   (Schönbohm, 2006) But 
passing the buck to multiculturalism, although a common enough move, serves only to blur the 
degree to which segmental living is a widespread preference and practice by majority communities. 
In emphasising the uniqueness of Muslim problem areas, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that 
such problem areas existed before, or that there are ‘problem areas’ which are not Muslim.  “The 
first generation immigrants took over the houses and areas of the native Dutch underclass270, and 
they in their turn migrated to better suburbs.  The problem areas, and Dutch politicians like to talk in 
terms of problem areas, were already problem areas and places where the Dutch under-classes lived 
in the 1960s.  The problems were already there, it was only an exchange of people.  So the Dutch 
moved up and out and the immigrants in. ” (el Boujoufi, 2008)271  
                                                          
267 Van Strein is a policy adviser in the areas of immigration integration and international affairs to The People's Party for 
Freedom and Democracy. 
268 He was referring generally to Muslims but later emphasised that it was Moroccans which were considered by the 
political establishment as the most problematic group.  
269 A. Heer has been a member of the Cantonal Parliament Zürich Kantonsrat and factional leader of SVP from 2004-07.  In 
2007 he has was elected to the Swiss Parliament Nationalrat. For further information see Appendix two.   
270 El Boujoufi emphasised these weren’t just working class areas, but areas of a class below the working class.  
271 D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest officially 
recognised top-level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands.  For more information see Appendix two. 
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Delinquency and crime have become strongly connected to Muslim areas and Muslim youth and are 
the ‘incontrovertible evidence’ of failed integration.  Research suggests that immigrant youth 
embrace the dominant perception that natives have of them, and that they foreignise themselves to 
underscore their antipathy to majority culture and system. 272 (Kaschuba, 2007) Research has shown 
the much localised nature of some Muslim youth loyalties, in which identification with turf and gang 
culture merge, so that gang members are proud to be from Kreuzberg in Berlin or De Baarsjes in 
Amsterdam.   Yet this kind of identification is spatially located outside the system and may involve 
illegal activities such as drug dealing and stealing, and which may become very much part of their 
root identification.  (Decker and Weerman, 2005) This German street identity is further reinforced 
when set against a background of stigmatisation in the country of origin.  Turks living in the German 
Federal Republic for example are referred to in Turkey as Germaners273 (Tertilt, 1996).  They have lost 
their authenticity; they are no longer Turks in their Turkish homeland.  In this way they belong to 
neither system but only to the street and to each other.  There is often a blanket loyalty to other 
members which becomes proof of belonging and draws upon traditional honour culture.  (Bucerius, 
2008) Muslim is also taken into this identification to create an image of young urban male, who 
works outside and in opposition to the system.   In addition to specifically ‘delinquent’ youth street 
culture, there are ethno clan criminal cultures such as the Kurdish-Lebanese in Berlin.  Here 
dominant images are of drugs dominating local economies, turf justice being administered internally, 
and officials being threatened.  These have become unmanageable and are the stereotypical urban 
‘no-go’ areas, the criminal ‘hotspots’ with opaque structures, and against which the police are 
thought to be ineffective.  “There are stories of violence, but above all about the failed integration in 
German society. ” (Beck, 2009) 
Aggregation and segregation are doubtlessly important phases in the extended immigration journey.  
The formation of immigrant neighbourhoods may be seen as performing important functions, all of 
which help people cope with the trauma of migration and settlement.  They may be understood as 
spatially located interim stations on an immigration journey to some putative terminal station called 
‘integration’.  There is nothing unique in this, and Germans, for example, reproduced their own 
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regional identities – dialects, religion, and cuisine – in plantation villages274 in the USA.  (Walter, 
2006) The same was true of their much earlier settlements in Eastern Europe.  But ‘plantation 
villages’ have only the flavour of rustic innocence whereas ghettos are seen as altogether more 
sinister and threatening.   
This word Ghetto resonates negatively in the German collective imagination.  It is connected with 
images of the Warsaw ghetto, the Nazi enforced segregation of Jews – it speaks of oppression and 
vulnerability.  It was surprising therefore to discover, how easily people referred to Muslim or 
immigrant neighbourhoods as ghettos.  Bader referred to a new housing development on the edge of 
Neckarsulm as ‘the Amorbach ghetto’ which is a new housing development situated close to the Audi 
factory.  It is a ‘model’ housing area, fitted out with the latest solar cell technologies, new streets, 
schools, hospitals.  Everything speaks of a modern suburban neighbourhood with a majority 
allochtonous population.  On the hill opposite is a contrast suburb, just as modern but where the 
majority are autochthonous - this is clearly not a ghetto.  Bader used the ghetto image  frequently 
and grounded his understanding in references to kids who come from there, who could neither speak 
good German nor good Turkish.  (Bader, 2008) The Ghetto image was therefore constructed less on 
spatial visibilities of crumbling decaying neighbourhoods, which the Amorbach ghetto clearly is not, 
but on a socially immobile Muslim underclass.  In the Netherlands immigrant neighbourhoods 
provided similarly powerful images of ghettoisation with the ‘dish cities’ of Amsterdam, Rotterdam 
and The Hague. (Mintjes, 2008) Although most autochthones also possess satellite dishes in 
immigrant Muslim neighbourhoods it has a different symbolic meaning - the dish remained the 
symbol of dislocation and insulation; of living Morocco in the Netherlands; of simultaneous presence 
and absence.275   
Invisibilisation 
Urban spaces are the primary visible containers of ethnic and religious difference.  Whereas in the 
Netherlands and Germany urban spaces are home to large immigrant Muslim populations, it is not 
the case in Switzerland.  Since the largest urban centre is the city of Zürich with 365 000 persons 
(Bundesverwaltung für Statistik, 2008) therefore large dense urban concentrations of Muslims are 
                                                          
274 verpflanzten Dörfern 
275 But as Dr.F.Volpi has pointed out to me Gulf entertainment channels are just as popular as Moroccan ones. 
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missing by default.  It is unsurprising then that ‘parallel society’ type debates, which emphasised and 
built upon the “quantitative explosion of ‘difference’” (Isin, 2000:231) were less important in this 
case.  But that is not to say that space and visibility were unimportant issues.  
In terms of identity struggles, Connolly has reminded us that “…threat is posed not merely by actions 
the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being 
as other” (Connolly, 1991:66) In this sense the building of mosques in Switzerland follows a similar 
pattern of reaction and resistance which I have alluded to in the previous section. The visibilisation 
which purpose-built mosques entail, points to layers of oppositional and conflictual meaning.  At a 
first take, they represent in concrete, the fulfilled aspirations of Muslims to provide a worthy 
environment for believers to practice Islam; second they provide a fund of new symbolic meaning by 
providing an alternative image of assertive Islam on the move.  The mosque, especially the show-
piece mosque, becomes, on the one hand prestige objects, reflecting new senses of belonging, 
dignity and self-confidence but on the other of ulterior identity gaining strength through expanding 
visibility.   
In the Swiss case the concentration of oppositional meaning has authored a security strategy of 
invisibilisation.  This is not simply a process of minimisation such as hiding mosques in industrial 
estates – although it involves that too - but re-employs an older coping mechanism which was 
effective in Zürich, from the 16th to the 19th century.  (Dätwyler, 2008)276 A similar securitised 
strategy of invisibilisation277 has been developed and driven forward under the direction of the 
conservative populist SVP in alliance with smaller rightist parties.  It is an additional layer of 
effacement which ensures that either mosques remain in backyards or remain hidden in industrial 
estates.  But should Muslims manage somehow to comply with the ever stricter zoning laws and get 
their mosque built in a central location, minaret prohibition facilitates considerably lowering visibility 
impact.  
                                                          
276 P. Dätwyler is a trained theologian and journalist and leads the Reformed Church’s public relations department. He is 
involved inter-religious dialogue in Zürich. For more information see Appendix two. 
277 Invisibilisation is being used to name a strategy.  I am not referring to absolute de facto invisibilisation but a very 
restricted visibility.  
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Although the desire to invisibilise serves several purposes, it is importantly an exercise of power, one 
of a number of subordinating practices. (Lenzin, 2008)278 By seeking to invisibilise a community the 
knowledge of presence still remains, but the very limiting of visibility underlines its subordinate 
position.  This strategy of invisibilisation underlies a loud and abrasive security discourse in 
Switzerland.  The questions facing the populist-conservatives are how to effectively subordinate 
Islam to a dominant Swiss Christian secular culture.  Invisibilisation does not mean expulsion, 
although the SVP also argue for expulsion of criminal foreigners (Swiss People's Party, 2008) they 
primarily seek  significant erasure.   It does not seem to be only about mosques and minarets, Lenzin 
sees it as a much wider and gendered process, in which Muslimas are put under pressure to shed the 
veil and invisibilise themselves.  (Lenzin, 2008)  In what would from a majority perspective be 
considered invisibilisation - being invisibilised in traditional dress – may become inverted to resist 
secular invisibilisation through maximising religious visibilisation. Morais emphasised that although 
hijabs were tolerated with reluctance, Burqas would never be tolerated in Switzerland. (Morais, 
2008)  
Although gendered aspects provide another dimension of invisibilisation discourse, it has centred on 
mosques and particularly the significance of minarets.  Minarets are unique architectural features of 
mosque design, and more even than the usual classical cupola, point out the building’s religious 
function and thus impart its unmistakable Muslim identity.  (Sadaqat, 2008)279 The struggle for 
visibility and the power to invisibilise have become a key site of power struggle between the right to 
religious identity as in places of worship and a politicisation-securitisation strategy aimed to curtail 
putative Islamisation.   
 In Switzerland Muslim visibility has a magnified political brisance due to a number of factors.  First 
there has been a strengthening of conservative populism with the SVP taking on a dominant and 
dominating role.  Second the SVP have skilfully used initiative and plebiscite to impact a range of 
issues and thus manipulating direct democracy opportunity structures, have strengthened their 
political power base.  Lastly they have chosen Muslim visibility as the issue to confront a self defined 
                                                          
278 R. Lenzin is an Islam expert of  Swiss-Pakistani origin. For more information see Appendix two. 
279 Ahmed Sadaqat is Imam of the Mahmud Mosque and a spokesman for the Swiss Ahmadiyya community. For more 
information see Appendix two.  
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process of Islamisation of Switzerland.  The SVP are uninterested in architectural design, in questions 
of style and harmony, but have chosen the minaret (and indirectly the mosque itself) as the visible 
representation of threat.  In so doing they seek to anchor a prohibition of future minaret building in 
the federal constitution.   In their own words:“The SVP supports unequivocally the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of belief and conscience.  On the other hand it is decisively against the 
expression of religious-political claims to power and their symbols (for example the erection of 
Minarets)” (Swiss People's Party, 2007:80)  
On their party website they write “The people’s initiative ‘Against the building of Minarets’ seeks to 
have the aforementioned building prohibition anchored in the constitution.  The Minaret does not, 
as a building, have a religious character.  It is neither mentioned in the Koran nor in the other holy 
scriptures of Islam, rather represents much more a religious-political symbol.  The minaret tower 
represents from time immemorial, a symbol of victory, of conquest.  They are the landmarks of an 
intolerant culture, which considers itself as having the divine commission to assert Islamic law over 
national law. ” (Swiss People's Party, 2009) 
The ‘towers of Islam’ are thus portentous, auguring what is to come and pointing to future 
dominance and conquest.  This kind of suggestion of invasion and impending conquest as threat 
resonates with older national stances of uncompromising acuity, a traditional defensiveness as 
survival.  This way of dealing with enemies implies the need to externalise the menace in the national 
imaginary.  The Islamist aspirants operate under the guise of religion but behind the mask is political 
expansionism.  Minarets are not only boundary markers but stakes marking out possession as well as 
further claims so that “it is now time to set limits.  Otherwise following the Minarets  there will soon 
be the demand for Muezzins and finally the demand for the introduction of Shar’ia.” (Swiss People's 
Party, 2009) 
The reality is of course much less dramatic, minarets where they have been permitted, are low 
structures, and are strictly regulated with regards to number, positioning and height.  The minaret of 
the Mahmoud mosque in Zürich was dwarfed by the bell tower of the Reformed Church on the 
opposite side of the road.  What this seems to represent symbolically is quite the opposite of what 
the SVP are inclined to argue.  The extreme (re)actionism, initiated and sponsored by the SVP and 
facilitated by direct democratic interventions, does not perhaps have majority support, but has 
nonetheless substantial support.  A Le Matin survey discovered a strong groundswell of support for 
the prohibition, 43% of French speaking Swiss were in favour of a general ban on minarets.  (Swiss 
News, 2007) Yet anything approaching a close result will translate into tightening and restriction, as it 
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has done before.  There is general opposition to this initiative by political elites, outside the 
conservative rightist spectrum, at federal cantonal and communal levels.  Many see it as damaging 
the national reputation abroad, and causing conflicts with international human rights agreements to 
which Switzerland is signatory.   Stüssi has, for instance, drawn out the far-reaching  legal 
implications for Swiss popular sovereignty and its potential clash with international law.  (Stüssi, 
2008) In addition, at a practical level, he argues that the initiative is to all intents and purposes 
obsolete and unnecessary since Cantonal law prohibits the construction of buildings which do not 
harmonise with their surroundings and this means in practice that any future purpose-built mosques 
can onlybe built in industrial zones and not in population centres. (Häne, 2008) Maizar280 drew 
attention to this apparently callow approach being taken to minarets.  “Do you really think” he asked 
“this *banning minarets+ would stop Islamisation, if it were really happening in Switzerland?  If they 
are to fight what they see as Islamisation then they must begin to fight ideas with ideas and not with 
rifles and axes. ” (Maizar, 2008) 
Integration meant something inherently practical for Alimi, something which grows out of intense 
but equable social involvement.  He has a high public profile and appears in fora where he argues 
that Islam requires Muslims to integrate into their countries of settlement, by emphasising how they 
must subordinate themselves to national law.  Yet he argues as well, that there is a subjective 
dimension to integration, a personal inner attitude and this differs from individual to individual.  He 
argues that ‘Integration does not damage religion but rather furthers communication and getting to 
know each other. ” (Seelhofer-Brunner, 2009) He argues that fear of Islam is unfounded and the 
proof if this is found in the quality of local relationships and interactions between Muslims and non-
Muslims.  He assured me that the town authorities of Wil, only speak positive things about the local 
Muslim community and himself.  He, like Tufan281 is often called upon to mediate in difficult 
situations.  He argues that the mosques should be a piece in the social and religious mosaic of Wil 
and that the minaret, instead of being distorted should be transformed into a symbol of integration.  
(Alimi, 2008) 
                                                          
280 Dr. I. Maizar is President of FIDS one of two top level Muslim Umbrella Organisation in Switzerland. For further 
information see Appendix two. 
281 J.Tufan is vice-President of The Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe Avrupa Türk Islam Kültür 
Dernekeri Birgliği. For more information see Appendix two. 
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Sadaqat was adamant that the rendering of the minaret as a power symbol was a distortion.  His 
mosque is the oldest in Switzerland, built in 1963 with a minaret and one of only four mosques which 
presently have one.  The minaret is, he argued nothing more than an architectural detail, it belongs 
to a mosque as a spire might belong to a church, it serves to mark out that it is a mosque.  He 
contradicts SVP positions and insists that there are references to minarets in the holy Muslim 
scriptures and that it has never been understood as a symbol of power and conquest.  He continues 
that minarets are non-functional objects in Zürich, because a Muzzein making the call for prayer only 
makes sense in a majority Muslim area.  Further he argues that even here they seem to be 
unnecessary since new technologies can do the job better.  They are according to Sadaqaat merely 
architectural elements which complete a mosque.  He mentions that no one in the area where his 
mosque is situated, ever objected to the minaret.  He emphasised the good relations with the local 
church282.  They allow us to use their car park and their church tower is a lot bigger, so why all this 
fuss? He refers to a line which SVP spokespersons have sometimes referred to “the mosques are our 
barracks, the believers our soldiers, the cupolas  our helmets and the minarets our bayonets” This 
kind of stuff is not in the Koran this is something from a Turkish politician  283and has nothing to do 
with religion.  (Sadaqat, 2008) 
The minaret has been used as a mobilisation issue; by using it as a symbol of ulteriorisation it has 
been possible to provide a very visible concrete pointer to ‘creeping Islamisation’.  Switzerland is 
portrayed as an endangered nation, one creeping towards Sharia.  Maizar has pointed out that it is a 
rather callow method to tackle something as ideational and ideological as Islamisation. (Maizar, 
2008) In this he is undoubtedly right, yet as invisibilisation; it is an effective process of subordination.  
Pieterse rightly highlights the connection between the mosque and minaret as visible narratives (and 
evocative images) of transition - the collective move from the mats in the backyard.  He describes 
‘mats to minarets’ as “a story of achievement and social mobility: from humble origins to proud 
attainment.  ‘Mosques without minarets’ evoke a different image: of a subculture on the margins.” 
(Pieterse, 2004:87)   
                                                          
282 a large Reformed church is directly opposite the mosque, its bell tower dwarfs the minaret.  
283 The reference is to a poem by Ziya Gökalp, a Turkish nationalist, which Erdogan as mayor of Istanbul publicly recited and 
for which he was forced out of office and imprisoned for ten months.   
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In the Swiss case absence of large urban concentrations of Muslims have meant a lesser 
securitisation of ‘parallel-societies’ and ‘ghettoisation’. (Heer, 2008)  As a result issues of visibility and 
spatiality have been concentrated on mosques and on the minaret especially as an ulteriorised 
symbol.  In Germany and the Netherlands on the other hand large urban concentrations of Muslims 
have led to politicised and securitised debates centred on ghettoisation and parallel-societies.  These 
have emphasised visible transformations but also more sinister opacities: protecting criminal 
economies, secessionism,284 providing cover for terrorism.  Here dense invisibility and 
impenetrability have been the steady focus of security talk, where loss of state control and the 
ultimate disintegration of society are the result of failed integration.   
This rendering of ‘parallel societies’ as a security issue, has been reinforced by official perceptions of 
a negative relationship between integration and segregation. 285 The latter has been the driving force 
in much recent Dutch urban policy-making, where the idea dominates that physical restructuring will 
be an effective instrument of desegregation and social mixing and lead to greater integration, 
economic growth and neighbourhood safety.  (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2008)  The ‘Rotterdam Law 
was one of the first examples of how tough income requirements were imposed on accommodation 
seekers to prevent lower income groups moving into certain areas;  after 2006  all Dutch cities could 
implement similar policies.  In addition they could create special entrepreneurial zones in specific 
streets or neighbourhoods and also hinder unemployed people moving between cities.  (de Wijk, 
2006) In these ways urban development authorities were able to alter and control ethnic and 
religious concentrations and in this way to control and manage segregative (non-integrative) 
dynamics.   Likewise planning authorities could entice people to move out of segregated areas. 
Rahman286 emphasised that the whole integrated school project and the new housing zone, in which 
it was situated, was to encourage people to move out of the ghettos to South East Amsterdam.  He 
said it had been successful as many young Muslims had moved there.   
                                                          
284 where majorities become unwanted minorities 
285 ethnic and/or income 
286 R. K. Rahman is director of the As-Soeffah Islamic primary school in Amsterdam he is deputy President of the World 
Islamic Mission (WIM). For more information see Appendix two.  
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Part II Permanence, non-negotiability and expulsion 
Acquiring citizenship in the lands of settlement retains for immigrants strong symbolic and legal 
significance. If moving from the backyard to the showcase mosque was a symbol of arrival and 
upward mobility, passport possession has been traditionally the guarantee of equal legal rights and 
the right to permanence. However as many interviewees gave expression to their new ‘settled’ 
imaginaries, many also drew attention to the fact that it did not seem to advance their claim to 
belong in the eyes of ‘native’ populations. As new Muslim generations become ‘nationals’, othering 
practices were understood to disrupt any ‘natural’ identification with lands of settlement thus 
diminishing the integrative potential of citizenship. In this section data is drawn mostly from the 
German case where the issues of citizenship and belonging still are problematic even in the wake of 
citizenship reform. 
Interviewees offered accounts of how their new settlement imaginaries and identities had changed 
by first engaging in loyalty practices.  Cebo287 announced “this is my country now!” and he expressed 
how his identity had been positively re-inscribed both by a cognitive sense of possession and through 
the legal permanence of citizenship.  In emphasising the pluralism of life the key idea was that there 
could only be a balanced emotional parallelism - it would never be ‘either or’ but ‘always both’.  
Tufan recognised but chose to resist the polarising pressures of being Turk or becoming German, and 
employed a distinctly religious vocabulary, to express his understanding of co-existence, and to add 
depth to his convictions.  He defined his identity as a Muslim and a German citizen.  He emphasised 
that his religious commitment required his voluntarist and solidarist commitments to his German 
homeland and society.   
But the possession of citizenship alone was not considered a proof of final transition to identification 
with the nation. Kiabami288 for instance expressed Muslim transition to settlement in terms of the 
high degree of connectivity which, even without citizenship, implied evidence of de facto 
                                                          
287 C. Cebo leader of this interview group, is project coordinator at the Alevi national headquarters in Cologne. For more 
information see Appendix two. 
288 Mohammed Reza Kiabani is secretary of Ahe-I-beyt a conservative Shia organisation with close links to the Islamic 
regime in Iran. The organisation provides a range of services to Shia Muslims in Switzerland such as Hajj, and transmitting 
fatawa from highest religious authorities in Iran. Kiabani has represented the Shia community in talks with the Federal 
government. 
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permanence. He expressed how Muslims had become part of the fabric of Swiss society and summed 
it up with a sense of finality: “We have become connected” (Kiabami, 2008)289 Gülbahar290 built upon 
the idea of Muslim connectivity to characterise an active responsible identity  in society: “We 
encourage young people to be responsible citizens and to play a constructive role in society.” By 
emphasising the socialisation processes of growing up and being educated in Germany he clearly 
expressed his sense of belonging as predicated on a successful integration into German society.  He 
characterised integration as a complete-able process, through which a stage could be reached in 
which identifications could rest.  Integrated identity meant for him “mutual identification with each 
other”.  But this was understood as conditional and dependent on the quality of that mutuality.  His 
religious duty was to integrate but this also required positive response from the majority population.  
(Gülbahar, 2008) 
A new emphasis on integration, has occurred in the wake of citizenship reform in Germany, and 
coincides with generational transition - with the appearance of new leadership in Muslim 
organisations and new Muslim voices in politics, (Kiliçarslan, 2008) (Oezcan, 2009)291 – but it also 
coincides with changing attitudes. For first generation guest-workers, diasporic life meant vital and 
intimate connection with lands of origin and disconnectedness with the land of settlement.  Whereas 
some emphasised a continued need for connection to old homelands, Muslims have broadly 
recognised the nature of that connection as having significantly altered. “80-90% of the problems are 
here so the solutions are to be found here as well.” (Kolat, 2008)292 “We understand that our lives 
and our future is in the Netherlands.”(Altuntas, 2010) 
                                                          
289 Mohammed Reza Kiabami is secretary of Ahe-I-beyt a conservative Shia organisation with close links to the Islamic 
regime in Iran. The organisation provides a range of services to Shia Muslims living in Switzerland such as Hajj, and 
transmitting fatawa from highest religious authorities in Iran. Kiabami has represented the Shia community in talks with the 
Swiss Federal government. 
290 M. Gülbabhar is Chairman of The Federal Youth Council of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG). For further 
information see Appendix two. 
291 Ergin Oezcan is a Kurdish an executive committee member of The Left party Heilbronn. For more information see 
Appendix two. 
292 K. Kolet, Turkish Community Germany (TGD) the largest secular Turkish-Muslim organisation. For more information see 
Appendix two. 
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Changing attitudes of belonging and loyalty were also emphasised by Kolat in the stance of his 
organisation toward to the Turkish and German governments. Turkey remained involved in European 
affairs and would always be interested in winning influence - he thought they would be ‘stupid’ not 
to - yet he continued there would be no automatic support for Turkish agendas among Turks in the 
West. “We have a bridging function, but we maintain an independent position.” (Kolat, 2008) 
Musluoğlu293 similarly underlined a switch from political loyalties embedded in an older diasporic 
mentality: “It used to be that if they caught a cold in Turkey we sneezed in Germany. But not 
anymore.” (Musluoğlu, 2008) New identifications with new homelands meant therefore new 
cognitive calibrations which emphasised equiproximity to both Turkey and Germany. In the case of 
Alevis, the history of persecution in Turkey had eased present identifications with new homelands. 
(Kaplan, 2008)294  
Complex underlying identifications underlay this embracing of the new homeland space, as Muslims 
seek to reconceptualise their post-settlement identities, by finding what Bhabi has called a ‘third 
space’. (Bhabhi, 1994) This may be understood as a new imaginary which expresses simultaneously 
both distance and proximity.   For the Alevis hybridisation is a ‘natural’ way of adjusting and mixing in 
their new environment; ‘taking what is good’ has always been a central notion in the syncretic 
understandings of their religious identity. (Kaplan, 2008) Ateş for example suggests that those Turks 
who live in Germany and have made some kind of ‘conscious transition’ should be referred to as 
Deutschländer.295 (Ateş, 2008) This new label for what is conceived of as a new hybridised identity 
seeks to resist the more subaltern predicate ‘Turk’ which is commonly used to identify and other, 
and which under the Ottomans also designated an underclass. (Kolat, 2008) 
                                                          
293 N. Musluoğlu is active in a range of integration projects and is an trusted partner of the Integration department of the 
city of Heilbronn. For further information see Appendix two.   
294 Ismail Kaplan is the director of Education and Development of the Alevi Community Germany. For more information see 
Appendix two. 
295 This approximates to the Turkish term Almancılar loosely translated Germaner 
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Citizenship an integrative mechanism? 
If the acquisition of citizenship is a central process in a ‘ framework for enablement’ (Freiherr von 
Leoprechting, 2008)296 it brings with it no automatic sense of belonging; in many cases it means 
remaining on the outside but this time with a Dutch, Swiss or German passport.  If passports fix a 
legal right to permanence what interrupts closer identifications, which naturalisation and passport 
possession might suggest?  
Continued othering through ethnic identification was one theme which was emphasised:  “I don’t 
look German, therefore I am not thought of as German.” (Toprak, 2008)297  Continued ethnicised 
völkisch understandings of the ‘nation self’ means that practices of reification and othering continue 
to be easily accomplished.  Toprak was convinced that he would always be seen to be a Turk, and a 
foreigner to natives.  He elaborated further by illustrating what he called his ‘symbolic exclusion’ by 
recounting an incident which occurred in the Recklinghausen council.  A fellow councillor was 
confronted with some issue related to Muslim immigrants, automatically he turned to Toprak and 
said ‘Why don’t you handle this, it has to do with your people’. Toprak informed him that he had 
lived his whole life in Germany, was a German citizen, and asked him to explain in what sense it could 
be especially his field of expertise. The reaction was a look of embarrassment and no further 
comment.  Toprak explained how he, in this situation, understood himself first to be permanently 
symbolised – a Muslim, an immigrant and a foreigner;  second this symbolisation was as a personal 
violation, since his persona298 had been mis-represented; lastly it cut through several layers of 
evident affiliation: sharing liberal-democratic views, well-educated and speaking fluent accent-free 
German. Being symbolised was to be permanently imprisoned in a category of non-belonging.  
                                                          
296 Dr. R. Frh. v. Leoprechting is a jurist and head of corporate relations at the Metro A.G. He is also President of the 
German-Turkish Chamber of commerce Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer (TD-IHK) with a membership of 
320 companies, including many of the largest in both Germany and Turkey. He was participant in the Integration summits. 
297 A. E. Toprak is vice President and General Secretary of the Alevi Community in Germany Alevitischen Gemeinde 
Deutschlands. He describes his role as being ‘ambassador for the Alevis in Europe’ and was their representative at the 
German Islam Conference (DIK). He is a member of the Green party and councillor for the city of Recklinghausen. 
 
298 In the sense of a his perceived or evident personality. 
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Musluoğlu emphasised that non-native appearance necessarily changed how belonging could or 
would be understood in society.  “Look at me with my dark skin, do I look German?” Otherness was 
fixed through differing life histories, memories, and sensibilities. In addition, he argued, belonging to 
an ethnic underclass, would of itself prevent many aspects of  social and cultural alignment, “ and a 
passport makes no difference!” (Musluoğlu, 2008)  
Citizenship was therefore understood as a formality, a formal way of getting and keeping legal rights, 
(Oezcan, 2009) especially the right to permanence.  Sengül saw it as part of a package of rights which 
ought to contribute to balancing the accounting sheet of  duties and rights, “duties only if rights, if 
rights then duties” (Cebo, Sengül et al., 2008) Maizar saw citizenship as problematic if centralised 
within integration discourse, and warned explicitly, that citizenship could be no final guarantee of 
integration neither for immigrants nor the state.  ‘It is not a clean bill of health299’ (Maizar, 2008) This 
served as a warning not to overload citizenship with inflated claims, either as evidence of successful 
integration or of achieving freedom from the ‘taint’ of being foreign.  
The attainment of citizenship is unquestionably an important moment in the journey to permanence. 
On the one hand it presents an unchallengeable legal right to residence and guarantees an equality 
of legal rights. However, although it defines legal permanence, my research suggests that it would be 
insufficient to bring about deep identification with the land of settlement. Citizenship possession in 
itself did not point to deeper identifications; rather new loyalty practices were expressed in terms of 
finding equiproximity and independence between two places of belonging. 
Non-negotiability of secularism 
Responses to secularism span spatial temporal and moral categories. But as a general reading of 
immediate responses it was accepted as a permanent or non-negotiable facet of social and political 
organisation. It was also understood therefore to be central to integration since it framed social and 
political rights. Secularism was understood primarily as qualified neutrality and equidistance to 
religion. For Alevis and Ahmadis it was understood as protecting  minorities in the majority society  
“secularism is a protection not only for Alevis but for religious and non-religious people as well.” 
(Kaplan, 2008) Because this was a standard response by Muslims, I also undertook to explore 
something more of the temporal dimensions of secularism and was confronted by responses which 
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re-iterated the non-negotiability300 of secularity in the work-space and secularism in integration 
discourse. 
In interviews with Trade Union officials and factory workers work spaces were understood as 
important integration sites, (Löffler, 2008)301 yet Trade Union officials allowed no place for a religious 
dimension in any of their dealings. To seek to represent any religious demand would mean to do the 
same for all groups and this would be too complex. Any arrangements for religious accommodation 
could therefore only be worked out by workers and employers on a case to case basis. (Oezbek, 
2007)  But requests of a religious nature were generally rejected.  (Bader, 2008) In one interview at a 
large multinational, the manager called in his assistant to check out if there ever had been requests 
of a religious nature and what company policy was.  He was relieved to inform me that there had 
been no such requests and it was not the company policy to provide religious facilities or to facilitate 
religious practice in any way.  (Böckle, 2008)  
Trade Unions are significant voices in national debates on integration, and in Germany and 
Switzerland and involvement on behalf of Muslims, is conceived in more general terms as fighting 
discrimination.  (Schweizersichegewerkschaftsbund, 2009) In the Netherlands there has been more 
evidence of Trade Unions willingness to become involved in religious issues at the national level, 
although this has occurred only rarely and from Christian unions.  The National Federation of 
Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands CNV302 suggested that a Christian holiday ought to be 
abolished for a Muslim one.  Although the suggestion was carefully marketed, as not being an attack 
on Dutch religious and cultural traditions, it created a backlash by populist politicians and its own 
membership.  (Clark, 2006) According to the CNV vice chairman Rienk van Splunder, the intention 
had been "to offer Muslims the freedom to practice their faith" since he felt the feast days of other 
religions were insufficiently honoured in the Netherlands.  By introducing official holidays on such 
                                                          
300 I understand non-negotiability as a temporal stance pointing to permanence 
301 B. Löffler is regional chairman of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB). This organisation represents the 
largest German Unions at national and regional level on issues of national interest. A former teacher, he is engaged in 
representing Trade Union positions on immigration and integration.  
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feast days, he hoped the CNV could contribute to "freedom and respect for one another".  (NIS-
News, 2006)  When I rang to arrange an interview with van Splunder, I was told he no longer worked 
for the Union and that they were no longer interested in pursuing the issue. 
Keeping work spaces clean of religious involvement, Trade Unions understand themselves as 
important voices influencing and shaping integration discourse. (Oezbek, 2007)  As such their 
secularity was considered inherent in the rights anchored in the Basic Law. This was frequently 
emphasised and reiterated as non-negotiable in the processes of integration. (Bader, 2008) 
“integration can only be possible within the defined limits of The Basic Law.” (Norbisrath, 2008)303 
Trade Union involvement in integration could only take place within the prescriptions of the 
constitution. (Oezbek, 2007)  Constitutional loyalty as loyalty to the secularity of the social and 
political system was considered strictly obligatory, and marked the boundary beyond which 
integration could not be understood to stray. Unsurprisingly then any discussion of a limited Shari’a 
functioning alongside and complementary to secular law was considered intolerable. (Löffler, 
2008)304 
The continued propinquities of new Muslim citizens have been especially problematic for 
conservative parties with communitarian understandings of citizenship. By placing a premium on 
loyalty to the political community, other perceived loyalties are understood as conflicting with the 
primary loyalty. This leads, according to this reading, to indecision, ambiguity and even disloyalty. But 
discussing loyalty in terms of hierarchy however necessarily excludes any notion of multiple national 
loyalties. Alternative understandings are immediately subject to suspicion and ulteriorisation. Just as 
directing integration toward Muslims was understood by many to presuppose an integration deficit, 
so directing loyalty talk toward them implied a loyalty deficit, and this was understood also as 
working only because of diffuse social suspicion and discriminatory practices. (Holzberger, 2008)305  
(Oezbek, 2007) (Kolat, 2008) 
                                                          
303 Volker Norbisrath is a lawyer and SPD party executive member. For more information see Appendix 2. 
304 B. Löffler is regional chairman of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB). For more information see Appendix 
two. 
305 M. Holzberger is expert and adviser to the Green party for Asylum and Migration. For more information see Appendix 
two. 
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 “It all comes down to loyalty in the end; if you want to belong to this country then you decide to 
belong.  You make a choice.  If I choose to be German then I have to surrender any other previous 
nationality I had until then.  This shows how much your new country means to you, or which country 
means most.  It shows where your loyalties lie.  You cannot serve two masters !” (Angelow, 2008)306 
Angelow continued to emphasise throughout the interview that, if dual citizenship were permitted, 
there would inevitably be conflicts of interests and loyalties would be divided as well as senses of 
belonging and identity.  Therefore offering the option of German citizenship was considered 
important but could only be acceptable if former citizenships were surrendered. All who wanted to 
take German citizenship, he emphasised, needed to be aware that it carried a cost, namely the 
sacrifice of previous citizenship which would prove loyalty to the political community.  Citizenship for 
the conservative centre was about clarification and avoiding ambiguous or conflictual relationships.   
Loyalty as portrayed by conservatives was considered by Muslim representatives as both archaic 
“something belonging in a medieval state” and ‘insubstantial’ since any one could claim to be loyal 
and accuse others of disloyalty”. (Kolat, 2008)There were as well discriminatory templates in place 
which distinguished between allochtonous and autochthones: “Who is the more loyal the one who 
stays here and pays his tax or those who move to Monaco to avoid them? Being loyal means for me 
respecting and obeying the laws and behaving as a normal European citizen ought to behave. (Kolat, 
2008) 
With the optional model in place, many Muslims in Germany have opted for a mix of strategies. 
Many refuse German citizenship, as naturalisation statistics prove; (Kolat, 2008) some have decided 
that one parent should take German citizenship while the other remains Turkish and thus securing 
legal rights in both countries;  (Musluoğlu, 2008) some have opted for German citizenship. Illustrative 
of the latter category is Aydin307 who felt unhappy about his decision. He does not sense that he is 
fully accepted now as a German citizen. He puts this down to his immigrant background, with which 
he still identifies.  He continued to tell me how he felt in a strangely contradictory situation, for, 
having decided for German citizenship, he senses a kind perplexity in autochthones which he didn’t 
                                                          
306 Dr. J. Angelow a CDU adviser to the German government in the field of domestic politics. For further information see 
Appendix Two. 
307 H. Aydin is a factory worker, a naturalised German citizen and a member of the Alevi Community in Heilbronn. 
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sense before.  He felt that when he had a Turkish passport he was more readily accepted as a 
foreigner, but with a German passport he felt Germans were insecure, as if they didn’t know what to 
make of him.  He also worried about how they might see him and his family in the future.  (Aydin, 
2009)   
Equiproximity of identification among Muslims has meant that the optional model jars with already 
well developed realignments in settled imaginaries. Optionalism or ‘choosing between’ necessarily 
requires preferencing and prioritising, but means also for many having to engage in contradictory 
demotion and downgrading of older loyalties. This forced situation has met with strong resistance 
from all Muslim organisations. “We will continue to fight for dual citizenship, it remains on the 
agenda.”  (Kolat, 2008) Interviewees argued that that multiple belongings should not be understood 
as something mutually exclusive.  Many Muslim – and non-Muslim - interviewees argued that dual 
citizenship entailed no necessary contradictions of loyalty.  (el Boujoufi, 2008) (Oezbek, 2007) 
(Holzberger, 2008) (Bader, 2008) 
Loyalty discourse and more generally faulty or deficient integration work together drawing from and 
contributing to effect a blanket ulteriorisation of Muslim identities which points back once more to 
native securitised and Muslim scrutinised identities. Researches by Hagendoorn and Sniderman have 
highlighted how Dutch majority perceptions consider Muslim loyalty to be ‘suspect’ working on a 
continuum from suspicious ambiguity to disloyalty. Their research points to widely held and deeply 
embedded attitudes in Dutch society and had in large part to do with perceived non-liberal attitudes 
and practices among Muslims. (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007) “Grass-roots Dutch are afraid a 
growing Muslim population will mean that eventually they will be made a minority and their values 
will be overturned.” (Mintjes, 2008)  
Permanence and security 
If secularism is a non-negotiable both in significant integration sites and in integration discourse 
more generally, then it must be seen to be neutral. (Gülbahar, 2008) However others understood this 
neutrality only in a qualified non-absolute sense. “The state must be neutral, but not be 
disinterested. (Kaplan, 2008) Here the issue seemed to be a concern with the potential for 
radicalisation within faith communities, which some speakers felt, would be dangerous to ignore. 
The possibility of increasing radicalism therefore served to underpin and strengthen the argument 
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for the state’s involvement in helping establish moderate Islam. (Amin, 2008)308 There were criticisms 
which indicated that secularism, as a principle of state, as opposed to a pragmatic approach, could 
also precipitate radicalism in Muslim communities. The lack of oversight by state authorities was 
seen to be potentially contributory to the growth of radicalism.  Mosques were not only places of 
worship but places of business and the authorities were in many cases unwilling to investigate known 
business activities and abuses, thus leaving radicals freedom to operate.(Musluoğlu, 2008) Due to 
lack of funding, almost all Islam literature in Dutch was being written and printed in Saudi Arabia 
which meant it was Wahabi in message and tone. (Rahman, 2008) The Dutch authorities would not 
support financially the Islamic University in Rotterdam on principles of secularism which was, 
according to Mintjes, “incredibly short-sighted” since by refusing financial support was endangering 
an important voice for moderation. (Mintjes, 2008) Similarly the refusal of the Swiss state to help 
Muslims financially to establish mosques meant that funding had to be found abroad and this 
opened doors to conservative and radical influences. (Amin, 2008)   
Most Muslim organisational leaders argued therefore for a positive but temporally limited 
involvement in religious organisations to counteract the potential of de-stabilising radicalism. But 
others warned that too much involvement would be interpreted (and resisted) as state interference 
and would be counterproductive. (Şenay, 2008)309 Secularism was accepted as an organising principle 
of society and polity but operationally should work in more pragmatic terms – the state regulating 
involvement according to circumstances on the ground. (Musluoğlu, 2008) (Rahman, 2008)  
Temporally understood, the secular state should have a permanent general overview of 
developments within religious communities, as this related to the security of society, but only getting 
temporarily involved when it deemed necessary and easing out again when the situation changed.   
Temporal stability of immigrant populations and the terms of their permanence have been brought 
together with the issue of criminality by the right in Switzerland. “Foreign criminals should be kicked 
out!” (Heer, 2008) The speaker went on to explain that the majority of serious crime was perpetrated 
by foreigners and Swiss security would be increased by prompt expulsion. The fact that many of the 
                                                          
308 Dr.Ismail Amin is President of VIOZ, a Muslim umbrella organisation operating in Canton Zürich.  For more information 
see Appendix Two. 
309 Dr. B. Şenay is professor of history of Religion and is the Counsellor for Religious Affairs at the Turkish Embassy in The 
Hague. For more information see Appendix two. 
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expellees would have been born and grew up in Switzerland was considered irrelevant. Increasing 
security meant diminishing foreign criminality and saving national resources such as the costs of 
police, prisons, welfare and rehabilitation. Similarly in Germany the Munich underground incident310 
was exploited by of the CDU to make quick political capital.  “Koch tried to exploit the problem but 
the people didn’t buy it. I think we need to find allies in society which recognise this kind of problem, 
and who recognise that people who are born here belong here; that they are one of us, if you like.  If 
this attitude was more widespread in society then this would create of itself the feeling of belonging 
among the migrants.” (Kolat, 2008)  
Without national citizenship, temporal status remains ambiguous. Clearly those who are persona non 
grata or having ‘pariah status’ (Saggar, 2009) and without citizenship remain most vulnerable to 
expulsion. Yet possession of national citizenship is in itself no guarantee.  Van Strein saw dual 
citizenship as having ‘positive’, if unforeseen, aspects.  The dual citizenship of Moroccans had the 
advantage, he thought, of providing a legal loophole through which delinquents and criminals could 
be sent back to Morocco.  This he thought, would not be possible if the people he had in mind, would 
be solely Dutch citizens.  He related in detail a story of a criminal group, a Moroccan mafia outfit, 
operating in the town of Edam.  “These people terrorised the town; they ran a racket, and the people 
of the town were really afraid.  Eventually, they were arrested and put on trial, and were now, thanks 
to their Moroccan citizenship, awaiting extradition to Morocco.  Thankfully they have dual 
citizenship, so they can be sent back. “ (van Strein, 2008)  
Part III Expectations  
In this section I seek to show how speakers expressed their expectations about Integration, 
secularism and security.  When asked to describe what Integration meant for them, two main 
approaches emerged: pragmatic problem-solving and critical. Illustrative of the first group were 
interviewees who highlighted Integration’s extensive range of meanings and width of application, but 
were also aware of the problems this entailed and sought practical solutions. (Freiherr von 
Leoprechting, 2008) The second approach involved problematising the term itself and its meaning 
instabilities.    
                                                          
310 A young Greek and his Turkish accomplice attacked and severely injured a German pensioner after he told them to stop 
smoking on the underground. The attack took place in December 2007, and Hessian elections took place in January 2008. 
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Great expectations – Integration 
Problem-solvers sought greater definition through narrowing the application of integration to 
processes in defined operational fields – achieving equal employment opportunities, (Löffler, 2008) 
raising education and vocational training, (Norbisrath, 2008) and early language training. (Morais, 
2008) This was often narrowed into sub-fields – Imam-training (Ousalah, 2010),311 mosque-building 
(Alimi, 2008). Problem-solvers worked on a assumption of a causal relationship – the efficacy of 
integration is directly proportional to the efficacy of its programmes. (Morais, 2008).312 This was most 
clearly illustrated in official integration discourse which embodied a secular professionalised 
approach. Morais emphasised the complexity of multi-level cooperation - Federal, regional 
(Cantonal) and communal – to argue that integration must be professionally managed.  To work, 
integration needed to be a set of clearly defined interlinking projects.  (Morais, 2008) This 
professionalism was further underlined by other integration officers who not only applied policy 
efficiently but engaged in advanced networking, building dialogic relationships - municipal-Muslim, 
inter-Muslim, inter-migrant.  (Graber, 2008)313  
By contrast critical approaches defined Integration through a tension between how it was 
understood, the policies it authored, and what they expected it to be. Defining the proper meaning 
of the term, was often sought through concept preference: as participation, (Kolat, 2008) 
acceptance, (el Boujoufi, 2008) and identification with lands of settlement. (Tufan, 2008) This was 
followed by a process of assessing the extensity and intensity of cleavage by comparing their 
discursive experience with their own conceptualisations. Discrimination experiences for example 
were set against an ideal of participation; suspicion and ulteriorisation against acceptance; identity 
distortion against positive and knowledgeable identification. These cleavages were understood to 
have powerful effects as critical voices expressed anger about being conscripted and locked into 
                                                          
311 I. Ousalah is vice President of The Association of Imams in the Netherlands Vereniging Imams Nederland (VIN). For more 
information see Appendix two. 
312 I define integrationism as the acceptance of this kind of causality. 
313 R. Graber is the head of the Integration department in the City of Heilbronn. For more information see Appendix two. 
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habilitative discourse; its lack of definition only made it all the more threatening for Muslims. 
(Demirdögan, 2009)314  
The emphasis on the lack of definition by some critical interviewees however seemed to overlook 
stable meanings which served as the starting points for the narratives of what integration ought to 
be; these were also drawn upon to identify subversive processes. Some of these stable meanings 
were: the right to participate, to retain religious identity, and mutuality in adaptation through 
dialogue and negotiation 
Kolat emphasised the significance both of structural adjustment and a more concrete concept of 
participation.  In a well prepared exegesis of the term, he outlined how this was to be understood as 
occurring in five spheres: political, educational, vocational training, cultural and social. Only in the 
latter sphere was there anything like progress, all the others were static and even regressive. Yet 
structural adjustment was only 50%, the other 50% was psychology. Effecting structural change was 
not uncomplicated but less difficult than effecting a shift in social and political psychology. The latter 
was characterised by deep rejectionism: “German national consciousness is built upon a negative 
rejection of foreigners. So this fear and rejection of what is foreign has always been present 
historically. They developed a very coloured picture of Turks [...] they don’t have any culture they are 
rural...” (Kolat, 2008) All structural alteration was for Kolat a plus, both for Turks and Germany but 
the culturalisation of problems together with cultural rejection of Turks were the main problems 
underlying integration.   
In chapter four it was argued that the distinction between integration and assimilation needed to be 
kept analytically distinct, and that there were good discursive grounds for this, since users of the 
terms recognise conceptual distinction in the terms.  “Muslims want to integrate, not be assimilated” 
(Kiliçarslan, 2008) There is also a strong ethical purpose in upholding the distinction since users also 
recognise that integration may be misused or subverted and be made a cloak for assimilation.  In this 
way the analytical distinction points to ethical understandings of what integration ought to be, and 
permits at the same time critical uses of assimilation in integration discourse.  Critical voices often 
used assimilation to criticise how integration is framed, building upon distinct differences of meaning 
to obtain critical purchase and to map out its proper ethical content.  So conceptual distinctions are 
                                                          
314 S. Demirdögan is a member of the Left party  and stood for election to the European Elections in 2009. For more 
information see Appendix two. 
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needed to emphasise possibly coercive tendencies in integration, and to point out where grey areas 
might be, or where transitions may be taking place.   
Assimilation was universally understood by Muslim interviewees as coercive measures resulting in 
identity loss.  It was a term which sounded alarms and was represented throughout as a source of 
security anxiety in Muslim communities.  There were national declensions of the term: Kaplan for 
example described the integration policy of having to learn German without any provision of mother-
language teaching, as ‘Germanisation’, (Kaplan, 2008) Demirdögan saw the attempts to achieve 
liberalisation of values as ‘Christianisation’. (Demirdögan, 2009) It is a deeply rooted fear of identity 
erasure or what amounts to the same, losing the power to practice and transmit cultural and 
religious identity.  Tufan is passionate about his Muslim identity “I don’t want to lose my identity.  
For God’s sake, never! That is how I am strong…”  (Tufan, 2008) This angst takes on different 
dimensions such as a fear that Muslim religious practice, and by extension religion as a whole, is 
being violated by a penetrant secular state. Şenay emphasised that the training of Imams in the 
Netherlands was resisted and opposed as interference in religious practice by a broad segment of 
ordinary Muslims.  There was a fear that the state would subvert Islam.  (Şenay, 2008);  Demirdögan 
asserted that by seeking to make religious belief and practice subject to liberal values and by 
extension to its cultural specificities it was in effect  an attempt to Christianise Muslims. 
(Demirdögan, 2009)  
 Oezcan was dismissive in describing Integration, it being ‘nothing more than slow-motion 
assimilation’.  He understood the term as pointing to a narrow instrumentalised and therefore 
temporary, political programmatism.  When it has accomplished its purposes it will be redundant.  In 
its ascendancy he understood it as “a fashion word which will disappear in the next five years!”  He 
brings the terms together in a way which highlights the danger of integration for (Muslim) 
immigrants ‘there are no predefined limits to which elites may go in pursuit of integration’.  
Demirdögan, a candidate for the European Parliament for The Left, however disagrees and 
understood integration more broadly.  She understands it as a necessary part of the global process of 
migration and movement.  As long as there is global population movement then there will be 
integration politics in some form or other, but she felt that there was a hidden assimilative dynamic.  
“Integration, as understood today, is channelled through Islam, in which the move is to set it against 
a modern Christian values system.  Stationing Islam and Christianity in this way, shows that this is 
assimilation politics; Muslims should first accept modern and then Christian values. ” (Demirdögan, 
2009)  
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Kolat warned that Integration, to have any future, must be clearly distinguished and set apart from 
assimilation, which he characterised as ‘a majority word’.  Yet he went on to say that Germans only 
understand integration in terms of ‘the whip’. (Kolat, 2008) Integration was characterised by ‘deficit 
thinking’ and was driven by an endless stream of demands and requirements to which immigrants 
must adjust.  He indicated that this was also extended to all Muslims.  By emphasising German 
Integration discourse as attempts to pressurise rather than persuade, emphasising compliance rather 
than solidarity, he sought to point out how it fell short in practice.  
 Echoing the undefined limits of integration, Maizar argued it was, in the Swiss context “too 
penetrant *...+ it bores too much into the person. ” (Maizar, 2008) Kilicarslan described discussions 
she had had with Afro-Americans in which she was surprised to hear a more positive approach to 
assimilation.  Assimilation was fine they thought, as long as each person, group or community could 
decide how far they wanted to assimilate.  In this understanding individuals and communities had 
some measure of control over the process and could therefore work out the nature of their own 
assimilation.  Most Muslims she emphasised, in the German context, wanted to integrate but not 
assimilate, yet, she argued, they will acculturate of themselves.  She understood integration as both 
an underlying ‘natural’ process of cultural realignment going on, but of the moral rightness of people 
to choose their own pace.  The alternative was that when assimilation was dictated from the top, or 
when integration was instrumentalised by political actors, Muslims felt coerced and developed 
resistances and counter strategies.  “when people are told you ought or must think in these ways 
then it is coercive and assimilative. ” (Kiliçarslan, 2008) Tufan complained how integration was 
conceived and projected in terms of chains of bureaucraticised imperatives: “You must do this and 
this and this, then that and that and that!”  These representations of integration in the German 
context were aberrations and equivalent to a command economy, in which non-negotiables 
overwhelmed the negotiables.  When the former dominate integration becomes assimilative.  (Tufan, 
2008) 
From the ‘use and abuse’ of integration themes highlighted by critical interviewees, Integration was 
understood neither as something purely voluntarist nor overly coercive. A consensus seemed to be 
that Integration involved finding ways to negotiate within non-negotiables. For many, especially state 
elites, the main non-negotiable was the secular constitution because it established the values which 
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must be held in common so that society and polity could function.  (Löffler, 2008)315(Norbisrath, 
2008) Another important non-negotiable was religious identity. (Tufan, 2008) Gülbahar insisted that 
integration meant welcoming and finding place for his Islamic identity. “integration must mean the 
integration of my Muslim identity.” (Gülbahar, 2008) Both Tufan and Gülbahar emphasised that they 
welcomed dialogue and engaged in it wherever they could. Both emphasised however that they 
must be seen as human subjects not as enemies.  For Tufan dialogue is a necessary pathway within 
negotiation which helps shift perceptions of enemy to those of friend.   He argued that integration 
could only be accomplished together as a common negotiation of a common life. But he warned too 
that Integration should not only be talk, it had to be matched by action too.  Then he produced a list 
of demands for changes on core integration issues.  (Tufan, 2008)  
The German chancellor has prioritised integration in the last coalition government “Through 
tolerance and open-mindedness, our society becomes richer and more humane.  Integration 
concerns all of us – people from migrant families, as well as the citizens living here for a long time.  
Integration can only succeed in cooperation. ” (Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 2007) Although interfaith dialogue was thought to build robust relationships (Dätwyler, 
2008) it was also thought to have negligible effects in the integration process, since the 
understandings generated remained limited to very small circles of interested people.  Likewise 
Integration summitry was understood to be little more than ‘talk shops’. (Kiliçarslan, 2008)  
Despite unequal powers between established integration players - trade unions, secular Muslim 
organisations and political parties of the left -  integration was understood to require a moral 
equivalence. Maizar emphasised that dialogue and negotiation could only be meaningful if that 
meant talking at eye level, (Maizar, 2008) Tufan drew attention to the need for mutual respect and 
sensitivity. He felt that dialogue was the way to understanding, yet he warned that state 
interlocutors ought not to see him as an enemy. (Tufan, 2008) The Integration Chancellor herself 
made much of “Talking with and not about immigrants”  The EKD also shared this participatory 
conceptualisation and saw it as ‘designing a common life form …  *which is+ not only a reciprocal but 
                                                          
315 B. Löffler is regional director for the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) Deutscher Gewerkschafsbund.  This 
umbrella organisation represents the largest German Unions at national and regional level on issues of national or regional 
interest.  A former teacher, he represents Trade Union positions on immigration and integration.   
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a continuous process, which subjects both minorities and majorities to societal change … its goal is 
equal societal participation. ” (Evangelische-Kirche, 2002) (Geisler, 2008)316 
Defining expectations of Integration, what ought to be, required therefore, drawing upon some 
stable meanings to point out not only the dimensions of cleavage but the active processes which 
undermined and subverted. Essentialisation of a Muslim identity requiring integration, involves 
extensive stereotyping.  One way in which this occurs is a compression or expansion of identities 
through a process of syncopation.  This flattening of diversity and collapsing of middle ground and 
interim positions is best captured in the term synecdoche.  This is usually understood as a figure of 
speech or rhetorical device in which either a part is made to stand for the whole, pars pro toto ( I 
refer to this from here on as ‘one for all’) or the whole for a part totum pro parte (I refer to this as ‘all 
for one’).  For the purposes of this research I use it to mark out what has often been alluded to by 
Muslim interviewees and which is (often emotionally) denounced as gross injustice.  It points to 
extensive predication, working sets of presuppositions and clearly subordinate subject positioning.  I 
use the rhetorical term synecdoche to define two sets of processes which effectively compress or 
syncopate identification on the one hand or bloat and expand it on the other.     
Looking at the following statements we see a clear example of Synecdoche at work.  An example of 
‘all for one’ is given in this statement which emphasises the power of constructed oppositionals, to 
narrow and constrain choices individual Muslims can make.  “Muslims and immigrants are only seen 
as a collective.  [The] individual is the greatest victim, because his freedom of identity is at stake.  In a 
false contradiction between ‘civilization and barbarism’, Muslims have to choose in favour of or 
against their family, religion and their own threatened identity. ” (Azough 2006 in Snel and Stock, 
2008) An example of ‘one for all’: "We are very disappointed," said Mr Karaademi.  "We just wanted 
to do our mosque up a bit, with this small minaret and a tea room.  We actually thought it might 
promote dialogue.  "I even gave them a written undertaking that we would never make the call to 
prayer," he said.  "They seem to think we are all criminals or terrorists - that's like saying all Italians 
are in the mafia. " (Foulkes, 2007)  
In ‘one for all’ the individual is implicated in a representation of a whole.317 Synecdoche functions like 
a metaphor, in that the meanings which identifiers construct, effect a stronger even automatic 
                                                          
316 Dr. R.Geisler is a member of the governing body of the Lutheran Church in Germany and spokesperson for immigration 
and integration. For more information see Appendix two. 
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connection.  If successful, it transforms identity classification since “. . . classifications are 
transformation systems, allowing the movement of meanings up, down and across the system’s 
organised grid.  Things are not simply themselves; with a simple shift of angle everything is 
something else, something more specific, more general, alike or contiguous in some way, its meaning 
located somewhere else.  A human is a primate or is a mammal; a human is Greek or the Greek is 
Socrates; a human is a lion or a sloth.  A further metaphorical twist may generate a new system with 
axes of no previous salience. ” (Game and Metcalfe, 1996:49)  
In a group interview I conducted at a Zürich backyard mosque involving the Imam, Amir318 and a 
translator, I gained an unexpected insight into synecdoche.  It was an interview which had developed 
a formal character and in which the interviewees were giving carefully controlled responses.  At one 
point I asked the Imam to comment on his ideas about the place of Shar’ia in Swiss society.  Quite 
suddenly the translator burst out ‘just because we believe in the Shar’ia they think we are 
terrorists!”.  He was quickly silenced by the Amir.  (Manzoor, 2008) The outburst illustrated how 
being subjected to ‘all for one’ there was deep frustration and bitterness at the injustice of one kind 
of identity being mis-read as another.   
El Boujoufi pointed out an ‘all for one’ in his comments about the inflated effects of radicalism in the 
Netherlands.  He said that perhaps 1% of the entire Muslim population were considered ‘radical’ or 
‘possessing the potential’ for radical action by the Dutch government, but still Muslims in total were 
suspected.  Muslims therefore, even long-time residents, were all subjected to integration even 
although he understood this as measures only necessary for new incomers.  In drawing attention to 
what he considered injustice, he indicated that synecdoche occurred not only at the micro level, but 
at the national level too and was thus implicated in defining both policy and the objects of policy.  He 
emphasised that the ridiculous proportions: a handful of fanatics in a community of one million could 
not be soberly treated but that somehow one million Muslims had to be held responsible.  
Throughout the interview he reiterated how Dutch political elites continually projected the potential 
of the few onto the whole Muslim community which rendered implausible Muslim statements of 
loyalty and undervalued their integration efforts.  Through ‘all for one’ the whole community is 
implicitly held responsible for the actions of a few.  Musluoğlu expressed the sense of his community 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
317 The person is not merely associated with as in metonymy, but is considered an integral part of the larger entity.  
318 The leader of the mosque community.  
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being held to ransom.  ‘Who knows what will happen if some madman does something stupid here?` 
(Musluoğlu, 2008) He was undoubtedly expressing the underlying fear of a community but he was 
pointing out the potential for this to trigger a new synecdochical reaction; implicating a whole 
community by the doings of one or more individuals.   
Interviewees indicated that synecdoches were not only crude devices employed by the populist right 
or the tabloid press, but (as with most essentialisation mechanisms) were employed more subtly as 
well.  Kolat drew attention to ‘one for all’ to highlight the ease of transition to equivalence, which he 
claimed were based on entrenched presuppositions - cultural inferiority, dubious religiosity and 
terror - “There is anti-Turkish feeling in society but since 9/11 there is, as well, the notion that Turk is 
equivalent to terrorist - of course this is over-simplified and isn't always the case. But it is easy to 
create the path Turk-Muslim-Terrorist.” (Kolat, 2008)   
Synecdoche might not place all Muslims directly in the category of terrorism just because they 
believe in Shar’ia.  Synecdoche is suggested when identities are placed in too close a proximity to 
certain issues.  As I pointed out in chapter five Muslim participants at the DIK reacted angrily to 
security being a main topic at this conference.  Bringing Muslim-Integration summitry into such a 
close proximity with security issues did not suggest that all Muslims were a security risk but that 
enough were or likely to be, to justify that decision.  Relativised Synecdoches as partial compression 
or expansion serve also to feed suspicion and ulteriorisation of Muslim identities.  Synecdoches do 
not involve only micro exchanges but, as El Boujoufi indicates, they can be part of larger processes of 
conscription into Integration discourse; neither are they only crude devices, since they may be 
relativised to become parts of qualified expressions such as “we know that not all Muslims are 
terrorists but . . . ”  This involves enough syncopation to bring subjects and issues into a proximity of 
suspicion.   
Interviewees understood Integration as a distinct habilitative type across the cases, differentiated 
from more laissez-faire models such as Dutch multiculturalism and older more coercive regimes of 
assimilation as in Germany in the early 20th century.  It was located through different context-specific 
sets of issues, but was understood to concern, and be concerned with, Muslim populations. Core 
Integration meanings concerned adjustment and fitting in but were clearly qualified by an added 
sense of mutuality; this was represented using the two-way street metaphor. Though this suggests 
less interactive dynamic and more streams moving in opposite directions, the metaphor was clearly 
used to emphasise that adjustments were not one-sided, though it was also accepted that Muslims 
would have the biggest burden of adjustment. Integration was also understood as constructed 
200 
 
through multi-level interaction in which encouraging and removing hindrances to participation would 
ameliorate material disadvantage on the one hand and increase equality and contribute to stable 
social relationships on the other. States were understood as the most able agents and therefore had 
the lion’s share of responsibility to effect structural adjustments.  
In all cases elites emphasised material pragmatic problem-solving, which emphasised both deficits 
and provisioning, with the latter being placed, especially in Switzerland, within contractual 
arrangements.  This emphasises the formal mutuality of Integration arrangements in which new 
Muslim immigrants obligate themselves to integrate by entering into contract with the state 
(Cantons in this case) which, in turn, obligate itself to provide opportunities to acquire important 
resources in language and cultural training. By providing well-designed and well-funded courses, 
immigrants will be required in return to fulfil a legal obligation to participate and bring the courses to 
a successful conclusion.  Such contracts would place individuals under both a legal and a moral 
obligation, and though new immigrants were considered the primary objects, longer-term residents 
who came to the authorities attention would also be involved. (Morais, 2008) Representatives 
complained that these integration courses with their legally binding nature placed many Muslims and 
especially new Muslim immigrants in fear, since underperformance might lead to a nullification of 
their residence rights. Evidence points to the development of a contractual dimension to Integration 
instruments in all three cases. 
Successive federal governments in Germany have placed Integration at the centre of policy making 
thus conferring upon it a ‘top priority’ status. Highly publicised summitry has become a defining 
characteristic of Integration which emphasises participation, dialogue, and consultation as well as a 
commitment to adopting recommendations and incorporating them into new policies. In the 
Netherlands a lower profile consultation regime has been in place since the early millennium which 
emphasises ongoing consensus and is clearly an expression of earlier ‘polder’ models. Consultations 
had a more negotiative quality in that they took place between ‘officially recognised’ partners (top-
level Muslim umbrella organisation) and state elites. In addition, the results of consultations had a 
binding quality since state elites were obliged to take account of them and see that they found 
meaningful expression in policy formulation. As a result there seemed to be general satisfaction that 
these integrative mechanisms worked. Because the memory of past political turbulence was still very 
much present and speakers were aware of the potential of the populist right, low-profile 
arrangements were found to be better suited to situations where polarisation was considered a risk. 
Similarly in Switzerland Integration was seen to be developing a consultative dimension in which 
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Muslim representatives were invited to talk to federal state elites and in this way gain a national 
profile. These ‘positive developments’ remained however vulnerable, to right-wing populism. 
Sensitivity or vulnerability to right-wing populism was largely absent in German Integration discourse 
which possibly made its very public summitry approach possible.  
Muslim organisations in all cases have been encouraged to form top-level umbrella organisations.  
State elites have emphasised the need to speak with one stable representative voice. But despite 
efforts on the part of Muslim organisations to come together, contention has centred on 
representation and legitimacy. State elites emphasise that top-level umbrellas clearly represent, in a 
formal sense, only a small percentage of those considered to be Muslim.  Yet Muslim organisations 
unsurprisingly point out this is much higher in informal terms, in that the mosques they manage have 
much higher attendance rates than membership rolls reflect. The issue of representation was 
especially contentious in Germany, it was recognised but not emphasised in the Netherlands, and 
because of Muslim organisational under-development it had not yet become an issue in Switzerland. 
Some institutional assimilation (re-organising along membership lines) was clearly underway, in 
Germany but the goal of finding a single voice was considered by many as unrealistic. Although 
aggregation through top-level umbrellas was considered a clear advantage for all, the conservative 
religious leanings of these organisations were considered highly problematic for the state and for 
secular Muslims. The goal of achieving official recognition of Islam (with which finding Muslim 
organisation is intimately connected), will it seems continue to remain elusive. Elites in all three cases 
continue to publicly support Muslim re-organisation but, especially in Germany, by problematising 
representativeness and legitimacy, place it beyond the bounds of possibility. A result of this has been 
a new official emphasis on diversity with special emphasis on feminist-emancipatory voices. This 
seems to be on the one hand an implicit acceptance that Islam’s voice will be polyphonous, but on 
the other, points to a concern of state elites that Muslim re-organisation will strengthen entrenched 
religious fundamentalism and potential radicalism.  
As already noted, critical voices problematised Integration’s protean meanings yet they were 
obviously prepared to work with the concept. Their usage revealed that there were some widely 
accepted and sufficiently stable meanings which could be used to identify discursive subversions but 
also to frame their expectations. Expectations were especially high in Germany about what 
Integration might achieve and this accentuated the element of risk involved. Some speakers felt 
Integration failure – that is that all the consultations and negotiations would bring no tangible 
change – would put the processes in reverse. The Integration stakes were therefore considered 
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especially high in Germany. Expectations of what Integration should be, or the integrity of processes 
was considered to reside in an ongoing willingness of all parties to negotiate at eye-level, though 
within clearly defined sets of non-negotiables. Understandings of the latter necessarily differed 
depending on what the speaker sought to prioritise. In broad terms, Muslim voices emphasised the 
non-negotiability of religious identity whereas state and corporate elites emphasised the non-
negotiability of constitutional and democratic norms.   
Though expectations generally centred on protection of identity as well as greater participatory 
involvement, critical voices also drew upon discrimination narratives to highlight what they 
considered the dangers to the processes and practices which might ultimately threaten the 
credibility of Integration. For example language proficiency was universally accepted, through the 
cases, as a key integrative factor helping both incoming and resident Muslims to become more 
socially mobile. In the German case however, the strong emphasis on German language acquisition 
and proficiency also connected strongly to the subordination (even suppression) of Turkish language 
speaking. Language acquisition therefore was universally accepted as the door to Integration but 
where it was seen to be promoted at the expense of original language retention then it became 
integral to framing and forming insider/outsider and majority /minority boundaries. 
Many interviewees placed the development of integration policies on a time line.  This was often 
described as a narrative of missed opportunities, in which the logic of work import – cheap mobile 
labour for industry on the understanding of temporary residence and return – dominated political 
and economic elites’ thinking in the early phase.  Immigration was unimagined although there had 
been similar considerable economic immigrations to Germany and Switzerland in the early 20th 
century, the elites remained consistently short sighted.  (Freiherr von Leoprechting, 2008) This was 
reinforced by guest workers and asylum seekers which constituted Muslim immigration since they 
frequently understood their own needs as exclusively material - earning money for families, home 
projects or basic survival.  (Mohammed, 2008) Yet a major strategic error occurred with the 
emergence of a second generation.  These were either born in the host country or came at a young 
age and came through the system.  In Germany  an official logic of denial became internalised and 
entered mainline ‘foreigner’ discourse.  Kaplan read the lasting damage to the fragile sense of 
acceptance of immigrant communities in the grand denial, repeated ad infinitum in the nineties by 
the conservative centre parties in Germany: “This is not a land of immigration”.  This was not just a 
denial of the reality,  but was an expression of antipathy to immigrants themselves.  “immigrants 
were unwanted” (Kaplan, 2008) In addition because the dominant philosophy of utility underlay 
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dealings with the guest workers, elites devised schemes of return – rotation systems, payments - and 
continually refused to accord them any right of say in social or political matters, even those most 
directly affecting themselves.  All of this underlined the rejectionist approach of the CDU/CSU/FDP 
coalition and the sufferance approach of the SPD/Greens.  (Türk, Sezgün et al., 2006) The denial 
therefore of immigration in the face of reality has been highlighted as a root cause of negative 
attitudes to Muslims (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2002) 
The absence of integration therefore, became located not only in a politics of immigration denial but 
of rejection.  Neglect within the laissez-faire approaches, became a connecting thread as un-
negotiated settlement moved from a dominating logic of return to one of unwanted.  Muslims were 
left to work settlement for themselves, to find resources where they could.  One interviewee 
emphasised working against the odds: “I did my best with what I had.  We had no courses offered us, 
I came as a teenager and I did my best. “ (Musluoğlu, 2008) A commonly held opinion was that the 
social consequences of neglect were isolation, illiteracy and criminality, so that subsequent 
generations  would represent a danger for social peace. Youth judge, Kerstin Heisig, saw an 
increasing ghettoisation in Berlin, with some streets in some areas resembling subterranean 
conditions.  (Beck, 2009) As a result she and her colleagues developed a new hard-line realist 
‘Neukölln model’.  Heisig argued that the velvet gloves approach could not continue and that the law 
had to be more alert, more reactive and rigorous.   A fast track process has been set up in which 
young people are charged and sentenced in quick succession, so that actions and consequences are 
seen to be closely connected in the minds of delinquent youth.  Police have discretionary powers to 
decide if any particular case can be fast tracked.  This is considered important both for their 
motivation and so that “they should be able to develop a sense whether this is a potential criminal or 
not” (Heinemann, 2009) Räcke and Heisig as judges in the neighbourhoods319 have sought to present 
another picture of anti-German behaviour. 320 In this account Turks and Arabs are the principal 
perpetrators and German youth, the victims; so  that the order of things is turned on its head so that 
the majority become minority.  (Heisig and Räcke, 2006) This approach to Muslim youth criminality 
received hefty criticism and was seen to over-emphasise cultural identity instead of social 
disadvantage.  Mohammed saw this as blatant racism.  (Mohammed, 2008)  
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Shared expectations in political representation 
High profile figures such as Cem Özedemir joint leader of the Greens in Germany, or Ahmed 
Aboutaleb, mayor of Rotterdam, have drawn attention to the increasingly important role Muslims 
are playing in politics in Germany and the Netherlands. Yet some critical voices have accused the 
main political parties of seeking only to project an image of openness and modernity.  “They want to 
present a good image, show themselves open to Muslims, so they recruit Muslims as alibis. ” 
(Mohammed, 2008)321  This ulteriorisation of mainstream political parties clearly illustrated that it 
has multiple pathways.  At an election meeting of The Left, Ibrahim questioned the sincerity of the 
party. “ How could it be”, he asked, “that The Left who were supposedly fighting for the rights of 
immigrants, placed immigrant candidates so far down the national party-lists, where they had no 
chance of election.  Wasn’t the placing of them on the list at all just so much window dressing?” 
(Ibrahim, 2009)322 There was obviously strong support for this view in the audience. The party 
regional chairman argued that The Left needed to place the best known candidates higher up the 
lists to maximise their appeal.  Özcan admitted that even The Left, which in his opinion was the most 
immigrant friendly party, still did not practice what they preached.  Muslims were still seriously 
underrepresented.  Not only in the listings but in the whole party structure, the under representation 
of immigrants was a striking fact. (Oezcan, 2009) Similar criticism was levelled at Germany’s largest 
trade union, IGMetall by one of its functionaries, who made clear that although efforts were being 
made to redress imbalance throughout the organisational structure, Muslims and more generally 
immigrants, were clearly underrepresented.  (Bader, 2008)  
In all three cases, centrist political parties seek to give greater profile to Muslims and understand this 
as evidence of Integration. Parallel to this governments have traditionally understood integration to 
require Muslims to speak with a unified voice, so that effective representation would be the portal 
through which Muslims could participate in and meaningfully frame integration discourse. (Kolat, 
2008)  (Tufan, 2008) Although Muslims have been encouraged to form top-level aggregative 
umbrella organisations, their moves in this direction have been open to a number of charges. Over-
                                                          
321 B. Mohammed is director of the European Integration Centre Templehof, and SPD member for the Borough Assembly. 
He was a non-organisational executive member in the German Islam Conference DIK.  
322  The immigrant candidate for the Left at this meeting was Frau Demirdögan who was placed 11 on the party list for the 
European Parliament and who failed to be elected. 
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inflated representational claims;  (Freiherr von Leoprechting, 2008) ethnic and theological 
divisiveness and fragmentation;  (Mohammed, 2008) sectarianism; (Toprak, 2008)non-cooperative 
and competitive for resources.  (Graber, 2008) lack of professionalism; (Bauerbach, 2008)323 
narrowness of vision and interests; (Hibaoui, 2008)324 (Kiabami, 2008) but the size and resources 
available to some organisations, means they may be functionally inadequate for any public 
representational role. (Amin, 2008)  
Given the magnitude of criticism, it was argued that a better alternative to trying to find a 
representative Muslim voice would be to give Muslims greater voice and leverage within the political 
structures – through granting them greater responsibility within political parties.  (Mohammed, 
2008) (Oezcan, 2009) A more effective strategy than seeking ‘a single telephone number for all’ 
therefore, would be to address the under-representation of Muslims in the structures of political 
parties and other corporate actors such as Trade Unions.  As members and office holders in political 
parties, it was argued Muslims would participate more effectively, operating in a wider political field 
of action in which they would be ‘compelled’ to keep a more inclusive vision.   
These are some of the reasons presented, which cast doubt on the ability of most organisations to 
represent Muslims nationally.  The claim to represent a sufficiently significant number of Muslims is 
placed in question.  This is in part due to a culture of de-centralisation in which mosques are full but 
membership ledgers are small.  Some larger organisations such as DITIB seem to recognise the need 
to alter their organisational structure to ensure members are registered.  (Kiliçarslan, 2008) 
Theological and ethnic factionalism continue to dog attempts to unify and to be recognised as 
representative and delivers powerful arguments for the limitations of this approach.   
On some occasions organisational structures permit Imams to act as social entrepreneurs and do 
valuable public, and thus representational, work and in so doing provide important bridging 
mechanisms for local authorities.  (Alimi, 2008)  On many occasions however, organisations even 
although initially prepared to cooperate, come along only part of the way.  Often the role of a leader 
is significant, so that an entrepreneurial Imam with representational skills, moving to another 
profession or area, can bring cooperation to an abrupt halt.  In such cases the core organisation may 
                                                          
323 Bauerbach is a pseudenoym for an Islam expert working for the BMI.  For more information see Appendix two. 
324 Dr. A. Hibaoui is a former Imam of a Moroccan Mosque in Stuttgart working in the department of Integration Politics at 
the municipality of Stuttgart. For more information see Appendix two.  
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revert to what its local leaders consider to be the central and more immediate problems which 
occupy their organisation or community, and which they have to deal with.  Sometimes they see the 
value of initiatives but feel they should concentrate on what they understand and do best.  (Hibaoui, 
2008) In this way mosques and smaller organisations may not be suited to representational roles.  
Because of the functional limitations of single organisations, aggregation under umbrella 
organisations offers an attractive strategy for state and Muslim elites.  This merging and bundling of 
energies and voices is understood as an important socialisation process and a step toward proper or 
sufficient representation.  Yet two problems seem to recur with all aggregative organisational 
merging: first representational legitimacy and second the problem of finding acceptable 
representation.  The first of these problems affects the legitimacy of any claims to speak on behalf of 
Muslims.  Since leaders/spokespersons are elected or appointed from within organisations, usually, 
the size of the membership roll is therefore  considered essential to establishing the representational 
weight of actors.  The second problem has to do with risks as state elites, seeking to find moderate 
representation, indirectly empower traditional religious and/or anti-integrationist representation.   
Another important hindrance to organisational efficacy, is the lack of resources, this became 
especially obvious in the Swiss case.  The Swiss government adopt a secular position which means 
they are reticent about any kind of funding for specifically religious projects.  The degree of secularity 
of the Cantons however differs. Sponsors were sought throughout the middle-east for Mosque 
projects in Zürich. (Amin, 2008) Underfunding was also mentioned in The Netherlands, since 
ideological secularism of the state required neutral equidistance to all religions.  This meant the 
Dutch Government would not financially support the foundation of the Islamic University of 
Rotterdam, even although underfunding was endangering a project which the government thought 
important and worthwhile.  (Mintjes, 2008) In addition the political and legal structure of the country 
dictates the necessity for parallel organisational structures which increase the difficulties faced by 
Muslim organisations, and which prevents them from organising nationally and thus having a 
national presence.    
Although incorporation of Muslim organisations remains an important policy position in habilitative 
government strategies in the cases under study,  inherent limitations need to be more fully 
understood and recognised - low levels of professionalism, narrow (formal) representational bases 
and lastly the problem of state elites finding ‘acceptable’ actors.  Muslim organisational leaders have 
long argued that their influence (and representation) is greater than any estimate of 
representativeness based on narrow membership rolls.  In Switzerland decentralised governance and 
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the localised nature of official decision-making, complicates Muslim organisation, as does ethnicity 
and sectarianism.  As a result Islam takes on a narrow even local character and has difficulty 
persuading state elites that it can act politically for the whole Muslim community.  (Waardenburg, 
1996) Institutionalisation of Islam continues to remain a key Integration strategy in the cases studied, 
but has made little progress.  
Critical interviewees cast doubt on the authenticity of Integration and reiterated the assertion that to 
be Integration, habilitative policies had to be more than a top-down, one way street.  Were it to 
develop in this way, then immigrants could only ever be passive objects,  to be adjusted, habilitated 
and assimilated.  When this was conceived to be the case, then it was denounced as a misuse of the 
term, a distortion of what it should be.  This meaning cleavage frequently used to expose ulterior 
motives in political elites - they talk about Integration but they mean assimilation.  The differentiated 
meaning of integration – as opposed to assimilation or multiculturalism - was also emphasised in 
official discourse where emphases were placed on: voluntarism, solidarity, cooperation, reciprocity, 
commitment to dialogue.  There is therefore a clear seam of meaning which understands Integration 
as negotiated reciprocal adjustments.  Any perceived unidirectionality or linearity understood as 
dictation from the top, was understood to be a bastardisation of the term.   
Maizar emphasised the need to avoid any reaching of an Integration terminus.  This would be 
dangerous.  (Maizar, 2008) When Integration was understood and handled as process (as opposed to 
a hard and fast endpoint vision - then it was creatively open and safely indeterminate.  In this sense 
Integration had a metaphorical dimension “Whereas literal knowledge aspires to the inert status of 
information, metaphor works with indeterminacy to keep meaning safe from the final clarification 
which is its obituary. ” (Game and Metcalfe, 1996:50) Integration as process opens up the possibility 
of contention, of disputing whether it can be considered complete at any point in time or even 
complete-able, and dovetails well with post-modernist understandings of identities as multiple, 
changeable and fluid.  
The idea, or imagination that Muslim settlement might be successful – with implications for 
completed processes and permanent belonging - has been a cause of concern for some conservative 
elites.  As Muslims adjust and begin to approximate to a national identity imaginary this becomes 
distinctly unsettling for many.  When imagined positions or endpoints seem to be approached, then 
new habilitative requirements are devised.  In this way endpoints may be re-positioned, in a game of 
upping-the-ante, of creating new stipulations, of shifting lines, which seeks to perpetuate 
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problematisation of Muslim identities.  “They will never be Germans and they shouldn’t even try” 
(Bader, 2008)  
Perceptions and imaginations connect to habilitative discourse in the volume of everyday noise – 
experiences (personal and shared), survival tactics and practices.  It works through and between all 
levels so that micro, meso and macro level dynamics interact.  Tufan emphasised time and again that 
Integration cannot be isolated to any level or theme, but must involve all levels so that it is 
considered relevant in the common shaping of a common life.  (Tufan, 2008) Official habilitative 
discourses, however are defined at any point in time, and cannot therefore be understood or 
interpreted as developed in any isolated level.  In addition, insofar as negotiation is understood to be 
an indispensible part of integration, actors will have a catalogue of issues, which elites may wish to 
close down.  Yet for the integration dynamic to continue, not too many issues can fall under the ‘non-
negotiable’.  There cannot be too much of “this is how we do things here!” Official Integration 
policies may be conceptualised and designed in relative isolation but for policy to work effectively 
there must be unbroken impulses working to and from micro meso and macro levels.    
To underline the centrality of Integration in Germany, the coalition government of SPD and CDU/CSU 
have persistently emphasised a ‘politics of Integration’ with top level summitry involving immigrants 
and in particular Muslims.  Chancellor Merkel has emphasised that Integration is a central political 
platform of her government and understands this to mean ‘Talking with them and not about them. ’ 
(Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2007)Parity themes were also emphasised 
by participants: Integration involved ‘not being talked down to’ but talking to each other at the same 
level .(Oezbek, 2007)  Initiators and participants of the Integration summits in Germany emphasised 
therefore a level field as a prerequisite for meaningful discussions.  But behind the rhetoric of 
equality, of taking each other seriously, lay other narratives of power inequality and disadvantage.  
At the early stages of the first integration summit, there was already tension about Immigration 
legislation325 just then being introduced in the German Parliament Bundestag.  It was generally 
understood by Muslim participants to be discriminatory and clearly designed with Muslims in mind.  
(Oezbek, 2007) The TGD walked out, refusing to participate further and threatened to boycott the 
second planned summit also.   The crux of the problem was understood to centre on the stricter 
conditions for the admission of spouses from Turkey and North Africa.  It was discriminatory in that 
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its stipulations were not to be extended to other ‘foreign brides’, for example from the far East.  
(Oezbek, 2007) Although there were many who welcomed the stop to the ‘bride industry’ and 
‘marriage migration’ from Muslim countries, yet felt that the inherent discrimination needed to be 
addressed.  In addition the difficulty of fulfilling conditions needed to be addressed. Hibaoui for 
example drew attention to the fact that when he sought permission for his wife to join him from 
Morocco, the condition that she attend German classes would have meant she would have had to 
travel 200 miles from their home to the next city where German lessons were offered.  The travelling 
aside, the costs also were prohibitive.  (Hibaoui, 2008) Set against tightening migration laws and the 
special case of marriage migration, many Muslim representatives have become critical of the whole 
summitry exercise: Kilicarslan dismissed the Integration and Islam summits, as mere ‘talk shops’.  
(Kiliçarslan, 2008)  
Discriminatory practices inscribe space and are key spatial markers and central to understanding how 
difference is located throughout spatial categories.  Interviewees had sets of migration/arrival and 
discrimination narratives to draw upon.  Rather than provide at this point extensive descriptive 
accounts of discriminatory praxis as spatial markers, I draw attention to the less visible or submerged 
discriminations to which many Muslims testified to across these cases.   
Rahman,326 described how the positive effect integration is lost in continued discriminatory practices 
in the Netherlands. 327 He describes the ease with which Dutch employers practice a kind of hidden 
discrimination, he shrugs his shoulders.  His body tells me “what can we do about it?’ He describes 
how Dutch employers inspect the various indices of identification: names, appearances, even areas 
of residence will serve.  They are used to keep Muslims at bay.  It happens all the time and everyone 
knows it but … Rahman just shrugs his shoulders again.  (Rahman, 2008) Lenzin328 looks pensive when 
she considers the magnitude of the problem, from a gendered perspective she asks “how many 
Muslimas here in Zürich are denied an opportunity because of the veil? Unquantifiable, really, but 
                                                          
326 R. K Rahman is director of the Islamic primary school As-Soeffah in south-east Amsterdam.  
327 His description of how submerged discrimination takes place has been researched by Bovenkerk et al and van Beek.  See 
Gowricharn, R. (2002). "Integration and Social Cohesion in the Netherlands." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
28(259-273). 
328 R.  S.  Lenzin is an expert on Islam has a consultancy business and lectures extensively on the subject of Islam and 
women.  She sits on many committees and advises the Cantonal government on Islamic and Muslima issues.  
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most of them just accept it as part of their lives.  There is a deeply embedded religious quietism 
among Muslimas here. ” (Lenzin, 2008) Toprak329 describes how he is subjected to discriminatory 
practice by fellow city councillors and characterises it as ‘symbolic exclusion’ to do with a way of 
seeing and identifying him. (Toprak, 2008) Ibrahim also decribed widespread racism among workers 
on the factory floor.  (Ibrahim, 2009) 
At the political level discriminatory practices were often alluded to by interviewees.  Bader 
emphasised that in the trade union structure there was inbuilt immigrant under-representation, 
which reflected not only a supposed shortage in qualified persons but also discrimination.  He 
emphasised that there were ongoing efforts to redress structural imbalance.  (Bader, 2008) Oezcan 
also drew my attention to this same problem within the part structure of the socialist Left party. 330 
The under-representation of immigrants and Muslims throughout the whole party structure was 
indisputable, and that was how it was in the party which was possibly the most sympathetic to 
immigrants.  (Oezcan, 2009) At the political meeting of ‘the Left’, K. Ibrahim, a member of the 
audience and whom I later interviewed, touched on a very sensitive issue.  Why, he demanded to 
know, were immigrants always placed so far down the party lists.  Why was the ‘immigrant’ 
candidate Demirdögan, who was canvassing at this event, only in eleventh place, which virtually 
ensured her non-election.  (Ibrahim, 2009)This was a question which found instant resonance with 
the rest of the audience.  The party functionaries put it down to a rational choice – they had to place 
their better known autochthonous candidates higher up the list to have a better chance of election.   
In most interviews through the three cases, discrimination was considered ongoing and widespread 
practice.  Discrimination and racism only briefly recounted above were part of the larger shared 
narrative repertoire of most Muslim interviewees.  Discriminatory practices were pointed to in all 
cases, and these continued to be significant boundary markers.  But what was also pointed out by 
some was a more submerged discrimination characterised by low visibility and subtlety.  Although 
Bader and Oezcan’s comments might be fairly easy to verify, many others would not.  Those who 
pointed to the latter also expressed a deep seated resignation - they thought it would always be 
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around in some shape or form.  (Rahman, 2008) Discrimination or racism continue to characterise 
othering practices, yet some who sought to point to these, tended to add qualifiers like ‘not all Swiss 
were like this, the majority were helpful people’.  (Sadaqat, 2008) 
What these snippet histories serve to illustrate is that Muslims live and are visibilised through many 
identity templates: guest worker, tolerated foreigner, 331 asylum-seeker, resident (temporary or 
permanent status) citizen; they enter or are placed in many different kinds of spaces – factory, 
school, asylum barracks, neighbourhood; they build multi-faceted relationships with those they 
choose to, or must interact with; they must get through their obstacle course of paperwork such as 
applications and registrations, health issues, employment or unemployment, and often with  very 
limited social capital.  As they find their feet, they co-occupy already culturally inscribed spaces in the 
land of settlement.  In some limited ways they can re-shape their environments through 
concentrating in particular neighbourhoods.   This has often happened in former worker areas where 
rents are cheaper.  They rent houses and flats, set up shops, find business opportunities - importing 
food and spices, providing services – travel, burial arrangements.  They re-model mundane spaces 
into sacred spaces so that garages become mosques.   They culturally re-inscribe their 
neighbourhoods so that it becomes ‘our area’.  In accretive processes neighbourhoods gain new 
people, new businesses, new interacting subjects and as a result new repertoires of meaning.  
Immigrants reveal a hierarchy of belonging which is only slow to change.   
The first level of belonging is communal belonging that is belonging to own ethnic and religious 
communities. 332 A second level of belonging is that of spatial immediacy, that is the physical locale 
itself – the neighbourhood and city.  Muslim youth identify readily through the cases with Kreuzberg, 
or Cologne, Berlin or Amsterdam.  A third layer of belonging is homeland belonging or membership 
of the nation.  This research has revealed that this is not a simple diasporic identification with the 
implication of immigrants playing double identity roles  – ‘a German by day, a Turk by night’ - rather 
there are more complex sets of  identifications working through multiple spaces and their possession 
or occupation.   
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332 In Switzerland this has an additional Cantonal dimension -Turks have concentrated in Canton and city of Zürich, 
Albanians, Bosniaks in Canton and city of Basle, Arabs in Canton and city of Geneva.    
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In a similar way citizenship was understood as a key temporal marker wrought in the details of 
settlement and naturalisation. In the Netherlands dual citizenship was considered generally as 
unproblematic, whereas in Switzerland acquisition of citizenship, requiring proof of integration 
resting in its turn on evidence of cultural assimilation was not unproblematic. Here the much 
localised character of the naturalisation process as well as the burden of proof333 for applicants (that 
they had sufficiently acculturalised and socialised) were not perceived as insurmountable problems. 
Where problems were most clearly expressed was in the German case where citizenship was 
considered inextricably linked with a legacy of conservative resistance and reluctance. The optional 
model was understood to be for conservative elites as a way of sifting prospective new citizens on 
the basis of their loyalty, but for Muslim representatives it translated as blanket rejection. The 
considerable material difficulties involved - negotiating inheritance rights in Turkey for instance – had 
led to the employment of different strategies. Muslim speakers saw the acquisition of citizenship in 
the first instance as a formality and not of itself bringing about a closer identification with the land of 
settlement. Instead loyalties were expressed on the basis of multiple belongings and equal but not 
divided loyalties. 
Secularism and the expectation of identity protection 
In each interview I asked the interviewees to tell me what they understood by secularism and how 
they assessed it.  The responses were at the first generally positive.  Kaplan felt secularism to be 
necessary to successful integration, since secularism - understood as the state’s commitment to 
neutrality - protected all of society both religious and non-religious.  He emphasised how Laïc 
secularism in Turkey was something of a sham and that Sunnitism was dominating both politics and 
society.   (Kaplan, 2008) Sunni domination and repression of religious minorities in Turkey framed the 
background for most Alevi responses. Persecution narratives were related, in which it had been 
necessary to camouflage  their proper religious identities in Turkey.  A common Alevi ruse, for 
example in Anatolia, had been to put on lights before dawn during Ramadan, to suggest that they too 
were preparing the first meal before the Muslim fast began.  (Kaplan, 2008) Similar narratives were 
produced by several Ahmadi interviewees in the context of Pakistan.  Whereas the Alevis in part 
prefer to be called Alevis rather than Muslim, the Ahmadiyya more closely identify with Islam, yet 
they are considered by mainline Muslim organisations as theologically heterodox which makes, in 
spite of pragmatic considerations, co-operation out of the question.  (Amin, 2008) In Pakistan, 
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through Ordinance XX,  Ahmadis have from 1974 been effectively criminalised.   Here strategies 
common among the Alevis in Turkey, of living ‘as if’, or posing as Muslims, fall under the penal code.  
(Khan, 2003) Representatives from both these ‘Muslim’ communities expressed strongest support for 
a state neutral secularism.  
But acceptance was also emphasised by mainline Sunni organisations.  Kiliçarslan understood the 
ethical stance of state neutrality as not disadvantaging Muslims or other non-Christian religions.  Yet 
equidistance to all religious communities was not, she felt, to be that important or realistic.  She 
emphasised that she had no real problem with limited privileging of Christian religions, yet she felt 
that secularism should at least be flexible and fair with respect to Islam.  She illustrated what she 
meant by highlighting the issues of mixed swimming lessons and prohibition of teachers wearing the 
hijab.   
There was not generally a problem of the privileged position of the Christian faith, except where 
Muslims felt their own religiosity was discriminated against. Refusing to allow teachers to wear the 
hijab was distorting Muslim positions by making what was a religious obligation into a political 
statement. For Kiliçarslan334 the hijab was a religious obligation, to teach without the hijab for a 
believing Muslima was a sin. This was considered of a different order of magnitude to forbidding the 
wearing of a cross, since wearing the latter had no moral dimension, it was simply a choice. 
(Kiliçarslan, 2008) Similarly Gülbahar emphasised that he was not against nuns teaching in habits and 
wimple, wearing crosses or having crucifixes on walls in schools, but was against differentiations 
which were discriminatory and unjust. (Gülbahar, 2008).  Secularism must take account of such 
differences to be properly fair and neutral.  (Kiliçarslan, 2008) 
Maizar drew attention as well to mixed swimming lessons and saw this as the thin edge of the wedge 
in Switzerland.  “Here the laws now insist that all children must attend mixed swimming classes.  It is 
part of school attendance requirements335.”   All Muslims would recognise the right of every child to 
learn how to swim but he failed to see what this had to do with gender equality or integration.  
Muslim parents he argued were not just seeking exemption but they went to great lengths to 
accommodate the state.  He mentioned how parents were prepared to hire swimming baths, at their 
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own expense, to provide separate swimming classes, but this alternative was rejected by Zürich.  He 
referred to the High Court of the Canton Schaffhausen which ruled in 2007 against a Muslim father 
who wished his sons to be exempted from mixed swimming lessons.  This went against an earlier 
Federal court ruling permitting exemptions on religious grounds.  Strangely the Schaffhausen court 
argued that requiring mixed swimming reinforced gender equality and furthered the integration of 
foreigners, whereas the earlier Federal court argued the opposite – that exemption would further 
integration.  (Human-Rights.CH, 2008) In the case of Schaffhausen’s ruling on mixed swimming the 
reason for overturning an earlier Federal court ruling in 1993 was that conditions had changed in 
Switzerland and that what was formerly considered integrative was now understood differently due 
to increasing danger of social disintegration and religious fundamentalism.  (High-Court-
Schaffhausen, 2007)By placing integration above religious conviction, they were subordinating a 
natural human right336 to integration. (Maizar, 2008) Liberal secularism was understood to be 
increasingly definitive Integration discourse, so that an ideology was increasingly shaping Integration 
and setting it above religious sensibilities. It was also emphasised that local authorities were not 
uniformly insensitive, but on many occasions they were unwilling to make, or allow, any alternative 
provision and thus ‘enforcing’ a liberal-secular version of Integration. 
Throughout the interviews, secularism was primarily defined as state neutrality which was 
understood as not seeking to further specifically theological aims of any particular religion.  
Neutrality meant therefore fair and equal treatment for all religions, and the non-intrusion of the 
state.  Neutrality as equidistance from all religious faiths was not however, considered a necessary 
element in the meaning of the term.  Throughout the interviews secularism was seen by religious 
Muslims as a social and political ‘good’.  It was understood to be protective and therefore a security 
provider for all beliefs and practices.  This was seen as necessary for the development of religious 
community, collective and individual identities and integration.  More laïc understandings of the 
secular state as not only neutral but as an interventionist guarantor of separations and enforcer of 
private and public occupancy were treated with scepticism.  Kaplan criticised Turkish laicism, as being 
the state seeking on the one hand to control Islam but simultaneously favouring Sunni Islam, so that 
the latter was now seen to be controlling the state.  For this reason, he continued, the state had to 
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be neutral but also alert and not disinterested.  It had to be committed to maintaining the general 
well-being337 of all. (Kaplan, 2008) 
State and corporate elites emphasised the supremacy of the secular constitution as the non-
negotiable framework for integration. Muslim interviewees expressed their ready acceptance of the 
constitutional order, secularity of national legal frameworks and the secular character of the state. 
Expressions of loyalty to the constitution became therefore in many cases an important part of 
loyalty practice for Muslim interviewees. Secularism was understood to be the legal protection for all 
(Muslim included) religious and non-religious practice. The high issues of secularism - separation, 
neutrality and equidistance - were however recognised to be less pure in practice, having 
‘exceptions’ based in historically rooted relationships, and practices which were in general  accepted 
as insofar as non-injurious to Muslims.  
Secularism was considered a non-negotiable by corporate elites. They felt it guaranteed the efficient 
functioning of the workspace and any involvement with religious issues was considered outside the 
remit of trade unions, religious issues were considered specifically local issues and to be negotiated 
individually at the local level.  Where religious imperatives impinged on the secularity of work space 
– as in the issue of the hijab – then the secular constitutional order was given priority. In this way 
religious issues were invariably cleared from the table.  But for religious Muslim voices the 
constitutional prohibition of teachers in Germany from wearing the hijab was considered 
discriminatory, and felt to work against the principle of freedom of religion of Muslimas. In this way 
secularism was thought to reinforce inequality and to work to the disadvantage of Muslims and 
‘Islam’.  
An important issue in all cases was the issue of training Imams locally. The problematic issue here 
had less to do with location of training but of training standards.  All recognised the necessary limited 
knowledge and understanding of foreign Imams. Muslim representatives however warned of the 
dangers of transferring western standards onto Islamic ones. Further contentious issues such as 
mixed swimming, bride importation, hijab wearing were all brought into the discussion with Muslim 
speakers who often emphasised the elites’ unwillingness (secular stubbornness) to find compromises 
– which often entailed rejecting reasonable alternatives.  Muslim representatives considered good 
will and willingness to find solutions essential but very mixed in practice. In Germany and Switzerland 
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inflexibility was most frequently emphasised, though there was some regional variations mentioned 
here with more generally Catholic Cantons and Lands being considered more sympathetic to 
separate gender education. 
Synecdoche and ulteriority – security in Integration 
As mentioned earlier, both synecdochical directions - pars pro toto (‘all for one’) making all 
responsible for the work of individuals and totum pro parte (‘one for all’) making the individual is 
responsible for the whole (or a representation of the whole) – are powerful reinforcers of 
oppositionals in securitisation discourse.  Individuals are exposed to a mis-representation of a 
supposed whole, just as that whole is exposed to the actions of individuals.  In this way Muslim 
individuals are held responsible for their identification with the whole, so that the stereotyped 
collectivity called ‘Islam’ becomes that which fixes a particular kind of securitised focus on the 
individual.  Islam as the enemy of progress, Islam as the enemy of free speech elides to is enemy of 
progress, free speech etc; The individual is cast in the image of a supposed whole.  This is perhaps a 
somewhat crude rendering of what the power of synecdochical practice can do in identity 
construction, yet the frequency of its appearance in discussions with Muslims underlines its 
reificationary power and points to subjection and subordination.   
Yet it works as well through the process of ulteriority.   This may be understood as a subcategory of 
alterity or Othering.  It hints at one of the most dangerous kinds of Others - the suspected Other.  
The construction of ulterior identity is fastened in a widely held perception of subversive potential, 
simply, in a web of national suspicions.   This suspicion not only places identities in the category of 
alterity which suggests an easily identifiable other but of ulteriority.  One synecdochical dimension 
employed in this ulteriorisation is that Islam abroad stands for Islam at home.  Islam abroad is 
considered anti-democratic and violent therefore the same is valid for Islam at home, it too has that 
potential.  Given the right set of circumstances, that is ‘in reality’, it is anti-democratic and 
subversive.   
In an interview at a mosque in Zürich I was invited to talk with an Imam and an Amir, with another 
member of the mosque serving as translator.  The main focus of the discussion centred on religious 
themes and I noted there was reluctance to be critical of their situation in Switzerland.  Asking about 
their life in Zürich they all nodded agreement that everything was fine, they were happy etc;  but 
when our conversation turned to a discussion of law and Shar’ia, and I sought to introduce some of 
my own opinion about law based religion, we were suddenly interrupted by the interpreter who 
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burst out that ‘just because we believe in the Shar’ia they think we are terrorists!” (Manzoor, 
2008)The Amir spoke quickly and the tone informed me that he was telling the interpreter to keep 
quiet.  Although the outburst was smoothed over, it was a significant moment for it touched 
sensitivity to synecdoche.  
Heitmeyer has pointed to the vulnerability of Turkish youth and put forward a rather simple 
equation, namely that the search for certainty, and one which German society could not offer, would 
make ‘dubious’ Muslim organisations more attractive and they (disaffected Muslim youth) would 
receive without question a message of violence.  (Heitmeyer, 1996) This kind of prophetic message 
wrapped in dubious sociological theory tells a story of shady, not to be believed or trusted Muslim 
organisations seeking to recruit Muslim youth.  They conceal their real motives and intentions by 
adopting a double strategy: one directed at an internal audience, in which brainwashing takes place 
through a mixture of badgering and asserting religious superiority; a second is directed to an external 
audience in which the fare is a smooth liberalised commentary of tolerance.  The ulteriorisation of 
identity is evident in the German government’s approach to Millis Görüs.  On the one hand the 
political elites deal with this organization as part of its integration programme yet it is kept under 
surveillance by The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bvf).338   In fact the interior 
ministry requires this kind of reasoning to justify surveillance at all, since there have been no 
instances of breaking the law.  (Gülbahar, 2008) There is however recognition from the Bvf  and the 
interior ministry that there are more moderate streams which seem to work for independence from 
Islamist Turkish organisational structures, yet express doubt that this will be able to establish itself in 
the long term.  The annual report on German internal security postulates a considerable discrepancy 
between their public claims and actual activities, in which the former seem legitimate whereas the 
latter seems to reveal disintegrative tendencies fuelled by ideological positions.  In total therefore 
the Bvf understand a rejectionist attitude towards western values and supports taking distance to 
democracy.    It is of course beyond the scope of this research to examine in detail the organisation 
Milli Görüs itself, or to assess the validity of the Bvf’s assessment.  It is important only to keep in 
mind the way in which suspicion underlies its identity perception of this organisation.  As one of the 
largest Muslim organisations in Germany, with a significant youth work (which is commented upon at 
length in the 2007 report) it will clearly be a key player in future integration debate and negotiation.  
Aware of the heterogeneity of thinking within the organisation, the Bvf and by extension the BMI 
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assess pessimistically any potential for change which negotiative involvement or generational change 
might bring about.  Suspicion is discursively fastened to strong alterity-type identifications – anti-
democratic, Islamist, rejectionist; and ulterior-type identifications.  Discrepancies lie between claims 
and activity, seeming on the whole to point to disintegrative attitudes.  (BMI, 2007) 
The suspicion of a Muslim fifth column has been around since the 9/11 group were known to have 
lived and organised undetected in Germany.  It is periodically aired in various conspiracy type 
theories when new cells are uncovered or when razzia are carried out.  The sensitivity to being 
suspected was well illustrated by Kolat, who explained how he travels regularly to Turkey for talks 
with Turkish government officials. He recounted how on one occasion he had been approached by a 
Turkish official in an attempt to enlist the help of TGD in lobbying for the Turkish government, which 
he refused. “We are not a fifth column!” he retorted.  In describing this incident in these terms, Kolat 
made clear that he is aware of existent and ongoing ulteriorisation to which Muslims and their 
organisations are subjected. In addition, by engaging in loyalty practice – publicising his refusal to be 
a lobbyist - he seeks to counter any hint of Turkish behind the scenes manipulation.   He made clear 
that he has multiple but prioritised loyalties first to the members of TGD, those they represent and 
works for; but more broadly also for Germans and German society. His loyalty and connection to 
Turkey is neither denied nor defended but his loyalty practice clearly subordinates it to local 
commitments.  Seeking to represent Turks in Germany and in Turkey, requires a careful balancing 
act, but with respect to loyalties he is quite clear, there may be priorities but no simple exclusions.  
Throughout the interviews Muslims found the media, to be Islamophobic, actively working against 
Muslims. (Sadaqat, 2008)  Hafez’s studies of media and Islam reveal a narrowing process at work, a 
way of concentrating on a few core negatively charged aspects of Islam.  In addition, a standard stock 
of images are produced and repeatedly used: veiled women, inflamed demonstrators, Shari a 
punishments.   Taken together these processes of theme narrowing and image repetition implicate 
national media in producing distorted stereotypes of Muslims and their Islam.  (Hafez, 2000) The 
challenge to deconstruct ‘hard core’ Islam images comes through clearly in many interview 
situations.  Kilicarslan spent considerable time emphasising how much thought had gone into the 
design of the Ehrenfeld mosque in Cologne.  The architecture had to present another image of Islam.  
Transparency and access were to be the main themes.  They wanted to get away from the 
sometimes sinister image of back-street (backward) religion and wanted to present other more 
positive views of religiosity.  We don’t want to be always looking at the backsides of praying men.  
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(Kiliçarslan, 2008) Many complain of the media stereotyping, as serving only to reinforce deep seated 
prejudices and discriminatory practice in the population.  (Sadaqat, 2008)  
A narrative of security in Integration was built up of small pieces. Throughout interviewees in all 
cases were framing their answers against existent securitisation in which Muslims were understood 
to be primary security referents. In the Netherlands and Germany, the transmogrification of social 
space through altering urban skylines and streetscapes was considered by Muslim speakers –both 
secular and religious - as evidence of a normal settlement. As key to visibility and presence, religious 
Muslim representatives emphasised the significance of showcase mosques which were considered 
especially important both as visible evidences of integration (permanence and social mobility) as well 
as reflecting openness and accessibility to majority populations. These texts were however, clearly 
set against powerful securitising discourses of ‘Muslim occupation’ and ‘creeping Islamicisation’, in 
which Muslims occupied and created opaque spaces. Securitising space and visibility was understood 
by Muslim speakers to be part of ongoing powerful ulteriorisation of ‘Islam’ and Muslim identities. 
Though spatial occupations and parallel societies were less securitised in Switzerland mosque 
visibility became a primary focus and author of an invisibilisation counter discourse.  
9/11 was understood by all speakers who alluded to it, in all cases, as a turning point for Muslims in 
which general attitudes to Muslims and Islam had changed in the majority populations. However no 
Muslim interviewees felt that their personal situation had been acutely threatened. The role of the 
media was introduced in all cases as implicated in stereotyping Muslims through building on media 
events such as London and Madrid or uncovering various Jihadi plots. This narrowing and reiteration 
of security themes and exclusion of more positive narratives of settlement employed both subtle and 
crude synecdoches to fix images of danger and threat.  
Although the threat of terrorism, as a security theme, was considered to have a continued brisance 
in all cases, elites drew attention to deeper security concerns such as the development of a growing, 
under-performing and increasingly Muslim class.  The banlieu riots involving Muslim youth in France 
were frequently alluded to as a potential future scenario in Germany if nothing was done. So 
Integration was clearly brought into play as preventative security in which state resources needed to 
be employed in breaking up a monolithic and increasingly criminalised339 class.  In this way the term 
Integration was used to introduce a meaning of securing stable relationship between Muslim 
                                                          
339 In the sense not only of crime in the community, but of the crimes of underachievement immobility and isolation. 
220 
 
minorities and non-Muslims majorities. As growing Muslim underclass would be an economic drag in 
the future, the urgent task of Integration was to tackle ‘the problems’ and ensure societal 
sustainability. 
The securitised narrative of a Muslim underclass, in which young people would be trapped in 
communities of underachievement, was supplemented with a spectre of radicalisation and over-
foreignisation. In Switzerland and the Netherlands a vocal populist right has succeeded in 
constructing a sinister creeping Islamicisation discourse.  Muslim speakers, proved sensitive to such 
claims, and sought to show the over-inflated nature of the claims and to defend themselves against 
identity distortion and othering through ulteriorisation. Muslim organisational representatives 
sought to underline their contributions to moderation, tolerance and stability, seeking to prove 
through their social and political work their value as agents Integration. Through iterated loyalty 
practices they sought to defuse the image of a fifth column, an army of sleepers waiting to usher in 
Shar’ia.   
Dominant meanings or meanings of domination? 
‘what does Integration mean then on the basis of these investigations?’ and taking this an analytic 
step further what do the core meanings of Integration do?  From the data, Integration was seen to 
have some stable core meanings which centred on cooperation, mutuality340 and negotiation within 
non-negotiables (and therefore within de-limiting, parameters). The extent of adjustment and 
accomodation was therefore considered to have limits. To move beyond a descriptive account of 
what Integration means asking a different kind of question such as ‘what does Integration do?’ This 
opens up meaning analysis to another kind of interrogation as the performative dimensions of the 
discourse or its power dimensions are laid bare.  
Integration and the problem with problem-solving 
Many interviewees (both Muslim and official speakers) understood Integration as a problem-solving 
process which would tackle the problems of lower education, unemployment and sub-standard 
housing. In a larger sense it would also serve to maintain social peace and ensure the future of both 
national economic growth and liberal democracy. (von Leoprechting, Wagishauser, Norbisrath, 
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Angelow) As Cox has pointed out problem-solving theory implies preserving the status quo, so that as 
theory it is always for some purpose and always serves someone. (Cox) Drawing Muslims into the 
debates by publicly emphasising that this kind of governance is different based as it is on cooperation 
‘doing it together’, mutuality adjustment being a ‘two way street’, and fairness since those most 
likely to be affected by it will have a say. Muslims therefore are to be brought into the debates, to 
get to know them better (Merkel) to hammer out the details, to design new policies which will clearly 
impact Muslim communities most. Still there was/is evidence to suggest that Integration is 
administered through a powerful top-down dynamic.  
One aspect of problem solving is that there needs to be a defined problem for which possible 
solutions are put forward and tried out. Integration as a problem solving approach therefore needs 
to define the problem(s). For example speakers from within the political, social and economic 
establishment341 as well as Muslim organisational leaders understood Integration sets of processes 
which could be launched and managed through legislation to tackle the problems of discrimination, 
social disadvantage and underachievement. But this approach also assumed that Integration 
consisted not only of defineable and finite sets of processes but ones that were also completable. 
Therefore beginning, interim and endpoints (or terminii) could be set and to assess the progress of 
the solution. This however, appeared from the data, to be understood as a limited rather narrow set 
structural alterations: redressing imbalance for Muslims in several markets - jobs, education and 
housing. (Löffler, Bader, Oezcan) This was complemented by emphasis onlanguage learning and 
cultural knowledge ie ‘how things are done here’. Already in the course of an interview it was clear 
that there was often a linearity and uni-directionality inbuilt in the understanding of adjustment 
which went beyond the observation that immigrants have always to do the most adjusting. 
As a problem solving approach the governments seek then to device solutions which are ‘acceptable’ 
both to target populations and which are constitutional and also within international human rights 
norms. The expertise of bureaucracies are therefore also drawn upon. Though there were clearly 
differing emphases within bureaucracies at the regional level, the latter were clearly seen by Muslim 
speakers to be pivotal in the expression and tone of execution. So although some Integration officers 
emphasised their work as consisting of networking and faciliation (Graber) yet there was always an 
emphasis on efficient programme design and carry through. In other bureaucracies there was 
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evidence of even greater ‘efficiency’, more thorough-going more intensive and extensive. So 
Integration measures were being designed for the very earliest phases of immigration. This meant, 
demanding  would be immigrants undertake preparatory language courses in the country of origin. 
This was often bound up with great difficulty and in many cases de facto impossible. (Hibaoui) So 
even before arrival a sifting process had already begun. In addition the immigration tests were 
supposedly able to sort the integratable from non-integratable andbe conducted even at the arrival 
points. Immigrants were to be met at the arrival lounge since ‘integration begins at the airport’ 
informed of their rights but importantly of their obligations. Those who later refused to comply with 
stipulations such as attending a minimum number of language classes would be subject to 
punishments such as welfare cuts. (Morais, 2008)  Where residence rights were to be decided, on the 
basis of fulfilling Integration requirements bureaucrats had immense power which caused a lot of 
fear in immigrants (Musluoglu)  
Defining object populations 
As this sifting implies another power of  Integration discourse is  to define its object population. This 
entailed powers of identification and subsequent inclusionary/exclusionary powers as well. 
Integration discourse was understood to be concerned primarily with Muslim immigrants and 
residents (though it was understood to affect all immigrant groups and their descendents). (Kolat, 
van Strein) As problems become defined, problem-solving measures adopted and anobject 
community are brought togethter the close-ness, the sense of proximity can in itself be threatening 
to those object populations, especially if those who do the defining are external to those 
communities. (Musluoglu) The distance covered from problems within communities to problem 
communities is clearly a critical transition and often ends defining two kinds of opposing identities: 
the problem makers and the problem solvers.  
Given the power Integration discouse exerts in the definition and identification it becomes easier to 
understand how the logic which underpinning problem-solving may also have the power to extend 
the object field i.e. the pool of Integration objects may become more inclusive. Integration policies 
and measures were considered therefore not only for new incomers but to include third and fourth 
generation ‘settled’ or long-term residents.  (El Boujoufi, Maizar) This was achieved by tackling 
further problems within the existent Muslim population. (von Leoprechting, 2008)So the emphasis 
bearing down on both would-be immigrants, immigrants and resident populations was negatively 
focused on deficit. (El Boujoufi, 2008) So new problems and issues were being identified and drawn 
into the central debates so that it could be understood as expansive, but the common thread were 
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the social problems Muslims were thought to create. (Mohammed, Bader) This defines the dominant 
tone of Integration discourse through each of the cases.  
This is not of course to deny that there are not social problems in Muslim communities. Some 
Muslim representatives were clearly concerned with some of the ‘crimes of the community’, 
women’s rights were being abused (Demirdögan, Lenzin) Muslim youth were often problematic 
(Tufan) but the objectification and the harsh confrontational tone with strong securitising 
undercurrents which were conducted in the name of Integration which caused alarm. (Demirdögan, 
Kilicarslan) 
Muslim speakers were therefore often sceptical of its effects given the still widespread distrust of 
Muslims and the identity distortion practices to which they were subjected in the social and political 
spheres. (El Boujoufi) Though Muslim organisations had been invited to participate in ongoing 
dialogue and negotiation there was a clear groundswell of mistrust on their part, since the 
boundaries of the negotiable and non-negotiable were considered pre-defined. This was borne out 
by research at the BMI and Bauerbach interview. Here it was clearly stated that the whole 
organisation of the Integration summit and Islam conference was not open to discussion. The 
invitees, the themes to be discussed were all set and non-negotiable. In contrast Integration has 
been set at a much lower key in the Netherlands. Here officials drew on more established praxis and 
interviewees pointed out that this was not a bad thing and that consultation though not publicised to 
the same extent as in Germany was nonetheless ongoing and effective. (El Boujoufi, 2008, Ousalah) 
In Switzerland, Integration continued to develop as a model of local governance. On the federal level 
‘negotiation’, in the absence of effective Muslim organisation, was understood to be largely to be 
symbolic, a vehicle through which the government could send positive messages. (Maizar) 
Security dimensions in Integration were pointed to by a number of speakers (Angelow, Kolat, 
Bauerbach, Holzberger, van Strein, Laursick)  and it is the power to identify threat and set about 
finding solutions (and therefore render Muslim communities as security referents) is  the most 
significant power at work in Integration. By defining  Muslim communities as an underclass whose 
demographic growth and staticity threaten the very sustainability of society (Boehmer) clearly points 
to the macro dimensions of security involved in Integration. Placed within a problem solving 
approach even though terrorism per se  was considered insoluable that is ineradicable and would 
always constitute a threat, a growing Muslim  population growing more alienated and vulnerable to 
radicalisation was considered still more threatening. The root problems then of uneven 
224 
 
development, underachievement with accompanying alienation and possible radicalisation could 
however be attacked through Integration policies (Laurisck). 
Integration discourse contained critical but also emancipatory meanings and expectations but this 
was largely conceived within the overall macro problem-solving approach. Muslim representatives  
placed official recognition of Islam as a long term goal and objective. More radically critical voices 
tended to reject Integration altogether. Some saw it as protean in its meaning and though they could 
draw on stabilised meanings within it they still saw it as being easy to hijack by the conservative 
right. (Maizar) It was considered to bring nothing of lasting benefit, a a mere toy of the government 
and ’the establishment’. (Oezcan, Kolat). Some critical positions were more issue focused, and those 
who defined this position were prepared to work to achieve more short-term goals, but sceptical of 
the overall direction. (Kilicarslan) Here there was considered to be a growing distance between its 
core meanings and the practices it authored. In many casesMuslim speakers suspected their 
interlocutors of having assimilative goals.  
The meaning of mutuality however fed expectations of being heard and taken seriously, (Tufan) of 
being treated as equals ‘talking to each other at eye level’ (Maizar) with the hope of actually 
achieving (at least some of) the goals they had set. Reaching goals in Integration discourse was 
considered important, though some viewed the fora set up for its development as little more than 
just so many ‘talk shops’. (Kilicarslan) The possibility of gaining recognition as legitimate 
representatives  and spokespersons, engaging in debate at the highest level able to be seen to get 
results and exert influence over the processes, were clearly some of the emancipatory goals set by 
organisations. However these aspirations too have have produced mixed (contradictory) signals. The 
ongoing invitation by government to engage in Integration is often accompanied by officials 
problematising the very representative legitimacy of Muslim speakers. Reducing representation to 
formal representation and ultimately to membership rolls, undermines the power to negotiate. In 
addition though no one would dispute the multiplicities within Muslim communities there seems also 
to be a move toward emphasising safety in multiples. This has been clearly developing within the 
German Integration discourse where participants have been drawn from a wide cross section of 
voices has been heard from both organised and individual non-representative. Complaints have been 
loud about unilateral government decisions about who may speak and ultimately who is heard.  
Yet to be absent or excluded (also self chosen exclusion) from Integration debates is to run the risk of 
not being heard at all. The walk out and boycott by important Muslim organisation at the first 
Integration summit in Berlin 2006 illustrates the point. This strategy of resistance was chosen as a 
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way to highlight the discriminatory dimension to new legislation restricting the bringing of brides 
from Muslim countries. (Oezcan)  But its limited effects were clear for all to see. The organisations 
involved were unable to have any leverage over the legislative passage and received only bad press.  
Eventually the boycotters were drawn back to the second Integration summit thus underlining their 
subordinate position throughout.  
By conceptualising Integration as one kind of approach in which assimilative and laissez-faire 
tendencies were also possible, it was more easy to see identify assimilative dimensions in Integration 
policies and programmes. This was often emphasised in the case of Switzerland where cultural 
assimilation was still clearly at the centre of official discourse. ‘If they want to fight Islamicisation 
they need to fight with arguments and ideas’ (Maizar)  Throughout the cases, Muslim speakers 
invariably placed their cultural and religious identity as their central non-negotiable (Tufan, Gülbahar, 
Amin) whereas government speakers in their turn emphasised liberal democracy as legally fastened 
in ‘the constitution’ (Norbisrath, Holzberger, Bauerbach) and as the foundation of both of societal 
functioning and Integration. This became the key intersection of power for on the one hand 
constitutional loyalty and the right to identity were pitted against each other (though as many 
Muslim speakers pointed out they were not necessarily in conflict with each other).  
Integration may be understood as a producer of new meanings, to have (albeit in a limited sense) 
emancipatory dimensions. These might include the very practice of engagement for shaping debates 
and influencing negotiations.Engaging in politics and politicising issues lies at the heart of this  
habilitative approach. Where subordination is practiced Integration may provided the tools for 
resistane. Defined as it has been in discouret may also provide some critical purchase in those 
debates and serve to highlight its more assimilative features But because it was recognisable as a 
distinct habilitative approach working with mutuality and negotiation it can create space  be used to 
criticise hidden or subversive processes of  assimilation. (Oezcan, 2008) (Kolat, 2008) (Demirdögan, 
2008). 
Integration has switched the core emphases from state provisionism to a more limited provisionism 
(providing the tools to integrate) and the expectation on individual and groups to act responsibly – to 
integrate themselves. Muslim speakers sense and register on the one hand opportunities to achieve 
greater equality but also greater pressures to conform. It becomes therefore less a question of which 
model of habilitation be chosen but also who will dominate this discourse? In Switzerland a weak 
Muslim community struggling to organise and to speak effectively as well as a strengthening 
conservative domination of the debates has added plausibility to the charge that despite positive 
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statements from many political speakers as well as extensive funding342, Integration appears to be a 
cover for cultural assimilation. In this way Integration, could still be understood as an opportunity for 
Muslims to define their identities and positions and engage in the business of politics. (Tufan, 2008) 
(Maizar, 2008) In this respect it was still considered to be emancipatory or to have emancipatory 
potential. 
Integration as a problem-solving approach works its way out from the dominant integrationist 
presupposition that structural alteration – better housing, better jobs and vocational training 
opportunities, greater equality of treatment (religious education in schools), better language 
proficiency – will inevitably lead to a state of being integrated (Heckmann). But these approaches 
assume that alterations can be accomplished in clean surgical operations and are remiss in failing to 
recognise how meanings and changes develop from out of this discourse (and many other 
interconnected ones as well). The question remains whether  these kind of alterations in themselves 
will lead to greater identification with societies of settlement, in other words, if they are necessary 
(and most agree about this) are they also sufficient of themselves? Certainly there can be no 
automatic connection or causality between the two and texts suggest that they will be insufficient: 
Musluoglu pointed out that speaking German did not make Muslims feel more German; (Musluoglu) 
Sadaqat questioned outward compliance as being sufficient for acceptance ‘Is a veiled woman who 
speaks the language and abides by law considered fully integrated?’ (Sadaqat) In a similar vein 
Maizar pointed out that cultural knowledge and skills were also considered at the end as inadequate 
‘understanding the cultural scripts of the host society does not translate into acceptance.’ (Maizar) 
These kinds of comments all point to the inability to satisfy Integration demands to find acceptance 
and recognition. The power of (in)security is disruptive (even subversive) to ‘identification with’ nor 
does ‘fitting in’ dispel suspicion. Whereas the building of mosques may presuppose a normal 
settlement pattern, as most Muslim speakers would assert, this ‘natural’ development could quickly 
be subverted and turned to author a powerful security counter discourse with a dominating 
presupposition that something quite different is in fact happening: the subversion (Islamicisation) of 
society. Then the calls become loud for more integration whereby this is seldom understood as a call 
for deeper involvement, debate and negotiation but rather for more restrictive policies.  
                                                          
342 See integrationism p. 8 
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Integration as predicator 
The power to define is clearly a signifcant power in Integration pointing outwho is defined and who 
defines. But this rests on the kinds of predication Integration effects. As important central meaning 
producers in Integration Muslim speakers described their settlements in the three case studies 
through space, temporality and expectancy. They understood themselves as co-builders of integrated 
societies. The mosque and minaret were their own contribution to urban space inscription. This was 
read as evidence that their communities were ‘integrating’ ‘fitting in’  and finding their place. They 
understood themselves therefore as progressive not socially immobile but moving from the backyard 
to main street community. The identities Muslim speakers ascribed to themselves emphasised their 
equality as workers contributing to economic growth (Oezcan) as tax payers (Kolat), as citizens who 
were obligated but who had as a result corresponding rights (Cebo group) people who had several 
complementary loyalties to several homelands (Tufan) religious but modern and integrated 
(Gülbahar) having public identities which emphasised accessibility and transparency but which 
needed more private sequestered religiously defined spaces.(Kilicarslan). There was evidence of 
public progress new social and political figures, but also of insufficient progress in education and 
vocational training. (Kolat) 
Within discussion of Integration Muslim speakers used the following predicates to define themselves: 
socially progressive, family oriented, transparent, accessible, integrative, cooperative, engaging in 
Integration, socially and politically engaged, loyal - having multiple loyalties and not disloyal. This was 
only partly acknowledged by official speakers who rather emphasised tendencies to isolation and 
seggregation. Muslims as ghetto-makers, creators of opaque spaces and workers in alternative 
economies, creators of areas in which natives felt unwelcome (Mintjes) and de facto social 
separatists. As participants and implicated in creators of parallel societies; they had themselves 
created the climate for delinquency criminality. (van Strein) They were an underclass, and therefore 
needed to be taken in hand to offset potential destabilisation. (Laurisck) Official Integration speakers 
however used the following descriptors for Muslim communitites: underperforming, socially static, 
inward looking, ghettoised, segregated, isolationist, unwilling to speak German, speaking a Ghetto 
language mix which was neither Turkish or German, vulnerable to radicalism, 
On the one hand these kinds of predication point out some of the cleavage which defines significant 
power. Minority-majority 
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Of majority societies, official speakers thought of their societies as open, offering opportunities, fair, 
tolerant, but also keeping to themselves and not open to making contacts. Muslim speakers spoke of 
majority reserve, and keeping themselves apart, and practising a kind of apartheid. 
Conscriptive power and Integration as subject positioning 
Whether Muslims as individuals or as group identities wish it or not, they have been made 
Integration’s objects. Indeed the very ease with which they in particular are identified as needing ‘to 
be integrated’ underlines the power of conscription inherent in Integration discourse. How do they 
become to be so irresistably drawn into this debate and others not? How after such long periods of 
official neglect have they as a group come to be of such central interest?   
Integration as a problem-solving approach presupposes a set of measurable indices. As such it is 
more susceptible to portrayal as defining an interim processual period in which progression may be 
measured or at least approximated and assessed. This assumes in its turn reachable endpoints or 
terminii both for processes and the identities involved. This teleological approach is clearly 
vulnerable to shorter-term readings when evidence may be distortive. Indeed such approaches are 
always susceptible to exaggerated short-term pessimism or optimism. This was the case with the 
assumed bankruptcy of multiculturalism which authored a limited set of policies over a ten year 
period in the Netherlands. It fell to the criticism of too little progress, increasing regress i.e. 
insufficient evidence of positive interaction beyond ethno-religious communities coupled with overall 
underachievement and staticity. 
What sort of subject positioning does Integration discourse achieve? Returning to fundamental 
questions such as who is to be integrated and by whom?  
Some interviewees emphasised the distortions inherent in their own subject-positioning. Integration 
as not only a discourse for managing new immigrant settlement but for established populations of 
immigrant background. Drawing in subjects who might not normally be considered integration 
objects. How could people who have lived 30 years and more, speak fluently, understand the cultural 
scripts, interact with such ease and clearly identify closely with places of settlement also be 
Integration’s objects? It may be argued that it is not they, but more problematic ‘Muslim’ subgroups 
which are Integration’s proper objects. The objectification is a problem orientated not only 
connected to immigration flows. 
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One power has been the power to subordinate Muslim identities343. Some texts in this chapter have 
pointed to what I have termed ulteriorisation and though obviously a wider and more established 
process than can be laid at Integration’s door, nevertheless Integration draws upon these. So many 
Muslim organisations are thought to lack transparency; to have multiple agendas, prominent among 
which are the suspicion of using democratic structures to further undemocratic goals, or placing 
themselves at the disposal of external powers seeking influence in Europe. Muslims therefore need 
to be positioned in certain ways vis à vis other individuals and groups and sufficiently othered or 
deviant to justify Integration. So social problems become Muslim problems, youth problems are 
Muslim youth problems, youth criminality becomes Muslim youth criminality and so on. Torn for 
their larger contexts, multiply predicated Muslim foreign youth criminals who need to be expelled. 
(Heer)  So in discourse they are made the focus of sustained attention and are subjected to 
Integration programmes, in which the decision-making power of bureaucrats create fear and 
insecurity (Musluoglu)  
Many of these ulterioration practices, were identified and addressed directly, Muslim speakers 
protested not only the way in which long resident and largely acculturated Muslims were continually 
being conscripted into integration and inevitably into ‘failed-integration’ debates. The persistence 
and unevenness of integration attention has been interpreted as possible only because of broad 
social and political practices rooted in non-acceptance and distrust. (El Boujoufi, 2008) (Kaplan, 2008) 
The ‘majority’ fear of hidden radicals faux democrats was acknowledged but also countered by the 
argument that they should take up the challenge of engagement ‘talk to them, engage with them 
and if they are radicals they will soon reveal themselves’ (Tufan, 2008) It was however the charges 
against society and politics of misrepresentation of their identities which brought consistent criticism 
across the cases. From the data the research identified two kinds of identity distortion which were 
considered significant. The practice of conscripting identities to make all responsible for the 
behaviour of one and in reverse making this one in some way responsible for the doings of Islamist 
regimes abroad. (Musluoglu, El Boujoufi, Maizar) Though Muslim interviewees considered these to 
be powerful and distortive practices it is not always clear from political discourse whether. Roland 
Koch’s failure in the (2009?) elections. Beating the immigrant drum send foreign criminals back didn’t 
                                                          
343 Identities are understood to cover a wide spectrum of individual and group of which organisations are an important 
players in Integration. 
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resonate as well as he had expected. However the ‘problem’ of Muslim immigrants was considered 
important to win future elections. (Van Strein, 2008) 
Muslim organisations warn of ulteriorising practices within Integration. They have protested at 
having to repeat their positions by confessing their liberal-democratic commitments, by being placed 
in too close a proximity to security. Though they counter with a range of loyalty practies their 
messages are largely unheard and therefore ineffective. So the desire for dual citizenship in Germany 
derailed by the suspicion of disloyalty remains for the time being a non-starter. Questioning the 
nature of spaces to be allowed to Muslims, the degree to which they may change it, playing 
insecurity by asserting developing parallelism and segregated living, lifting the veil of temporality but 
putting categories of Muslims into it (expelling criminals). 
Placing Muslims within ‘Islam-security’ debates making them security objects places them clearly in a 
position of threat. They are defined through ‘official’ voices as a growing ‘underclass’, defined in 
terms of their deficits and threatening future economic stability and growth. Threatening to cost the 
state serious money (Wagishauser) Threatening in the present threatening the future. The story of 
economic and social staticity leading to alienation and radicalisation is a well trodden causality 
trajectory. So the macro project Integration is nothing less than the protection of society by ensuring 
its sustainability. It is has nothing to do with charity it is not equality for the sake of living up to 
‘national’ values. Terrorism can be more easily controlled at this stage restricted to a few isolated 
fringe movements and individuals, but the fear that it will grow in correspondence to the size of the 
source population and depth of its alienation.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN Equality in difference and the integrity of Integration 
What are the contributions of this research  
This research contributes at two levels: firstly at a theoretial level the main contribution has been to 
add  a new approach to Integration research, by placing the emphasis, from the start, on the 
identificational dimension of ‘fitting in’ or what is referred to in this study as habilitation. This 
problematises an assumed linearity inherent in problem-solving approaches and argues that 
identifications take place not at the end of a process or set of processes344 but throughout the 
processes. By disturbing this kind of assumed trajectory, doubt is placed on any assumed 
automaticity inherent in structural problem solving approaches to integration. By disrupting the 
assumed causality of this approach, a secular reductionist materialism is also upset, allowing Muslim 
subjectivities to assume a different ontological position. Deconstructing the dominant assumptions 
therefore (and the resulting meanings which develop from them) open up space for a more 
independent ontological position for Muslims as ‘people of religion’. This work therefore adds to 
critical research in rejecting  reification and essentialisaton of identities on the one hand  and 
engages in deconstruction of the underlying assumptionsof key identity framing discourses. 
At a second level this research makes a significant empirical contribution by exploring some of the 
content and interconnectivity of the three chosen discourses which impinge upon Muslim identity 
development. This involved introducing a new term ‘habilitation’ to replace the more sociological 
term ‘integration’. ‘Integration’ was then reserved to refer to a distinct set of processes, strategies 
and debates developing from the 1990s on. By emphasising Integration as one of several habilitative 
possibilities and examining its development in three contexts a clearer analytical approach was 
developed. 
The choice of contexts was also something quite different. Many researcher have chosen single case 
studies to concentrate more fully on the particular dynamics in a single case which serves to 
emphasise the unique conditions of becoming in that context. Comparative research by contrast 
needs to find both contrast and similarities. Many comparative studies have  the large cases – 
Germany and France (Kastoryano) (Fetzer, Soper)(Brubaker) or groups of smaller cases grouped 
together in regions. This research by contrast has taken three European countries sharing some 
                                                          
344 Heckmann identifies these as structural, cultural, interactive and identificational. See page 63 
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similarity as having histories of religious diversity and a broadly similar work-driven Muslim 
immigration. Two are ‘minor’ cases were chosen which had long been considered successful 
consociational models, both had the reputation for being ‘multicultural’ into the new millennium. 
These were taken together with Germany as a ‘major’ case, to produce a new cross case interpretive 
understanding of Muslims and the settlement regimes. The introduction of Switzerland served to 
step outside the EU framework.  
Taking ‘people of religion’ seriously as a methodological choice has meant opening up research to 
speakers. Place has been given to how they identify their own development in settlement. This they 
chose to do through identifying ‘their’ Integration issues. By emphasising the multi-level working of 
Integration and the diversity of players, this research took a broader approach to meaning 
development than more conversation or content analytic approaches and sampled a wide ‘speaker’ 
population. Here a significant empirical contribution has been to highlight how distortive practices 
have developed in and around Integration. New insights into the practices of identity distortion such 
synechdoche and ulteriorisation - ‘rise from the data’ and point to how deep seated suspicion 
permeates both social and political spheres in which Integration is developed. Security dimensions 
within Integration discourse are also developed and highlights a changing emphasis in official 
discourse from the threat from terrorism to fear of a growing but vulnerable underclass.  From 
primary data collected in interviewees and drawing from secondary data  it has been possible to 
show how Integration is a macro-security project being developed to achieve relational stability and 
societal sustainability.  
Though the emphasis moves through critical deconstruction drawing attention to the performative 
dimensions of Integration ie what it does the research approach aslo seeks to be constructive. If 
Muslims are confronted and in some degree are forced to negotiate (Köhler not free not to integrate) 
then it will require that its integrity of meaning and practice is not endangered. If as some 
interviewees have suggested it is an opportunity to make public their identity struggles (Tufan) and 
to contribute and resist,  then it is also an opportunity, for as official speakers publicly opine as to 
what it is, then they too can be held to account. The integrity of Integration will consist in maintaing 
an ethos of mutuality, and the prioritising of negotiation over compliance. Getting to know, gaining 
new knowledge (Merkel) recognition, willingness to accept criticism, need to justify positions. 
In contrast to more positivist approaches to Integration, in which methodologies are adopted which 
privlege material factors and collection of hard data, this research adopts a critical constructivist 
approach. Whereas material factors are considered significant of themselves, examining the ways in 
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which Integration is constructed and discursively produces power is a signficant alternative 
approach. Building on core critical identity theory, identities are understood to be constructed 
through self-other boundary setting. (Wodak) Yet just as this research builds upon a core 
understanding of the diversity of Muslims and only loosely groups together as ‘people of religion’, 
likewise ‘other’ against which ‘self’ is defined, though possibly understood in quite simple terms, is 
nonetheless  multiplex. Other is more properly understood as multiple Others. (Hansen) So this 
research seeks not only to add to understanding of the diverseness and multivocality of Muslims and 
their interlocutors but also the perceptions each have of who the ‘others’ are and how they place 
them in a hierarchy.  In addition this research adds to the body of knowledge concerning the 
processes of othering which take place. Just as Self and Other contain immense diversity so the 
processes of othering contain diverse practices and kinds of othering. The speakers have themselves 
pointed out conscriptive processes  such as ulteriorisation and distortive practices such as 
synechdoche. 
Questions of essentialisation need to take into account the civilisational and societal constructs of 
Islam. Though Islam is not diminished as an identificationary locale it requires careful handling. This 
research takes an anti-essentialist position and emphasises the conscious usage of ‘Muslims’ and 
‘Muslim’ rather than ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamic’. Though this change in emphasis in itself offers no 
guarantee against essentialisation tendencies, the switch in emphasis is nevertheless meant to 
emphasis subjects over objects, heterogeneity over homogeneity and fluidity and change as opposed 
to stasis. Working within a critical constructivist methodology and grounded investigative methods, a 
key priority is to take ‘people of religion’ seriously. This is understood to require greater sensitivity to 
secular blind-spots and to resist materialist reductionism of religious motivation and action. By 
introducing habilitation as a generic term to replace integration, a way is provided for maintaining 
distinction, avoiding confusion and for permitting the easier tracing of critical usage. So it may be 
easier to understand how assimilation is used to criticise a discourse of Integration. As a working 
definition which embodies much of its present discursive meaning, Integration is understood to be 
sets of negotiative processes working within sets of non-negotiables.  
Contexts of settlement, deliver important understandings about how difference, and in particular 
Muslim difference, have been understood and dealt with. Looking at each case separately, Muslim 
immigration was explored through common parallel patterns of economic driven guest-worker 
migration, family reunification and settlement.  Conservative denial in Germany, an ambitious 
deconstruction of ethnicised national identity through citizenship extension, and the adoption of 
234 
 
high profile Integration, characterise the stages of transition in this case. In the Netherlands, 
segmentalised social organisation, multiculturalism and welfarism failed to realise the potential for 
Muslim emancipation and protection. As Muslim immigrants become both objects of concern and 
hostility for a secularised majority an abrasive realism has come to characterise Integration talk. 
Switzerland, tolerant of traditional territorialised difference, has had difficulty managing the central 
tension between economic need and cultural defence.  As such, it has become increasingly 
vulnerable to right wing conservativism able to exploit opportunity structures to securitise Swiss 
national identity through assertions of creeping Islamicisation.     
Organising voices through spatial temporal and expectational categories served to illustrate the 
importance increasing visibility and presence have come to hold in political and social discourse 
through a securitised shifting from the social need for space for Muslims to politicised Muslim space 
as in parallel societies. The latter characterises a significant transition from habilitation as making 
room and providing conditions for adjustment, to the politics of failed integration. In a second 
temporal category the move to permanence, acquiring citizenship, is problematised in the optional 
model which was seen to be disruptive to ‘identification with’ development. The permanence or non-
negotiability of secular arrangements was seen especially in loyalty to the constitution and in 
working environments. In the third category expectations of integration, secularism and security 
were explored. Not only the protean meaning of Integration was emphasised but also more stable 
cores which were drawn upon to highlight subversive practices and processes. 
As this research has shown, Muslims, as long-term residents and citizens, seek to correct the 
imputation of disloyalty or the perception of ambiguity in their loyalty (often implied and certainly 
part of any ulteriorisation process) to the places of their settlement.  As Mamdani has shown in the 
US, loyalty and disloyalty are invariably constructed around power oppositions: ‘good Muslims’ 
support the US in the war against terror, bad ones do not.  American Muslims are in this way 
pressured to show their loyalty and patriotism in their condemnation of terror and Islamist terror in 
particular.  (Mamdani, 2005) In the European sphere, in the absence of blanket support for the War 
on Terror, the rendering of a good Muslim is somewhat different.  To extend Mamdani’s 
characterisation: ‘good Muslims’ are integrative ‘bad Muslims’ are anti-integrative.  In many respects 
the latter dichotomisation parallels the former but there are significant differences too.   
Whereas the room for manoeuvre seems to be more restricted in the US, Muslims in the three case 
studies consistently resisted aspects of integration as assimilative.  The ambiguities in the term 
‘integration’ and the demand and expectation of identity retention permitted greater interpretive 
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space.  Yet there are indications that this too may be shrinking – ‘you are free to integrate but not 
free not to integrate’.   As a possible result of discursive shrinkage, Muslims were anxious to engage 
in ‘loyalty practices’.  Muslims as ‘settled’ immigrants possessed complementary loyalties, and where 
new loyalties were emphasised, it was not at the expense of older ones.  In this way loyalty to 
original homelands remained, but modified through elevating the land of settlement to a kind of 
personalised possession.  Here the sentiments of possession were significant since they pointed to 
‘identification with’ which integration must not only aim for but provide for. Citizenship was found to 
be insufficient.  So although an original homeland retained its cherished status, a new one was 
constructed and deemed to have an equally cherished status.  Further exploration of how settled 
immigrants blend identifications in ‘loyalty practices’ into non-exclusive, non-contradictory but 
consistent understandings of multiple possessions would be a valuable research project, since the 
multiplicity of loyalty is a kind of expression which needs to be understood not as contra integration 
but rather as evidence of an integration already well progressed. This would have special relevance 
to the German case and would contribute to a reappraisal of the optional citizenship model.  
Certainly where loyalties are less territorially fixed, new forms of trans-local loyalties need also to be 
more fully understood in any conceptual development of habilitation generally, and Integration 
particularly.  As young Muslims re-imagine their belonging and the territorial spaces they occupy, and 
especially as they engage in communicative interaction across their inherited ethnic and theological 
differences, they begin to see the multiplicity and diversity of their primary loyalties (for example 
Islam) on the one hand, and on the other hand, their world as a single space.  (Mandaville, 2002) 
Taking on board, translocal dimensions would serve to place integration in a more expansive 
habilitative model in which processes and their articulation would occur in less enclosed national 
spaces.   
 Yet the securitisation of western societies through the settlement of Muslims has, in this research, 
concentrated narrowly on local spatial, temporal and expectancy aspects, exploring how they in their 
diverse localised expressions have also become the primary conduits of ulteriorisation. This has 
meant a concentration on localised voices. One possible research development would be to include a 
transnational dimension into integration and security processes by introducing extra-national voices, 
such as those of trans-national actors.  However this kind of suggestion quickly runs up against the 
charge of being ‘unrealistic’.  State elites may be unwilling to seriously consider transnational 
contributions since they may become uncomfortable with the implications for national sovereignty.  
They may fear losing control of the debate, and possibly being sensitive to external criticism of 
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inadequacies.  Therefore at the political level it might easily become part of a threatened sovereignty 
debate, with emphases on ‘illegitimate interference’ and ‘interventionism’.  In this way transnational 
voices may therefore be dismissed as irrelevant to the debate.  Yet summitry offers good 
opportunities for transnational voices to speak into integration discourse and perhaps to help in 
important re-formulations of meaning.  Religious spokespersons might offer more incisive insights 
into the needs of people of religion and more generally of religion as ‘communities of faith’ (Thomas, 
2005) and ‘communities of purity’ (Kaya, 2009).  Communities would appear not only as localised but 
translocal coping devices, having simultaneously national and transnational characters.   
Another problem for national elites, by introducing transnational Muslim actors would be to ensure 
that only non-radical voices would speak, something they have difficulty enough controlling in 
national spaces.  In a word transnational voices might lead to radicalisation at worst, dissonance and 
confusion at best.  In the light of the ‘dangers’ it is necessary to ask what kind of positive contribution 
might transnational actors conceivably make? One suggestion would be that transnational voices 
might be to free the integration debate from the contextual morass of becoming in which national 
actors are necessarily involved.  One promising approach would be to explore how and in what ways 
EU might contribute to national integration discourses.   
Although the primary emphasis in the EU has been on creating workable integrative institutional 
structures for the European member states, internal tensions within member societies by mass 
immigration, have also been the catalyst for calls from within the EU, for more uniform integration 
policies in the member states.   These moves have taken place against some significant cross EU 
trends such as the general decline in official multiculturalism; (Entzinger, 2003) the adoption of a 
‘thin’ integration approaches based on a de-ethnicisation of citizenship; (Joppke and Morawska, 
2003) and lastly the decline of welfare as an integrating principle which reflects more generally the 
changing nature of welfare states and the rise of neo-liberal doctrines of immigrant self-sufficiency 
and responsibility.  (Schierup, Hansen et al., 2006) (Kymlicka and Banting, 2006) 
Given that similar integration trends are taking place within member states, how far might this be a 
reflection of top-level EU policy preferences? Or relatedly, to what extent is, or can, the EU be 
involved in the integration processes and procedures of its member states? If the EU is impacting or 
seeking to impact processes of integration then it may be fair to ask, to what extent will it be possible 
for the EU to input identity-framing processes? Would immigrants and second and third generation 
descendents of immigrants interact differently with the EU? Would they see it as an important 
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transnational coping strategy (Joppke and Morawska, 2003)  or would national citizenship continue 
to be understood as the ultimate guarantor of rights and identity? (Hansen, 2003) 
Because state elites have been deeply involved in the negotiation of Muslim identities, (Kastoryano, 
2002) the management of the process of immigrant integration is still considered a national 
competence. This is underlined, to the present, through the EU principle of subsidiarity, yet strong 
practical arguments for its removal from a national to a supranational competence have also been 
made. The logic and imperatives, which underlie this call, have been strengthened and legitimated by 
on-the-ground facts. The intermeshed nature of the supranational entity through the Schengen 
accords increasingly mean that change or failure to change in a policy area, by one member must 
have economic and security repercussions for the others. (Süssmuth and Weidenfeld, 2005) 
New research designs on Integration might usefully explore changes in supranational policy making 
and highlight ways in which the EU seeks to contribute or influence developing national habilitative 
strategies.  As things stand it is however, unlikely that this will occur in any simple transference of 
competences through communitisation; still the means of indirect influence may become significant. 
In 2004, for instance, the European council adopted the “Hague Programme” which emphasised the 
need for greater coordination between integration strategies and EU policy based on what were 
defined as Common Basic Principles (CBPs).  The Council adopted the “Common Basic Principles for 
Immigrant Policy” in the EU and further suggested in September 2005 “A common Agenda for 
Integration”.  This was conceived as the new framework for implementing CBPs at EU and national 
levels, and for providing a European impetus for cooperation and for finding and exchanging best 
integration practices, “a distinctive European approach to integration through cooperation and 
exchange of good practice. ” (EU-Commission, 2007) In this way “mainstreaming integration” 
through knowledge sharing would become established EU practice.  “Mainstreaming integration 
becomes an integral part of policy making and implementation across a wide range of EU policies and 
the Communication announces the Commission's commitment to put forward new initiatives to 
further develop this common framework”.  (EU-Commission, 2007)  
Providing general guidance in terms of setting broad goals for integration would however be a 
significant EU contribution and would fit within the overall aims of neo-liberal economic policy – 
greater efficiency, mobility and de-regulation.  Continued emphasis on labour mobility will likely 
remain of central importance in EU thinking, (Schierup, Hansen et al., 2006) yet supranational elites 
are likely to remain aware of concerns in national populations about increased immigration and 
perceptions of ineffective integration.  Frattini for example, estimated that the EU would need 
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upwards of 25 million new migrants in the next 25 years to meet shortfalls in skilled labour and to 
ensure that the aspirations of Lisbon would be achieved, namely that the EU becomes the world’s 
leading knowledge economy.  As vice Commissioner of the EU, he sought to de-securitise 
‘immigration’ by seeking to replace the term with ‘mobility’.  In addition he clearly twinned 
immigration and integration “There can be no immigration without integration. ” (Frattini, 2008) “the 
link between legal migration policies and integration strategies needs to be continually reinforced. 
”(EU-Commission, 2007) This seems to point to a necessary supranational involvement in national 
integration as in immigration. 
Doing things differently  
To conclude this research project I would like to make a number of suggestions: that Integration as a 
nexus of power 345should be further explored by researchers and Integration-players from the aspect 
of what this discourse does;  secondly by gaining greater understanding of its performative effects, 
that shaping power might  be exerted differently and more sensitively to the needs of its objectified 
subjects. In this way a greater degree of being held accountable would  be introduced for all 
participants who exercise power in this debate (especially official Integration makers but also 
organisation heads) because recognising and “...attributing ‘power’ to an issue immediately raises 
the stakes for political justification of action or inaction.” (Guzzini, 2005:497)  
The assignation of power not only implies responsibility and accountability but also  issues a 
challenge to think differently about the matters in hand. That is to make suggestions about how 
things could have been (or still could be) done differently.  Integration as a central framing discourse 
together with its tributary security discourses impacts and will continue to impact the development 
of Muslim identities and the conditions of their settlement in the case studies in this study. 
Integration cannot be avoided and those with most to lose cannot afford to that they stand outside it 
and see it as ‘a treacherous metaphor’ (Banton) or a ‘fashion word’ (Oezcan), or to have it 
unilaterally struck from the vocabulary. (Kolat) To be relevant to shaping of this ongoing project 
requires ongoing engagement and especially for those most directly affected by it. This is not to 
suggest that engagement will mean shoring up a status quo for criticism must accompany to uncover 
where power is used and misused. Tactics of resistance and boycott, will also have their place, but as 
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 That is to objectify and conscript, to establish presuppostions which appear as ‘natural’ or ‘self-evident’ and, to label and 
brand and thus to effect subject positionings. 
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has been already pointed out structure favours particular courses of action (Jessop) Since 
confrontational tactics have to this point have been largely ineffective, agents must see where their 
best chances lie. Critical voices cannot afford to stand in lofty detachment and imagine they can 
effectively speak into it’s discursvie development. This seems to have been understood by Muslim 
organisations as they engage in the opportunity structures which encourage ongoing practices of 
consultation and negotiation. They must however be sensitive to how discourse develops or they 
may discover themselves being rejected by their clients as little more than self-seeking 
collaborationists. Likewise government and corporate speakers must be clearly aware that there can 
be no return to laissez-faire whether that be understood as in an ‘invisible hand’ which will make ’ 
‘identification with’ happen of itself, or just plain neglect. They too must continue to understand the 
need to engage ‘at eye level’ to negotiate even where the power inequalities are so clearly evident. 
The question of security has been one of the most disturbing features of developing Integration in 
the three case studies and one of the central pointers to power. Yet Integration can only remain a 
relevant discourse of adjustment within liberal democracies if distance can be opened up and 
maintained within Integration between its core processual dynamics and the hard edge of security.  
This is not to suggest that it can remain isolated from its other interconnected discourses as the 
ineffective construction of silence in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s illustrate. But neither 
should it be de-railed by ‘events’ whether this be a terrorist event (an attack or a plot uncovered) or 
a ‘successful’ securitisation such as has led to the banning of minarets in Switzerland. Integration 
may require  an overarching  agreement which spans sufficiently the political spectrum of democratic 
parties.  Though sabotage from the right may be an ongoing threat. 
Lastly it is the great awakening of expectation on the part of Muslim immigrants and citizens, of their 
desire to find acceptance and recognition, to find their home, to feel they fit and can function within 
the springs and cogs of society and politics which need to be recognised throughout. Deep 
integration as ‘identification with’ the lands of settlement need to be seen not as standing at the end 
of processes but as something nurtured and protected throughout. This will mean creating effective 
consultative institutions and returning periodically to the core meanings of Integration cooperation, 
mutuality and negotiationThe dominance of the presupposition that Integration is merely about 
finding solutions to deficits which is at the heart of problem solving approaches must be must be set 
aside since Integration is  about identities ‘in becoming’. This is a much greater project than 
structural alteration and difference management it is about how a new kind of predication can take 
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place and ultimately about new subject positioning. The protection of the integrity of Integration 
must therefore work at the very roots of power. 
Integration has awakened and nurtured hope and expectancy, and must be understood as non-
injurious, it must develop visions and processes so that ‘whole people’ may be allowed to fit. (Lenzin, 
2008) It must remain sensitive to human subjects and their subjectivities, to their collective choices 
and their collective voices, and so there needs to be mutual responsibility and accountability, so that 
the expectations of people are neither ignored nor the human soul ‘bored into.’ (Maizar, 2008) 
Problem-solving integrationism alone will not be sufficient therefore to ensure the integrity of 
integration. This will require a greater commitment to its underlying ethic and imperative – the 
rightness of and need forongoing dialogue, consultation and negotiation.  To ensure the integrity of 
integration, will require continued critical discursive interrogation in which power and responsibility 
will be called to account and alternatives considered. It will need therefore to remain a negotiated 
process, an ongoing open-ended search for ways to equalise difference and keep a differentiated 
sense of that equality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Soli Deo Gloria  
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Appendix One Abbreviations used   
ANAG  Law on Foreign Nationals' Residence and Settlement (CH) 
BAMF  Federal ministry for Migration and Refugees Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (FRG) 
BMI  Federal interior ministry Bundesministerium des Innern (FRG) 
Bvf The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz  (FRG)  
BVV   Borough Assembly Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (FRG) 
BZK  Ministry for interior Affairs Ministrie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Kroninkrinksrelaties (NL) 
CBPs  Common Basic Principles 
CDU  Christian Democratic Union Christliche Demokratische Union (FRG) 
CNV  The National Federation of Christian Trade Unions in the Netherlands  Christelijk Nationaal 
Vakverbond 
CSU  Christian Social Union, Christliche Soziale Union Bavarian sister party to CDU 
DGB   The Confederation of German Trade Unions Deutscher Gewerkschafsbund 
DIGO  The association of Islamic Communities in Eastern Switzerland Dachverband islamische 
Gemeinschaften in der Ostschweiz.   
DIK  German Islam Conference Deutsche Islamkonferenz 
DITIB   The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für 
 Religion e.V. Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği, 
Diyanet  Presidency of Religious Affairs Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 
EKD  The Lutheran Church of Germany Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands 
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany, BRD Bundesrepubik Deutschland 
GDR  German Democratic republic, DDR Deutch demokratische Republik 
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IGM  Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IGM) Industriegewerkschaft Metall 
IGMG   Milli Görüş or Islamic Community of Milli Görüş Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş 
NVV  Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions 
SCR   Swiss Council of Religions Schweizerischer Rat der Religionen 
SPD  Social Democratic Party, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
TCNs  Third Country Nationals  
TD-IHK   The Turkish-German Chamber of commerce Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und 
 Handelskammer  
UDHR   United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
VIN  The Association of Imams in the Netherlands Vereniging Imams Nederland 
VIOZ   The Federation of Islamic Organisations in Zürich, Vereinigung Islamische Organizationen in 
 Zürich 
WIN  Newcomers integration act Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (NL) 
WRR  Scientific Council for Government Policy Wetenschappelijke Raad vor het Regeringsbeleid
  (NL)  
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Appendix Two Interviewees 
In this appendix I have organised the interviewees together with some interview details, 
alphabetically and written some further information about their activities and roles within 
organisations and institutions. 
Akgunduz 
Written response to interview questions. 23.01.2010 
Professor Ahmed Akgunduz is rector of The Islamic University of Rotterdam. Islamitische Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Bergsingel 135, 3037 GC Rotterdam. An Ottomanist specialising in Islamic Waqf in the 
Ottoman Empire, he was visiting Professor for Near Eastern Studies at Princeton before taking up his 
present post.  
Alimi 
Interview: Minarets are part of integration 7th November 2008, Titlisstr. Wil Switzerland  
Bekim Alimi is Imam of the Islamic Community Wil in eastern Switzerland and  is active within one of 
the two top-level umbrella organisations, FIDS, in addition he is vice-President of The Association of 
Islamic Communities in Eastern Switzerland DIGO. He has been prominent in media as a 
spokesperson for Muslims which extends beyond his work in FIDS.  He is therefore well known both 
within communal and Cantonal politics and at the national level also.  He works actively for 
integration in the town of Wil and has a high standing with the communal authorities.  He is often 
called upon to mediate in difficult situations involving Muslims.   
Altuntas 
Telephone Interview: Choosing the Netherlands 15th January 2010 
Mr Altuntas is vice-chairman of Millis Görüş Noord-Nederland. He is the director of the group’s 
Islamic Schools organisation (which for legal reasons has a separate legal identity) which has the 
management of 46 Islamic schools. Millis Görüs split in 1997 into two separate organisations - north 
and south. We (North) wanted the emphasis to be upon our lives and future in the Netherlands and 
to loosen ties to Germany and Turkey.  
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Amin 
Interview: The Possibility of Radicalisation. 5th November Granitweg Zürich 
Dr. Ismail Amin former professor of Arab philology from Zurich University is President of VIOZ an 
umbrella organisation in Canton Zürich. The umbrella organisation represents mainline Sunni 
organisations but because of theological differences not Ahmadiyya or Alevis which are not 
recognised as genuine Muslims. Speaking with a united voice and being heard at the Cantonal and 
national level on all issues affecting Muslims is the aim of the VIOZ. 
Angelow 
Inteview: CDU integration Policy 17 September 2008, CDU Party Headquarters Klingelhofstr.8, Berlin 
Dr. J. Angelow is responsible for political programme content and analysis for the CDU national party. 
He is also an adviser to the government in the field of domestic politics and is co-responsible with 
Herr Bott, for policy development on the issues of immigration and integration. He is chairman of 
one of three special commissions346347 within the CDU for ‘Domestic politics and integration’, and as 
such he is a key contributor to setting the emphases in the integration politics of the present German 
government. 
Aydin  
Hasan Aydin is a factory worker and member of the Alevi Community in Heilbron. 
Interview: How will they see us tomorrow? 21.05.2009 Alevi Zentrum Heilbronn. 
H. Aydin is a factory worker and naturalised German citizen. He is a member of the Alevi Community 
in Heilbronn. 
Bader 
Interview: IGMetall, integration and immigration 04.08.2008 Neckarsulm 
                                                          
346 Bundesfachausschuss 
347 The other two independent committees are ‘Security architecture’ and ‘Islamism and extremism’ 
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Felix Bader is a party secretary involved in immigration and integration for IGMetall, Europe’s largest 
Trade Union. This interview took place at a regional office in the Salinenstr. Neckarsulm. 
Felix Bader is a local IGMetall official at the Neckarsulm office. He leads a special committee called 
“Immigration” which deals with many of the issues of representing foreign workers or workers from 
a Turkish or Russian background. He organises meetings with workers to discuss and find solutions to 
problems foreign workers face in some of the big factories in the area - Audi A.G., Peerburg 
Kolbernschmitt – but this also extends beyond the factory environment to problems in workers areas 
such as the ‘Amorbach Ghetto’.  
Bauerbach 
Interview: Integration Summitry: The Islam Conference and the BMI 19th September German Ministry 
of the Interior, Alternative Moabit, Berlin. http://www.en.bmi.bund.de/ 
Bauerbach is a pseudenoym for an Islam expert  at the BMI who has worked extensively in the DIK . 
He has also been a political adviser to the embassy in Istanbul. In 2002 he returned to Germany to 
work for the Department of Migration and Asylum and later for the BMI. His main work has been in 
the preparation and involvement in the Islam conference.  
Böckle  
Interview: Segmentalism and secular work space 7th August 2008 at headquarters in Neckarsulm 
W. Böckle has been for many years the Personnel manager of the Kolbenschmidt-Pierburg 
Aluminium plant in Neckarsulm which employs over 2000 workers. He is intimate with the 
procedures of day-to-day management in a multi-national company and especially with the problems 
which occur with respect to foreign workers on the factory floor.  
Describing itself as a global company with plants in Europe, Asia and the US it is a major producer of 
aluminium parts for the car industry. See http://www.kspg-ag.de/index.php?lang=3  
Cebo 
Group Interview: This is my land now! 2nd September 2008 Alevi Headquarters Stolbergerstr. Cologne 
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This was a group interview with Cafer Cebo, Dogan Sengül and Alisan Zülfikar. Cebo who functioned 
as leader of the group, is project coordinator at the Alevi national headquarters. A veteran activist he 
has led an important campaign in Germany in the early 1980s against xenophobia and discrimination 
against foreigners and has been involved in various organisations. He has served as chairman of an 
umbrella organisation at the regional level and has been speaker of a special anti-discrimination 
commission set up by the regional government of Northern Rhine Westphalia. He has also been 
involved in the setting up and management of the Immigration Museum and has been awarded the 
Rhineland Medal348 for Understanding among the Peoples349 
Migration Museum see http://www.domit.de/ 
Dätwyler 
Interview: From teaching in religion to teaching about religion – new secular arrangements in Canton 
Zürich. 6th November 2008 at the Reformed Church Headquarters Zürich. 
P. Dätwyler theologian, publicist, journalist,has been active in radio TV and newspaper.  Hew as 15 
years in the department of religious affairs in Swiss Television switched to the Zurich Reformed 
Church Reformiertkirche Zürich and took over public relations informationsdienst. Since 2000 he has 
been Cultural representative kulturbeauftragte, an advisory role in which he works closely with the 
President of the Church council, Rudi Reich – cultural work feuillton, cultural projects, concerts, 
exhibitions, special events, round-table discussions podiumsgespräche, cultural work ethnological 
sense inter religious dialogue. He is interested inTaoism and Zen Buddism but in the last ten years 
has recognised the urgency and challenge of Islam. 
Demirdögan 
Interview: Integration as Projected through the Enemy Image of Islam 21st May 2009, Alevite Cultural 
Centre Heilbronn 
                                                          
348 Rheinlandtaler 
349 Völkerversändigung 
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Sidar Demirdögan is a member of the Left party350 and stood for this party at position 11 for election 
to the European Elections in 2009. See http://www.epsu.org/a/4994  She is a political scientist and 
Germanist and President of the Federal Association of (female) Migrants in Germany e.V.351 
http://www.migrantinnen.net/ whose aims are to support the integration of female migrants into all 
areas of life, to offer a forum for female immigrants to speak and be heard, and to agitate for the 
rights to residency and work independent of husbands. The organisation organises conferences and 
publicises instances of domestic violence and forced marriages. It is opposed to Ghettos and parallel 
societies. 
El Boujoufi 
Interview: Why am I the object of integration 6th October 2008, Koninginnegracht The Hague. 
D. El Boujoufi is the chairman of the Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid CMO which is the largest 
officially recognised top level Muslim umbrella organisation in the Netherlands. He meets regularly 
with top government officials as part of CMO’s official advisory role, speaks publicly on a wide range 
of Muslim issues and coordinates Muslim leadership at the national level 
Geisler 
Written response to interview questions. Interview set for 1st September 2008 was cancelled.  
Dr. Ralph Geisler is a member of the governing body of the Lutheran Church in Germany (EKD) 
Oberkirchengemeinderat and is the Church’s spokesperson on the issues of Foreign and Ethinc 
minorities, immigration and integration in the Federal Republic. He is prominent in interreligious 
dialogue, and has written on the themes of religious diversity and cultural coexistence.  
Graber  
Interview: Facilitating Integration at the Communal Level. Case Study Heilbronn. 07.07.2008 at the 
Integration office Heilbronn. 
                                                          
350 Die Linke 
351 Vorsitzende des Bundesverbandes der Migrantinnen in Deutschland e.V. 
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R. Graber is the head of the recently created Integration department in the City of Heilbronn. She 
designs integration initiatives and contributes to those initiated by Immigrant associations. She 
understands an important dimension of her work to be to link various immigrant organisations which 
often have little knowledge of each other or are competitive entities seeking funding and thus 
unwilling to cooperate or share information. As such she sees her work as concretising integration 
programmes within the National Integration Framework and contributing to on the ground initiatives 
and bridge-building between immigrant organisations. See 
Gülbabar 
Interview: Millis Görüş Integration and Security Surveillance 4th September 2008, IGMG Centre 
Mehrheimerstr. Cologne 
Mesud Gülbahar is an Economist and is Chairman of The Federal Youth Council of the Islamische 
Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş. He is responsible for  IGMG’s youth work in Europe. They  have an 
extensive network of organisations, 30 Associations in western Europe and each having a 
corresponding youth organisation for which programme – sport, further education and training, 
seminars, careers advice -  and structure are planned and developed for regional organisations. 
Europe wide IGMG have over 500 mosque associations. An independent organisation they are under 
surveillance by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. They are often considered 
with suspicion as an umbrella for ‘camouflage’ organisations transmitting anti-secular and radical 
Isalmist message.  
See http://www.iibsa.org/cms/index.php?id=118 
M.Gülbahar speaks about programme and activity for Muslim youth as one way in which youth 
criminality can be fought. 
 See http://www.mjd-net.de/node/1869 For Muslim Jugend Deutschland see http://www.mjd-
net.de/ 
Heer 
Interview Kick the foreign criminals out! 4th November SVP Cantonal Headquarters, Nüschelerstr. 
Zürich. 
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Alfred Heer has been from 1995-2007 a member of the Cantonal Parliament Kantonsrat and factional 
leader from 2004-07. Since 2007 he has been a member of the Swiss Parliament Nationalrat. He 
describes his goals peaceful coexistence, but one in which violent criminals must be set clear 
boundaries. Foreign criminals should be expelled. he is for low taxation and a strong middle class. His 
motto Security and Prosperity for us!  
See http://www.svp-
zuerich.ch/nt/index.php?sid=880c263114cef33b7a74d6b45f5f4f18&item=./mandate/kr&id=68&bezi
rk=stadt_zh 
Hibaoui 
Interview: Mosque life and integration disinterest 20th August Tübingen 
Dr. Abdelmalik Hibaoui is a former Imam of a Moroccan Mosque in Stuttgart. He works in the 
department of Integration Politics at the municipality of Stuttgart. As Imam he had initiated several 
projects and established ongoing dialogue with the mosque and the police authorities. This was 
especially appreciated by the latter but petered out when resigned as Imam at the mosque. Today he 
is involved in the project ‘Intercultural Opening and Qualification of the Islamic Communities in 
Stuttgart’352  in which he liases between the municipal authorities and the Arabic speaking 
communities in designing integration initiatives. 
Hizami 
I.Hizami is an architecture student whose parents were asylum seekers from Afghanistan. This 
interview took place at a protest before the Tweede Kaamer building in the Hague. 
Holzberger      
Interview Green Integration and post-Nation Identities Date  Sept. 17. 2008 Dorotheenstr. Berlin 
Mark Holzberger is adviser to the green part for Asylum and Migration. In his position as policy 
adviser he contributed significantly to the SPD-Green project of extending citizenship to resident 
                                                          
352 Projekt "Interkulturelle Öffnung und Qualifizierung der islamischen Gemeinden in Stuttgart" 
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foreigners. He is critical of the new integration summitry and its supposed obligations and asserts 
‘well meant is not well done!’ See http://www.migration-boell.de/web/integration/47_1886.asp 
IGMetall Group 
Group Interview: Living Apart. 10th May 2007 IGM Regional Headquarters, Neckarsulm. 
This group interview involved F. Bader, regional secretary of IGMetall in Neckarsulm; A.F. Sadi, 
T.Ceylan, and  E. Oezcan all union members and workers in the Audi A.G. factory Neckarsulm. 
Kaplan 
Interview: Secular Integration and Alevitism Alevite Headquarters, Stolbergerstr. Cologne. 
 Ismail Kaplan is the director of Education and Development of the Alevi Community Germany  
Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland e.V. 
http://www.aabk.info/index_de.html 
Kiabami 
Interview: We have become connected 3rd November Ahle-l-beyt headquarters, Grabenstr. Schlieren 
Mohammed Reza Kiabani is secretary of Ahe-I-beyt a conservative Shia organisation with close links 
to the Islamic regime in Iran. The organisation provides a range of services to Shia Muslims in 
Switzerland such as Hajj, and transmitting fatawa from highest religious authorities in Iran. Kiabani 
has represented the Shia community in talks with the Federal government. 
See http://www.ahlebeyt.ch/deutsch/index.htm 
Kılıçarslan 
Interview:The New Face of Islam in Germany 3rd September 2008 in Liebigstr. Cologne.  
A. Kılıçarslan is vice General Secretary of DITIB and is the first woman to sit on its central committee. 
She holds German citizenship and has a degree in teaching and is an economics teacher. She works at 
The Meeting and Training centre for Muslim Women Begegnungs- und Fortbildungszentrum 
muslimischer Frauen (BFMF) in Cologne and leads its training section. As an independent 
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organisation, within DITIB, it offers German and Integration courses to Muslimas, but also political 
training and teaching for state school examinations.  Within BFMF she oversees and counsels newly 
immigrant Muslimas in all areas of life adjustment. She writes regularly on women’s issues at  
www.turkpartner.de She has agitated for the rights of religious women and against their 
discrimination; she represented DITIB at the German Islam Conference and was the only Muslima 
wearing the Hijab. In contradistinction to Necla Kelek, a prominent Islam critic and fellow participant, 
AK sees wearing the hijab as a sign of her emancipation: „It is a sign of emancipation that I wear this 
scarf in a society which can only accept this with great difficulty. That is my Muslim emancipation.” 
AK seeks to raise awareness of the discrimination Muslimas experience due to their visibility. They 
have difficulties finding a training place or a job, they are paid worse and “whenever she is seen, they 
think, she is poor and oppressed. I don’t wish anyone on the street to think they must have sympathy 
with me just because I wear a hijab.” AK rejects any reformation of Islam to fit modernity but sees 
greater room for contextualisation of controversial Qur’an verses and argues for a more coverage of 
interpretations by women theological experts. As a central committee member she has argued for 
the restructuring of DITIB to meet the demands of the German government for representative 
legitimacy through membership rolls. 
For more about her views on forced marriage and honour crimes see 
http://www.taz.de/index.php?id=archivseite&dig=2007/05/04/a0093 
Kiramli 
Interview: The permanence of xenophobia 21st May 2009 Alevi Zentrum Heilbronn 
I. Kiramli works in a hydraulics factory in Neuenstadt. He is active in the Alevi community in 
Heilbronn and is an Austrian citizen. 
Kolat 
Interview: Steering and independent course. 18th September 2008 at TGB headquarters, Tempelhofer 
Ufer, Berlin. 
K. Kolet, Turkish Community Germany (TGD) the largest secular Turkish-Muslim organisation. He was 
a participant in both the Integration Summit and German Islam conference, and boycotted 
temporarily the Integration Summit in protest against new discriminatory immigration laws which 
restricted the immigration of Turkish spouses to Germany. 
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Laurischk 
Interview: The Walls which Remain. Tuesday, 16th September 2008  Dorotheenstr. Berlin 
Frau Sybille Laurisck, is an FDP member of the German Parliament Bundesrat. She is at present 
chairperson of the Committee for Family, Seniors, Women and Youth. She is concerned with the 
politics of integration, family, equality and youth   
http://www.laurischk.de/Home/2840b486/index.html 
http://www.laurischk.de/Integration-und-Migration/2871b503/index.html 
Lenzin 
Interview: The Invisibilisation of Islam in Zürich. 7th November 2008 Feldeggstr. Zürich 
R. Lenzin is an Islam expert of  Swiss-Pakistani origin. She teaches at the European Project for 
Interreligious Learning in Zurich, is a lecturer in intercultural communications at the University of 
Lucerne, and is Vice-President Interreligious Association of Switzerland. She has gained public 
prominence in Zürich through her interreligious dialogue championing Muslima affairs and 
opposition to the Minaret ban. 
Löffler 
Interview: German Trade Unionism and Integration 6th August 2008, DGB headquarters Heilbronn. 
B. Löffler is regional chairman of the Confederation of German Trade Unions. This organisation 
represents the largest German Unions at national and regional level on issues of national interest. A 
former teacher, he is engaged in representing Trade Union positions on immigration and integration.  
Maizar 
Interview:  Integration Interim Points. 8th November 2008 Poststr. Roggwil 
Dr. I. Maizar is President of FIDS one of two top level Muslim Umbrella Organisation in Switzerland. 
As such he plays a clearly representative at the national level for Muslims in Switzerland. He is called 
upon to advise and liaise with national representatives and in the Cantons in Eastern Switzerland. In 
his public relations role he is called upon to appear in panel discussions and writes extensively on 
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Muslim issues. His role as President of FIDS means contacts to every Muslim organisaton in 
Switzerland.  
Mansoor 
Group Interview: Sharia and Terror, 4th November 2008 at a mosque in Zürich 
This interview was conducted with the Imam and Amir of a mosque in Zürich with a translator. 
Mintjes 
Interview: The Unhappy Dutch 8th October 2008 Amersfoort 
H. Mintjes is a member of The Protestant Churches in the Netherlands and is active in The Dutch 
Council of Churches which is an umbrella of various Protestant churches. He is chairman of an 
Interfaith sub-committee responsible for fostering good relations with Muslims, and is involved in 
framing inter-faith dialogue, writing policy documents, and giving lectures.  
 http://www.protestantchurch.nl/ 
http://www.oikoumene.org/en/member-churches/regions/europe/netherlands/ccn.html 
Mohammed 
Interview: Social Structure of Integration 19.09.2008 European Integration Centre Templehof Berlin 
B. Mohammed is by profession a Health and Hygiene inspector. He is director of the European 
Integration Centre Templehof, and SPD member for the Borough Assembly 
Bezirksverordnetenversammlung (BVV) He was a non-organisational executive member 
Präsidiumsmitglied in the DIK.  
Interview on the DIK see http://www.deutsche-islam-
konferenz.de/nn_1318858/SubSites/DIK/DE/DieDIK/Plenum/Interviews/InterviewMohammed/interv
iew-mohammed-node.html?__nnn=true 
Function in BVV Templehof: SPD party speaker for Integration, sits on committees for Women, 
Integration and Health see http://spdnet.sozi.info/berlin/thf-
schoeneberg/fraktempschoen/index.php?mod=content&menu=40113&page_id=492 
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Morais 
Interview: Integration at the Cantonal level – Zürich. 5th November 2008 Cantonal Integration 
Department, Neumühlequay, Zürich 
J. Morais is head of the Cantonal integration department Integrationsfachstelle in Zürich. Her 
responsibilities include developing an integration model for Zürich and diverse integration 
programmes. Before coming to Zürich she was head of the Red Cross in Basle and her work 
concentrated on political asylum seekers. She then built up the integration department Canton Basle.   
Musluoğlu  
Interview: Correcting Integration Mistakes. 9th July 2008 Im Kreuzgrund, Heilbronn. 
N. Musluoğlu is a qualified social counsellor for foreign workers and their families.  He has worked for 
many years for the municipal authorities but a number of years ago founded his own company 
Türkdaniş.  Offerring professional advice to Turkish immigrants and their families across a wide range 
of problems they may face in German society, he works also as a translator in negotiations.  He is 
active in a range of integration projects and is an trusted partner of the Integration department of 
the city of Heilbronn.   
Norbisrath 
Interview Date 18.09.2008 SPD Headquarters Willy-Brandt house, Wilhelmstr. Berlin 
Volker Norbisrath is is a lawyer and SPD party executive. He has been for the last ten years a political 
advisor for internal and justice affairs for the Social Democratic party at the party headquarters in 
Willy-Brandt house Berlin. 
Oezbek 
Interview: IGMetall and Integration, Friday 20.07.2007, Frankfurt am Main. 
N. Oezbek is a member of the central committee of The Industrial Union of Metalworkers (IGM) 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall and is leader of the Union’s Migration Department.  He is an influential 
voice, shaping immigration and integration policy within Europe’s largest Trade Union, which has 
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been an influential negotiatior on behalf of immigrant workers since the beginning of work 
importation schemes and into the Integration Summitry of 2007-9.   
Oezcan 
Ergin Oezcan is a Kurdish an executive committee member of The Left die Linke in Heilbronn. He is 
involved in a number of integration projects at  communal level and has stood as a socialist candidate 
for the municipal elections in the city of Heilbronn. He is a naturalised German citizen and an active 
member of the Türkischer Aleviten Kulturverein e.V.   
See http://www.dielinke-unterland.de/ueber_uns/kreisvorstand/ 
Ousalah 
Telephone Interview: Training Imams in the Netherlands, 11th January 2010  
Imam Ousalah is vice President of The Association of Imams in the Netherlands Vereniging Imams 
Nederland (VIN) This organisation concerns itself with the training of Imams and oversees important 
social work such as prisoner welfare. VIN has about 120 Imams as members. 
Rahman  
Interviews:  Integrated Education in Amsterdam 12th October 2008 at the As Soeffah Basis School 
Amsterdam, World Islamic Mission and The Religious Duty of Involvement and also 11th January 2010 
Telephone Interview. 
R. K. Rahman is director of the As-Soeffah Islamic primary school in Amsterdam he is deputy 
President of the WIM and is therefore active in framing organisational policy. He represents the 
President Mr Nasir Joemann when abroad. The latter represents WIM on the CMO and is therefore 
directly involved in Dutch Government - Muslim negotiations.  
Sadaqat 
Interview: The non-problem of Minarets 6th November 2008 at the Mahmud mosque Zürich. 
Ahmed Sadaqat is Imam of the Mahmud Mosque. He is a spokesman for the Swiss Ahmadiyya 
community which built the first Mosque in Switzerland in 1962.It is one of four Swiss mosques with a 
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Minaret. Sadaqat speaks on behalf of the Ahmadiyya religious community and has gained 
prominence through his public participation in debates about Islam and against the Minaret ban. 
See http://www.ahmadiyya.ch/cms/ 
Şenay 
Dr.Bülen Şenay Religious Councillor at Turkish Embassy Netherlands 
Interview  8th October 2008 at Javastraat 2, The Hague 
Dr. B. Şenay is professor of history of Religion and is the Counsellor for Religious Affairs at the Turkish 
Embassy in the Hague. As Counsellor for Religious Affairs he appointed by the government in Ankara 
he is head of the department of the Embassy dealing with religious issues. He is responsible for the 
overall cooperation between Diyanet in Ankara, the organisation of official Turkish Islam in the 
Netherlands and the Dutch government. This interview took place at the department for religious 
affairs of the Turkish embassy in The Hague.  
Toprak 
Interview: Alevis, Schäuble’s model pupils. 3rd October 2008 at Alevi Centre Cologne. 
A. E. Toprak is vice President and General Secretary of the Alevi Community in Germany Alevitischen 
Gemeinde Deutschlands. He describes his role as being ‘ambassador for the Alevis in Europe’ and 
was their representative at the German Islam Conference (DIK). He is a member of the Green party 
and councillor for the city of Recklinghausen. 
Tufan 
J.Tufan is vice-President of The Union of Turkish-Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe Avrupa Türk 
Islam Kültür Dernekeri Birgliği. He is a member of the central committee of the Central Council of 
Muslims Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) and Coordination Council of Muslims in 
Germany Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland. He is a Christian Democrat (CDU) and is a 
councillor in the city of Dinslaken.  
Van Strein 
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Interview: Van Strein The VVP, new realism and Integration. 12th October Twede Kamer The Hague. 
Van Strein is a policy adviser in the areas of immigration integration and international affairs to The 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. In his advisory 
capacity he works closely with members of Parliament, Henk Kamp (former Defence minister) and 
Hans van Baalen (now VVD faction leader at the European Parliament). He describes his work as 
analysing new Government policy documents, advising on responses and drafting response and 
position documents. He also liaises between the Parliamentary party and the municipal level getting 
on-the-ground responses to integration issues. 
Von Leoprechting 
Interview: Integration Through Commerce 2nd September 2008, Metro Headquarters, Schlüterstr. 
Düsseldorf 
Dr. R. Frh. v. Leoprechting is a jurist and head of corporate relations at the Metro A.G. He is also 
President of the German-Turkish Chamber of commerce Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und 
Handelskammer (TD-IHK) with a membership of 320 companies, including many of the largest in both 
Germany and Turkey. He was participant in the Integration summits. 
http://www.td-ihk.de/home 
Wagishauser 
Amir Abdullah Uwe Wagishauser is President and head of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat e.V. in 
Germany. 
Interview: 5th September The Ahmadiyya and Integration at the national Ahmadiyya headquarters 
Frankfurt.  
Wagishauser is Amir or leader of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community. An organisation which 
represents moderate views on religious practice and acceptance of secular separations, they are 
considered heterodox and their core religious identity is denied by other mainline Sunni 
organisations. Wagishauser is a convert to Islam and is one of the ‘Muslim’ moderate voices in 
Germany. He has been involved in public discussions about the building of mosques which he argues 
visibilises Muslims like nothing else and express arrival.  The group is estimated to be about 30 000 
strong but is committed to a programme of mosque building.  
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The Ahmadiyyas came to public attention by their plans to build 100 new mosques in Germany. 
Wagishauser, modestly thinks that five new mosques a year would be realistic. But it is has not only 
been the question of how the ‘archetectonic outgrowth’ of immigration should be handled but 
location has also proven controversial. See 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,583903-2,00.html 
Whether hidden on an industrial estate or placed in a town centre the implications for visibility are 
important. As Amir of the Ahmadiyya Wagishauser has necessarily been involved in the controversy 
surrounding the Heinersdorf mosque has shown. He has also sharply criticised CDU Bosbach’s 
suggestion of having a central register for converts to Islam. See 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/326/418091/text/ 
For further information see http://www.ahmadiyya.de/ 
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Appendix Three Organisations 
Germany 
KRM  
Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland. The KRM 
is an umbrella organisation in Germany consisting of four Muslim organisations. 
DITIB 
DITIB The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für 
Religion e.V. Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği, is the largest Muslim organisation in Germany, founded 
in 1984 as a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Ankara (DIYANET) its headquarters are in 
Cologne-Ehrenfeld, Subbelratherstr. 17, 50823 Köln, Tel. 0221 579820  www.ditib.de DITIB is a fully 
recognised partner and provider of integration courses by the Federal Agency for Migration and 
Asylum seekers Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 
IRD 
IRD Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik www.islamrat.de 
VIKZ 
VIKZ Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren in Deutschland e.V. www.vikz.de 
ZMD 
ZMD Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland www.zentralrat.de 
 
Netherlands 
Introduction to organisations in the Netherlands. In the aftermath of the murders of Fortuyn and Van 
Gogh Government has encouraged the education and training of Imams in the Netherlands. An 
organisation of Dutch Imams has also been set up. The Dutch state officially recognises two Muslim 
organisations CMO and CGI 
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CMO 
Conactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid (CMO) was set up in 2002 and was recognised by the Dutch 
government as an official consultation partner in November 2004. Its membership is mainline Sunni 
Muslim and reckoned to have a membership of about 500 000. Its members include Islamic 
Foundation Nederland (Diyanet), Milli Görüş Nederland (MGN), Islamic Foundation in the 
Netherlands (ISN), the Netherlands Islamic Federation (NIF), the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation 
(TICF), the Union of Moroccan Mosque organizations in the Netherlands (UMMON) and the Surinam 
umbrella organization World Islamic Mission (WIM) Union of Moroccan Mosques, Surinam World 
Islamic Mission. 
The CMO functions as a consultative organ, discussion partner for the Dutch government, particularly 
on themes to do with Muslim interests and with special interest in the integration of Muslims in 
Dutch society -  Islamic spiritual care in army and prisons, health care, visas for Imams, Dutch Imam 
training courses and their status within labour law. 
DIYANET 
DIYANET the Presidency of Religious Affairs Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı is an official governmental office 
for  
See http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/default.asp 
VIN 
The Association of Imams in the Netherlands Vereniging Imams Nederland (VIN) This organisation 
objectives: to create an organisational structure to help Imams in the Netherlands. Its goals are to 
cooperate with all institutions who share similar objectives; to utilise the media; to be involved in 
constructive dialogue with the government; organising leactures and translating and publishing 
books. VIN has about 120 Imams as members. http://www.imamonline.nl/nl/  
VIN has criticised government policy on Imam training and has argued that many Imams have left for 
other countries. The vacuum was especially felt in the Moroccan community and many unqualified 
Imams were stepping in sometimes representing doctrines such as Wahabbism which has been to 
date unknown in the Netherlands. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6279785.stm 
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V.V.P. 
The VVP was founded in 1948 and has its political base in a secularised middle class. It describes itself 
as a liberal party and strongly supports private enterprise in the Netherlands, but is in fact more a 
conservative-liberal party. It promotes fiscal responsibility, is internationalist democratic and is 
broadly committed to the welfare state. 
WIM  
World Islamic Mission is an umbrella organisation which is a member of the top level umbrella 
organisation CMO. It is located within the Sunni-Sufi Qadriyyah stream. It represents about 35 
mosques and based on regular attendance numbers about 50 000 people. In addition to religious 
help, WIM’s objectives are to help Muslims attain upward social mobility. In the Netherlands WIM 
have important advisory roles – within CMO –  to non-Muslims, for example companies seek advice 
how to facilitate good relations with Muslim workers. They run a number of schools which are 
Islamic in character but which follow a Dutch curriculum see more information about As Soeffah 
school Amsterdam. The organisation initiated contacts with Jewish groups after the Iraq invasion and 
frame an important inter-religious linkeage. It rejects any external national influence in the 
development of Islam in the Netherlands, the proper focus of Islam in the Netherlands is the 
Netherlands. WIM resists any attempt at structuring along membership lines since ‘every Muslim 
must be free to come or to leave.’ (Rahman, 2010) Involvement and contribution at social and 
political levels and to seek the goal of societal peace these are religious duties. WIM though wary of 
government intervention or interference in internal religious affairs and practice, supports the Dutch 
government’s attempts to establish national training for Imams.  
It is structured along the lines of an association or charitable organisation with a board, President, 
Vice-President and members appointed from various member organisations. There is therefore 
representation from Women’s and Youth groups as well as from more traditional sources such as 
mosques.  
CGI 
Contact Groep Islam is a break off organisation of CMO. It is the smaller of the two officially 
recognised umbrella organisations in the Netherlands with a membership estimated at about 115 
000. Its members include Ahmadiyya, Alevis Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the 
Netherlands Rand van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties Nederland (RMMN) and Netherlands 
Muslim Council Nederlandse Isalamitische Omroep (NIO).  
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NMR 
The Dutch Muslim Council De Nederlandse Moslimraad was an umbrella organisation for more 
moderate streams of Islam such as Ahmadiyya and Alevitism and as such it illustrates well the 
problems of finding a single representation of Islam in the Netherlands. The difficulty of finding ‘one 
telephone number’ is illustrated by the complications NMR and CMO have had in setting up a 
common broadcasting foundation. The NMR had been ordered to combine its broadcasting 
organisation Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service Nederlandse Moslim Omroep (NMO) with that of 
CMO Dutch Islamic Broadcast Organisation Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (NIO). These 
foundations had been previously allocated radio and television time by the official monitoring 
agency, Dutch Media Authority Commissariaat voor de Media (CvdM), but then the latter ordered an 
organisational merger since neither could be considered solely representative of Islam.  See 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2005/6/article33.en.html 
They could manage the content of their programmes individually but the organisational structure 
was to simplified into a single entity. This had been considered the catalyst for a radical takeover of 
what had been considered the more moderate of the two. The public nature of the controversy 
about this alleged orthodox takeover of NMO revealed the internal tensions related to organisational 
merger. The latter had 2,5 hours of TV transmission time. There had been a public controversy when 
the Alevis and Ahmadis claimed they were kicked off the board on the Dutch NOVA network, though 
these claims were later shown to be unfounded. The homogenisation of Dutch Muslims has been 
considered an obstacle to defeating radical Islam in the Netherlands. See  
http://www.scribd.com/doc/24056401/A-GUIDE-TO-SHARIAH-LAW-AND-ISLAMIST-IDEOLOGY-IN-
WESTERN-EUROPE-2007-2009 
 The new board members were Yahia Bouyafa who was alleged to have ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Abdelmajid Kayroun is chairman of Al Farouq mosque in Utrecht whose Imam was 
deported in 2001 for spying for Libya and Mohammed Nanhekhan a member of World Islamic 
Mission (considered a radical Muslim organisation). Joining together with the more conservative 
counterpart the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Organisation (NIO) the new organisation would be 
completely orthodox. 
This umbrella organisation has 200 member organisations and has spoken strongly against Geert 
Wilders calling him a fascist and racist and a threat to Dutch society. They condemned his 
controversial film Fitna but simultaneously appealed for calm among Dutch Muslims. 
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Switzerland  
Maizar has called for one super umbrella organisation for Switzerland. See 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/index/Muslim_leader_wants_national_umbrella_group.ht
ml?cid=7889948 
FIDS 
Federation of Islamic Umbrella organisations in Switzerland Föderation Islamischer 
Dachorganisationen in der Schweiz (FIDS) Präsident: Dr. Hisham Maizar, 
Roggwil/TG.  http://www.fids.ch  FIDS was founded in 2006 with a membership ten umbrella 
organisations: The Albanian Association Islamic  Albanisch Islamischer Verband (AIV), The Islamic 
Community of Ticino  Communita Islamica nel Canton Ticino (CICT) The Umbrella Organisation of 
Islamic Faith Communities East Switzerland Dachorganisation der Islamischen 
Glaubensgemeinschaften Ostschweiz (DIGO), The Islamic Community of Bosnians Islamische 
Gemeinschaft Bosniaken (IGB), The League of Swiss Muslims Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (LMS), 
Swiss Islamic Faith Community Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft (SIG) The Union of 
Muslim Associations of Fribourg Union des Associations Musulmanes de Fribourg (UAMF), The 
Vaudoise Union of Muslim Associations Union Vaudoise des Associations Musulmanes (UVAM), The 
Association of Aargau Muslims Verband Aargauer Muslime (VAM), The union of Islamic organisations 
of the Canton Lucerne  Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen des Kantons Luzern (VIOKL)  
The goals of FIDS are to: support religious peace in Switzerland; represent its member organisations 
and their concerns before the authorities at Federal, Cantonal and Communal levels and before other 
recognised Swiss institutions; frame a constructive relationship between Muslims and wider Swiss 
society; support inner- and inter-Islamic relationships; support active and peaceful integration of 
Muslims in Switzerland. Membership is open to any Islamic umbrella organisation; FIDS is a member 
of the Swiss Council of Religions Schweizerischen Rat der Religionen (SCR) 
The member umbrella organisations represent more than 130 ethnic and multiethnic Islamic 
Associations and Centres throughout all sixteen Cantons of Switzerland.  
KIOS 
Koordination Islamischer Organisationen Schweiz KIOS ist he oldest Swiss Muslim Umbrella 
organisation. Its Präsident Dr. Farhad Afshar a retired sociologist and Shia Muslim has a high media 
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profile in national discussions about Islam.  As spokesperson for KIOS he has argued consistently and 
strongly for training Imams in Switzerland. In addition to KIOS’s own Association members its 
members include three Cantonal Associations: The Basle Muslim Commission die Basler 
Muslimkommission, The Union of Islamic Organisations Zürich (VIOZ), and The Cantonal Association 
Bern.  In total there are about ten or twelve member organisations, but this is difficult to verify since 
Dr. Afshar is reluctant to communicate this information see 
http://archiv.onlinereports.ch//2005/AfsharFarhadPortraet.htm 
Together with FIDS these two umbrella organisations aspire to speak as the voice of Islam in 
Switzerland. 
SIG 
The Swiss Islamic Faith Communnity Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft (SIG) was 
founded in 1999 with its base in Wetzikorn. Its president is Abdullah Kasapoglu. The organisation 
stresses its ‘native’ non-foreign character through the ‘Swiss’ in its name. It is a conservative Islamic 
organisation and works toegher with Millis Görüs on joint projects: Islamic calendars, Haj, Zekât Fitre 
(contributions during Ramadan) and Kurban (contributions instead of animals for the Feast of 
Offering). SIG seeks to project a neutral middle of the road attitude to Turkey although it emphasises 
the wealth of Ottoman history which it celebrates, and to a moderate integration.  
Kasapoglu writes in the introduction to a pamphlet outlining the founding principles of the 
organisation (Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft, Wetzikon. 1st Edition from 10.2003) 
“Our children go to school and work here as well. We celebrate our religious holidays and weddings. 
We have become part of Swiss society, whether one wants to accept that or not. Therefore we must 
be active to be able to live here together without problems. We are open to mutual Integration. But 
we are against Assimilation under the alias of Integration. It is our fundamental task to protect our 
children and our faith. No one may force another to something which does not harmonise with his 
convictions.” (My translation) See also  
http://www.sig-net.ch/index.php?option=com_content&task=section&id=4&Itemid=34 
VIOZ 
Founded in 1995 it has 17 members. The president is Dr. Hatipoglu and the retired but honorary 
president Dr. I. Amin. Members are Islamic Community Zürich Foundation Stiftung Islamische 
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Gemeinschaft Zürich (SIGZ), Congregation of Islamic Bosnian Communities Zürich Dzemat der 
Islamischen Gemeinschaften Bosniens in Zürich, Association of Islamic Cultural Centres Verband der 
Islamischen Kulturzentren Federation of Islamic Associations of Switzerland Föderation der 
Islamischen Vereine in der Schweiz, Islamic Centre Zürich Islamisches Zentrum Zürich Turkish Islamic 
Idealist Association of Switzerland Türkisch-Islamischer idealistischer Verein der Schweiz, Turkish 
Islamic Foundation for Switzerland Türkisch-Islamische Stiftung für die Schweiz, Albanian Islamic 
Community Albanisch-Islamische Gemeinschaft, Swiss Muslim Society, Fellowship of Kosovo Bosnians 
Gemeinschaft der Kosovo Bosniaken, Cultural Association El Iman Kultureller Verein El Iman, 
Woman’s Association Fatima-as-Zahra Frauenverein Fatima-az-Zahra, Association for Islamic 
Education in Switzerland Verein für islamische Religionspädagogik Schweiz (VIRPS), Association of 
Islamic Culture Verein für Islamische Kultur, Al Hidaya Association Al Hidaya Verein, Cultural 
Association An‘ Nur Kultur Verein An' Nur, Mevlana Cultural Association Mevlana Kultur Verein. 
Grounding principles emphasise moderation and harmony between Muslims and the wider Swiss 
society. The tone is one of supporting tolerance and mutual respect. As such it is against violence, for 
human rights as set out in the 1948 UNDHR, has no ambition for an Islamic state and seeks to further 
integration and inter-cultural and -religious dialogue. 
http://www.vioz.ch/2005/20050327_VIOZ_Grundsatzerklaerung.pdf 
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Appendix Four Data Sources 
Data sources which I have used are: interviews which are my main source for primary data, a range 
of secondary sources provide my background data: newspaper articles, party political programmes, 
political statements, academic literature.   A third source of data, metadata, is produced through the 
analytical process itself.  Using Grounded Theory guidelines I have sought to map the process of 
analysis through memos which define categories and their relationships, record steps involved in 
decision making.   I have used Qualitative data software, developed to help record in a non-linear 
fashion, close to the data and which provide tools to aid abstract thinking from the data.  New 
questions occur in the process of working with the data, changing ideas about analytical categories 
and theoretical significance are all fed back into the research.  In contrast to traditional research 
journals memos are recorded as the ideas occur, they show how this comes to be understood, why 
this choice and not another was made.  They are notes which are jotted down across large amounts 
of data and which can be brought together when needed through search queries.  My primary data 
sources are therefore interview transcripts, secondary data: field notes,  key discursive texts, 
academic literature and metadata generated through the process of analysis.   
Adopting a grounded theory approach I have treated a variety of material as data.  Since “everything 
you learn in the research setting(s) or about your research topic can serve as data.”  (Charmaz, 
2006:16) 
My primary data sources have been the texts produced by speakers in interview situations. 
Interviews were usually on a one to one basis but some were also group interviews. These were 
supplemented with telephone interviews. 
I used secondary data from a number of sources: newspapers, (online and in Libraries), academic 
articles but also my own memos and notes. 
Un-cited secondary data sources include some interviews which did not significantly add nor detract 
from the central hypothesis of the research; conversations about integration issues conducted with 
private persons, though a few formally non-representational voices have been sparingly used. 
Television programmes, press sources, official and semi-official documents such as integration plans, 
position papers, broschures, integration newspapers, invitations and materials about special events, 
books authored by the interviewees, online materials:  blogs, articles, comments. 
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Appendix Five Coding 
Coding that I used in my discourse analysis have been  
1. Recognition codes: foreigner Ausländer,‘Islam’, Muslims as collective, Muslims as individuals 
, acceptance, rejection, foreigner, Turk, Immigrant, tolerance geduldete Ausländer,  
toleration.  
2. Loyalty codes:  expressions of feeling at home, my home, possession, multiple loyalty, 
conflicting loyalty, ambiguous loyalty,  
3. Ulteriorising codes: Turkish language, self-isolation, segregation, Islamicisation, Shar’ia, 
spouses, value conflict  
4. Mis-recognition codes:  all for one, one for all  synechdoches, misunderstanding, ignorance, 
distance, remoteness, contact, 
5. Securitisation codes: national security, terrorism, Islamism, parallel societies, Ghettos 
[cultural/religious assimilation, underclass, radicalisation, suspicion,] 
6. Integration codes: adjustment,  fitting in, made to fit, offers, obligation, acceptance/non-
acceptance of religious identity, language proficiency, jobs, housing, schools, vocational 
training, 
7. Expectation codes: is-should be, participation, acceptance, identity retention, cultural 
legitimacy, 
8. veiled assimilation, integrationism, programmes, language, integration at command, moral 
responsibility, religious responsibility,  
 
Categorisation 
1. Spatial-integration [physical change, show-case mosques, neighbourhood, meeting] 
2. Spatial-secularism [separation, public-private spheres] 
3. Spatial-security [parallel societies, ghetto, criminality] 
4. Temporal-integration [permanence] 
5. Temporal-secularism [non-negotiability, work, constitution] 
6. Temporal-security [rights, residency, expulsion,] 
7. Expectancy-integration [mutuality, mutual adjustment, obligations] 
8. Expectancy-secularism [neutrality, equisdistance, protection, intrusion, acceptance, 
rejection, ] 
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9. Expectancy-security [stability, sustainability, relationship, enemy, friend, danger, threat, 
terrorism, underclass] 
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Appendix Six Trajectory Diagram 
In late 2008 I began to explore the idea of representing broad discursive changes in habilitative 
strategies in the three cases.  I was aware from the start of the drawbacks of typological approaches 
for example of unreal ideal types which generally locate at the ends of the axes as well as the 
drawbacks of opting for static representation of what are dynamic processes.  Yet I felt that a simple 
two axis diagrammatic approach could be included in this study, as an illustrative device.  It is 
important to keep in mind that official strategies imply a strong degree of control over habilitative 
processes and these in their turn are not irrevocably pinned to envisioned endpoints.  Any 
assumption of linear progression toward clearly defined and immutable endpoints is therefore a vast 
oversimplification.  Its chief value therefore is as a visual aid, a device to mark out interim positions.   
 
In the diagram a horizontal axis sets out processes and envisioned endpoints along a continuum from 
pluralist to assimilative.  Endpoints are envisioned or set out in blueprints and against these, readings 
may be taken by both immigrants and elites.  Habilitation is also understood as process or sets of 
linked processes, and these may be understood to move in a pluralist or assimilative position.  Both 
processes and endpoints or envisioned termini are significant in that they connect practice with 
non-negotiable/ 
un-negotiated  
Assimilative  
negotiable / 
negotiated  
Integrative 
Pluralist  
NL Orange, FRG Blue, CH, Green 
Laissez-faire 
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larger narratives of purpose.  Identifying and scrutinising endpoints and their underlying purposes 
permits us to take readings of the normative pulse and to compare this with processual direction, 
draws the need for justification into the picture and may suggest alternatives.      
Because endpoints involve projected termini of coexistence, it becomes clear that there will be 
divergent imaginaries.  It is likely that there will be divergence between immigrants and state elites, 
or between different state elites.  There is also the possibility that there will be divergence in policy 
and ostensible goals.  The issue of security may serve to skew processes as policies are devised with 
this in mind.  All of this suggests that there will be divergence both between the framers of 
habilitation and the objects of this and between processes and envisioned endpoints.  Divergence 
and skew may be altered through negotiation, when strategies may be corrected or re-formulated so 
that other processes are prioritised and new strategic endpoints set up.  Endpoints may be 
understood therefore only as the overriding priorities set within habilitative strategies at certain 
moments of time.   
The vertical axis has to do with two dimensions: the degree of negotiability imagined and the actual 
degree of negotiation being undertaken in any particular habilitative discourse.  The degree of 
negotiability initially imagined will I assume stem from how habilitation in a general sense is 
envisioned and the sets of non-negotiabilities fielded.  However negotiation may change what may 
be considered non-negotiable will change and how habilitation will be re-envisioned.   
With respect to Muslims and their settlement, all three cases begin in the un-negotiated hemisphere.  
This was not because non-negotiable but because of the assumptions of transience and self 
understandings as not lands of immigration.  But in the aftermath of the economic recession of the 
early 1970s different approaches began to unfold.  The Netherlands’ laissez-faire pluralism as a 
relaxed co-existential segmentalist approach began to change into a better regulated and organised 
pluralism.  This was in keeping with past pillarised experiences but it also was in keeping with a 
national attitude which understood segregation and difference as not at all bad.  (Koopmans, 
2006)353 The Netherlands in the early 1980s officially recognised Muslim permanence and began a 
process of pillarising Islam.  Multicultural policies began to be formulated within the un-negotiated 
pluralist quadrant.  There was and remains considerable quasi-negotiation taking place in several 
advisory mechanisms.  Only in the aftermath of the political upheavals in the early millennium did 
                                                          
353 Koopmans larger point is that this is still the case 
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Dutch policies and strategies qualitatively change.  Continuing to ‘officially’ commit to diversity and 
pluralism new strategies, policies and statements have altered their emphases toward a stronger 
sense of national unity.  The tone of laissez-faire has changed to one of obligation, responsibility and 
enforcement.  By contrast in Germany there was a longer period of un-negotiated, unrecognised but 
de facto pluralism, which only at the end of 1990s began to change in policy approaches.  Previously 
a deep-seated imaginary of ethnicised belonging which had translated historically into strong 
assimilative policies, still continued to be ‘officially’ represented by the conservative centre.  This 
found expression in reiterated denials of being an immigration land and the retention of a narrower 
ethnicised definition of citizenship.  Although significant, the new optional citizenship model which 
was introduced in 2000, does not commit to pluralism but rather continues to flatten difference in a 
single civic belonging.  Although Germany is of the three the one moving most decidedly to a 
negotiated integration, it still remains spiritually anti-pluralist.  In a similar way the Swiss though 
having had a long historical lineage of pluralism, have been the most assimilative with regards to 
habilitating new dimensions of Muslim difference.  Though there has been official commitment to 
integration at all levels, policies worked out at regional level continue to reveal strong assimilative 
acculturalist overtones.     
Although this diagram is a most simple illustration of directions within habilitative discourse it serves 
also to introduce my purpose of distinguishing conceptually between models.  I locate integration, 
conceptually and discursively, as midpoints between two conceptual polarities.  On the vertical axis, I 
understand it as occupying a variable position between negotiative and non-negotiative, but to be 
integration it must contain a significant negotiative dimension.   Discursively though integration may 
in fact move between rather restrictive non-negotiabilities.  It will be important, in the next chapter 
to render integration in its contexts, where divergences and complexities may become clearer, since 
integration processes and envisioned endpoints will be mediated through different sets of issues and 
strategies.   Integration-in-context may then be understood as different sets of issues containing 
different assimilative or pluralist logics.  Certain identity issues may move in a more assimilative 
direction whereas simultaneously on other issues may move towards pluralist or laissez-faire 
positions.  In this regard researching the dynamics and logics of integration is very much like trying to 
hit a moving target.  (Klopp, 2002) Yet the term, though in discourse highly complex and variable 
cannot be set aside, since it is at the heart of multiple new discursive frameworks of Muslim 
habilitation.   
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Analytically I distinguish integration from assimilation and laissez-faire approaches.  What 
distinguishes these core habilitative concepts is the degree to which a negotiative dynamic is 
present.  It is negotiation within asserted non-negotiables – it is explicitly circumscribed.  Yet it is not 
simply subordination, though there are elements of governmentality and social disciplining involved.  
Locating integration as a negotiative position, albeit limited i. e.  within non-negotiables, has 
significant discursive justification as well.  Integration is portrayed as a two way street, and a game 
with multiple players.  (Council of the European Union, 2005) In terms of differential power state 
elites seek to stress that it is not a top-down process but involves, as well, a significant bottom up 
dynamic.  Muslims are invited to contribute, to participate, and to negotiate.  (BMI, 2001) There is 
therefore a convergence of analytical and discursive understandings.  For the purposes of this 
research therefore, integration is more negotiable in ethos and more negotiated in practice than 
either assimilation or laissez-faire.   
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